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ABSTRACT 
From the feverish buying of tulips in Amsterdam in the 1600s to the recent U.S. frenzy in subprime 
mortgages, asset bubbles have proven to be a recurring economic phenomenon. While large asset 
bubbles, such as the U.S. stock bubble of the 1920s and the Japanese bubble of the 1980s, can result 
in pronounced, long-term financial and social consequences, even seemingly benign bubbles 
usually result in the misallocation of resources and budgetary problems for governments. 
In response to the regularity and consequences of these events, asset bubbles have been studied 
by a large number of scholars covering an increasingly diverse range of academic disciplines. 
Unfortunately, despite these ever-expanding streams of research, asset bubbles remain a poorly 
understood aspect of our economic worlds. What is worse, numerous scholars, practitioners, and 
policymakers feel as though we lack even a basic understanding of these events, a failure that is 
now undermining the reputation of today’s globalized, free market system.  
In this thesis, I argue that narratives play a central role in market speculation and thus the 
detailed and systematic study of narratives in these events provides a promising means by which to 
advance our understanding of how asset bubbles form. In light of this observation, I develop a 
conceptual framework, referred to as the institutionalized narrative (I/N) perspective of asset 
bubbles, and, using this framework, conduct a longitudinal study on the role that narratives played 
in the U.S. technology (tech) bubble of 1997 to 2000. 
The I/N perspective developed in this manuscript is a research lens and sensitizing mechanism 
that adopts a social constructionist view of financial markets where powerful market actors and 
institutions play a dominant role in shaping market behavior. In particular, the I/N perspective 
combines narrative research with institutional theory to explore how narratives that lead investors to 
expect significant capital gains, referred to as boom narratives, ultimately become the taken-for-
granted context by which investors make decisions. Following this framework and using the U.S. 
tech bubble as a case study, this thesis investigates how boom narratives in tech stocks became a 
taken-for-granted, institutionalized aspect of investing in the mid to late 1990s and why efforts to 
challenge or deinstitutionalize these narratives repeatedly failed.   
These questions were investigated through an in-depth study of the events surrounding the U.S. 
tech bubble and 400 institutional texts (approximately 4,000 pages of raw data) that covered the 
years 1987, the year of the preceding market crash, to 2000, the peak of the tech bubble. Texts were 
gathered according to the three pillars of institutionalization, being the cognitive (represented by 65 
speeches by Federal Reserve officials), normative (represented by 135 articles from The New York 
  
Times and Forbes), and regulative (represented by 200 statements by speakers at hearings from the 
U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs). Analysis was conducted through 
a unique combination of an event history database, keyword sampling, narrative analysis, discourse 
analysis, and process analysis.   
Drawing on the findings of this study, I outline a narrative theory of asset bubble formation. 
This theory contends that large-scale bubbles can emerge through three interrelated phases of 
narrating a crisis, narrating a recovery, and narrating a boom. If certain conditions are met in each 
phase, increasing levels of herd behavior, speculation, and illegal market practices are predicted to 
follow.  
In the first phase, narrating a crisis, powerful market actors are largely aligned in their 
exposition of negative narratives and view overregulation and business constraints as critical 
impediments in the economy. In the second phase, narrating a recovery, the dominant narratives 
tend to view continued deregulation as an economic enabler and the possibility of stricter 
regulations as a dangerous impediment, while normative texts start to produce increasingly positive 
narratives over time. In the third and final phase, narrating a boom, powerful market actors, 
particularly from the more prudent and powerful cognitive and regulative pillars, expound 
increasingly positive and optimistic narratives, while a range of alternatives to fundamental analysis 
start to dominate discourse. 
Given its focus on a critical and neglected aspect of asset bubble formation, being narratives, 
and its longitudinal consideration of narratives, actors, and events, the narrative theory offers a 
novel and rather detailed account of how large-scale bubbles can form. As a result of this novelty 
and detail, the theory serves to complement, integrate, and challenge existing thought on these 
episodes. In particular, the narrative theory highlights the importance of narratives and actions 
during a crisis and recovery, the highly influential role of cognitive and regulative texts, the 
replacement of fundamental analysis with a range of alternative means, and the incompleteness of 
existing theories on asset bubbles from a range of disciplines.  
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CHAPTER 1: THE ENIGMA OF ASSET BUBBLES 
 “We still do not have a good definition of an asset bubble; and we still do not know how to identify 
them, what causes them to grow or burst, and what their welfare implications are.” 
-Douglas Evanoff, George Kaufman, and Anastasios Malliaris, in Chicago Fed Letter (2012, p. 4) 
For the past two centuries, asset bubbles have plagued the world’s economies. Occurring in a wide 
range of assets from stocks and bonds to real estate and precious metals, bubbles have struck both 
developing and developed countries on a repeated basis. 
Historic accounts of asset bubbles date back to the early 1600s, beginning with the Dutch tulip 
bubble of 1636 to 1637, and include several other frequently cited events such as speculation in the 
South Sea Company and Mississippi Company circa 1720, the bubble in stocks during the Roaring 
Twenties that immediately preceded the Great Depression, and excessive loans to a number of 
countries in Latin America during the 1980s. Despite the historical regularity of these events, in the 
late 1980s—during a period referred to as the Great Moderation—the belief emerged that modern 
economies had rid themselves of the large-scale bubbles and excessive volatility of previous eras. 
This belief was then quickly shattered by an unprecedented wave of bubbles of increasing scale 
and scope. First, in the early 1990s, Japan’s nearly decade-long bubble burst, and the nation’s home 
prices, measured in real terms, dropped almost 70 percent over the next 15 years (Kindleberger and 
Aliber, 2011). Just a few years after the bursting of Japan’s bubble, a crisis erupted in Southeast 
Asia and quickly spread to Russia and South America. Fearing that the contagion from this crisis 
could disrupt the entire U.S. banking system, the U.S. Federal Reserve hastily arranged a multi-
billion dollar bailout of one of the nation’s largest hedge funds (MacKenzie, 2003; Stein, 2003). 
Before the dust from this fallout had even settled, global stock prices soared, particularly prices of 
U.S. technology stocks. At the turn of the century, however, share prices in most major financial 
centers, including France, the United Kingdom and the United States, crashed, with U.S. technology 
stocks experiencing a stunning 80 percent decline in just three years. 
Amazingly, in spite of this relentless barrage of financial calamities, in the early 2000s the 
belief reemerged that modern economies were bubble-free and the historically high stock and real 
estate valuations in the developed world were somehow justified in this “new” era (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2013). In 2007, to nearly everyone’s amazement, a rising number of defaults on subprime 
home loans led to a near meltdown of some of the world’s largest banks. 
While most asset bubbles do not result in the panic and chaos referred to above, many of them 
do result in the misallocation of resources and budgetary problems for governments. For example, 
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housing booms often encourage too much investment in real estate and underinvestment in personal 
savings, which was the case in the United States during the 1990s and early 2000s (Akerlof and 
Shiller, 2009). Governments suffer when the growth of bubbles brings in increased revenue in the 
form of taxes, enabling officials to raise expenditures, but then revenue suddenly drops after the 
bubble ends, leaving governments with huge deficits as those expenditures are often very difficult 
to scale back in time (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2013; Shiller, 2005).  
However, when the bursting of a large-scale bubble results in financial panic, such as a banking 
crisis, the consequences are much worse. The chain of events that typically ensues is that falling 
real estate or stock prices cause overleveraged sellers to default, which immediately damages the 
balance sheets and lending ability of most financial institutions, leading to the failure of several 
banks. As businesses are unable to secure new loans and lose confidence in the economy, 
investment dries up, which results in lower wages and the loss of jobs. As these affected workers 
have less money to spend, consumption also dries up, which in turn affects businesses, and a 
vicious cycle develops. Eventually, the government and other institutions, such as a central bank, 
are left with no choice but to intervene to prop up failing banks and restore confidence in the 
economy—an intervention that usually results in huge costs to taxpayers and even larger 
government deficits.  
These consequences are perhaps best illustrated by the recent global financial crisis (GFC) that 
followed the U.S. housing boom of 2002 to 2007. According to an estimate by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the GFC resulted in over US$4.1 trillion in assets being written off financial 
books (IMF, 2009), with total commitments by the U.S. government at almost US$9 trillion (Munir, 
2011). Aside from these economic consequences, estimates suggest over 200 million people were 
pushed into poverty as a direct result of the crisis (ILO, 2009).  
The significance and spread of asset bubbles has resulted in a number of steadily expanding 
research streams that seek to understand, explain, and predict these events. The largest stream by far 
is composed of mainstream economic theories, which largely view market participants as rational 
decision-makers and thus financial markets as the best means of pricing assets. Through this lens, 
mainstream economists have put forward a number of theories on the causes of asset bubbles, which 
include explanations of market frictions (Miller, 1977; Palfrey and Wang, 2012; Scheinkman and 
Xiong, 2003; Shleifer and Vishney, 1997), rational speculators (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004; 
DeLong et al., 1990; Doblas-Madrid, 2012; Flood and Hodrick, 1990), intrinsic and extrinsic 
bubbles (Azariades, 1998; Froot and Obstfeld, 1991), and a fundamentalist view that bubbles 
simply do not exist (Fama, 1965; Garber, 2000; Pástor and Veronesi, 2006). 
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While these theories greatly aid in understanding a number of smaller, more isolated asset 
bubbles, the recent surge in bubbles of increasing reach and volatility has resulted in a rather intense 
backlash against these mainstream explanations (e.g., Evanoff et al., 2012; Friedman, 2011; Issing, 
2009). In particular, the consequences of the recent housing bubble have “forced researchers and 
policymakers to reconsider their understanding of both the economics of asset price bubbles and 
alternative policy options to address them” (Evanoff et al., 2012, p. 1). 
As a result, attention has shifted to a second growing research stream, which is research on the 
role that irrational behavior plays in financial decision-making. This stream, which includes the 
fields of behavioral economics, behavioral finance, and economic psychology, has also offered a 
number of theories on how asset prices can occasionally reach such stratospheric heights. Included 
in such theories are notions of “group think” and “herd behavior” (De Martino et al., 2013; 
Galariotis, Rong, and Spyrou, 2015; Hommes et al., 2008; Hüsler, Sornette, and Hommes, 2013; 
Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011; Moinas and Pouget, 2013; Schoenberg and Haruvy, 2012), 
“escalation of commitment” (De Bondt and Thaler, 1995; Staw, 1976), overconfidence and 
euphoria (Heath and Tversky, 1991; Minsky, 1986, 1992; Roll, 1986), and, even, blaming 
testosterone (Eckel and Füllbrunn, 2015). 
Again, while all of these explanations seem to offer some useful insight into behavior during 
speculative events, behavioral theories of asset bubble formation suffer from overlooking a critical 
aspect of all large-scale bubble episodes, namely the overarching political, social, and cultural 
conditions under which bubbles form. This observation is now being increasingly voiced by 
researchers (e.g., Shiller, 2014; Stracca, 2004) and has resulted in a third, much more recent, stream 
of research on these events, being research from the overlapping fields of sociology and 
organizational studies. A recent spate of such studies (e.g., Abolafia, 2010a; Campbell, 2010; Davis, 
2010; Engelen et al., 2012; Hirsch and Morris, 2010) has largely identified institutional and 
regulatory failures as primary culprits in recent bubble episodes, while factors such as greed 
(Perrow, 2010) and cultural arrogance (Stein, 2011) have received some attention.  
Given such a large number of research efforts, one would think that we would now possess a 
rather thorough or comprehensive understanding of how and why asset bubbles form and thus the 
ability to quickly identify and even, in some cases, predict and prevent such events from occurring. 
Unfortunately, as so succinctly expressed by Evanoff, Kaufman, and Malliaris in this chapter’s 
opening quote, the consensus seems to be that we still know so very little about asset bubbles. In 
this thesis, I argue that our lack of understanding of how asset bubbles form is directly linked to a 
critical oversight. The oversight is simple: research on asset bubble formation has overlooked and 
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neglected a core driver of decision-making during periods of market speculation, that being 
narratives.  
In basic terms, a narrative is a cohesive story or account of events, experiences, or phenomena, 
whether true or fictitious. Narratives, which are a retrospective sense-making tool, are ubiquitous in 
our social worlds and, for reasons explained in this thesis, play a dominant role in the development 
of asset bubbles. The power of narratives in asset bubble formation has, in fact, been hinted at 
numerous times. Just over the past few years, a number of studies and well-known scholars have 
highlighted the importance of news, stories, or rhetoric on the emergence of asset bubbles (e.g., 
Akerlof and Shiller, 2009; Bhattacharya et al., 2009; Hansen, 2014; Munir, 2011; Roy and Kemme, 
2012). Disappointingly, though, these works have resulted in very little scholarly attention to how 
narratives influence the growth of asset bubbles. In this thesis, I tackle this very oversight by 
conceptualizing and investigating the role that narratives play in asset bubble formation. 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. First, in Chapter 2, I provide some 
background information on how asset bubbles are defined and more detail on some of the more 
prominent bubbles of the past few hundred years. I then review the main theoretical contributions 
put forward from both within and outside the field of economics and discuss the limitations of these 
explanations. I then present my argument as to why narratives are so influential in the emergence 
and growth of asset bubbles.  
In Chapter 3, I develop a conceptual framework by which to investigate the role that narratives 
play in asset bubble formation. Referred to as the institutionalized narrative (I/N) perspective of 
asset bubbles, this framework serves as a research lens and sensitizing mechanism that allows for 
the in-depth, longitudinal study that comprises the bulk of this thesis.  
Aside from outlining and illustrating this framework, Chapter 3 also explains the two research 
questions posed in this thesis, those being 1) How does a boom narrative become institutionalized? 
(in other words, how do expectations of significant capital gains become a taken-for-granted aspect 
of investment?), and 2) Why do efforts to deinstitutionalize boom narratives fail? (or why do efforts 
at challenging these expectations, and thus “pop” the bubble, seem to always fail?). 
Chapter 4 then details the research design, including explanations of case selection, choice of 
methods, data collection, analysis techniques, and validity and reliability criteria. In brief, this study 
employed a unique combination of narrative analysis, an event history database, discourse analysis, 
and process analysis to examine the U.S. tech bubble of 1997 to 2000. Data was collected according 
to the three pillars of institutionalization, with texts sampled from the U.S. Federal Reserve 
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(representing the cognitive pillar), The New York Times and Fortune magazine (normative pillar), 
and hearings from the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (regulative 
pillar). 
Chapters 5 through 9 present the findings of this study. These findings include results from the 
event history database (Chapter 5), the narrative and discourse analysis of the three pillars (Chapters 
6, 7, and 8), and the process analysis of the totality of my data (Chapter 9). Through these analytical 
steps, at the end of Chapter 9 I arrive at eight overarching conclusions concerning the 
institutionalization and failed deinstitutionalization of boom narratives during the tech bubble. 
In the final chapter, Chapter 10, I draw on these empirical findings to outline a narrative theory 
of asset bubble formation. This theory contends that large-scale bubbles can emerge through three 
interrelated phases of narrating a crisis, narrating a recovery, and narrating a boom. If a number of 
certain conditions are met in each phase, increasing levels of herd behavior, speculation, and illegal 
activity are predicted to follow. Given its focus on a critical and neglected aspect of asset bubble 
formation, being narratives, and its longitudinal consideration of narratives, actors, and events, the 
narrative theory presents a novel and rather detailed account of how large-scale bubbles can form. 
As a result of this novelty and detail, the theory serves to complement, integrate, and challenge 
existing thought on these episodes. At the end of Chapter 10, I elaborate on these implications and 
conclude with a number of suggestions as to how future studies can start to test and build upon the 
narrative theory.  
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CHAPTER 2: ASSET BUBBLES AND THEIR THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS 
This chapter provides an overview of asset bubbles, their theoretical explanations, and the 
limitations of extant theory. The main conclusion from such an overview is that, despite numerous 
contributions from a range of disciplines, we still have a very poor understanding of how asset 
bubbles form. In this chapter I also observe that the role of narratives and narrative thought in asset 
bubble formation has been largely overlooked and neglected. I argue that these two observations are 
not coincidental and that narratives are a core driver of financial decision-making during bouts of 
speculative mania. Thus, careful and systematic investigations into the role of narratives in asset 
bubble formation provide a promising means by which to advance our understanding of these 
events.  
This chapter is structured as follows. First, I provide some background information on asset 
bubbles, including the two most commonly cited definitions of an asset bubble and a brief 
description of some of the more notable bubbles of recent history. I then outline the main theoretical 
explanations of asset bubbles from a diverse range of academic fields and explain the limitations of 
these theories. I conclude the chapter with an explanation of why narratives play such an influential 
role in market speculation and why narrative research is a promising means by which to better 
understand these events.  
2.1 What is an asset bubble? 
There are two widely used definitions of the term “asset bubble,” which is also commonly referred 
to as a “speculative bubble.” The first definition, which can be referred to as the fundamental value 
definition, recognizes an asset bubble as existing “when the market price of an asset exceeds its 
price determined by fundamental factors by a significant amount for a prolonged period” (Evanoff 
et al., 2012, p. 1).
1
 This is the general definition of bubbles commonly employed by most 
economists (see, e.g., Barlevy, 2007; Dale, Johnson, and Tang, 2005; Kindleberger and Aliber, 
2011; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003; Stiglitz, 1990), who sometimes adopt a more specific 
definition according to their research setting or their view of the cause(s) of bubbles.  
For example, Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), in their study of asset trading with short-sale 
constraints, define an asset bubble as the “difference between the current owner’s demand price and 
his fundamental valuation, which is exactly the resale option value” (pp. 1185–1186), while Stiglitz 
(1990) refers to bubbles as a condition when prices are high “only because investors believe that the 
selling price will be high tomorrow—when ‘fundamental’ factors do not seem to justify such a price” 
                                                 
1
 A situation where an asset’s price falls significantly short of its fundamental value is referred to as a “negative bubble.” 
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(p. 13, emphasis in original). In this definition, an asset’s fundamental value is its estimated net 
present value (NPV), which is defined as “the expected value of all dividends the asset yields over 
its lifetime, properly discounted to reflect the present-day value of dividends paid at future dates” 
(Barlevy, 2007, p. 46).  
The second commonly used definition, which can be referred to as the boom-to-bust definition, 
recognizes a bubble as a situation in which the price of an asset rises rapidly in a short period and 
then drops in a similarly dramatic manner, resulting in a noticeable “spike” in asset values. This 
definition is frequently cited in the popular press (Barlevy, 2007) but is also sometimes invoked by 
academics (see, e.g., Griffin et al., 2011). Due to its lack of economic jargon, the boom-to-bust 
definition offers a description of bubbles that is easy to comprehend, hence its popularity in the 
press, and rather succinctly depicts some of the more notable bubbles of the past 100 years, such as 
the stock bubble of the 1920s or the housing bubble of 2002 to 2007. 
While these two definitions do overlap and may refer to the same bubble phenomenon in many 
cases, there are notable differences between them. First and most obvious, a boom-to-bust definition 
requires an asset’s price to crash before it can confidently be labeled a bubble, whereas a 
fundamental value definition does not. Therefore, assets that appear overvalued but have yet to 
decline in price would be regarded as bubbles under a fundamental value definition but not under a 
boom-to-bust definition.  
A more contentious difference between the two definitions is that the boom-to-bust definition 
does not make explicit the nature or cause of the price swing. This deficiency is seen as particularly 
problematic by most economists, who view price swings as quite natural and even desirable in some 
situations (Barlevy, 2007). Barlevy (2007) provides the example of new fashion accessories, where 
prices can often surge due to an initially limited supply and then drop steeply once supply catches 
up or fashion trends shift. In these situations, price swings are seen as useful indicators to 
manufacturers of when to increase and decrease supply, a scenario that hardly justifies bubble 
terminology. 
That is not to say that the fundamental value definition is without its drawbacks. Most notable, 
the fundamental value of an asset can, at times, be incredibly difficult to ascertain. Such is often the 
case with new products, companies, industries, and investment vehicles and during periods of 
significant societal change. Not surprisingly, most of the largest bubble episodes of the past few 
hundred years have occurred under these very conditions, a point that will be elaborated upon in the 
following section. Thus, during periods of significant innovation and change, asset bubbles have 
become rather difficult to identify with any degree of certainty. 
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In my explanation of a narrative conceptualization of asset bubbles, I will return to the issue of 
defining an asset bubble, but first, the next section provides a brief account of the history and 
conditions of some of the world’s more notable bubbles.  
2.2 A brief look at past bubbles 
“I can calculate the motions of the heavenly bodies, but not the madness of the people.” 
-Isaac Newton, 1720, after losing over £20,000 in the South Sea Bubble (Trollope, 1860, p. 346) 
Regardless if using a boom-to-bust or a fundamental value definition, asset price bubbles are “a 
recurrent feature of modern (post-1800) economic history” (IMF, 2003, p. 64). For example, the 
IMF (2003) identified 52 equity price bubbles in 19 countries between 1959 and 2002 and 23 stock 
market bubbles in just the United Kingdom and United States alone between 1800 and 1940.  
Asset bubbles frequently occur in stocks, bonds, and real estate, such as in the 1890s stock 
bubble where the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) index rose 36 percent from 1891 to 1892 and then fell 
27 percent in just 14 months (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009) or as in the Southern California housing 
bubble of the 1980s where prices shot up and then collapsed by 40 percent (Kindleberger and Aliber, 
2011).  
However, bubbles also sometimes occur in traded commodities such as gold, as when its price 
rose from $40 an ounce in 1970 to $970 an ounce in 1979, only to fall back to $300 an ounce in the 
1990s (ibid.), and silver, which experienced a price jump from under $9 an ounce in 1979 to over 
$50 an ounce in 1980 and then fell back to $10 an ounce just two months later (Abolafia and 
Kilduff, 1988). 
Table 2.1 on the next page lists some of the more notable, and thoroughly studied, bubbles of 
the past few hundred years. The Dutch Tulip Mania, also referred to as Tulipomania (Dash, 1999), 
is generally regarded as the first recorded speculative bubble (Shiller, 2005). Tulip Mania refers to 
the feverish buying of tulip bulbs in 1636 during the Dutch Golden Age, in which contract prices 
for bulbs increased by several hundred percent to the point where some bulbs sold for more than 10 
times the annual income of a craftsman (Dash, 1999). In 1637, after a local outbreak of bubonic 
plague, prices collapsed by over 99 percent in just a few days (Garber, 2000).  
  
Table 2.1  The big 10 bubbles
2
 
Bubble Year Countries directly affected Asset(s) Price rise (years) Price drop (years) 
Dutch Tulip Mania 1636–1637 Netherlands Tulip bulbs Prices increased several 
hundred percent (1636) 
Prices fell over 99% within a 
few days (1637) 
South Sea Bubble 1720 Great Britain Stock Stock rose eight-fold     
(Feb–June, 1720) 
Stock fell to near original value 
(Jun –Oct, 1720) 
Mississippi Bubble 1718–1720 France Stock Stock rose 20-fold        
(Jan–Dec 1719) 
Stock fell by 90%              
(Jan–Dec 1720) 
1920s stock bubble 1920–1929  U.S. and global  Stocks Stocks rose five-fold in real 
value (1920–1929) 
Stocks fell to below 1920 
levels (1929–1932) 
Loans to Latin America 1970s–80s Mexico, Brazil, Argentina Foreign debt Debt = 50% GDP (1983) Countries defaulted (1980s) 
Japanese bubble 1985–1989 Japan Real estate 
Stocks 
Real estate prices quadrupled 
(1980–1991) 
Real home prices dropped by 
68% (1991–2006) 
Nordic bubble 1985–1989 Norway, Sweden, Finland Real estate 
Stocks 
Prices rose five-fold  
(1980s) 
Prices returned               
(1990–1993) 
Asian financial crisis 1992–1997 SE Asia, Latin America, Russia, 
etc. 
Foreign debt 
Stocks 
Foreign debt above 180% of 
GDP (1993–1996) 
Currencies in SE Asia lost over 
30% of value (1997) 
U.S. tech (dotcom) bubble 1997–2000  U.S. and global (Brazil, China, 
France, U.K., etc.) 
Stocks Stocks rose five-fold in real 
value (1997–2000) 
NASDAQ declined 80% 
(2000–2003) 
Real estate & debt bubble 2002–2007 Global: U.S., Spain, Ireland, 
Greece, Portugal, Spain, etc. 
Real estate 
Gov’t bonds 
U.S. real estate prices 
doubled (1997–2006) 
Prices declined by over 20% 
(2006–2008)  
                                                 
2
 As highlighted in Kindleberger and Aliber (2011, p. 11). Additional sources for this table include Akerlof and Shiller (2009), Barlevy (2007), Dale et al. (2005), Griffin et al. 
(2011), Shiller (2005), and Stein (2011). 
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The first two major stock bubbles occurred almost simultaneously in Europe in 1720—one in 
Britain, the South Sea Bubble, and the other in France, the Mississippi Bubble. In Britain, the South 
Sea Company, created in part to reduce the nation’s debt, was granted a monopoly to trade with 
South America. Despite having never turned a significant profit, the company’s stock price soared 
from £130 in February 1720 to over £1,050 in June of the same year, only to drop back to £170 just 
a few months later (Dale et al., 2005). In France, the bubble was a result of speculation in the 
Mississippi Company, which was owned by Scottish economist John Law and held a monopoly on 
business in the French colony of Louisiana (Bammer, 2002). After the company’s stock fell by 90 
percent in 1720, Law had no choice but to flee the country (Sheeran and Spain, 2004). 
Perhaps the most thoroughly studied bubble of the past 100 years is the stock bubble of the 
Roaring Twenties and its eventual crash in 1929 that coincided with the onset of the Great 
Depression. During the 1920s, stocks in the United States rose five-fold in real value during a time 
of increasing consumer confidence but also careless spending, rash investment decisions, loose 
government regulations, and high levels of corruption (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009). The euphoria 
officially ended on October 29, 1929, known as Black Tuesday, when stocks fell by 12 percent. The 
Dow Jones Industrial Average (hereafter Dow Jones) would not return to its 1929 peak valuation 
until 25 years later, in November of 1954 (Galbraith, 1954). The next bubble of mention did not 
occur until the 1980s when several Latin American countries reached a point where they were 
unable to meet their foreign debt obligations. During the 1960s and 1970s, developing countries in 
Central and South America such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico borrowed vast sums of money 
from foreign lenders, increasing from $125 billion in 1972 to $800 billion in 1982 (Kindleberger 
and Aliber, 2011). As interest rates increased in the United States and Europe, several countries 
experienced difficulties making debt repayments, resulting in a wave of defaults that started with 
Mexico’s declaration in 1982 that it could no longer service its debt. 
In the late 1980s, Japan and the Scandinavian countries of Norway, Sweden, and Finland 
experienced large-scale real estate and stock bubbles, with Japan’s bubble resulting in a much 
deeper and longer retraction. By the end of the 1980s, the market value of Japanese stocks and real 
estate was twice that of those in the United States, despite Japan’s gross domestic product (GDP) 
being less than half of the U.S.’s and its land area, which is mostly mountainous, equivalent to only 
five percent of that in the United States (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011). At the bubble’s peak, 
some analysts estimated the market value of the land under the Imperial Palace in Tokyo to be 
greater than the value of all the real estate in the state of California (ibid.). In 1991, after Japanese 
banks were instructed to limit the growth of real estate loans, the bubble burst. Within a few years, 
prices were 60 percent below their peak, a drop that “wiped out company balance sheets [and] 
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crippled the nation’s banks” (Fackler, 2005). In Scandinavia, real estate and stock prices rose three-
fold in Norway and five-fold in both Sweden and Finland, only to return to their original levels by 
1993 (Borio, Kennedy, and Prowse, 1994). 
In the early 1990s, a bubble formed in Southeast Asia during a period in which several 
companies moved production facilities to low-cost sites in the region. As foreign money flowed into 
these countries, the value of their currencies rose precipitously, along with a rapid increase in 
consumer spending and real estate and stock prices. In the first half the decade, stock prices in 
Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia increased by between 300 and 500 percent (Kindleberger and 
Aliber, 2011). After the devaluation of the Thai baht in 1997, investors across the globe quickly 
pulled their money out of the region, leading to the collapse of Asian economies and a contagious 
effect that spread to both Brazil and Russia. Russia’s eventual default on its foreign loans resulted 
in the bailout of the highly leveraged U.S. hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), 
which faced a $4.6 billion debt hole (MacKenzie, 2003; Stein, 2003). Immediately following this 
event, a bubble formed in the U.S. stock market, one that was centered on highly speculative 
investments in technology companies, primarily internet start-ups. From 1997 to 2000, U.S. 
technology stocks rose more than five-fold (Griffin et al., 2011), along with similar booms in 
markets in Brazil, China, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (Shiller, 2005). In the United 
States, the boom was seen as a hallmark of the “new economy,” in which service companies would 
replace the U.S.’s traditional manufacturing base. However, from 2000 to 2003, after moves by the 
U.S. Federal Reserve to withdraw liquidity from the market, stocks tumbled 40 percent, with the 
NASDAQ suffering an 80 percent drop (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011).  
Recently, the 2002 to 2007 bubble in real estate, and in some government bonds such as those 
of Greece, resulted in effects that continue to be felt today. In the United States, residential 
investment as a percent of GDP went from 4.2 percent in 1997 to 6.3 percent in 2005 (Akerlof and 
Shiller, 2009). During the same time, subprime mortgages, those to borrowers who historically have 
had difficulties making repayments, surged to represent over 20 percent of all mortgages (ibid.). A 
surge in home prices was not limited to the United States, with similar price increases in Australia, 
Great Britain, Iceland, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa, and Spain (Kindleberger and Aliber, 
2011). A rising wave of defaults that started in 2007 led to a bank run at Northern Rock in the 
United Kingdom and the collapse of several U.S. financial institutions such as Lehman Brothers and 
Washington Mutual. From 2006 to 2008, U.S. home prices decreased by over 20 percent, while 
prices in smaller countries such as Spain fell by over 30 percent, where prices showed little sign of 
recovery even seven years after their initial falls (Smyth and Urban, 2013). 
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While asset price bubbles in large, developed countries remain infrequent events, a particularly 
worrisome trend of the past few hundred years is asset prices becoming increasingly volatile and 
bubbles becoming more international in their growth—and collapse. Kindleberger and Aliber (2011, 
p. 1) note that “the years since the 1970s are unprecedented in terms of the volatility in the prices of 
commodities, currencies, real estate, and stocks.” The authors also observe a pattern of international 
funds moving from country to country, and bubble to bubble, over the past thirty years. For 
example, many of the speculators during the Asian financial crisis were Japanese investors who 
could no longer realize significant returns in their home country, while many of the institutional 
investors who lost money during the tech bubble were also some of the hardest hit by the subprime 
mortgage crisis (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011). Perhaps most worrisome is that these trends exist 
despite the creation of several institutions, such as central banks and the IMF, that are designed to 
analyze, manage, and prevent such events—not to mention countless studies by economists and 
other academics on the causes and consequences of these bubbles. This observation has incited 
many economists and policy makers to “reevaluate what they really know about asset bubbles” 
(Evanoff et al., 2012, p. 1), with some going as far as to say that the “reputation of mainstream 
economics has been undermined” (Issing, 2009, p. 431). In the next section, I review the 
mainstream economic explanations of bubbles that are currently the subject of such debate and 
highlight some of the recent explanations offered from other fields such as behavioral economics, 
economic psychology, and sociology. 
2.3 Theoretical explanations of asset bubbles  
While extant literature has identified a wide range of factors that influence the growth and bursting 
of asset bubbles, such as the availability of credit (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011), low interest rates 
(Issing, 2009), fraud (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009, Ch. 3), and herd behavior (Shiller, 2005, Ch. 9), 
there are very few comprehensive theories or theoretical approaches for understanding asset bubbles 
in their entirety. Over the past few decades, the dominant theory of asset pricing in mainstream 
economics has been one of market fundamentalism, which is based on the assumption that market 
participants make rational decisions based on an asset’s fundamental value. However, in the wake 
of the 2008 market crash and increasing volatility in asset prices worldwide, this view has recently 
come under intense scrutiny. As a result, numerous scholars are now pointing to research from the 
fields of behavioral economics, behavioral finance, psychology, sociology, and organizational 
studies for superior explanations of the existence of asset bubbles. However, while these fields have 
certainly generated an abundance of insight on human and social behavior during bubble episodes, 
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their findings remain fragmented and overlook a critical aspect of all asset bubbles, that being the 
role of narratives. 
Before explaining why narratives are so influential in determining asset prices during 
speculative events, in this section I outline the main theoretical contributions put forward from both 
within and outside the field of economics and discuss the limitations of these explanations.  
2.3.1 Explanations from mainstream economics  
In economics, the most pervasive “theory” invoked to understand the behavior of asset prices is one 
of market fundamentalism. Market fundamentalism is not a theory in the sense of a unified, distinct 
explanation of one phenomenon but is rather a set of interrelated ideas and assumptions about how 
markets work—enabling economists and policy makers to make predictions and propose solutions 
to various social problems such as inflation and unemployment. Market fundamentalism rests on the 
foundation of the efficient market hypothesis, which asserts that market participants make rational 
decisions based on an asset’s fundamental value and thus asset prices always reflect their true value. 
This is essentially an extension of classical economic theory, such as the belief in free markets and 
the “invisible hand,” ideas that continue to dominate most economic thought in capitalist societies. 
Thus, market fundamentalism is based on the assumptions that financial markets are the best means 
of pricing assets, free markets ensure money flows to investments with the highest return, and 
government regulation should be kept to a minimum to avoid interference with the market 
mechanism (Block, 1996). 
Therefore, from a market fundamentalism standpoint, large fluctuations in asset prices are 
simply a reflection of significant changes in information about fundamentals. In other words, if 
using a fundamental value definition, bubbles cannot exist, as prices always reflect fundamentals. 
Proponents of this view argue that what appears to be a bubble is simply the observation of an 
asset’s value being affected by large scale, exogenous “information shocks,” such as the 
introduction of new government regulations or a new, perhaps poorly understood, technology. 
While this view recognizes that some investors may act irrationally, the theory contends that these 
investors are far outnumbered by sophisticated actors who quickly trade against irrational bets, 
thereby eliminating deviations from fundamental values (see, e.g., Fama, 1965).  
As an example of this view, Garber (2000) argues that the commonly cited early bubbles in 
tulips, the South Sea Company, and the Mississippi Company were actually situations where prices 
reasonably reflected market fundamentals. The rapid rise and fall of tulip prices in the 1600s, he 
argues, is a standard feature of markets in newly developed varieties of rare bulbs. Garber adds that 
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most of the speculative trade in tulips took place in taverns under a fatalistic atmosphere brought on 
by the bubonic plague, which between 1634 and 1637 killed over 17,000 people in Amsterdam 
alone. That is to say, he sees the trade in tulips at that time as no more than an alcohol-infused 
drinking game where losing a significant portion of one’s life savings was not the most pressing 
issue. Garber goes on to argue that the South Sea and Mississippi bubbles were merely the result of 
failed financial innovations, innovations that were supported by government officials at the highest 
levels in both Britain and France and thus justified the public’s anticipation of higher share prices. 
A similar argument is that when bubble episodes coincide with situations of high uncertainty, 
incredibly high valuations may be appropriate. For instance, Pástor and Veronesi (2006) argue that 
the high valuations given to start-up tech firms during the 1990s were justified on the basis that a 
firm’s fundamental value should increase with uncertainty about its future profitability. As many of 
these start-ups were still in a period of building brand awareness, website traffic, and market share, 
the uncertainty surrounding these firms was extremely high and thus, these scholars argue, their 
observed valuations were within reason. 
Aside from this strict adherence to market fundamentalism, other economists propose that 
bubbles can exist under the assumptions of efficient markets from four causes. First, markets may 
be constrained by frictions, such as short-sale restrictions (Miller, 1977; Palfrey and Wang, 2012; 
Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003) or capital constraints (Shleifer and Vishney, 1997) that prevent the 
market mechanism from working effectively. Second, rational speculators may drive a bubble’s 
growth based on the expectations of selling the overvalued asset later at a higher price 
(Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004; DeLong et al., 1990; Doblas-Madrid, 2012; Flood and Hodrick, 
1990). This explanation implies that speculators know the bubble will eventually burst but usually 
have sufficient influence on the market to time its collapse (Griffin et al., 2011). Akerlof and 
coauthors (1993) illustrate this argument in their explanation of several financial crises in the 1980s, 
as, for example, they contend that outsiders and corporate “looters” likely coordinated actions in the 
1980s to manipulate junk bond prices. 
A third explanation argues that bubbles can emerge when investors systematically misvalue the 
fundamentals of an asset, which is referred to as an “intrinsic bubble” (Froot and Obstfeld, 1991). 
As an example, intrinsic bubbles may arguably arise in new products that at first appear promising 
but later disappoint due to technical flaws that cannot be overcome or a lack of complementary 
services that impede the product’s adoption. A final explanation is that bubbles can occur under 
conditions of uncertainty when investors erroneously take external factors into account that have no 
impact on an asset’s fundamental value, which is known as an “extrinsic bubble” or “sunspots” 
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(Azariades, 1998). For example, investors may adjust their valuations to economic forecasts that 
have little influence on the asset under consideration.  
Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, most economists and policy makers 
adhered to the notion that the assumptions underlying market fundamentalism could sufficiently 
describe and predict most market behavior. As noted by Stracca in 2004 (p. 394), “Today, there 
seems to be almost a consensus that the market is most of the times rational.” In addition, such an 
approach also appears adequate in explaining many smaller, isolated bubbles where factors such as 
capital constraints, market manipulation, and misevaluations play a large role. However, a market 
fundamentalist view of asset bubbles has come under intense scrutiny in recent years as asset prices 
have become increasingly volatile and bubbles have become increasingly international and 
destructive in their effects
3
. In fact, numerous studies of the past twenty years have shown that pure 
fundamentals and rationality do not drive financial decision-making and asset pricing, particularly 
during historic cases of large-scale bubbles (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009; Avery and Zemsky, 1998; 
Canterbery, 1999; Chancellor, 2000; Dale et al., 2005; Griffin et al., 2011; Kindleberger and Aliber, 
2011; Lux, 1995; Perkins and Perkins, 1999; Shiller, 2005). 
For instance, Griffin and colleagues (2011) conducted a detailed analysis of stock purchasing 
behavior during the tech bubble and found that sophisticated, institutional investors such as hedge 
funds and mutual funds were the most aggressive purchasers of technology stocks during the 
bubble’s growth—even when those stocks demonstrated poor economic fundamentals such as 
price-to-sales (P/S) ratios. The authors also found that, despite no significant change in market 
fundamentals, these institutional investors were also the most aggressive sellers when the bubble 
burst, a period in which individual investors continued to buy. In studies on buying behavior during 
the South Sea Bubble, Dale and co-authors (2005) and Chancellor (2000) conclude that rational 
arguments based on fundamentals cannot explain the behavior of stock purchasers during this 
episode. These authors note that the South Sea Company was a relatively simple company with 
known cash flows and that there was plenty of public information showing how shares were 
extremely overvalued before the bubble burst.  
From a more macro perspective, Akerlof and Shiller (2009, Ch. 11) demonstrate how stock 
market movements over the past 100 years cannot be explained by fundamentals, stressing that “no 
one can even explain why these events rationally ought to have happened even after they have 
                                                 
3
 As argued by Cooper (2008), the creation of central banks in order to deal with market instability is essentially an 
admission that markets are not efficient.  
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happened” (p. 131, emphasis in original). As a final example, Shiller (2005, Ch. 10) shows how, 
during bubble episodes, earnings growth and price growth do not correspond well at all.  
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008, several notable economists such as Otmar 
Issing, President of the Center for Financial Studies in Frankfurt, and Benjamin Friedman, professor 
of political economics at Harvard, have called for a reevaluation of the efficient market hypothesis 
and other mainstream economic theories (Friedman, 2011; Issing, 2009). They argue that 
mainstream economic theories are unable to predict and explain large-scale bubbles and their 
associated crises, a failure that has damaged the public’s trust in both mainstream economics and 
the free market system. In particular, the efficient market hypothesis has been criticized for “having 
supported an unfounded belief in the robustness of the financial system” (Issing, 2009, p. 431).  
Critiques have also been made from outside mainstream economics, with numerous scholars 
arguing that most economists tend to almost completely ignore research from the other social 
sciences (e.g., Abolafia, 2010a; Armour, 2010; Block, 2010; De Bondt and Thaler, 1995). As a 
result, one area that is increasingly garnering attention is research on the role that irrational behavior 
plays in financial decision-making, research that falls under the broad fields of behavioral 
economics, behavioral finance, and economic psychology. 
2.3.2 Explanations from behavioral economics, behavioral finance, and economic psychology 
The fields of behavioral economics, behavioral finance, and economic psychology are, to a large 
extent, overlapping and are primarily concerned with the role of human psychology and social 
behavior in influencing financial decision-making. Within these fields, several scholars have 
investigated how irrational behavior can lead to the buying and selling patterns witnessed during 
bubble events.  
In their seminal book on financial crises, Kindleberger and Aliber (2011, Ch. 3) document 
numerous historical examples of irrational purchases, lending, and speculation, emphasizing the 
influence of “group think” or “herd behavior” during bubble episodes (see also Galariotis et al., 
2015). The authors quote a banker during the South Sea Bubble as saying, “When the rest of the 
world are mad, we must imitate them in some measure,” and Chuck Prince, chair of Citigroup in 
2008, when he defended his company’s actions during the subprime mortgage bubble with, “You 
have to keep dancing as long as the music is playing” (p. 43). Observations of herd behavior in 
financial decision-making have also been documented in numerous experiments (e.g., De Martino 
et al., 2013; Hommes et al., 2008; Hüsler et al., 2013; Moinas and Pouget, 2013; Schoenberg and 
Haruvy, 2012).  
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For instance, Schoenberg and Haruvy (2012) found that traders are heavily influenced by their 
perceived performance relative to other traders, particularly when given information about high-
performing peers. In their experiment, traders were much more aggressive in bidding up prices after 
learning that some of their peers had outperformed them in a previous round, causing prices to 
quickly surpass fundamental valuations. This experimental finding is supported by the historical 
analysis of Roy and Kemme (2012), who found that rising income inequality is likely to inflate 
asset bubbles. They surmise that rising income inequality results in a “keeping up with the Joneses” 
phenomenon in which people in lower income groups over-consume and over-borrow in efforts to 
emulate the habits of wealthier individuals.   
In another experiment, Hommes and colleagues (2008) found that traders were highly prone to 
trend-chasing behavior, with participants much more likely to buy after a stock had successive gains 
and to sell after a stock had successive losses—again despite fundamental valuations suggesting 
they should act otherwise. De Martino and co-authors (2013) argue that this type of trend-chasing 
behavior is essentially hard-wired into our brains, with their neuroimaging experiment suggesting 
that during bubble episodes investors may be influenced more by their attempts to predict the 
behavior of other traders, known as theory of mind (ToM), than explicit information available in the 
market.  
Scholars in these fields have also pointed to clear evidence of irrational “escalation of 
commitment” in financial markets (Staw, 1976), referring to situations in which financial decision 
makers choose to “throw good money after bad” (De Bondt and Thaler, 1995, p. 402) by continuing 
to invest in unprofitable ventures. Explanations for this phenomenon include the theory that 
decision makers, due to the emotional cost or humiliation of admitting failure, tend to have 
“confirmatory bias” and constantly look for evidence that supports their ideas (Rabin and Schrag, 
1999). Eckel and Füllbrunn (2015) suggest that testosterone may be to blame. In their experiment, 
all-male markets consistently generated speculative bubbles, whereas all-female markets did not. In 
fact, their experimental all-female markets generated numerous negative bubbles, with prices 
remaining substantially below fundamental indicators.  
Many scholars also argue that financial decision makers consistently demonstrate acts of clear 
hubris and overconfidence, particularly in areas where they have self-declared expertise (Heath and 
Tversky, 1991). As an example, despite numerous studies demonstrating negative returns for 
acquiring firms, corporate mergers and takeovers became increasingly popular in the 1980s. Roll 
(1986) contends that managerial hubris can explain the trend, arguing that managers of acquiring 
firms—partly due to their recent run of success—were convinced that they could run the target 
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firms better than current management and thus systematically overestimated the benefits of a 
takeover.  
Hyman Minsky (1986, 1992), who was heavily influenced by the work of British economist 
John Maynard Keynes, argued that capitalist societies tend to develop states of collective 
overconfidence, which he referred to as states of euphoria. Minsky hypothesized that 
overconfidence is likely to arise during long periods of stability, periods that encourage more risk-
taking and innovation. After periods of increased income, he argued, both lenders and investors are 
inspired to take on positions of increasingly greater risk, which invariably leads the economy into a 
vulnerable position in which a slowdown would immediately force a large number of investors to 
sell their assets in distress. Minsky saw this inevitable chain of events as the cause of financial 
crises and their resulting recessions.  
While research from the fields of behavioral economics, behavioral finance, and economic 
psychology have produced a long list of insights—of which only some of the more influential have 
been mentioned here—into how irrational behavior may be partially responsible for the buying and 
selling patterns witnessed during euphoric bubble episodes, the findings from these fields remain 
highly fragmented and unable to offer a comprehensive explanation of bubble phenomena. 
Moreover, research from these fields tends to adopt an individualistic, reductionist view of market 
behavior, with many of the empirical findings in these fields resulting from highly controlled 
experiments (often with only undergraduate students as participants) that exclude exogenous 
influences such as institutional and regulatory constraints and incentives, historical trends, and 
broader social and cultural changes.  
In the context of large-scale bubble episodes and their resulting financial crises, however, such a 
reductionist view is highly problematic, as these events have repeatedly proven to be highly 
complex phenomena that are deeply rooted in the prevailing political, social, and cultural ethos of 
their times. As an illustration, Galbraith (1954), in his seminal work on the 1929 stock market crash, 
notes “The striking thing about the stock market speculation of 1929 was not the massiveness of the 
participation. Rather, it was the way it became central to the culture” (p. 103, emphasis added). 
Galbraith goes on to document how stock market speculation became the common conversation 
topic of most gatherings, with countless housewives, doctors, and farmers all “becoming experts” in 
the market. He adds that common people became infatuated and absorbed by rising prices, while 
many decided market speculation was to become their full-time job.  
After the recent crisis in 2008, many scholars, including economists, are pointing at other social 
phenomena as the primary contributor of the crisis, including distorted incentives at large-scale 
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institutions (Friedman, 2011), regulatory failure at the highest levels of government (Hirsch and 
Morris, 2010), and broad cultural changes occurring over several decades (Stein, 2011).  
Concurrently, researchers are now recognizing the need to look beyond explanations of 
irrational behavior and focus more on how social factors can influence large-scale bubble events. 
Calls for research on the social aspects of these events are exemplified by Stracca (2004, p. 399, 
emphasis in original), who states, “In particular, to study how prices are determined in large 
competitive markets more recourse to social, rather than individual psychology might be warranted,” 
and Shiller (2014), as he argues, “The question is not simply whether people are rational. It’s about 
how best to describe their complex behavior.” As a result, a small but growing number of 
researchers from the fields of sociology and organizational studies are starting to address the need 
for more socially situated explanations of asset bubbles
4
. 
2.3.3 Explanations from sociology and organizational studies 
Despite asset bubbles and their resulting effects being highly relevant to the fields of sociology and 
organizational studies, or business studies in general, these events have received relatively little 
attention from these fields (Munir, 2011; Vaara and Durand, 2012). However, in recent years, 
particularly after the widespread damage resulting from the GFC, a small number of researchers 
have started to explore the social and cultural factors responsible for the crisis and similar 
speculative events.  
A large percentage of studies in these fields see institutional and regulatory failures as the 
primary culprits in the recent housing bubble and its resulting financial crisis. Institutional 
explanations take the view that markets are embedded in institutions, which “stabilize, regulate, and 
legitimize economic activity” (McDermott, 2010, p. 315). Abolafia (2010a) is one of the strongest 
critics of contemporary institutions for their role in recent crises. He argues that the institutions of 
professional economics, the Federal Reserve, and political discourse all reinforce a market ideology 
based on market fundamentalism, an ideology he sees as poorly suited to prescribe a remedy for 
large-scale asset bubbles.  
Other scholars have stressed the role of regulatory failure in the recent crisis (e.g., Campbell, 
2010; Davis, 2010; Hirsch and Morris, 2010). Common to this view is the argument that, as 
speculative bubbles have increased in both their frequency and intensity over the past few decades, 
                                                 
4
 Of course, the fields of sociology and organizational studies do, from time to time, overlap with research from the 
fields of behavioral economics, behavioral finance, and economic psychology. Thus, my contrast of their findings is 
undoubtedly a slight exaggeration. However, broadly speaking, the differences between these two groupings hold true.  
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the dominant neoliberal ideology underpinning Western capitalism during this time is largely to 
blame. Such an assertion is hardly new, however, and echoes concerns of early economists such as 
Henry Carey (1864/2015), who vehemently argued that “instability is the essential characteristic of 
the system called free-trade” (p. 6). Similarly, a number of studies on the crises in developing 
economies in the 1990s point to inadequate regulation of financial institutions as a primary culprit 
(Kahler, 1998).  
As an illustration of this view, Campbell (2010) blames a rash of neoliberal policies that started 
in the 1970s for the run-up in housing prices. He cites the 1970 repeal of a rule that prevented 
investment banks from going public on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) of 2000 as two examples of policies that encouraged a large 
and unregulated shadow banking sector to take on risks that posed a threat to the entire economy. 
Campbell (2011) concludes that the market instability circa 2007 was created due to a 
preponderance of reinforcing institutions—those that generate similar incentives, in this case being 
incentives for increasingly risky mortgage borrowing—and a dearth of compensating institutions—
those that make up for one another’s deficiencies.  
Other accounts of the largely self-regulated derivatives market of the 1990s and early 2000s 
have also singled out a lack of federal oversight as a key factor in the market’s ability to take on 
such pervasive and ultimately systemic risk in just a few short years (e.g., Das, 2010; Engelen et al., 
2012; Tett, 2009). Davis (2010) argues that this process of deregulation, along with the 
securitization of numerous types of bonds, loans, and receivables, is evidence that the American 
economy has shifted to a finance-centered system that “ties the fate of households, businesses, and 
governments to the vagaries of financial markets” (p. 75). Hirsch and Morris (2010) seem to agree 
with such conclusions and add that deregulation has been sold to the public on the grounds that it is 
in the best interest of society, with capitalism shifting from a rights-based economic framework in 
the 1960s to today’s profits-based economic framework. Hansen’s (2014) work helps in 
understanding this shift. He documents how, in response to the Great Depression and two world 
wars, the middle of the twentieth century became a period of more rigorous financial regulation. 
However, after the stagflation of the 1970s, privatization and deregulation became the dominant 
rally calls of business leaders and policy makers alike.  
Several scholars claim that this economic shift has coincided with an equally dramatic—and 
destructive—cultural shift. For instance, Perrow (2010) argues that the recent crisis was simply a 
result of greedy politicians, regulators, and executives who knew the dangers of their actions. 
Taking the argument one step further, Stein (2011) contends that Western countries have developed 
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a “manic culture” over the past twenty years, as witnessed by their consistent denial of large-scale 
threats, attitude of omnipotence over proper economic development, compelling need to be seen as 
superior to other states, and aggressive reaction to actors and systems that warn of impending crises. 
Consequently, he sees the culture of today’s capitalist societies as directly responsible for the credit 
crisis.  
2.3.4 The state of research on asset bubbles  
So taking into consideration insights from both within and outside the fields of economics, where 
does research on asset bubbles stand? First, it is safe to say that explanations based on market 
fundamentalism are only sufficient in explaining some smaller, isolated asset bubbles, with most 
scholars now agreeing that theoretical accounts of asset bubbles must consider both irrational 
human behavior and the broader social context of these events. Second, findings from research on 
irrational behavior seem to agree that financial decision makers are highly influenced by their 
emotions, which causes them to make decisions based upon their performance relative to peers, 
recent trends and fads, their insecurities, and acts of overconfidence—all of which suggest that 
instances of “group think” or “herd behavior” are naturally occurring market phenomena.  
In addition, overconfident, speculative behavior appears much more likely to occur during 
periods of relative stability, when confidence is already rather high and an ample number of high-
achievers exist to be imitated. Lastly, nascent research on the social context of bubbles and their 
resulting crises suggests that market speculation is deeply rooted in the regulatory and institutional 
components of a society, with deregulation playing a large role in some of these events. 
While all of these developments are useful in understanding why bubbles exist, most of the 
findings from these fields remain highly fragmented, with no clear, comprehensive framework for 
understanding asset bubbles in their entirety. Even more worrisome, most of these studies seem to 
indicate that—unless natural human behavior undergoes a radical, evolutionary transformation or 
the majority of countries decide to rethink the spread of our globalized, capitalist economic 
system—market speculation is here to stay. Even with the creation of various stabilizing 
mechanisms such as central banks, deposit insurance, and securities regulators, market fluctuations 
are likely to be a recurrent feature of our current economic system—thus warranting the 
development of more nuanced and comprehensive understandings of these events.  
Perhaps most problematic is that extant research on asset bubbles fails to answer even some of 
the most basic questions concerning these events. First, and most important, current research offers 
no answer as to why some assets develop bubbles while others do not. For example, the 1990s in 
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the United States represented a relatively stable economic environment in which unemployment 
gradually lowered and household incomes gradually rose, conditions ripe for an increase in 
investment risk and financial innovation. However, as noted by Shiller (2005), there is no 
theoretical explanation as to why stocks would become the asset-of-choice, particularly after the 
1987 market crash in which stock prices dropped by over 20 percent. Nor is there an explanation for 
why housing replaced stocks after 2000, especially when from 1900 to 2000 real home prices rose 
at the paltry rate of 0.2 percent per year (Shiller, 2005). Psychologists could argue that investors 
were chasing trends, but that merely begs the question of what made stocks or housing a trend in the 
first place. 
A second oversight of current research is a lack of investigation into why bubbles cannot be 
“popped” or “deflated” before they grow large enough to result in widespread turmoil. In fact, there 
are numerous historical examples going back as far as the early 1800s of authorities attempting—
unsuccessfully—to dampen the euphoria around speculative bubbles (Kindleberger and Aliber, 
2011, pp. 88–90). For example, in 1825, Britain’s Prime Minister George Canning, along with Lord 
Liverpool, Sir Francis Baring, and W. R. McCulloch, warned against excessive speculation in Latin 
America, speculation that included investments in the imaginary country of Poyais, only to watch 
the panic unfold nine months later. In February of 1929, eight months before the crash, prominent 
banker Paul Warburg, after a similar statement from the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, 
warned the American public that investment in stocks was eerily similar to that before the panic in 
1907—again, to no avail. As a more recent example, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan 
famously warned of “irrational exuberance” in the stock market in 1996, four years before the 
bubble popped. There surely must be some explanation as to why these warnings from such 
prominent actors resulted in little to no market correction. 
I argue that it is not coincidental that these basic questions have gone unanswered while the role 
of narratives in these events has received very little theoretical attention. The importance of this 
oversight is due to my contention that narratives and narrative thought play a critical role in 
market speculation and the formation of asset bubbles. In the next section, I explain this argument 
in full.  
2.4 The central (and largely overlooked) role of narratives in market speculation 
In simple terms, a narrative is a cohesive story or account of events, experiences, or phenomena, 
whether true or fictitious. The idea of a story or account being “cohesive” refers to the concept of 
taking independent and disconnected elements of our complex existence and pulling them together 
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to create related parts of whole entities (Polkinghorne, 1988). As related to human thought and 
decision-making, scholars widely acknowledge that narratives play an integral role in our cognitive 
functioning.  
Broadly speaking, there are two views, or modes as Bruner (1986, 1996) refers to them, of 
cognitive functioning. The first is the logico-scientific or paradigmatic view of thought, which sees 
the human brain as functioning similar to that of a computer’s microprocessor: it makes quick, 
categorical calculations based upon clear, de-contextualized input data or proof and provides 
impartial decisions through tight analysis and proven theories of causation. Such a view is largely in 
line with most mainstream economic models, which assume that market actors possess extremely 
high computational capabilities and an unlimited timeframe in which to make those computations 
(Conlisk, 1996).  
The second mode is one of narrative thinking, which, in contrast, sees the human brain as 
sensitive to aesthetics, associations, context, and good stories. In this mode, human thought is built 
upon concern for the human condition and primarily interested in the intentions of various actors, 
particularly the vicissitudes of these intentions (Bruner, 1986). While the goal of paradigmatic 
arguments is to convince the listener of their verifiable truth, the goal of narrative stories is simply 
to convince the listener of their lifelikeness, their verisimilitude. An important distinction here is 
that narrative thought is not to be viewed as simply irrational human behavior. Quite the contrary, 
narratives can be seen as a perfectly suitable, and often very complex, method of dealing with life’s 
less technical issues, such as human interactions, group norms, and the like.  
While the human brain can be thought of as able to easily alternate between the two modes, 
many scholars contend that narratives are in fact the basic organizing principle of all human 
cognition (Boland and Tenkasi, 1995) and communication (Fisher, 1985, 1989). Rather than take 
such an extreme view of these modes, I tend to agree with Bruner (1986) that these modes of 
cognitive functioning are complementary and thus irreducible to one another. However, in this 
thesis, I contend that periods of intense market speculation and asset bubble formation are fueled by 
narrative thought.  
In particular, I see three primary reasons why narratives are so central to market speculation: 
first, asset bubbles typically form during periods of great uncertainty when investors have few past 
results to guide their decisions; second, asset bubbles tend to arise during euphoric periods of easy 
credit and loose regulations, conditions that attract a surge in (new) retail investors and copycat 
organizations; and three, today’s globalized and high-speed investment environment, in which asset 
bubbles are increasing in size and frequency, provides endless investment opportunities and 
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information but limited time in which to make decisions. Below, I discuss each of these reasons in 
detail.  
2.4.1 Uncertainty  
In situations of great uncertainty, decision makers have less, or at least less reliable or relevant, 
historical data on which to base their decisions. As such, in these situations, making forecasts or 
predictions of future conditions and causal relations is all the more difficult. As demonstrated in this 
chapter, asset bubbles tend to form during periods of heightened uncertainty and multiple unknowns, 
which frequently arise from two conditions.  
First, bubbles frequently form during periods of profound innovation, including financial 
innovation (Fostel and Geanakoplos, 2012; Morris, 1999), and product introduction. For instance, 
the dotcom bubble formed during widespread innovation in information technology and computing 
that gave rise to a host of new organizations and services, while also almost instantly affecting all 
other sectors of the economy. Even tulipomania was an instance of a recently introduced product, in 
this case rare tulip bulbs, which witnessed wild speculation amidst the uncertain spread of the 
plague. Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2008) observe that speculative episodes in the U.S. have 
coincided with technological breakthroughs in railroads, electricity, automobiles, radio, 
microelectronics, personal computers (PCs), biotechnology, and the internet. Second, bubbles often 
form during the creation of new markets. The Southeast Asian crisis, in which hot money flowed 
into countries with very poorly understood risk profiles, and investment in the non-existent country 
of Poyais in the 1820s epitomize this category
5
. 
Thus, during periods of heightened uncertainty, decision makers, including investors, have no 
choice but to rely on narrative thought to guide their decision-making processes. Such a conclusion 
is supported by a wealth of studies in the broad field of narrative research. For example, one of the 
leading scholars on narratives and storytelling, David Boje (1991, p. 106) refers to storytelling as 
“the preferred sense-making currency,” with numerous studies supporting the hypothesis that 
narratives are the primary tool used to makes sense of ambiguous situations (Abolafia, 2010b; 
Brown, 2004, 2005; Bruner, 1986; Hansen, 2012; Martens, Jennings, and Jennings, 2007; Weick, 
1995; Zellermayer, 1997). Abolafia (2010b) demonstrates how narratives are even used by the 
Federal Reserve to make sense of complex conditions. In his study, in response to a situation in 
which money supply growth did not respond as expected to interest rate cuts, policy makers created 
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An additional cause of uncertainty can simply be a lack of historical data on a certain country or particular asset class. 
For instance, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) document how historical data on the issuance and default of domestic debt is 
(surprisingly) difficult to obtain.  
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a version of events that explained the phenomenon as a slower-than-expected response to cuts and 
adjusted their policy options accordingly. In direct relation to the dotcom bubble, Martens and 
colleagues (2007) found that entrepreneurial firms in the late 1990s constructed narratives in their 
initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses to convey a comprehensible identity for potential 
investors.  
The reliance on narratives amidst great uncertainty is what Taleb (2007) refers to as “narrative 
fallacy,” which he argues is our predilection for compact stories over raw truths, which leads us to 
think the world is less random than it truly is.  
2.4.2 Expanding credit and deregulation  
Moving on, narratives are also an essential component of market speculation because euphoric 
periods of expanding credit and deregulation entice numerous, often new, retail investors to enter 
the speculative frenzy, along with a number of copycat organizations that essentially mimic the bets 
made by first movers. The inclusion of a growing number of retail investors during speculative 
bouts is well documented and perhaps best represented by Galbraith’s (1954) account of 
housewives, doctors, and farmers all becoming enamored with rising stock prices in the 1920s or 
Griffin and colleague’s (2011) study that revealed the increasing presence of retail investors in the 
dotcom bubble during a period in which institutional investors were aggressively selling. While 
both of these bubble episodes attracted a large number of copycat organizations, the copycat 
phenomenon is perhaps best demonstrated in Gillian Tett’s (2009) description of how innovations 
in credit derivatives spread like wildfire throughout the financial community circa 2002, creating 
what she calls a number of “perverted offspring” at numerous banks.  
What makes the large presence of retail investors and copycat organizations so important is that 
these players rely much less on detailed or sophisticated analysis of market data and risk than 
institutional investors and first movers. To a large extent, these players are merely following the 
moves of what they see as more legitimate market players, with a large number simply hoping to 
ride the speculative wave—a phenomenon easily witnessed in any large-scale housing bubble.  
So instead of relying on the detailed analysis of data, retail investors and copycat organizations 
use narratives to guide their decision-making. While these players are certainly producers of 
narratives in their own sense-making efforts, they are also consumers of narratives in that they rely 
on existing narratives in the market as a key source of information. That is to say, narratives also 
serve as a form of communication, as a sense-giving currency. Such an observation has been 
similarly made by Akerlof and Shiller (2009), who state, “stories do not merely explain the facts; 
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they are the facts” (p. 54, emphasis in original), and narrative scholar Torill Moen (2006), who 
contends, “not only are we continually producing narratives to order and structure our life 
experiences, we are also constantly being bombarded with narratives from the social world we live 
in” (p. 56).  
The importance of narratives to retail investors and copycat organizations can also be inferred 
from numerous studies that have linked the advent of newspapers and media bias to the spread of 
speculative bubbles (e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 2009; Hartz and Steger, 2010; Shiller, 2005). Even 
dating back to the 1700s, accounts reveal how John Law carefully released reports on the discovery 
of gold and silver mines in order to fuel speculative interest in the Mississippi Company (Bammer, 
2002; Sheeran and Spain, 2004). Then, as news of fortunes being made in his scheme reached 
England, organizers of the South Sea Company, along with the British government, made every 
attempt to imitate Law’s techniques (ibid.).   
2.4.3 Global investment environment  
Lastly, today’s internationalized, high-speed investment environment, the environment in which 
asset bubbles are increasing in both size and frequency, makes narratives highly influential—on a 
global scale
6
. The influence of narratives in such an environment stems from the fact that investors 
have seemingly endless investment opportunities and information on which to base their decisions 
but limited time in which to make these decisions. The increasing internationalization of investment 
options is a well acknowledged trend of the past fifty years and is clearly demonstrated by tales of 
the recent housing bubble in which, for example, suburban school districts in Minneapolis were 
investing in off-balance sheet, structured investment vehicles (SIV) in Düsseldorf, Germany (Tett, 
2009, p. 175). Also widely known, today’s computer-based trading systems require faster, almost 
instant in some cases, decision-making. Over ten years ago, Oberlechner and Hocking noted in their 
study of trading activities (2004, p. 421), “new trading and information technologies…are 
demanding faster decisions and leave less time for mindful thinking and processing of information.”  
In an environment with endless choices and limited time in which to make decisions, the role of 
narratives can quickly trump that of logico-scientific thought. This is simply because narratives are 
so effective at attracting our attention and, by doing so, both limit and guide our decision-making. 
Stories and narratives attract our attention because they do not merely list or present facts but rather 
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 That is not to say that the current environment is the only period of internationalized investment. Further supporting 
the claim that periods of internationalized investment correspond with asset bubbles, Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2013) 
large-scale study revealed that, since 1800, “periods of high international capital mobility have repeatedly produced 
international banking crises” (p. 155).  
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they represent facts in an elegant and artistic way (Smith and Anderson, 2004). Through their 
cohesiveness and artistry, narratives are more easily learned and remembered than raw data or 
information (Shaw, Brown, and Bromiley, 1998), which allows narratives to spread quickly, 
especially to non-professional investors.  
Looking back at some of the largest bubbles of the past hundred years, it is easy to identify this 
artistry and appeal. For instance, one of the fastest-selling books of the 1980s was Ezra Vogel’s 
(1979) “Japan as Number One: Lessons for America,” while the 1990s gave rise to the “Asian 
economic miracle,” led by the “four Asian tigers” of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and 
Taiwan. Larger, economy-wide narratives also make smaller, individual company or project 
narratives much more appealing and believable. For example, it is doubtful that Enron’s 
announcement that it would be creating markets in bandwidth trading would have generated such 
excitement without the world believing that developed nations were entering a new, service-based 
economy driven by information technology.  
2.4.4 Discussion  
Unfortunately, despite the influential role of narratives in market speculation, narrative studies on 
these events remain sparse, with many existing studies only indirectly investigating this relationship. 
For example, Hartz and Steger’s (2010) study is directly concerned with corporate governance in 
the late 1990s, but their narrative analysis also provides insight into broader social trends during the 
dotcom bubble. Similarly, Martens and co-authors (2007) explore the relationship between IPO 
narratives and resource acquisition, a study that indirectly provides insight into sense making during 
the dotcom bubble. Other authors and studies have noted a clear link between news, stories, or 
rhetoric and the emergence of asset bubbles (e.g., Akerlof and Shiller, 2009; Bhattacharya et al., 
2009; Hansen, 2014; Shiller, 2005), while some scholars have even made direct appeals for 
discursive research on such events (e.g., Munir, 2011).  
Strongly supporting the need for such research is Roy and Kemme’s (2012) historical study of 
banking crises, in which they conclude, “Bubbles, while perhaps initiated by changing economic 
fundamentals, can very well build up over a length of time only due to popular stories and self-
fulfilling expectations about indefinite future increases in asset prices” (p. 292, emphasis in 
original). However, aside from the knowledge that a vital link exists and a handful of anecdotal 
examples of this link, we still lack any deep theoretical development on the role that narratives play 
in asset bubbles.  
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To summarize, in this chapter I have demonstrated how common and destructive asset bubbles 
have become. Due to these factors, asset bubbles have received unprecedented attention in recent 
years and have been the subject of numerous studies from a range of academic disciplines. However, 
despite these efforts, many scholars still feel as though we know so very little about these 
speculative events. In this last section, I have argued that narratives and narrative thought play a 
crucial role in financial decision-making during speculative bouts. Somewhat surprisingly though, 
narratives have received very little scholarly attention in their relation to asset bubble formation. 
Thus, in order to make substantial progress towards better understanding asset bubbles, we need to 
develop a much more nuanced and in-depth understanding of the precise role that narratives play 
during these events. This observation serves as the primary motivation behind this thesis.  
In the next chapter, I build on the above discussions of narratives and their role in market 
speculation and develop a novel, institutionalized narrative (I/N) perspective by which scholars can 
further explore the relationship between narratives and asset bubbles. The I/N perspective then 
serves as a sensitizing framework for a multi-staged empirical study, the findings of which are 
reported in Chapters 5 through 9 of this thesis. In Chapter 10, I draw on these findings and outline a 
narrative theory of asset bubble formation.  
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CHAPTER 3: DEVELOPING AN INSTITUTIONALIZED NARRATIVE (I/N) 
PERSPECTIVE OF ASSET BUBBLES 
In this chapter, I outline an alternative perspective of asset bubbles, one that gives prominence to 
the role that narratives play in the emergence, development, and growth of asset bubbles. In 
particular, this perspective highlights the eventual institutionalization of these narratives and thus 
serves as a useful sensitizing framework to help uncover how certain narratives become taken-for-
granted and deeply embedded in our economic, social, and cultural institutions. I refer to this 
perspective as an institutionalized narrative (I/N) perspective of asset bubbles.  
The I/N perspective developed in this chapter serves as the foundation of a multi-staged 
empirical study that is presented in this thesis and thus at this point should only be seen as a 
research lens, as opposed to a formal theory of cause and effect. In Chapter 10, I combine insights 
from my empirical findings with the assumptions of the I/N perspective to generate theoretical 
propositions about the causes of, and possible solutions for, asset bubbles.  
In this chapter, I first provide some background on how the concept of narrative is used in 
academic studies and explain how the concept is specifically employed in this thesis. I then provide 
a brief overview of institutional theory, its various streams of literature, and how it is applied in the 
I/N perspective. In the following two sections I outline the I/N perspective, clarify its processual 
orientation, and explain its theoretical underpinnings. I conclude the chapter by developing the two 
principal research questions of this thesis.  
3.1 Narrative research 
As the term “narrative” is a relatively common and thus broadly defined concept, it has been 
applied in a variety of contexts and forms within the academic community. For instance, Genette 
(1980) notes that narrative can refer to a written or spoken statement, the story or events that make 
up the narrative, or even the act of narrating. An often sticky issue is whether, and to what degree, a 
narrative differs from a mere story. Frequently, the terms are used synonymously (Moen, 2006). 
However, numerous scholars argue that narratives differ in that they must include an element of 
causality or plot whereas stories need only chronologically recount a chain of events (Randall, 1995; 
Tsoukas and Hatch, 2001). While this distinction is not universally agreed upon, there does appear 
to be widespread agreement that a narrative is a form of retrospective sense-making. That is to say, 
narratives are not written in advance of events as would a script, plan, or strategy, but rather they 
are a very natural way of recounting experiences and creating order out of the seemingly endless—
and at times chaotic—sequences of events in the human world (Tsoukas and Hatch, 2001).  
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Narrative research aims to offer a unique and arguably necessary lens through which to study 
human relations. Narrative studies are unique in that they take into account how the above-
mentioned statements, stories, and plots are produced and circulated amongst communities, thus 
providing us with a nuanced view of how small groups, organizations, societies, nations, and even 
the human race as a whole come to understand their natural and socially constructed worlds. 
Providing even more novelty, narrative techniques allow researchers to take into account both 
context (Moen, 2006) and non-human agents (Cooren, 1999).  
As narratives are a primary sense-making tool, context is always present, and this context and 
the stories produced within are frequently pervaded by a range of non-human agents such as 
contracts, rules, objects, procedures, and instruments that we interact with in very important ways. 
As argued by Cooren (1999), non-humans play a vital role in mobilizing human agents. For 
instance, contracts and rules direct employees to act in certain ways, while computers and 
instruments enable and constrain individuals in their daily actions. As these agents are largely 
ignored by other research methods (Cooren, 1999), their inclusion in narrative studies provides a 
unique glimpse into their role in the social construction of our worlds. Also somewhat unique to 
narrative research is the inclusion of temporal issues as an object and context of study. In this sense, 
narrative studies are able to locate observations and meaning in time as opposed to methods that 
ignore the importance of chronology or merely assume that observations are logically valid at all 
times (Czarniawska, 1997). 
The necessity of narrative studies can be traced to numerous observations of the omnipresent 
nature of narratives in human societies (Moen, 2006; Rhodes and Brown, 2005). According to this 
view, narratives are the fundamental means by which communities produce and spread common 
understandings—thus allowing these communities to function, grow, and prosper. According to 
Polkinghorne (1988), on an individual level, people without narratives simply do not exist. Hence, 
if our research efforts fail to acknowledge and investigate the role that narratives play in 
constructing our social worlds, we would accordingly be overlooking the primary method by which 
these worlds are created.  
Aside from the claim that narratives are our central sense-making mechanism, narrative research 
generally rests on a few common assumptions. As alluded to above, a first assumption is that 
narratives are essentially a communal activity. In other words, narratives are not created, maintained, 
elaborated upon, and edited by individuals acting in isolation, but rather they are constructed by 
communities, with some narratives eventually becoming institutionalized in society (a point that 
will be elaborated upon more fully in the following sections). As a result, various narratives become 
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a factual reality that we live amongst and interact with (Cooren, 1999; Fisher, 1985). As these 
stories are produced by human actors, a further assumption is that these stories are deeply infused 
with human experiences, values, audiences, and the like (Moen, 2006). Additionally, as these 
stories are produced by communities, they are also assumed to encode a form of 
“multivoicedness”—meaning that in a very deep and complex manner, narratives carry the voices 
of numerous actors, both past and present.  
As narratives are a sense-making mechanism infused with human thoughts and emotions, they 
are inevitably interpretations. Thus, a challenge for narrative research is that when scholars are 
interpreting narratives, they are ultimately interpreting interpretations. However, such a challenge is 
far from being unique to narrative methods. A final assumption related to this point is that, due to 
narratives being omnipresent and thus seemingly endless in number and variety, no “true” or 
“correct” narrative exists. That is not to say that some narratives cannot be more powerful or 
dominant than others (another point that will soon be elaborated upon), but researchers commonly 
refrain from interpreting narratives as factual, objective statements.  
A major strength of narrative studies is that they allow phenomena to be investigated in their 
given social, cultural, and institutional contexts (Moen, 2006). As argued by Tsoukas and Hatch 
(2001, p. 998), this aspect of narrative methods allows for “a more concrete rendering of causality.” 
With context ever present, narrative enquiries are thus historically located and specifically 
applicable. Tsoukas and Hatch (2001) stress that such a strength enables narrative studies to capture 
the complexity inherent in many organizational settings. 
In spite of these numerous novelties and strengths, however, narrative studies do have a few 
common drawbacks. Foremost amongst these is the subjectivity inherent in narrative analysis. This 
subjectivity can result from a number of factors, such as the researcher’s (or research team’s) 
experience and training, the researcher’s background and worldview, or simply the degree of 
ambiguity found in any given text. While such a critique has been repeatedly voiced over qualitative 
methods in general (Creswell, 1998; Krathwohl, 1998; Miles and Huberman, 1994), even narrative 
scholars acknowledge an “ongoing tension between stories and science” (Rhodes and Brown, 2005, 
p. 167). Perhaps adding to this tension is the multifaceted nature of narrative studies. Similar to the 
broad treatment of the term narrative, a narrative approach can be viewed as a method of inquiry, a 
set of specific methods, a form of data, a frame of reference, and even an entire paradigm (Fisher, 
1989; Moen, 2006; Reissman, 1993). Such a variety of applications has led to some confusion over 
what a narrative study should and should not entail. But perhaps spinning this observation more 
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positively, such a variety has also resulted in a number of highly innovative and customized 
research projects that would not have been possible if everyone followed a set of rigid guidelines.  
The concept of narrative has been previously applied in the field of economics, albeit sparingly 
(Dumez and Jeunemaitre, 2006). In general, many of these studies equate narrative with a form of 
event sequence. For instance, Monnet (2014) follows Romer and Romer’s (1989) narrative 
approach by examining archival meeting minutes of French policymakers. Monnet views the 
narrative of each policy period as the intentions of and decisions made by policymakers. Such a 
treatment of narrative is similar to Paul David’s (1985) classic study on the history of QWERTY, in 
which he used a historical storytelling of the QWERTY keyboard design to legitimize the concept 
of path dependence. While these applications of a narrative concept are certainly useful, they are 
also purely descriptive studies that are prone to what Dumez and Jeunemaitre (2006, p. 34) refer to 
as “partial description.” Pentland (1999) offers a further critique of such studies, claiming that by 
focusing almost solely on event sequences, researchers are excluding the very features needed to 
create explanations. 
Another common treatment of narrative in economics is equating the term to an argument or 
theory that explains a causal relationship. For example, Jonakin (2012) analyzed the narratives that 
economists used to explain away the necessity of free migration amidst a policy environment of 
liberalization and free trade. This treatment is similar to DiMaggio’s (1995) view that theories are 
essentially stories that describe the processes that connect cause and effect. While I cannot disagree 
that theories are essentially narrative in form, such a simplistic treatment of the term narrative 
provides very little, if any, novelty or insight to a researcher’s existing conceptual and 
methodological toolkit. Moreover, a simplistic treatment of narrative hardly allows for any 
systematic study or comparison, which is the ultimate goal of most research.  
In light of the limitations of interpreting a narrative as an event sequence, argument, or theory, 
this thesis employs a much more structured narrative form. Specifically, this thesis employs the 
narrative form identified by Fiol (1989), Pentland (1999), and Hartz and Steger (2010), who follow 
the classic narrative theories set forth by Russian Formalists such as Propp (1958). The choice of 
this form, aside from its popularity amongst scholars of numerous disciplines, lies in its simple yet 
well-structured architecture, a feature that enables a systematic and thorough investigation of almost 
any text. As a result, the empirical study presented in this thesis should be both thorough enough to 
support its findings and structured enough to allow for comparative studies by other scholars.  
According to this form, narratives contain three essential elements: a narrative subject, a 
destinator, and a set of enabling or impeding forces. The narrative subject refers to the “focal 
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actor(s)” (Pentland, 1999) of the narrative. Equivalent terms for such a role include hero and 
protagonist, which are actors that “along with sequence, …provide a thread that ties the events in a 
narrative together” (Pentland, 1999, p. 712). While the narrative subject is often a person, the term 
can be used rather loosely and, for example, refer to companies (Martens et al., 2007) or the entire 
economy (Hartz and Steger, 2010). Fiol (1989) notes that the subject is always seeking an object, 
which is the “ultimate goal that the subject is in search of” (Martens et al., 2007, p. 1109).  
A destinator, also referred to as a sender, is “an extratextual force, the source of the subject’s 
ideology” (Fiol, 1989, p. 279). This element refers to the broader economic, social, and cultural 
context within which the subjects of a narrative are operating (Fiol, 1989). In this sense, a destinator 
is similar to what Pentland (1999) identifies as the “canonical” or evaluative frame of reference, 
which he sees as including “standards against which actions of the characters can be judged” or “a 
sense of what is right and wrong, appropriate or inappropriate” (p. 713). Through the destinator, we 
are able to learn about the values of a particular cultural group at a specific point in time and infer 
how culture guides actions (Pentland, 1999).  
For example, in their study of corporate governance in Germany, Hartz and Steger (2010) 
identify the “invisible hand” as the sender when the economy was expanding and the “moral needs 
of economy” as the sender when the economy was contracting. Thus, when the German economy 
was expanding in the late 1990s, corporate governance was justified as being relatively amoral and 
focusing on traditional measures of profit and growth. In contrast, as growth tapered off and 
accounts of large and, in some industries, systemic fraud were increasingly reported in the German 
media, the Germany public started to demand more honest corporate behavior and stable corporate 
results. Consequently, corporate governance was now viewed as one of the primary mechanisms by 
which to monitor the morality and long-term stability of a company’s affairs.  
Lastly, enabling and impeding forces refer to any of a wide variety of forces that either help or 
hinder the subject in acquiring their desired object (Fiol, 1989). For instance, enabling forces can 
include capital market structures and close relationships with vendors, while impeding forces can 
include public greed and old-fashioned, out-dated modes of thought (Hartz and Steger, 2010; 
Martens et al., 2007). As evident from these examples, enabling and impeding forces need not be 
actors in the traditional sense (Fiol, 1989).  
Ultimately, a narrative is fully present when an implicit or explicit sequencing of events (Barry 
and Elmes, 1997; Czarniawska, 1998), or plot, arises in which a narrative subject seeks to acquire 
an object under the context of a certain destinator and being both (either) aided and (or) impeded by 
other forces. To the reader or listener, these narratives can possess various tonalities, which refers to 
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the connotation of the story as positive or negative (in other words, determining whether the subject 
is judged in a positive or negative manner) (Fiol, 1989). While other features can certainly be added 
to narrative analysis and increase the overall accuracy of the narrative in question, such additions 
usually come at the cost of simplicity and generality (Pentland, 1999). Moreover, adding excessive 
features greatly increases the risk of a researcher “forcing” a text into a given narrative structure, 
thereby reducing the reliability of the analytical process.   
3.2 Institutional theory 
The second cornerstone of the I/N perspective is its grounding in institutional theory. Institutions 
are socially constructed, established rules and conventions that govern our collective thoughts, 
intentions, and behaviors (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Cornelissen et al., 2015; Searle, 1995). 
These rules and conventions are both formal and informal and include, for instance, regulations, 
laws, norms, beliefs, taboos, and sanctions (North, 1991; Scott, 1995). Institutions are the very 
context in which individuals think, speak, and act (Schmidt, 2008). However, institutions are not 
only external to individual agents, for institutions are created, negotiated, maintained, and torn 
down by the thoughts, words, and actions of those same agents. In this sense, institutions are also 
internal to individuals and thus context can never be detached from the agents that operate in it. 
Institutions are thus quite distinct from organizations (North, 1991). While organizations 
represent groups of individuals with a common purpose, institutions operate at a higher level. They 
are our shared cultural systems (Schneiberg and Clemens, 2006), the taken-for-granted “facts,” 
organizational forms, and practices that define what is acceptable and appropriate in any given 
setting (DiMaggio and Zukin, 1990). As such, institutions provide a context—a frame of action—in 
which organizations emerge, operate, compete, and thrive. Institutions define reality for both 
individuals and organizations, providing stability and meaning to our social worlds (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995).  
As they define our social worlds, institutions are pervasive, affecting individuals, groups, and 
organizations in all modern societies (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; North, 1991; Searle, 1995). As 
they define what is acceptable and appropriate, institutions play a powerful role in influencing 
behavior as they constrain, facilitate, and reward various behaviors (Campbell, 2007). North (1991) 
argues that institutions are what make trade, or least the gains from trade, possible. He reasons that 
without institutions, transaction and production costs would make it uneconomic to swap with 
foreign, unknown parties. In a similar vein, Phillips and coauthors (2004, pp. 637–638) review how 
departures from institutional norms are costly, for these departures involve extra risk, are time-
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consuming, and are cognitively and physically much more difficult than the status quo. Hence, 
institutions compel both individuals and organizations to seek legitimacy and social conformity. As 
such, institutional norms become self-policing systems of social control (Douglas, 1986). 
The theory underlying the study of institutions, institutional theory, incorporates an overlapping 
and eclectic stream of research. A small sample of this stream includes research on institutional 
myths (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zilber, 2006), institutional logics (Ocasio, Loewenstein, and 
Nigam, 2015), discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2008), various forms of institutionalization and 
deinstitutionalization (Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001; Maguire and Hardy, 2009; Zajac and 
Westphal, 2004), and critical institutionalism (Peukert, 2010). Generally speaking, these examples 
are forms of “neo-institutionalism,” which adopts a culturally-based, sociological view of 
institutions, that can be contrasted with “new institutionalism,” which is derived from economic and 
political science theory and is frequently grounded in assumptions of rational thought and utility 
maximization (for further explanation and clarification, see Schneiberg and Clemens, 2006). 
A neo-institutionalist perspective, as is applied in this thesis, seeks to understand and explain 
how individual and collective cognition are related to the macrolevel features of institutions 
(DiMaggio, 1997). Neo-institutionalist studies strive to identify and probe shared thought structures 
that constitute legitimate ways of acting in various social settings (Cornelissen et al., 2015; 
Schneiberg and Clemens, 2006). Thus, such studies attempt to explain the endurance of and change 
in institutions, which in turn provides us with a better understanding of how individual action is 
derived from shared cultural systems. 
Given these features, neo-institutional theory is seen as a strong response to the overemphasis in 
many strands of research on individual agency and a neglect of societal structures and context 
(Schmidt, 2008). As argued for in this thesis, institutional theory rejects the reductionism that is 
commonly found in behaviorist and microeconomic theories and allows (in the view of some, 
requires) researchers to link different levels of analysis (Schneiberg and Clemens, 2006). 
One of the most commonly studied aspects of institutional reality is institutionalization, which 
can be described as a process by which “structures, policies, and practices acquire social legitimacy 
and ultimately become taken-for-granted as normatively appropriate in a population” (Zajac and 
Westphal, 2004, p. 433). In other words, institutionalized practices are those that are deeply 
embedded in our society, practices that move from “This is one way of doing something” to “This is 
how we always do something,” “This is how something should be done,” or “This is how something 
must be done.” Such practices ultimately take on a rulelike status in social thought (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977). 
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Studies of institutionalization investigate how meanings spread, diffuse, and are negotiated and 
reshaped over time (Zilber, 2006). That is to say, institutionalization cannot be seen as a simplistic 
process by which one idea or practice becomes uniformly adopted throughout a society. Rather, 
institutionalization is viewed as a rather complex process in which practices are constantly being 
understood, interpreted, and reproduced—often with slight variations—by a diverse range of actors 
in a diverse set of social conditions. As can be inferred, institutionalization is acknowledged to be a 
political process where actors with more power yield greater influence on institutionalized acts 
(Lawrence, Leca, and Zilber, 2013; Riaz, Buchanan, and Bapuji, 2011; Rojas, 2010). 
The “taken-for-granted” aspect of institutionalized practices can be demonstrated in a number of 
ways but is commonly understood as an absence of discussion on a certain practice (Schneiberg and 
Clemens, 2006). Hence, once an idea or rule acquires widespread legitimacy, people simply stop 
fighting over it and debate largely ceases (ibid.). That is not to say that institutionalized acts are 
always, or even usually, the “best” way to do something. In an institutional sense, what is viewed as 
appropriate in any given social setting is not based solely on individual cognition and careful 
deliberation but rather follows from cognitive scripts that are readily shared across society 
(DiMaggio, 1997). 
Scott (1995) distinguishes three aspects or “pillars” of institutionalization—the cognitive, 
normative, and regulative—that establish legitimacy and secure conformity to various practices. 
The cognitive pillar defines the prevailing orthodoxy (Scott, 1995), under which conformity 
becomes automatic and even unconscious as cultural support leads to practices being unquestioned 
(Hoffman, 1999). Deviance from the cognitive pillar is often met with a lack of comprehension, and 
alternatives are treated as irrational (Schneiberg and Clemens, 2006). The normative pillar refers to 
values and norms that result from social expectations and moral obligations (Scott, 1995). This 
pillar defines what is appropriate or expected in social situations (Wicks, 2001) and thus plays a 
large role in influencing behavior and producing conformity (Caronna, 2004). Alternatives to the 
normative pillar are viewed as dangerous, while deviance—although legal—is still punished as a 
violation of taboo (Schneiberg and Clemens, 2006).  
Lastly, the regulative pillar refers to established rules and laws that coerce and constrain certain 
actions and behaviors (Caronna, 2004). As actors seek to avoid penalties associated with non-
compliance, regulatory acts can be very powerful forces of institutionalization (Hoffman, 1999). 
While each pillar is known to be informative and influential on its own, the three pillars are now 
generally understood to be overlapping as, for example, regulative policies tend to incorporate both 
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cognitive and normative ideas (Schmidt, 2008). Despite this overlap, however, each pillar can 
potentially become dominant over the others (Hoffman, 1999).  
Of late, this focus on institutionalization has morphed into broader institutional processes, 
including processes of deinstitutionalization and institutional change. While the concepts are similar 
and overlapping in many cases, deinstitutionalization refers to the process by which previously 
institutionalized practices are abandoned (Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001; Davis, Diekmann, and 
Tinsley, 1994; Maguire and Hardy, 2009), while institutional change refers to the process by which 
one institution is replaced by another (Colomy, 1998; Ocasio et al., 2015). These studies are based 
on the common assumption that institutions are always under threat (Oliver, 1992), for institutional 
acts and practices are repeatedly subject to variation, conflict, deviance, and debate (Schneiberg and 
Clemens, 2006). 
Due to such pressures, institutions require maintenance in order to resist change (Martí and 
Fernández, 2013; Micelotta and Washington, 2013; Zucker, 1977). Shifting circumstances can 
further undermine the hegemony of existing institutions (Schneiberg and Clemens, 2006, p. 218), 
while marginalized actors—often the source of “institutional entrepreneurs” (Colomy, 1998)—seek 
to instigate change by introducing counter narratives and organizing social movements (Schneiberg 
and Clemens, 2006). Such dynamics serve as further evidence of the complexity and dynamism of 
institutional reality. 
3.3 The institutionalized narrative (I/N) perspective of asset bubbles 
In this section, I illustrate how the above concepts of narratives and institutional theory are 
combined to create an institutionalized narrative (I/N) perspective of asset bubble formation. This 
perspective then guides the empirical component of this thesis.  
The I/N perspective of asset bubbles views bubbles as emerging through the creation of a boom 
narrative, as developing through the formation of a collective boom narrative, and as growing 
through the institutionalization of that narrative. Below, I discuss and illustrate each of these three 
stages. Again, it should be noted that the following is not “proof” of a theory of causation but rather 
the development of a research lens and sensitizing mechanism that should enable detailed and 
provocative narrative studies on these events. Thus, instead of proposing a theory for empirical 
testing, this section develops a framework that can guide the collection and analysis of data and can 
then be used to create a dialectics with those results.  
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That being said, the features and focus of the I/N perspective are supported by a wealth of 
historical and scholarly evidence (as discussed in the previous chapter). In other words, the I/N 
perspective may also be understood as a translation of historical and scholarly accounts of asset 
bubbles into narrative and institutional language. 
3.3.1 The creation of a boom narrative  
Under this perspective, the first stage of a bubble can be understood as an innocuous, but still 
dynamic, state of competing narratives. In this stage, an asset is subject to several well-cited 
narrative interpretations, each with its own unique account of various facts, figures, events, and so 
on. Just as an organization can be understood as a multiplicity of different stories (Boje, 1995; 
Cooren, 1999), many assets are associated with such a wealth of information and variance of 
opinion that there can seem to be almost as many narratives as there are investors. Thus, while some 
investors may view the asset as capable of providing steady returns, an equally large number of 
investors may view the same asset as risky with little potential for large-scale growth. Such a state 
is likely for assets that have yet to receive much attention in the media or elsewhere, such as stocks 
in young, relatively unknown companies. In this stage, for there to be any chance of a bubble 
eventually growing, one of the narratives to emerge must be one that leads investors to expect 
significant capital gains, which will be referred to as a boom narrative.  
For example, a narrative may emerge that sees housing in downtown Los Angeles (narrative 
subject) as a great investment (meaning it will be subject to increased demand and capital gains, its 
object or ultimate goal) due to factors such as increased migration, a boom in the entertainment 
industry, and the likelihood of strict government controls of nearby land development (enabling 
forces). At this stage, however, large rises in LA home prices are unlikely as a large number of 
potential investors still view LA housing as risky, destined to drop in value, or only likely to 
provide incremental returns through rent. In contrast to the boom narrative above, these views are 
supported by the observation of a number of impeding forces, such as low growth in the per capita 
income of LA residents, strict mortgage down payment requirements, or increased inner city crime 
driving wealthier residents into the suburbs.  
3.3.2 Formation of a collective boom narrative  
The second stage of a bubble can be understood as a slightly more dangerous stage in which one of 
the narratives concerning an individual asset becomes widely shared amongst a significantly large 
group of investors. In this stage, potentially due to the overall connectedness of a community 
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(Boyce, 1995) along with the aesthetic appeal of the narrative (Taylor, Fisher, and Dufresne, 2002), 
one of the narratives becomes dominant while others are marginalized (Boje, 1995). As such, a 
large percentage of investors will view the asset in a similar manner and fluctuations in the asset’s 
price in response to various events or news will become more predictable. For instance, a stock 
(subject) may be referred to as a “blue chip stock” by a large group of investors, meaning they 
expect steady, reliable returns (object) due to the company’s experience, size, and reputation 
(enabling forces). As a result, individual news items about the company can now be easily 
interpreted against the backdrop of a blue chip narrative.  
Of course, what is dangerous about this stage is the possibility of a boom narrative becoming 
shared by a large group of investors, which will be referred to as a collective boom narrative. When 
this happens, an asset’s price is very likely to rise beyond previous expectations due to the large 
number of investors who act upon the belief that the asset will generate significant capital gains.  
Returning to the LA example, at this stage a large group of property developers may start to 
enthusiastically bid up prices of land sales in the area, all with the same prediction that home prices 
will rise substantially in five years’ time when construction is complete. However, at this stage, 
while downtown LA may undergo a small or brief real estate bubble, a large-scale nationwide 
housing bubble is unlikely to develop. This is because 1) a significant number of investors still do 
not share the same boom narrative and instead retain their competing narratives, thus keeping price 
gains somewhat muted, even in LA; 2) the narrative still needs to be translated to contexts outside 
of LA, which may not be experiencing commercial booms or subject to strict land controls; 3) the 
narrative is still open to critique in light of any new information; and 4) the narrative is still 
confined to a (largely) professional community of investors, limiting its spread. 
3.3.3 Institutionalization of a boom narrative  
The final, most dangerous, stage of an asset bubble is one in which a collective narrative becomes 
institutionalized. Relevant to this perspective, a narrative becomes institutionalized when it moves 
from an interpretation of an asset to the context of an asset—in narrative terms, becoming a 
destinator. For example, stocks listed on the Dow Jones are not interpreted as blue-chip stocks—
they are blue-chip stocks. While the debate of how blue-chip stocks in general are going to perform 
this year is still open for debate, the categorization of stocks on the Dow Jones as blue-chip stocks 
is essentially closed for debate. Therefore, when a stock is listed on the Dow Jones, it immediately 
becomes easier to interpret, analyze, communicate, and sell—especially to non-professional 
investors.  
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One can easily translate these implications to the situation in which a collective boom narrative 
becomes institutionalized, referred to here as an institutionalized boom narrative. When a boom 
narrative becomes institutionalized, the belief that a certain asset will achieve significant capital 
gains becomes broadly accepted as socially legitimate and normatively appropriate. During such a 
process, the narrative is likely to undergo what Earl, Peng, and Potts (2007) refer to as decision-rule 
cascades, meaning the rule or reason for making a decision becomes increasingly simplified as it 
spreads throughout society, losing the details and qualifications once regarded as central to the rule. 
As a result of this simplification, the narrative can now transcend specific situations and be applied 
much more broadly than its original form or intention—thus fueling its reproduction (Ocasio et al., 
2015).  
Returning one last time to the LA housing example, at this stage the narrative that “Home prices 
will go up in LA due to reasons a, b, and c” becomes “Home prices (in general) always go up”, 
“Home prices should go up” (meaning it is good for the economy and home owners), and/or “Home 
prices must go up” (meaning the government should intervene if prices drop, for a drop in home 
prices will severely damage economic activity). When such a transition happens, one can easily see 
how 1) competing narratives about homes as an investment will either be ignored or quickly 
rebutted, for competing narratives seem to argue in favor of damaging the economy and hurting 
home owners; 2) the narrative need not be translated (in any great detail) to any specific context; 3) 
the narrative is no longer open to critique, for the logical reasoning behind it has disappeared; and 4) 
in its simplified form, the narrative can easily spread to the non-professional investment community. 
In such a context, a rapid, nationwide rise in home prices becomes a very real possibility. 
3.3.4 Discussion  
A relevant question that arises here is how to define an asset bubble under the I/N perspective. Two 
points can be made, which leads us to the answer. First, the simple existence of a boom narrative 
certainly does not constitute an asset bubble. While this narrative may lead a handful of investors to 
aggressively bid for a certain asset, the existence of numerous other popular narratives mutes or 
cancels out any rapid rise in the asset’s value. Only in a limited number of situations could one or a 
few investors significantly alter the price of an asset. For example, the prices of certain one-of-a-
kind memorabilia, landmarks, and even brands can rise dramatically due to the whims of one or a 
few investors. However, these situations are akin to the price swings in fashion accessories offered 
in Chapter 2 and are far from the types of wild price fluctuations that concern policy makers. 
Second, a collective boom narrative, in which an asset is viewed favorably by a large group of 
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investors, could easily constitute a situation where prices rise beyond what is traditionally viewed as 
an asset’s fair, fundamental value.  
However, I would stop short of labeling any price rises in this regard as a bubble, simply 
because this stage refers to a narrative that is based upon the detailed analysis of the asset’s future 
returns and is largely confined to a group of professional investors that are well aware of the risks 
involved. Thus, under the I/N perspective, an asset bubble exists when a boom narrative becomes 
the taken-for-granted context by which investors make decisions. Under such conditions, boom 
narratives become an “inescapable context” in which both individuals and organizations operate 
(Teeter and Sandberg, 2017, p. 92).   
Important here is that such a definition does not require prices to rise by any minimum amount, 
nor does it require prices to fall in a dramatic manner. What it does require is that an asset’s value 
must be supported by the prevailing social, cultural, economic, political, and/or legal institutions of 
society. When looking back on various large-scale bubbles of the past 400 years, it is a relatively 
easy task to identify examples of boom narratives becoming institutionalized. For instance, in the 
1990s, the narrative of an “Asian economic miracle” powered by the “four Asian tigers” was 
adopted in numerous publications by some of the world’s most well-respected financial institutions, 
such as the IMF and World Bank (Page, 1994; Sarel, 1996). Consequently, East Asia’s boom 
narrative was given social legitimacy and ultimately became a taken-for-granted aspect of 
investment in the region. Central to this narrative was the assumption by investors that they ran no 
exchange rate risk in countries with fixed exchange rates—an assumption that encouraged 
international investors to adopt numerous aggressive, and poorly hedged, bets in the region (Kahler, 
1998).  
In the recent housing bubble, a collective narrative formed around the theme that homes were 
“investments that never lost value” (Davis, 2010, p. 75, emphasis in original). Such a view then 
became an assumption that was deeply embedded in the financial community. For example, the 
value at risk (VaR) measurement, which was the most widely used model for valuating risk at 
investment banks at the time, was based on the assumption that home prices could never fall by a 
significant amount nationwide (Campbell, 2010). When this assumption proved to be false, all VaR 
measurements instantaneously became worthless.  
While the I/N perspective is not a theory in the sense that it argues that narratives are the sole or 
most important cause of all asset bubbles, such a perspective does enable researchers to track the 
emergence, development, and growth of a bubble. In addition, the I/N perspective does not stand in 
contradiction to findings from various fields that have identified a litany of factors responsible for 
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the current and recent crises, such as low interest rates (Issing, 2009), fraud (Akerlof and Shiller, 
2009), deregulation (Jain, 2009), financial innovation (Morgan, 2010), cultural shifts (Hirsch and 
Morris, 2010), and agency issues (Friedman, 2011). Rather, the I/N perspective allows researchers 
to analyze how these factors affect the emergence and growth of a boom narrative, for example by 
acting as an enabling force or by ultimately becoming a destinator.  
Nor does the I/N perspective contradict observations of “group think” or “herd behavior” from 
the behavioral sciences. Instead, the I/N perspective suggests that it is the development of a 
commonly shared, and increasingly simplified, narrative that makes group think and herd behavior 
so widespread in financial markets. With most investors falling back on the narrative to guide their 
decisions and other, perhaps more sophisticated, investors “buy[ing] in anticipation of further 
buying by uninformed investors” (DeLong et al., 1990, p. 380), it is easy to understand how herd 
behavior could become so pervasive in the first place.  
Given its ability to track the emergence, development, and growth of asset bubbles, the I/N 
perspective outlined above should serve as a useful sensitizing mechanism for future research on 
these events. Of important note is that the three stages identified above should not be seen as a 
linear, deterministic process of asset bubbles being constantly produced. Instead, the processes by 
which boom narratives emerge, develop, and grow are undoubtedly much more nuanced. 
The I/N perspective is thus much in line with current theory on processual activities, which falls 
under the large umbrella of process theory. Process theory refers to the study of sequences of events, 
choices, relationships, ideas, and activities over time (Langley, 1999; Langley and Tsoukas, 2010). 
The ultimate aim of process studies is to understand the patterns in events and why things evolve 
over time in specific ways (Van de Ven and Huber, 1990; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). To probe 
into the evolution of events, process studies investigate how an issue grows, develops, and 
terminates and focus on how events unfold in situ (thus preferring the gerund “-ing” form of verbs 
such as “choosing” over “chose” or “negotiating” over “negotiated”) (Langley and Tsoukas, 2010; 
Welch and Paavilainen-Mäntymäki, 2014). 
The core assumptions underlying process studies are that phenomena have a transient, fluid 
character and experience multidirectional causality, such as through feedback loops (Pettigrew, 
1992; Sminia, 2009; Tourish, 2014). As a result of these assumptions, process studies require 
longitudinal research strategies, where researchers are sensitive to how the unit of analysis changes 
in content and/or shape over time (Monge, 1990). Process studies therefore adopt a rather different 
view of phenomena than most variance studies, which are primarily concerned with how a number 
of independent variables affect one or more dependent variables (for further explanation, see Welch 
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and Paavilainen-Mäntymäki, 2014, p. 4). In contrast, process studies are concerned with how 
sequences of events can help to explain the temporary outcomes of various scenarios (Sminia, 
2009). 
A key distinction to make in process studies is the degree to which one is adopting a “strong” or 
“weak” view of process. A weak or “synoptic” (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002) view of process treats 
processes as reducible to the action of things (Bakken and Hernes, 2006; Chia and Langley, 2004). 
Accordingly, static entities still dominate theoretical development, only their periodic alterations 
and evolutions are explored in greater detail. Conversely, a strong or performative view of process, 
as adopted in this thesis, sees actions and things as instantiations of complex processual movements 
(Chia and Langley, 2004). Under such a view, change is regarded as endemic and constitutive of 
our world (Mesle, 2008).  
Adopting these assumptions, the I/N perspective acknowledges a complex, multidirectional flow 
of information between various agents but argues that a broader sequence of phases is crucial in 
understanding the narrative component of asset bubble formation. While it could be argued that 
processes are much too complex to allow for such a view, studies have demonstrated that just a few 
deterministic elements are powerful enough to generate the complexity found in most social 
phenomena (for an overview, see Langley, 1999). However, what is missing from the I/N 
perspective, and what precludes it from theoretical contention, is an explanation of the underlying 
forces and conditions driving the evolution and institutionalization of a boom narrative.  
Later in section 3.5, I return to this issue to discuss some of the unresolved aspects of the I/N 
perspective. Before doing so, in the next section I elaborate on the underlying theoretical stance of 
the I/N perspective, primarily its ontological assumptions about the nature of financial markets.  
3.4 The theoretical underpinnings of the I/N perspective 
As applied in this thesis, the I/N perspective conceptualizes markets, which are arenas where goods, 
services, and monies are exchanged, as complex, socially constructed institutions (Abolafia, 1996). 
Such a conceptualization stands in contrast to the mainstream economics view of markets as price-
setting mechanisms (Biggart and Delbridge, 2004) and is based on the ontological assumptions that 
what we define as reality is in a constant state of social construction and that the construction of 
institutions is primarily a political project undertaken by powerful actors. Below, I elaborate on 
these assumptions.  
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The central premise underlying a social constructionist account (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; 
Gergen, 1994) of market behavior is that reality, in particular “social reality” or “social facts” 
(Searle, 1995), is not objective or given but is socially constructed in an ongoing process of actions 
and negotiations. In this sense, knowledge is viewed as produced not by individuals but through 
social interactions, while language is not seen as representing reality but as another part of reality 
that is socially constructed (Sandberg, 2001). As applied to the context of market behavior, 
“individual economic activities, such as speculation, are enacted in the context of social 
relationships, cultural idioms and political and economic institutions” (Abolafia, 2010a, p. 95). That 
is to say, financial decision-making is seen as constrained, shaped, and encouraged through social 
interactions, rather than solely based upon rational assessments of fundamental values.  
As can be inferred, a social constructionist account of markets sees values, beliefs, and culture 
as central to understanding markets (Abolafia, 1996; Biggart and Delbridge, 2004; DiMaggio and 
Zukin, 1990). For instance, DiMaggio and Zukin (1990) argue that culture can affect markets by 
influencing the interests of actors, by constraining their options, or by shaping a group’s goals and 
capacity to mobilize. Friedland and Alford (1991) see culture as defining the “logic of action” for 
any given domain, which refers to the domain’s, such as the family or economy, range of acceptable 
goals and strategies. For the economy, it follows that the rational maximization of outcomes based 
upon individual aspirations is not an innate drive but rather a socially defined goal and strategy 
(Abolafia, 1996).  
Under a social constructionist view, markets can only be seen as “stable” due to the creation of 
several institutions that are ultimately rooted in and upheld by the state (Fligstein, 1996). As 
explained by Abolafia (1996, p. 8), “stable and orderly market arrangements are produced and 
reproduced as a result of the purposeful action and interaction of interdependent powerful interests 
competing for control.” Through a never-ending process of negotiation, powerful actors produce 
socially accepted institutional arrangements, which include rules, roles, and relationships, that 
define markets and make market stability possible. 
As highlighted by Fligstein (1996), legally institutionalized rules, such as laws, are never neutral 
and play a highly influential role in determining how markets function and, to a large extent, who 
stands to gain and lose the most given current conditions. As in all states, laws are subject to 
ongoing political contests over their content and applicability, which also includes consideration as 
to the amount of state intervention in the economy (Fligstein, 1996).  
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Central to this thesis is the intersection of these assumptions and the I/N perspective of asset 
bubble formation. Table 3.1 on the next page provides an overview of this intersection. As the I/N 
perspective developed in this thesis is intended for use as a sensitizing mechanism, Table 3.1 also 
identifies areas in need of further investigation. In the following section, I further discuss some of 
the unresolved aspects of the I/N perspective and identify the two related research questions that are 
investigated in the empirical component of this thesis.  
3.5 Formulating the study’s research questions 
The I/N perspective provides a useful framework by which scholars can start to probe deeper into 
the theoretical connections between narratives and bubble episodes. Moving forward, narrative 
research on asset bubbles can take two general, and complementary, approaches: probing the 
origins and existence of narratives behind asset bubbles, and investigating the spread and resilience 
of these narratives.  
Research on the origin and existence of narratives during speculative bouts can be conducted at 
two levels. A first and necessary step is to map out in detail the descriptive features of the narratives, 
primarily those identified in section 3.1, that arise and circulate during these events.  
These descriptive features—such as subject, destinator, and enabling forces—are, however, 
merely descriptive. Moving from descriptive features of boom narratives to theoretical explanations 
of their origins and ultimate existence requires research into their deeper structures (Pentland, 1999).  
The deeper structures of a narrative refer to the voice or point-of-view behind the narrative, the 
narrative’s underlying event templates or storyboards, and, ultimately, the routine and abstract 
processes that give rise to the narrative (Bal, 1985; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). These deeper 
structures raise numerous, and heretofore mostly ignored, questions concerning asset bubbles.  
These questions include “Whose point-of-view is over- or under-represented in a boom 
narrative?”, “What patterns exist amongst history’s more notable boom narratives?”, and “What 
economic and social processes ultimately give rise to the creation of boom narratives?” The answers 
to questions such as these would certainly have direct implications for the forces underlying the 
origin and existence of narratives behind market speculation.  
  
 
Table 3.1  Overview of the I/N Perspective 
Stage Description Major assumptions Examples of unresolved aspects 
Boom narrative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One of the many well-cited 
narratives to emerge is a boom 
narrative, which leads investors to 
expect significant capital gains.  
 
 Reality and knowledge are socially 
constructed phenomena 
 Language does not represent reality, 
it is constructed and helps construct 
reality 
 The interests and options of any 
actor are affected by their culture, 
values, beliefs, relationships, and 
institutions 
 What are the descriptive features of 
historical boom narratives? 
 Whose voice or point-of-view is 
over- or under-represented in 
historical boom narratives? 
 What economic, social, and cultural 
conditions and processes are 
associated with the creation of boom 
narratives? 
 
Collective boom narrative 
 
 
 
 
 
A boom narrative is shared by a 
significantly large group of 
investors 
 A group’s goals and capacity to 
mobilize are affected by their 
culture, values, beliefs, 
relationships, and institutions 
 Why do some boom narratives take 
hold, whereas others wither away? 
 What types of communities or groups 
are more likely to share a boom 
narrative? 
Institutionalized boom 
narrative 
 
 
 
 
 
A boom narrative is 
institutionalized and thus becomes 
the taken-for-granted context by 
which investors make decisions  
 Institutions, which are rooted in the 
state, create market “stability” 
 Powerful actors produce 
institutional arrangements 
 Institutionalized rules are never 
neutral, there are always winners 
and losers 
 How do boom narratives become 
institutionalized? 
 Why do efforts to deinstitutionalize 
boom narratives fail? 
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What is perplexing about boom narratives, though, is not just their origin and existence but their 
ability to spread and infect broad swathes of society. Thus, the most immediate area of concern is 
likely the last stage of the I/N perspective, that being understanding how and why certain boom 
narratives become institutionalized. In other words, if we can better understand how and why these 
narratives become institutionalized, we may be able to better identify the processes by which 
destructive, large-scale bubbles form. Thus, the first and primary research question posed in this 
thesis is: How does a boom narrative become institutionalized? 
As noted in section 2.3, a striking limitation of current research is its lack of explanations of 
why bubbles cannot be “popped” or “deflated” before they grow large enough to result in 
widespread turmoil. Looking at this question through the I/N perspective, one would reply that a 
boom narrative has become institutionalized and thus is already deeply embedded in society. 
However, as already discussed in this chapter, over the past twenty years research on institutional 
theory has provided numerous examples of practices being deinstitutionalized (e.g., Ahmadjian and 
Robinson, 2001; Davis et al., 1994; Maguire and Hardy, 2009). That is to say, Paul Warburg’s 
efforts in 1929 and Alan Greenspan’s warnings in 1996 should be regarded as attempts to 
deinstitutionalize the prevailing narrative, but efforts such as these seem to fail time and again. 
Theoretically, we would expect that as contradicting narratives emerge and spread, processes of 
deinstitutionalization or institutional change are increasingly likely (Ocasio et al., 2015).  
Unfortunately, as this phenomenon has very few successful cases to examine, providing any 
detailed or empirical answer as to why these efforts fail may prove challenging. However, by first 
exploring how a boom narrative becomes institutionalized, this thesis should be able to provide 
some preliminary insight on why bubbles cannot be popped. Thus, the second question asked in this 
thesis is: Why do efforts to deinstitutionalize boom narratives fail? 
These two research questions were investigated as part of a large-scale empirical study, the 
results of which are reported in Chapters 5 through 9. As these two questions are overlapping, they 
are addressed in tandem in this thesis. In the next chapter on research design, I explain how this was 
accomplished.  
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CHAPTER 4: METHOD AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
In this chapter, I outline my case selection, choice of methods, data sources, and analytical 
techniques. These features constitute an overall research design aimed at providing empirical 
evidence supporting answers to the two research questions posed in this thesis. The purpose of this 
chapter is threefold. First, readers are provided with an explanation of the motivation behind the 
design of this project. Second, this chapter enables readers to better understand the procedures and 
techniques behind the findings presented in Chapters 5 through 9 and the theoretical development in 
Chapter 10. Third, and equally important, this chapter should enable any reader to either reconstruct 
this very study or to construct a similar study to test the applicability of my findings across other 
cases.   
This chapter is structured as follows. I first explain my selection of a single case study design 
and, specifically, my choice of the U.S. tech bubble of the 1990s. I then provide some background 
information on the four methods employed in this study, which are an event history database, 
narrative analysis, discourse analysis, and process analysis. I then explain my data sources, while 
leaving the sampling results for their respective chapters. Lastly, I explain the unique form of 
analysis employed in this study, which combines the four methods mentioned above in a novel way 
in order to best answer the study’s research questions.   
4.1 Case selection 
In order to uncover how boom narratives become institutionalized and better understand why efforts 
to deinstitutionalize these narratives fail, I selected the U.S. tech bubble of 1997 to 2000 for 
investigation. Previous studies on bubble episodes from the fields of sociology and organizational 
studies frequently employ a case study design (e.g., Abolafia and Kilduff, 1988; Campbell, 2010; 
MacKenzie, 2003, 2011; Perrow, 2010), with a major strength of these studies being the ability to 
track the historical emergence (or destruction) of certain phenomena. While selecting two or more 
cases would have provided more extensive opportunities for cross-case comparison, extant research 
on institutional change demonstrates the need for researchers to develop a deep and holistic 
understanding of each case under study (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Zilber, 2006). In the final 
chapter of this thesis, Chapter 10, I provide a few suggestions on how researchers can conduct 
similar research on other bubbles to allow for cross-case comparison. 
The U.S. tech bubble was specifically chosen as a case for empirical study for three main 
reasons. First, the tech bubble is a recent, large-scale bubble that involved a number of different 
actors. Therefore, unlike some smaller, isolated events, this bubble cannot be explained as merely 
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resulting from market manipulation, misevaluations, and the like. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the 
tech bubble represents one of the many major speculative events that coincided with a significant 
technological breakthrough, as also seen with rapid advancements in automobile, radio, and 
microelectronic technologies. Therefore, this study provides direct insight into the types of 
narratives that emerge and become institutionalized during these technological transitions. 
Furthermore, the scale of this event ensures that it is well documented by a range of texts and 
historical accounts, which should make the processes underlying the event more “transparently 
observable” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 537).  
Second, the tech bubble represents an instance where—despite countless books and studies on 
the event—the institutional origin of its boom narrative is still unknown. Shiller (2005, Ch. 4) 
comments on how, despite a crash in stock prices in 1987, in the 1990s the notion of stocks being 
the best investment simply took over. Third, the history of the tech bubble includes clear examples 
of failed efforts to deinstitutionalize its boom narrative. For instance, in addition to Greenspan’s 
warning in 1996 of “irrational exuberance,” in the late 1990s numerous news articles started to 
document the apparent herd behavior surrounding tech stocks (Shiller, 2005, Ch. 6). Despite these 
warnings, stocks continued to climb for another four years. It remains unknown why such 
prominent voices did not have a greater effect.  
4.2 Choice of methods 
This thesis employs a unique combination of narrative analysis, an event history database, discourse 
analysis, and process analysis. The precise order, execution, and combination of these methods are 
fully described in the analysis section, section 4.4. Below, I first provide an overview of the 
motivation for and some necessary background information on each method.  
Section 3.1 in the previous chapter provides an explanation of the motivation for this study’s 
narrative form
7
. This narrative form thus serves as one of the central methods employed in this 
thesis, as I identified the connotation of various texts and the narratives within according to their 
subject, object, destinator, enabling forces, and impeding forces. This is a basic type of narrative 
analysis, which is essentially identifying the tonality and descriptive features of a narrative. As 
explained in section 3.1, narrative analysis can take on many forms, and, as discussed in section 3.4, 
other narrative techniques can be used to probe into the ultimate origins of any given narrative. 
However, this study is primarily concerned with the eventual institutionalization (and failed 
                                                 
7
 To clarify, section 3.1 describes this study’s narrative form, while section 3.3 utilizes this form to develop a unique 
narrative perspective (the I/N perspective) by which to investigate asset bubbles. 
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deinstitutionalization) of these narratives. Hence, after mapping the various narratives present in the 
sample texts, these narratives then became the unit of analysis for an institutional investigation.  
An event history database (e.g., Langevoort, 2007; MacKenzie, 2011), discourse analysis 
(Foucault, 1972a; Potter and Wetherell, 1987), and process analysis (Langley, 1999; Langley and 
Tsoukas, 2010) were chosen as the methods by which to analyze the institutionalization and failed 
deinstitutionalization of the tech bubble’s boom narratives.  
Given its focus on analyzing interrelated texts that “cohere in some way to produce both 
meanings and effects in the real world” (Carabine, 2001, p. 268), discourse analysis is particularly 
well suited to investigate the development and spread of narratives. Discourse analysis is also one 
of the most commonly used methods to uncover institutional processes (Maguire and Hardy, 2009; 
Phillips et al., 2004; Schmidt, 2008; Schneiberg and Clemens, 2006; Selsky, Spicer, and Teicher, 
2003). However, institutional studies that rely solely on discursive analysis are often criticized for 
ignoring the prevailing historical, cultural, and social structures of the time (Heracleous and Hendry, 
2000). Numerous scholars have argued that discourses must always be viewed in context, for texts 
are entirely dependent upon society and history for their resources and their meanings can never be 
detached from their situational context (Fairclough, 1992; Hartz and Steger, 2010; Leitch and 
Palmer, 2010; Taylor et al., 1996). In addition, as institutionalization and deinstitutionalization are 
both processes of change (as highlighted in the previous chapter), studying these phenomena 
requires acute attention to the underlying sequences, patterns, fluidity, and multidirectional 
causality at play
8
. Therefore, in order to establish the historical and social background of the tech 
bubble and the connections between discourse and context over time, this study combines discourse 
analysis with an event history database and process analysis. Below, I further elaborate on these 
three methods. 
Discourse analysis is the systematic analysis of discourse, which can be referred to as a group 
of statements found in texts that describe a particular object, subject, or event (Foucault, 1972a). In 
discourse analysis, both the words “statement” and “text” are understood rather broadly, as 
statements refer to not only sentences but also calculations, graphs, and pictures (ibid.), while texts 
can include documents, books, media accounts, interviews, and speeches—essentially anything that 
takes on “material form and [becomes] accessible to others” (Taylor et al., 1996, p. 7). These texts 
                                                 
8
 My argument here is thus that all studies of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization are inherently process studies. 
That is not to say to that all previously conducted studies of these phenomena properly implement or even acknowledge 
a process perspective. This debate, however, lies far outside the bounds of this thesis (for a similar critique, see Welch 
and Paavilainen-Mäntymäki, 2014). 
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are understood to enable the development of stories, which, taken together, constitute a framework 
that allows certain meanings to emerge. 
Given the broad scope of its definition, discourse analysis can be used in a variety of ways and 
in a wide range of disciplines. For example, linguists tend to view discourse as language use and 
thus frequently investigate discourse at a more detailed, micro level (Alvesson and Karreman, 2000), 
whereas sociologists view discourse more as a form of social interaction, leading them to 
concentrate on broader patterns and contexts within discourses (van Dijk, 1993). In addition, 
scholars can choose to adopt a neutral stance towards the subject matter or take a more critical view 
and analyze how texts create and sustain forms of social dominance by some groups over others 
(Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000; Fairclough, 1992; van Dijk, 1993). In order to unveil how boom 
narratives become institutionalized over time, this study adopts a “meso” level of discourse analysis, 
which is “relatively sensitive to language use in context but interested in finding broader patterns 
and going beyond details of the text and generalizing to similar local contexts” (Alvesson and 
Karreman, 2000, p. 1133).  
As already mentioned, discourse analysis is frequently used to study institutional processes, 
including instances of deinstitutionalization (Maguire and Hardy, 2009). The importance of 
language and discourse has long been stressed by institutional scholars (Berger and Luckmann, 
1966; Searle, 1995), for discourses are interpreted as not only referring to but also forming the 
objects of which they speak (Foucault, 1972a). Berger and Luckmann (1966) view language as “the 
most important sign system of human society” (p. 35) because it “continuously provides [one] with 
the necessary objectifications and posits the order within which these make sense and within which 
everyday life has meaning” (p. 21). Searle (1995) sees language as “essentially constitutive of 
institutional reality” (p. 59), noting that “in order to have institutional facts at all, a society must 
have at least a primitive form of language” (p. 60). 
Under neo-institutional theory, discourse is viewed as one of the primary means of 
institutionalization, deinstitutionalization, and institutional change. Although agents are always 
subject to the rules of institutional reality, they are always capable of thinking, speaking, and acting 
outside of those institutions (Colomy, 1998; DiMaggio, 1997). In direct relation to this thesis, 
Colomy (1998, p. 289) reviews how institutional entrepreneurs frequently present their accounts in 
narrative form. As narratives are capable of entertaining, instructing, persuading, examining, and 
indicting, they are able to effectively discredit existing institutions and legitimize new programs 
(ibid.). Thus, while discourse is never a perfect representation of cognition (Cornelissen et al., 2015; 
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Schneiberg and Clemens, 2006), discursive output is one of the best sources of documentation of 
institutional features.  
Phillips and colleagues (2004) criticize institutional scholars for giving too much weight to 
patterns of action, arguing that “it is not action per se that provides the basis for institutionalization 
but, rather, the texts that describe and communicate those actions” (p. 635). The authors provide the 
example of Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou’s (1993) study, which demonstrates how texts used in U.S. 
business schools contributed to the widespread adoption of the multidivisional form by corporations 
in the 1960s. While most discourse analysts agree that discourses are never completely cohesive or 
able to determine social reality by themselves (Foucault, 1972a; Phillips et al., 2004; Schmidt, 2008; 
Selsky et al., 2003), discourse is commonly viewed as a dominant social force that shapes and 
constrains ideas and actions—while also providing “particularly good indicators of social change” 
(Fairclough, 1992, p. 211).  
An event history database is a typical method used to study the social construction of various 
phenomena, such as legislative acts (Langevoort, 2007), social problems (Lopata, 1984), economic 
crises (MacKenzie, 2003, 2011), and asset bubbles (Abolafia and Kilduff, 1988). As its name 
suggests, this technique is concerned with chronologically mapping the significant events, actors, 
modes of thinking, policies, practices, cultural shifts, and/or social institutions associated with a 
particular phenomenon. For example, in his analysis of the evaluation practices of financial 
instruments leading up the credit crisis of 2008, MacKenzie (2011) documents how asset-backed 
securities (ABSs), despite being structurally similar to other collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), 
came to be evaluated in two separate stages, a process that sidelined previously important 
gatekeepers. 
Lastly, process analysis is an overarching term that refers to a multitude of ways by which 
scholars can probe into the processual evolution of various phenomena (for an overview, see 
Langley, 1999). While diverse in their methodologies and their application of the term “process,” 
these analytical techniques share a common goal of identifying the basic mechanisms that drive 
patterns of events (Tourish, 2014; Welch and Paavilainen-Mäntymäki, 2014). 
This study employs two forms of process analysis. First, it employs a story or narrative strategy 
(Langley, 1999, p. 695). This technique involves constructing a detailed story from the raw data, 
where the researcher organizes the various levels of data chronologically. This technique allows the 
researcher to clarify sequences of events, propose causal linkages, and identify early analytical 
themes (Pettigrew, 1990, p. 280). A chronological story strategy, which is also a typical 
ethnographic tool (Van Maanen, 1988), preserves the detail and context of the data. Due to this 
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preservation, a story strategy is often a preliminary process tool by which researchers can organize 
and further probe into the data (Langley, 1999).  
A second process technique used in this study is temporal bracketing (Langley, 1999, p. 703). 
Temporal bracketing involves demarcating the data according to successive periods or phases. 
These phases do not represent a theory in themselves, but they structure the chronological data in a 
logical way and allow the researcher to further probe how a phenomenon evolves over time (ibid.). 
Phases are organized according to the principle of continuity, where events and ideas that express 
continuity are grouped together and periods of discontinuity are highlighted (Langley and Truax, 
1994). Of important note, these phases do not necessarily represent predictive sequences. Instead, 
they further structure the data to allow for theoretical abstraction, particularly of feedback processes, 
multidirectional flow, and underlying, causal forces.  
4.3 Collecting data 
Data for the event history database consisted primarily of books on the tech bubble but was also 
supplemented with articles from leading news outlets and academic journals in the fields of 
economics, business, law, and sociology. All data sources for the event history database are given in 
in-text citations.  
For narrative, discourse, and process analysis, texts on technology stocks were gathered from 
1987 until the bubble’s bursting in 2000. While the tech bubble did not start until the mid 1990s, I 
chose 1987 as the starting year due to it being the year of the last stock market crash before the tech 
bubble, which enabled me to better observe the reemergence of interest in stocks and the historical 
processes by which a boom narrative was institutionalized (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Also, 
while stock and tech narratives certainly continued after the bubble burst in 2000, the study of these 
narratives is not of direct relevance to the research questions posed in this thesis.  
It is important to stress that this study is not concerned with the public’s interest in stocks in 
general, which certainly would be influenced by a range of historical events dating back to and even 
preceding the creation of the stock market. Rather, this study is aimed at understanding how 
expectations of significant capital gains in tech stocks in the 1990s become a taken-for-granted 
aspect of investment.  
The selection of these texts was guided by the three “pillars” of institutionalization—the 
cognitive, normative, and regulative. In the remainder of this section, I provide an overview of each 
pillar’s corresponding population dataset. For each population dataset, samples were then taken, the 
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process of which was analytical in nature and thus is explained in the analysis section. In total, the 
sampling process resulted in 400 institutional texts (approximately 4,000 pages of raw data). 
An important overarching objective of my text selection was to strive to select texts representing 
a conservative, “higher level” of institutionalization. In other words, I sought to include sources that, 
by their very design and place in society, aim to be prudent and cautious in their discourse and 
decision-making. Thus, by understanding the narratives and their change over time at these sources, 
two conclusions can be argued. First, that the boom narratives, if present, at these sources would 
certainly be present at less conservative and cautious sources and represent a conservative estimate 
of the trends that occurred during the 1990s.  
Second, these sources would have a much greater institutional effect, for they represent 
centrally-located and highly trusted sources of information and discourse by both professional, 
institutional investors and non-professional, retail investors. As these sources would have greater 
resource power and formal authority, discourse at these sources often results in actions of great 
consequence for broader society (Phillips et al., 2004). Below, I elaborate on this concept for each 
pillar’s text selection. 
4.3.1 Cognitive pillar   
Various sources of discourse could be used to represent the cognitive pillar of discourse, such as 
academic texts, research publications, or texts produced by international economic and financial 
bodies, such as the IMF. For this thesis, I instead chose to analyze texts from the U.S. Federal 
Reserve, which is the U.S.’s central banking system.  
This decision was made for three reasons. First, the Federal Reserve was one of the most closely 
followed, if not the most closely followed, sources of U.S. economic reporting and forecasting 
during the 1990s—as it was in the decades preceding and following. The Federal Reserve, also 
referred to as “the Fed,” conducts various types of economic research, all of which is highly 
regarded by the nation’s financial institutions and a broad range of investors. Second, not only does 
the Fed possess a high level of discursive power, it also possesses a form of direct control over the 
nation’s economy, for the Fed is responsible for implementing the nation’s monetary policy (for 
information on how this is accomplished, see the Fed’s website at www.federalreserve.gov). Lastly, 
the Federal Reserve also has numerous regulatory and supervisory responsibilities concerning the 
nation’s banks and banking system. For instance, the Fed has responsibilities over setting margin 
requirements and helps to develop federal laws regarding consumer credit. Of important note, the 
Federal Reserve was created in 1913 in direct response to a series of nationwide financial panics. 
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Consequently, the Fed has both historical and obligatory motives to promote economic stability and 
prevent large-scale asset bubbles from forming and bursting.  
For my dataset, I analyzed speeches of Federal Reserve officials, which are likely to be more 
widely read (in this case heard as well) and understood than the Federal Reserve’s detailed 
economic publications. All speeches from the year 1997 onwards were available on the Federal 
Reserve’s website at the time of this project, while speeches from the year 1987 to 1996 were 
obtained via direct request to the Federal Reserve under the Freedom of Information Act.  
4.3.2 Normative pillar   
As noted by Maguire and Hardy (2009, p. 154), the normative aspect of discourse is rather difficult 
to capture, particularly because the normative pillar consists of attention to informal rule systems 
and social expectations. Following the decision of Maguire and Hardy (ibid.) to use newspaper 
articles as an indicator of normative pressures, for this study, the news media discourse was selected 
to represent the normative pillar. As the news media carries with it not only factual descriptions of 
events but also several comments, interpretations, evaluations, and recommendations (Fowler, 1991; 
Kuronen, Tienari, and Vaara, 2005), news texts play a strong normative role in society.  
The media is also frequently regarded by scholars as one of the most important influences on the 
social construction of reality (Desai, 2014; Hartz and Steger, 2010; Scott, 1995). Scholars have 
demonstrated how the media shapes the economic, political, and moral settings of society, as “we 
walk around with media-generated images of the world, using them to construct meaning about 
political and social issues” (Gamson et al., 1992, p. 374). As such, the media is seen as carrying 
powerful institutional pressures (Scott, 1995) and playing a dominant role in shaping societal 
discourses (Desai, 2014). In addition, numerous studies have demonstrated how media coverage can 
influence various types of business and investment decisions, such as foreign location choice 
(Kulchina, 2014) and stock purchases (Johnson et al., 2005; Pollock and Rindova, 2003; 
Wisniewski and Lambe, 2013).  
As one cannot analyze all media documents on a given topic over a 20-year period, a sample of 
media articles from two leading U.S. media outlets was taken. These outlets were The New York 
Times, chosen due to its nationwide and international prominence and being based in New York 
City, and Fortune, chosen due to its position as one of the nation’s leading business magazines. 
While the sample could include a larger number of media outlets, research has shown that 
journalists frequently imitate one another, resulting in numerous articles being almost carbon copies 
of one another (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996; Sigal, 1973).  
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In addition, the selection of two outlets, as opposed to five or six and thus a smaller number of 
articles from each outlet, allowed me to better observe shifts in discourse over time, which is the 
focus of this study. Articles from both media outlets were searched on ProQuest database, with 
many of the Fortune articles being obtained from Fortune’s website, fortune.com  
(archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/).   
4.3.3 Regulative pillar   
In order to account for the regulative pillar, I obtained texts from the highest relevant level of U.S. 
government, which in this case was deemed to be hearings from the United States Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. These hearings include speeches and 
testimony by a wide range of public and private sector experts on potential and existing federal 
legislation that concerns banking, insurance, financial markets, securities, housing, international 
trade and finance, and economic policy (for more information, see their website at 
www.banking.senate.gov); therefore, the discourse from many of these hearings is of direct 
relevance to the tech bubble.  
These Senate hearings can be subdivided into full committee hearings, subcommittee hearings, 
nominations, mark-ups, and conferences. For this thesis, only full committee hearings were sampled 
to ensure each hearing included a broad debate and was perceived as of great relevance or 
importance at the time. All hearings from the year 1997 onwards were available on the Committee’s 
website at the time of this project, while hearings from the year 1987 to 1996 were obtained via 
direct request to the Committee under the Freedom of Information Act. 
4.3.4 Discussion   
While these three sources represent a broad sample of the institutional discourse concerning the tech 
bubble, these three sources are certainly not an exhaustive sample of the discourse and narratives 
related to tech stocks that existed during the 1990s. As already mentioned, what these three sources 
do represent is a conservative, higher level picture of the narratives that became institutionalized 
during these years.  
All three of these sources—the Federal Reserve, leading media outlets, and the U.S. Senate—
have a vested interest in presenting prudent, well researched texts that offer a fair and balanced 
view of the U.S. economy and financial markets (that is not, of course, to say that they always do). 
Hence, while these three samples do not represent the ultimate sources of various economic and 
market narratives, they do represent the highest levels of institutionalization—which is precisely the 
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objective of this thesis. It is also important to stress here that institutional pillars can overlap 
significantly at times. My strict separation of the three institutional elements is thus largely for 
analytical purposes. 
A relevant question related to this discussion is to why the tech companies themselves, along 
with the analysts and brokers who touted the stocks of these companies, were not chosen as a source 
of institutional text. While it could be argued that the discourse present in the published reports of 
these companies and of the analysts and brokers covering these companies is representative of the 
cognitive pillar of institutionalization and was highly influential in creating the tech mania of the 
1990s, these documents were not included for a few reasons.  
First, companies have every incentive to generate (overly) optimistic, self-aggrandizing 
narratives of themselves. Thus, the study of how companies present their own narrative or that of 
their industry, while useful in many other endeavors, is not the focus of this thesis.  
Second, in a similar manner, brokers have every incentive to be optimistic about market 
performance. Brokers make commissions as a direct result of market participation, and if people are 
pessimistic about markets, they simply will not participate. Third, it is now well established that 
analysts are incentivized to generate biased, optimistic forecasts (Hong and Kubik, 2003; Lin and 
McNichols, 1998), which was certainly the case during the tech bubble (this point is elaborated 
upon in Chapter 5).  
Thus, while these players were certainly influential in the emergence of the tech bubble, the fact 
that they produced favorable discourse of tech companies during the 1990s is hardly surprising or 
even unique to that period. What was surprising and unique about the late 1990s was how everyone, 
not just these parties, became so enamored with tech stocks.  
 That being said, these sources are crucial to the understanding of the tech bubble. Of particular 
importance is an understanding of how the discourse of tech companies, their analysts, and related 
brokers was received by and disseminated throughout society. Hence, my study gives particular 
attention to the references to these sources and their discourse. The media sample in particular was 
rather revealing here, for it included numerous references to tech executives, analysts, investment 
bankers, and the like. By selecting regular newspaper articles as opposed to editorials or op-eds, I 
was able to include a large number of these sources in my study. As a result, the media sample 
acted as both a proxy and a filter for the narratives that emanated from these sources. This 
relationship is further elaborated upon in Chapters 7, 9, and 10.  
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4.4 Analysis 
The analysis in this thesis was inspired by a range of texts, all of which are cited in this section. 
However, I also customized each method and the combination of these methods to provide the best 
overall means of answering the two research questions. The analysis in this thesis is comprised of 
five stages. Table 4.1 on the following page provides an overview, and below I describe each of 
these stages in detail. For further insight into my analytical procedures, Appendix 4 at the end of 
this thesis provides an example of how one text was analyzed.  
4.4.1 Event history database   
My analysis commenced by constructing an event history database of the key events, actors, 
policies, practices, and institutions associated with the U.S. tech bubble. In this stage, different 
accounts of the episode were juxtaposed, resulting in a relatively comprehensive account of the 
event. This part of the analysis was designed to capture “who did what, and when.” The purpose of 
this event history database was to establish the historical and social background of the tech bubble 
and the connections between discourse and context.  
Thus, this stage of analysis remained rather broad as I abstained from overanalyzing the events 
surrounding the tech bubble. In the summary chapter of my findings, Chapter 9, I probe deeper into 
the events surrounding this episode by highlighting their influence on and causation by narratives of 
the period.  
4.4.2 Sampling by keyword   
The second stage of my analysis was essentially the sampling stage for texts used in narrative and 
discourse analysis. This stage also revealed several important trends in terms of the attention given 
to various topics throughout the sample period and thus the full results and some further details 
about this stage are provided at the beginnings of Chapters 6, 7, and 8. To arrive at samples for each 
pillar, keyword searches were conducted in the titles of the speeches, articles, and hearings for each 
respective pillar. The keywords included were “stock(s),” “equity (-ies),” “market(s),” “technology 
(-ies),” “innovation(s),” and “new economy.”  
  
 
Table 4.1  Stages of analysis 
Stage and method Data Purpose Key references 
Stage 1: Event history database Numerous books and articles, 
sources provided in text (Ch. 5) 
 Establish background of tech bubble 
 Enable further analysis 
 Abolafia and Kilduff, 1988 
 MacKenzie, 2003, 2011 
 
Stage 2: Sampling by keyword 
 
 
All three pillars as outlined in 
section 4.3 
 Provide a sample for further analysis 
 Note trends in terms of topic attention 
 Final samples provided in 
Appendices 1, 2, and 3 
 
Stage 3: Narrative analysis Sampled texts of all three pillars  Capture emergence and characteristics of 
narratives, particularly boom narratives 
 Fiol, 1989 
 Propp, 1958 
Step 1: Connotation of U.S. 
economy/companies 
  Establish tonality of each item in 
reference to economy/companies 
 
Step 2: U.S. economy/company 
narratives 
  Identify broader narratives  
Step 3: Connotation of tech 
companies/innovation 
  Establish tonality of each item in 
reference to tech co.’s/innovation 
 
Step 4: Tech company/stock 
narratives 
 
  Identify asset narratives  
Stage 4: Discourse analysis 
 
 
Sampled texts of all three pillars 
and event history findings 
 Examine institutional features of items 
individually and collectively 
 Berger and Luckmann, 1966 
 Maguire and Hardy, 2009 
Stage 5: Process analysis All data and findings  Clarify sequences and suggest causality 
 Develop narrative theory of bubbles 
 Langley, 1999 
 Pettigrew, 1990 
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For both the cognitive and regulative pillars, the keyword “technological” was added, and for 
the regulative pillar only, the keyword “security (-ies, -ization)” was added. These additions were 
made to provide a slightly larger sample size for those pillars, with the initial keyword searches 
resulting in less-than-adequate sample sizes. Keyword searches for the normative pillar on media 
texts resulted in expectedly large sample sizes, making further sampling necessary. This process is 
discussed in full detail in Chapter 7. 
Aside from arriving at an appropriate sample size for this study, these keyword searches, and 
thus this sampling process, were conducted for two very specific reasons. First, they allowed for an 
initial look at the attention given to the themes of stocks, equities, markets, technology, and 
innovation and the emergence of a new economy narrative. As I only conducted keyword searches 
in speech titles, this process ensured that these topics were the focus of sampled texts, as opposed to 
just being minor footnotes or mentioned in passing. Again, as my concern here is with how certain 
narratives became institutionalized and pervasive in society, my interest is when and how narratives 
concerning technology stocks and their context, the “new economy,” became the dominant topics of 
discourse.  
Second, by keeping these search terms rather general—that is, by choosing “technology” as 
opposed to “information technology” or “stocks” as opposed to “technology stocks”—the sample 
produced allowed for a comparison of these themes from the 1987 crash all the way up to the peak 
of the tech bubble. More specific search terms would have heavily biased my sample towards texts 
during the tech bubble, leaving little room for historical comparison.  
4.4.3 Narrative analysis   
In the third stage of my analysis, I created a narrative database by chronologically mapping the 
narratives of each institutional pillar. This stage of analysis was designed to capture the emergence 
and characteristics of various narratives, particularly the emergence and spread of each episode’s 
boom narrative(s). In order to capture these features, this stage was conducted in four highly 
interrelated and iterative steps.  
The first step was to initially read each speech, article, or testimony
9
 (which I will refer to 
collectively as “items” hereafter) and categorize it according to its overall connotation of the U.S. 
                                                 
9
 For the regulative pillar, each Senate hearing was made up of various statements and testimonies. Each individual 
person’s statement or testimony was treated as an individual item and analyzed separately from other statements and 
testimonies at the same hearing. Further details are provided in Chapter 8.  
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economy, including references to U.S. companies
10
. This step thus established the tonality of each 
item and provides a basic, initial look into the type of narratives that will arise within. While Fiol 
(1989) notes that tonalities can be positive or negative, I expanded the range of connotations in my 
analysis to provide a more balanced and nuanced view of the data. Five connotations were possible: 
1) a “positive” connotation, in which the author or speaker expressed general satisfaction with the 
state of the U.S. economy and U.S. companies; 2) a “negative” connotation, which expressed a 
general dissatisfaction with the state of the U.S. economy and U.S. companies; 3) a “neutral” 
connotation, in which the author or speaker referred to the U.S. economy or U.S. companies, but 
mostly in a technical manner; 4) a “mixed” connotation, which expressed a relative balance of both 
positive and negative connotations; and 5) “N/A” or not available, meaning the item made no, or 
extremely sparse, mention of the U.S. economy or U.S. companies.  
In this step, I abstained from reading too much into an author’s or speaker’s underlying or 
implied message(s). In other words, if an item included both positive and negative connotations, it 
was usually categorized as “mixed,” whereas if an item was mostly technical in manner, it was 
usually categorized as “neutral.” This ensured that items categorized as “positive” or “negative” 
would be marked as such by most, if not all, researchers conducting a similar study
1112
, meaning 
that any trend identified in these two categories is likely a conservative picture of what actually 
occurred.  
Following this initial step, I then mapped the related U.S. economy narrative for each item. 
Thus, for each item, I took the U.S. economy, or U.S. companies in general
13
, as the subject, and 
then identified the related object, destinator, and enabling and impeding forces. A narrative was 
only mapped for an individual item if fully present—items without a full economy narrative were 
                                                 
10
 An important distinction here is that I did not code the connotation of the item as a whole, simply its connotation of 
the U.S. economy or U.S. companies. For instance, some items would regard the U.S. economy as being in great shape 
and then focus on how a specific regulation was impeding one company’s or industry’s success. Such an item would be 
coded as a positive connotation of the U.S. economy, despite its overall negative tone.  
11
 Researchers experienced with this type of coding would be familiar with the common practice of having a research 
assistant, or second author, independently code all of the items and then check for areas of agreement and disagreement. 
A second coder, though, was not used for this study, primarily because the coding for this project was extremely time-
consuming and altogether took several months to complete. In order to provide transparency and enhance reliability in 
this stage, numerous quotations are provided in the findings sections to offer evidence and reasoning for how individual 
items were coded.  
12
 Following the footnote above, I must note that the direct quotes in my findings section do not include page numbers, 
as these page numbers were in part arbitrary and not consistent throughout. For example, some of the media articles 
were copies of a newspaper or magazine print, while others were available online. For the regulative pillar, some items 
were available as part of the formal hearing copy, while others were available individually online. Thus, many page 
numbers would simply be arbitrary according to how items were printed out and not consistent in terms of source. In 
general, most items were two to 12 pages in length and thus the quotes supplied are easy to search and find.  
13
 A few items, mostly media articles, included narratives of a single U.S. company. As many of these narratives were 
very specific to that company, they were usually not mapped or analyzed in detail. However, if the company’s situation 
was described as being representative of its broader industry or the U.S. economy, the narrative was mapped and 
analyzed as a part of this thesis.  
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simply coded as N/A for this field. Similar to coding for connotations, I adopted a relatively 
conservative approach to identifying a narrative and its components
14
. Combined, steps one and two 
provided a rather comprehensive view of what could be labeled a broader, “grand narrative” that 
provides meaning to the actors involved  (Deuten and Rip, 2000; Fenton and Langley, 2011). 
Steps three and four were similar to steps one and two, only instead of analyzing the discourse 
of the broader U.S. economy, I looked for connotations and narratives concerning the asset of 
inquiry. Thus, I categorized each article’s connotation of technology, including references to 
innovation, tech/telecommunications companies, and tech stocks, and then mapped any narrative 
treating tech companies or U.S./tech stocks as the subject. Again, a full narrative had to be present 
for it to be identified, otherwise articles were coded as N/A for this step.  
4.4.4 Discourse analysis   
The fourth stage of my analysis was conducted in a much more open manner, as I examined the 
broader institutional features of each item and the emergence, evolution, and relationships of the 
narratives over time. This stage was also highly interrelated to stages two and three and, similar to 
stage three, conducted in an iterative manner.  
In order to analyze the institutionalization of each boom narrative, I investigated how and when 
“knowledge” about each asset came to be “socially established as ‘reality’ ” (Berger and Luckmann, 
1966, p. 3). In other words, I attempted to uncover how subjective opinions came to be viewed as 
objective facts over time, while searching for patterns of repetition and the processes by which a 
narrative seemed to take on a life of its own and appear as matter-of-fact and self-evident. In line 
with this approach, I focused on how discourses underwent shifts over time, while seeking to 
establish each narrative’s “external conditions of existence” (Foucault, 1971, p. 22).  
Such an approach led me to explore a range of questions about each discourse, such as “What is 
it possible to speak of?”, “What terms are used, re-used, circulated, and repressed?”, “What terms 
are seen as valid and which are abandoned?”, and “Who has access to the discourse and who 
receives it institutionalized?” (Foucault, 1972b, pp. 234–235).  
                                                 
14
 Undoubtedly, the identification of a narrative can be viewed as subjective task. When conducting this step, along with 
every other part of the analysis for this thesis, I made all attempts to be somewhat conservative in my claims and 
maintained an attitude of skepticism. That being said, the findings presented in this thesis are still of my own production. 
I have made every attempt to provide ample quotations and evidence to support my claims, but I am only able to 
provide so much support in this document due to word limit constraints and in an effort to make this thesis as 
consumable as possible. Also, while I am confident that my findings are one plausible way of interpreting the data, I am 
by no means claiming that what is presented in this thesis is the only way of interpreting the data.  
Chapter 4: Case Selection, Method, and Research Design 
 
63 
 
Central to this approach was an attempt to maintain a principle of “exteriority,” meaning to 
resist the urge to interpret the underlying meaning of the actors involved and instead to treat each 
discourse as a factual phenomenon to be discovered. In other words, such an approach requires 
researchers to abstain from “reading between the lines” and engaging in guesswork over the 
motivation behind any given text. Instead, the focus is upon the immediate and potential effects of 
any given text. Hence, I closely examined where texts emanated from, how they were used, and 
when discourse became structured, coherent, and supported by a range of broader discourses 
(Phillips et al., 2004).  
Included in this stage was an investigation into why efforts to deinstitutionalize each boom 
narrative failed. From a social constructionist perspective, resistance to change implies 
“maintenance” of institutionalized acts (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Thus, this stage of analysis 
focused on the threats to and maintenance of each institutional pillar as I explored how alternatives 
to the status quo were constituted, how choices were contested and justified, and the processes by 
which the range of alternatives expanded and contracted over time and across settings (Schneiberg 
and Clemens, 2006). I explored whether texts sought to problematize the prevailing boom 
narrative(s), paying close attention to the historical and institutional context of these texts. I then 
looked at whether and how these texts were supported, countered, or ignored in subsequent 
discourse and how other actors maintained the status quo.  
4.4.5 Process analysis   
Chapters 9 and 10 present the results of the fifth stage of analysis, which included two types of 
process analysis. First, as presented in Chapter 9, I constructed a comprehensive story of the tech 
bubble from the totality of my data. For this stage, I viewed the event history data, narrative data, 
and discursive findings in unison and then arranged the data chronologically. I was thus able to 
explore the relationships between the three pillars and the event history, allowing me to both “zoom 
in” on the discursive and material accomplishments and “zoom out” to see connections between 
discourse and practices over time (Nicolini, 2009).  
This technique therefore provided a much broader overview of the narratives that emerged and 
persisted over time, including consideration of which institutional pillars were most powerful in the 
institutionalization of the boom narrative(s) (Schneiberg and Clemens, 2006). Based on the results 
of this first process technique, in Chapter 9 I arrive at a set of overarching conclusions of how the 
tech’s bubbles boom narratives were institutionalized and why efforts to deinstitutionalize these 
narratives ultimately failed.  
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In the theoretical chapter, Chapter 10, I then present the findings of the second process 
technique, which was temporal bracketing. Temporal bracketing was used in this study mainly as a 
means of theoretical development. Thus, in this last stage of analysis, I abstracted my data one level 
and explored the continuity and discontinuity of the events and discourse of the study. This stage of 
analysis was guided by Weick’s (1979) notion that all theories must balance accuracy, parsimony, 
and generality. Consequently, to ensure greater parsimony and generality, I considered how the 
features of the tech bubble story can be grouped and explained in a broader sense—that is, not just 
in terms of the emergence of dotcom firms and a new economy but in terms of interest in a new 
asset class and the development of an economy-wide boom narrative. As a result, the narrative 
theory of asset bubbles developed in this final chapter serves as a broader explanation of how large-
scale asset bubbles, particularly those related to the introduction of a new technology, can emerge, 
develop, and grow.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE TECH BUBBLE’S EVENT HISTORY 
In this chapter, I trace the key events, actors, policies, practices, and institutions associated with the 
U.S. tech bubble. While such an account could be described in great detail and at great length, such 
a task has already been attempted to varying degrees by a number of researchers (e.g., Fleckenstein 
and Sheehan, 2008; Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011; Lowenstein, 2004; Shiller, 2005). Thus, my 
attempt here is merely to establish the key or critical events associated with the episode. These 
events will then be used a backdrop to the following narrative and discourse analysis to ensure that 
the meanings of various discourses are appropriately rooted in their historical context. In Chapters 9 
and 10, I analyze the connections between events and discourse in order to develop a processual 
story of the tech bubble and a narrative theory of asset bubble formation. 
As stated in the previous chapter, data was collected from the years 1987 to 2000 to allow 
analysis of the historical emergence and institutionalization of the boom narrative in technology 
stocks. In addition, I also note some economic, social, and cultural trends leading into the late 1980s. 
These trends allow for a broader perspective on the discourses that eventually emerged in the 1990s.  
A starting point for understanding the (re)emergence of interest in stocks is to consider the long-
term performance of stocks in the decades leading up the bull run of the 1990s. Figures 5.1 and 5.3 
on the next page show stock performance from the Dow Jones and S&P 500 indexes going back to 
1937, just after stocks hit their low point following the crash of 1929. Figure 5.2 provides historical 
data on the tech-heavy NASDAQ, which was founded in 1971.   
A few initial observations can be made. First, dating back to the 1930s, the United States had 
been relatively bubble-free until the bull run of the 1990s. While the 1960s saw a run-up in stock 
prices, these gains were brief and only look impressive when comparing them to the lows of the 
1930s and 1940s.  
As explained by Lowenstein (2004, pp. 1–2), in the 1970s, the general public lost most of what 
little interest they had in stocks. Wall Street was rarely covered by the mainstream media, 90 
percent of pension funds were invested in bonds, bills, and cash, and by the end of the decade, the 
number of Americans who owned stocks would fall by seven million. Lowenstein (2004) notes that, 
even absent any large-scale crash or market panic, after adjusting for inflation, in 1976 stocks were 
down almost two-thirds over the previous ten years.   
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Figure 5.1  Dow Jones Industrial Average, January 1937–January 2003 
 
 
Figure 5.2  NASDAQ, August 1971–January 2003 
 
 
Figure 5.3  S&P 500, January 1937–January 2003 
 
Source for three graphs: Macrotrends (data is inflation-adjusted using the headline CPI, vertical grey areas 
indicate recessions, see www.macrotrends.net for additional information on their sources) 
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Second, while the 1980s witnessed a brief reemergence of interest in stocks, price gains in this 
decade were extremely tame compared to the excesses of the 1990s, particularly when looking at 
the NASDAQ’s performance. A few events of the 1980s, however, warrant mentioning. In 1981, 
the 401(k) pension account was created, which gave the general public much greater control over 
their retirement savings than traditional pension plans, which in turn led to the general public being 
more exposed to, and acquiring a greater knowledge of, stocks (Shiller, 2005).  
The spread of the “hostile takeover” in which one company acquires another despite the 
objections of the acquired company’s management team, alongside the popularity of leveraged 
buyouts (LBOs), led to Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) being much more concerned with low 
stock prices than they would have been in previous decades (Lowenstein, 2004). The Federal 
Reserve, still wrestling with the runaway inflation of the 1970s, raised interest rates (the federal 
funds rate, see Figure 5.4 on the next page) to over 16 percent in 1981 and then raised rates again at 
the end of the decade. 
By the end of the decade, three other important events had occurred. In August of 1987, Alan 
Greenspan would become Chairman of the Federal Reserve, a position he would hold until January 
of 2006. Two months after his appointment, worldwide markets crashed, with the Dow Jones 
dropping by over 22 percent and markets in Hong Kong and Australia dropping by over 40 percent. 
These drops, however, were relatively short-lived from a historical perspective, as seen in Figures 
5.1 and 5.3. Lastly, in 1989 the world witnessed the fall of the Berlin wall, which became a symbol 
to much of the Western world that capitalism—and its key tenet of the private ownership of 
property— had finally and officially triumphed over communism.  
Adding to this sentiment, the Soviet Union was officially dissolved in December 1991. Shiller 
(2005) notes that alongside the fall of these communist powers was the concomitant decline in labor 
unions in the U.S., where union membership declined from 20 percent of the workforce in 1983 to 
13.5 percent of the workforce in 2000. The early 1990s witnessed another brief recession, which 
Alan Greenspan and the Federal Reserve responded to by cutting interest rates several times in 1990 
and 1991, as rates plunged from nine percent in 1989 to three percent in 1992. 
The drop in interest rates coincided with the baby boomer generation moving more and more of 
their retirement savings out of certificates of deposit (CDs) and bonds and into stocks to replace 
disappearing yields (Fleckenstein and Sheehan, 2008). At the same time, the use of 401(k)’s 
doubled in the early 1990s, from a nationwide investment of $400 billion in 1990 to $800 billion in 
1995 (Lowenstein, 2004).  
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Figure 5.4  Yearly Federal Funds Rate, as a percent, 1961–2003 
 
Source: U.S. Federal Reserve 
 
This increased enthusiasm for stocks led to gains of approximately 50 percent in the Dow Jones, 
NASDAQ, and S&P 500 (see Figures 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 on the next page) from 1990 to 1995. The 
Federal Reserve responded by raising interest rates to six percent by April of 1995. 
 Additionally, in December of 1996, Greenspan famously questioned whether “irrational 
exuberance” was at play in current market valuations15. 
In spite of Greenspan’s rhetoric, the period of 1995 to 2000 saw dramatic returns for all major 
stock indexes, including a doubling of the Dow Jones and S&P 500 and a near quadrupling of the 
NASDAQ. These dramatic changes in stock prices coincided with significant changes in numerous 
business, political, social, and cultural arrangements and practices.  
One such change was the dramatic increases in executive pay, which was partially fueled by the 
growing popularity of using stock options as part of CEO compensation. As an illustrative example 
of pay increases, Lawrence Coss, CEO of Green Tree Financial, a company that financed mobile 
home purchases, took a bonus for just the fiscal year ending in 1996 of over $100 million 
(Lowenstein, 2004). Over the decade, CEOs, who also frequently served as Chairman of the Board 
of Directors, would become household names and celebrities in the financial media (ibid.).  
 
                                                 
15
 The precise quote from Greenspan is “But how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset 
values, which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past 
decade?” When viewed in its entirety, this quote is actually not quite a “warning” as it is commonly labeled but rather a 
rhetorical question. This quote is from a speech entitled “The challenge of central banking in a democratic society,” 
which was delivered on December 5, 1996 at the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of The American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research in Washington, D.C. It is available on the Federal Reserve’s website at 
www.federalreserve.gov.  
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Figure 5.5  Dow Jones Industrial Average, January 1990–December 2000 
 
 
Figure 5.6  NASDAQ, January 1990–December 2000 
 
 
Figure 5.7  S&P 500, January 1990–December 2000 
 
Source for three graphs: Macrotrends (data is inflation-adjusted using the headline CPI, vertical grey areas 
indicate recessions, see www.macrotrends.net for additional information on their sources) 
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The payoff was across the country, and by 1997 CEOs on average were making 326 times what 
a factory worker was making (Reingold, 1997). In response to the confusion surrounding how 
options were accounted for, in 1994 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed 
a rule that would have required companies to deduct the cost of options from their reported earnings, 
but the proposal was eventually shelved. 
The reluctance to enforce strict rules on options reporting was a sign of the times, with the late 
1990s also giving rise to numerous innovations in accounting and finance. Of particular influence 
were innovations in the use of derivatives and special purpose vehicles (SPVs)
16
. The use of such 
devices became common practice and resulted in annual reports becoming incredibly complicated 
and difficult to understand for most investors.  
In 1998, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) proposed to study whether 
derivatives should be regulated in a manner similar to common stock, but the proposal was quashed 
by Greenspan and Robert Rubin, the U.S. Secretary of Treasury at the time (Schlesinger, 2002). 
Eventually, many companies were found guilty of using such devices to improve short-term 
performance and smoothen out corporate earnings (and in effect defraud investors), an art perfected 
by corporations such as Enron and WorldCom.  
Problems with financial innovations were eventually unveiled alongside the discovery that 
many auditors and analysts had a severe conflict of interest with their clients in which auditing 
services and stock recommendations were being used primarily to win more lucrative consulting 
and investment banking contracts. A 1999 SEC proposal to clamp down on such arrangements was 
similarly thwarted, this time by Congress (Lowenstein, 2004). Also in 1999, the Glass-Steagall Act, 
which separated banking, insurance, and underwriting activities, was repealed.  
 Many of the changes that occurred during these years were pro-business in nature, particularly 
in the United States. From 1995 to 1999, interest rates were cut from six percent to under five 
percent. Alan Greenspan’s lowering of rates after the LTCM and Russian ruble crisis of 1998 came 
to be known as the “Greenspan Put,” referring to the belief by market participants that Greenspan 
was willing to increase liquidity by whatever means necessary in order to prevent the stock market 
from declining. Such cuts were partially made possible by several changes in how the rate of 
inflation was calculated, with the Boskin Commission’s recommendations leading to several 
                                                 
16
 A derivative is a contract between parties whose value is based upon an underlying instrument such as a specific 
interest rate, exchange rate, or stock price. An SPV is a subsidiary company structured so that its obligations are secure 
even if the parent company goes bankrupt. SPV’s are often used as a counterparty for derivatives and to isolate financial 
risk. 
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changes that all resulted in a reduction in the rate of inflation, which remained relatively low for the 
decade (Fleckenstein and Sheehan, 2008, pp. 39–43, see also Figure 5.8 at the bottom of this page).  
The popping of bubbles in Southeast Asia and Mexico led to a surge in funds to the United 
States (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011), while the Republican-controlled House of Representatives 
proposed cuts to capital gains taxes, resulting in a cut from 28 percent to 20 percent in 1997. All of 
these events coincided with a remarkable growth in the number of mutual funds, which went from a 
mere 340 in the United States in 1982 to over 3,500 by 1998 (Shiller, 2005).  
However, no change would shape the late 1990s nearly as much as the widespread innovations 
in computing, internet services, and telecommunications
17
. The World Wide Web first appeared in 
the news circa 1993 (Shiller, 2005), with PC sales and internet usage taking off shortly thereafter. 
Concurrently, around 1995, markets started to take off. U.S. stock prices rose at an annual rate of 
over 30 percent in 1995 alone.  
In 1996, the telecommunications industry was deregulated by Congress, and over the next five 
years telecommunications companies would borrow over $1.5 trillion from banks plus another $600 
billion in bonds and still billions more in stock—most of which was used to construct (somewhat 
redundant) fiber optic networks across the country (Lowenstein, 2004).  
 
Figure 5.8  U.S. Consumer Price Index, 1970–2000 
(annual average of 12-month percent changes, all urban consumers) 
 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
                                                 
17
 While the dotcom bubble and telecommunications bubble are sometimes referred to separately, in this thesis they are 
treated as parts of the larger technology bubble. As investment in telecommunications was in large part to construct 
fiber optic cables to support growing internet usage, the two bubbles are in fact inseparable.  
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By 1998, venture capital was pouring into dotcom companies with reckless abandon, as venture 
capital funding surged from $3 billion in 1990 to $60 billion in 1999 (Lowenstein, 2004, see his 
citation on p. 110). Concomitantly, hedge funds and mutual funds became heavily invested in 
publically-traded technology stocks (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004; Griffin et al., 2011). Fueling 
this enthusiasm over young companies was the incredible IPO valuations and gains these companies 
were achieving, often with very little revenue or profit supporting such valuations. For instance, 
theglobe.com, a website that helped people build home pages, saw its stock rise from $9 a share to 
over $60 a share on its first day of trading, a gain of over 600 percent (Fleckenstein and Sheehan, 
2008). Such a share price put the company’s valuation at over $5 billion, despite the company 
having only reached $2.7 million in revenues for the first three quarters of that year (ibid.). Three 
years later, theglobe.com filed for bankruptcy.  
By the end of 1999, market speculation was widespread. The Dow Jones was up 25 percent on 
the year, mostly due to the performance of “new economy” tech stocks, while the NASDAQ nearly 
doubled. At the end of the year, the price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio of the NASDAQ was 200, 
compared to Japan’s market peak of 80 a decade earlier (Fleckenstein and Sheehan, 2008). That is 
not to say that speculation was limited to tech stocks, with over half of the S&P 500 index 
exhibiting at least some bubble-like behavior (Anderson, Brooks, and Katsaris, 2010). 
Stock turnover
18
 was high as well, reaching well over 200 percent by 1999, compared with just 
88 percent in 1990 (Shiller, 2005). This increase in turnover came with a dramatic decline in the 
cost of trading and a large increase in the number of “day traders,” referring to individuals and 
institutions that buy and then sell stocks within the same trading day, thereby closing all positions 
by the close of business (ibid.). The increase in day traders also coincided with the increased 
popularity of finance programming, particularly the business news station CNBC (Fleckenstein and 
Sheehan, 2008). Despite the household savings rate reaching a new low, fortunes were being made 
on the market and unemployment dropped to under four percent (see Figure 5.9 on the next page). 
Thus, the country as a whole was in a rather euphoric state. 
By the end of the year and early 2000, however, there were also salient cracks in the euphoric 
wall that was built. The Federal Reserve injected $50 billion into the financial system over Y2K 
concerns (the concern of systemic computer failure when clocks rolled over to the year 2000) but 
                                                 
18
 Stock or share turnover is a measure of how frequently a share is traded. It is calculated by dividing the total number 
of shares traded by the average number of shares available during a given period. A high share turnover means the stock 
is (or at least was) easier to buy and sell.  
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then also raised interest rates to over six percent in early 2000. Margin debt
19
 was at its highest level 
since 1929, and nearly three times as high as in October of 1987 (Fleckenstein and Sheehan, 2008). 
By April of 2000, stocks started to crack, with the NASDAQ dropping by almost 10 percent in one 
day. In these early days of the bubble’s bursting, hedge funds and mutual funds dramatically shifted 
strategy, with many turning into aggressive sellers of tech stocks (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004; 
Griffin et al., 2011).  
In 2001, the party ended, with the NASDAQ dropping from its high of over 5,000 to under 
2,000. Within two years, over $5 trillion in paper wealth was wiped out on the NASDAQ, with the 
market value of NASDAQ companies peaking at $6.7 trillion in March 2000 and bottoming out at 
$1.6 trillion in October of 2002 (Gaither and Chmielewski, 2006). Similar, although not quite as 
dramatic, falls were seen in other U.S. and foreign stock indexes. The list of dotcom busts from 
these years, also referred to as “dot-bombs,” is rather lengthy. For instance, Boo.com, an online 
fashion store backed by J. P. Morgan and Goldman Sachs, spent over $180 million in just a few 
months but then went bust in May of 2000 (Sorkin, 2000). InfoSpace, whose founder Naveen Jain 
claimed the company would become a monopoly in wireless Internet, saw its share price plummet 
from over $1,300 a share in March of 2000 (which gave the company a greater valuation than 
Boeing) to just over $20 a share by April 2001 (Heath and Chan, 2005). Perhaps the darling of the 
dot-bomb bunch, Pets.com, which was founded in August of 1998 and sold pet supplies online, 
closed in November of 2000 after burning through roughly $300 million in investment funds (Haig, 
2005). 
Figure 5.9  U.S. unemployment rate (annual average), 1980–2000 
 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
                                                 
19
 Margin debt is debt obtained by borrowing from a brokerage firm to make an investment. For instance, if an investor 
borrows $5,000 from his or her brokerage firm to make a $20,000 investment, margin debt is 25 percent of the 
investment. If the share price of that investment were to drop past a certain point, the brokerage firm can require the 
investor to deposit more cash or sell some of the shares, which is referred to as a margin call. If investors are optimistic 
about future stock prices, they are incentivized to increase their margin debt as they anticipate that gains from share 
prices will be far greater than the interest charged on margin debt.  
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CHAPTER 6: THE TECH BUBBLE’S COGNITIVE PILLAR 
This chapter presents findings from the cognitive pillar of institutionalization, which establishes the 
prevailing orthodoxy and perceived rationality. Cognitive sources of institutionalization can be 
extreme powerful as support for them tends to become unconscious and unquestioned over time. 
For this study, the cognitive pillar was represented by U.S. Federal Reserve speeches. From 1987 to 
2000, there were 495 speeches made by Federal Reserve officials. The findings from the initial 
sampling stage are presented in Figure 6.1 below.  
A few initial observations can be made from this preliminary search. First, the words “stock(s)” 
and “equity (-ies)” rarely appear in these titles, with only one match coming from the year 1988. 
However, the word “market(s)” frequently comes up, suggesting that various forms of markets have 
always been the concern of the Federal Reserve. In contrast, references to technology, innovation, 
and the new economy did not truly start until 1995. All three of these areas received the most 
attention in 2000, as judged through speech titles.  
 
 
Figure 6.1  Keywords in speech titles (by count),  
speeches by U.S. Federal Reserve officials, 1987–2000 
 
Source: U.S. Federal Reserve 
Note: These keywords were searched in all 495 speeches made by Federal Reserve officials from 1987 to 2000. 
While each title could include two or more keywords (for example, “equity markets” contains both “equity” and 
“market”), no keyword was counted twice in the same title (no relevant cases were found for this situation).  
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The 65 speeches that included these keywords thus became the sample data for this chapter, 
with those speeches representing 13 percent of all Federal Reserve speeches from 1987 to 2000. 
Appendix 1 provides the reference information for each of these 65 speeches, along with their 
citation codes that will be used throughout this chapter. 
The findings from this sample are presented in two sections below. First, I provide the results of 
the third stage of analysis, which was the creation of a narrative database. I report on all four steps 
of analysis in this stage and provide representative examples of quotations, which illustrates the 
coding process, for each step.  
Second, I provide the results of the fourth stage of analysis, which was a more open 
investigation into the institutional features of the pillar. Included in this section is a discussion of 
why efforts to deinstitutionalize the tech bubble’s boom narratives failed.  
6.1 Narrative analysis 
Results from the first step of analysis in this section, categorizing each speech’s connotation of the 
U.S. economy and/or companies, are provided in Figures 6.2 and 6.3 on the next page, along with a 
selection of quotations and topics for each connotation in Table 6.1 on the following page.  
Figures 6.2 and 6.3, which are best understood in tandem, can be described in four general 
phases. First, the period from 1987 to 1988 included a large proportion of negative connotations and 
only one speech with a positive connotation. Second, the period from 1989 to 1993 was evenly 
dispersed with a few positive, negative, mixed, and neutral connotations.  
Third, the period from 1994 to 1996 was dominated by mixed speeches, with just a few positive 
connotations in 1996 and no negative or neutral connotations. Lastly, the period from 1997 to 2000 
saw a large increase in positive connotations along with a few mixed connotations and only one 
negative and one neutral connotation.  
The quotations and topics in Table 6.1 are organized according to these four phases, providing 
the reader with a better glimpse into the general trends in discourse of the U.S. economy at the 
Federal Reserve from 1987 to 2000. 
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Figure 6.2  Connotation of U.S. economy/companies (by count), 
sampled speeches by U.S. Federal Reserve officials, 1987–2000 
 
 
Figure 6.3  Connotation of U.S. economy/companies (by percentage), 
sampled speeches by U.S. Federal Reserve officials, 1987–2000 
 
Note: Each of the 65 Federal Reserve speeches sampled was categorized according to one, and only one, of the 
five connotations. The reader may note that Figure 6.2 does not exactly match the count of that in Figure 6.1 
for the years 1988 and 2000. This is because those years included speeches with more than one keyword in a 
title. Hence, those speeches were double counted in Figure 6.1 but only categorized one time in Figure 6.2.  
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Table 6.1  Selected quotations and topics for each U.S. economy connotation
20
 (sampled speeches by U.S. Federal Reserve officials, 1987–2000)
                                                 
20
 Note: These selected quotations and topics are not the only reason a speech was categorized as such but rather are representative of the reasoning for a categorization. Nor are these 
quotations intended to be “best examples” that demonstrate the category better than quotations from other items. They are merely intended to be representative of the type of 
discourse that was prevalent amongst a given category.  
Connotation Quotations and topics  
(1987–1988) 
Quotations and topics  
(1989–1993) 
Quotations and topics  
(1994–1996) 
Quotations and topics  
(1997–2000) 
Positive 
 
 
 
 
 
"…if one allows for differences in 
accounting, economic, and risk 
factors, returns to investors in these 
three important markets [the U.S., 
the U.K., and Japan] are broadly 
comparable."  
-Greenspan, Nov. 30, 1988 
 
"Nations with well-functioning 
market systems have provided 
consistently higher living standards 
for their citizens by more effectively 
unleashing the creativity of their 
people…" 
-Greenspan, Sept. 24, 1991 
"…an economic recovery that has 
been running for more than five 
years…the macroeconomic data 
seemingly imply—economic 
success, tranquility, and progress." 
-Greenspan, June 6, 1996 
"Even the most optimistic of 
forecasters could not have 
anticipated such a favorable 
confluence of economic events." 
-Ferguson, May 9, 2000 
Negative 
 
 
 
 
 
"…we find only a single American 
bank among the ten largest in the 
world. Every year, the situation is 
getting worse instead of better." 
-Heller, Mar. 6, 1987 
"One of the most disturbing 
elements of the current subpar 
recovery has been the extraordinary 
debilitation of our financial 
intermediation process…" 
-Greenspan, Nov. 18, 1992 
No such speeches during this period "Moreover, there will probably 
never be a time when calm and 
normalcy reign throughout the world 
and the time is auspicious for major 
reform of the financial system." 
-Rivlin, Mar. 1, 1999 
Mixed 
 
 
 
 
 
"… is a tribute to the resilience and 
adaptability of our financial markets 
and economy…these events have 
not only caused severe 
contemporaneous problems…" 
-Greenspan, Oct. 11, 1988 
"This year's symposium is being 
held at a time of great promise, yet 
great challenge, for the world 
economic order." 
-Angell, May 23, 1991 
"The processes of growth, 
globalization, and innovation have 
continued…Other developments, 
including the financial problems of 
banks…have posed serious 
challenges." 
-Greenspan, Nov. 18, 1996 
"Higher prospective rates of return 
from the application of the newer 
technologies has led to a surge in 
business capital spending… 
Recently, wariness about risk again 
has increased..." 
-Greenspan, Dec. 5, 2000 
 
Neutral 
 
 
Technical analysis of intraday funds 
-Angell, Nov. 2, 1988 
Speech on Latin American countries 
-Kelley, May 4, 1992 
No such speeches during this period Technical speech concerning retail 
payments system 
-Ferguson, Oct. 11, 2000 
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The second step of analysis, mapping each speech’s U.S. economy narrative, revealed six 
distinct yet highly interrelated narratives, which are outlined in Table 6.2 on the next two pages. On 
the following page, Figures 6.4 and 6.5 present the frequency trends of these narratives over the 
sampled period. 
The first narrative to emerge, “Economic Competitiveness,” stresses the (in)ability of the U.S. 
economy and U.S. companies to compete with foreign rivals, as these companies rightfully strive to 
maximize profits and dominate domestic and foreign markets. The narrative sees domestic 
regulations and international protectionism as crucial impediments that prevent U.S. companies 
from achieving these goals. This narrative was prevalent in 1987 and 1988 but disappeared 
thereafter.  
The second narrative to emerge, “Economic Stability,” which took over in 1988 after the crash 
of 1987, focuses on ways to strengthen and stabilize the U.S. economy, all in a context of fair 
market competition. In this view, while regulations can be helpful in ensuring stability, they can 
also be harmful in handicapping domestic companies. As speculation, moral hazard, and unfair 
advantages pose major threats, international accords, such as the Basel Accords, and institutions 
such as the Federal Reserve play increasingly important roles.  
This narrative quickly transitioned into the “Economic Growth” narrative that was by far the 
most common in the sampled texts, particularly during the early 1990s. This narrative stresses 
economic growth, returns to investors, and rising standards of living as primary objectives. 
International markets and foreign investors are seen as key contributors to such growth, while 
central planning and monopolies pose major threats.  
In 1996, a “Structural Shift” narrative emerged, which sees the U.S. economy undergoing a 
major transformation, largely propelled by numerous technological advances such as in computing 
and telecommunications, satellites, and new financial products. The major impediment to this shift 
is a lack of skills and education in these new technologies amongst the workforce.  
Two years later, the “New Economy” narrative started to replace the Structural Shift narrative, 
arguing that the U.S. economy was now heading towards a new type of system in which old 
economic rules could be thrown out in favor of new and exciting possibilities, in particular the 
coexistence of rapid economic growth alongside low rates of inflation. A flexible labor force and 
world class higher education are seen as primary drivers of this change, while “immutable” human 
nature and market imbalances, including bubbles, are seen as major impediments.  
  
 
 
 
Table 6.2  U.S. economy/company narratives (sampled speeches by U.S. Federal Reserve officials, 1987–2000)
                                                 
21
 Note: The columns for enabling and impeding forces are by no means exhaustive of every factor mentioned in the 65 speeches. Rather, they make note of the commonly cited and 
stressed factors in the sample, while efforts were made to place the most commonly cited factors at the top of each list. A detailed counting of factors in this sample was deemed 
unnecessary as the subjectivity and time required in such a task would have far outweighed any potential benefit in terms of theoretical insight.  
Narrative Object Destinator Key enabling forces
21
 Key impeding forces Selected quotations 
Economic 
Competitiveness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 International 
competitiveness 
and superiority 
 
 Profit motives 
 Laissez-faire 
capitalism 
 Deregulation 
 Innovation 
 World trade 
 Outdated regulations 
(such as Glass-Steagall) 
 Protectionism 
 International 
competition 
 Capital requirements 
"The banks, the regulators and Congress can 
cooperate to reduce and, hopefully, eliminate 
any remaining international competitive 
inequities." 
-Heller, May 9, 1988 
 
 
Economic 
Stability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Stability 
 Efficiency 
 Competitiveness 
 Fair competition 
 Laissez-faire 
capitalism 
 Prevalent market 
turbulence 
 Regulations (such as 
banking firewalls) 
 Deregulation 
 Technology/innovation 
 Global accords (Basel) 
 Diversification 
 Institutions 
 Market volatility and 
speculation 
 International 
competition 
 Protectionism 
 Outdated regulations 
"More adequate capital, risk-based capital, and 
increased securities powers for bank holding 
companies would provide a solid beginning for 
our efforts to ensure financial stability." 
-Greenspan, Oct. 11, 1988 
Economic 
Growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Growth 
 Return on 
investment (ROI) 
 Efficiency 
 Rising living 
standards 
 Stability 
 Laissez-faire 
capitalism 
 Global 
competition 
 International markets 
and foreign investment 
 Deregulation 
 Technology/innovation 
 Diversification 
 Institutions/culture 
 Healthy regulations 
 Risk management 
 Diverging economic 
policies 
 Inflation 
 Wasteful regulations 
 Monopolies/cronyism 
 Protectionism 
 Risks (payment risks) 
 Excessive debt 
"First and foremost has been the growing 
recognition of the importance of price stability 
to the achievement of sustainable maximum 
economic growth." 
-Greenspan, April 11, 1995 
 
"Competition is what has raised our standards of 
living for generations." 
-Greenspan, Nov. 18, 1996 
  
 
 
Table 6.2  U.S. economy/company narratives (sampled speeches by U.S. Federal Reserve officials, 1987–2000) (continued) 
Narrative Object Destinator Key enabling forces Key impeding forces Selected quotations 
Structural Shift 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Structural shift 
 Radical 
transformation 
 Progress and 
growth 
 
 Increased living 
standards 
 Laissez-faire 
capitalism 
 Competition 
 Technological advances 
(computers, telecom, 
satellites, financial) 
 Shareholder focus 
 Deregulation 
 Global competition 
 Venture capital 
 Risk management 
 Lack of skills and 
education 
 Inflation 
 Burdensome 
supervision 
 Protectionism 
 Systemic risks 
"… one of those rare, perhaps once-in-a-century 
events—a structural technological advance. The 
advent of the transistor and the integrated circuit 
and…the emergence of modern computer, 
telecommunication, and satellite technologies 
have fundamentally changed the structure of the 
American economy." 
-Greenspan, June 6, 1996 
New Economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 “New economy” 
 Unprecedented 
growth alongside 
low inflation 
 “Wheels of 
progress” 
 Technological 
shift 
 Laissez-faire 
capitalism 
 
 Technology (such as 
microprocessor) 
 Political stability 
 Free global trade 
 Flexible labor force 
 Deregulation 
 World class education 
 Prudent fiscal policy 
 Human nature as 
“immutable” 
 Global stress 
 Bubbles/imbalances 
 Inflation 
 Protectionism 
"… our advanced economy is primarily driven 
by how human psychology molds the value 
system that drives a competitive market 
economy. And that process is inextricably 
linked to human nature, which appears 
essentially immutable...But having said that, 
important technological changes…are altering, 
in ways with few precedents, the manner in 
which we organize production, trade across 
countries, and deliver value to consumers." 
-Greenspan, Sept. 9, 1998 
 
Economic 
Transition 
 
 
 
 Transition 
 “Shakeup” 
 Sustainable 
growth 
 Economic laws 
 Unsustainable 
growth 
 Optimism 
 Consumer confidence 
 Innovation 
 Sound banking system 
 Well-functioning 
capital markets 
 “Untoward events” 
 Inflation (especially 
higher energy prices) 
"In periods of transition from unsustainable to 
more modest rates of growth, an economy is 
obviously at increased risk of untoward events 
that would be readily absorbed in a period of 
boom." 
-Greenspan, Dec. 5, 2000 
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Figure 6.4  U.S. economy/company narrative (by count), 
sampled speeches by U.S. Federal Reserve officials, 1987–2000 
 
 
Figure 6.5  U.S. economy/company narrative (by percentage), 
sampled speeches by U.S. Federal Reserve officials, 1987–2000 
 
Note: Each of the 65 Federal Reserve speeches was categorized according to one, and only one, of the six 
narratives, except for speech #62 (Ferguson, Oct. 11, 2000), which did not possess a full narrative of the U.S. 
economy or U.S. companies and hence was coded as N/A.  
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The final narrative to emerge, “Economic Transition,” was found in only one speech: the last 
speech in the sample. In this speech, Greenspan observes that the U.S. is undoubtedly entering a 
period of “shakeup” and transition, where the old laws of supply and demand will determine which 
companies fold and which survive. He stresses that optimism and consumer confidence are 
paramount in this transitory phase, while “untoward events” such as market disruptions can now 
pose major threats. The next section, Section 6.2, offers further discussion of the interrelationships 
and discursive features of these narratives.  
In step three, categorizing each speech’s connotation of technology and innovation, three 
general phases can be described. As seen through Figures 6.6 and 6.7 on the next page and Table 
6.3 on the following page, the period from 1987 to 1993 included a large number, approximately 
half, of speeches with no connotation of technology or innovation. Then, in 1994 and 1995, all six 
sampled speeches possessed a mixed connotation of technology, in which these speeches drew 
attention to both the new efficiencies and products created by technological advancements and the 
new complexities and dangers of such advancements.  
Afterwards, from 1996 to 2000, the vast majority of speeches possessed a positive connotation 
of technology and innovation, often drawing attention to its critical role in the nation’s 
unprecedented rate of economic growth. The sampled texts included no speeches with negative or 
neutral connotations of technology.  
In step four, three tech company narratives and two U.S. stock narratives emerged from the data. 
Interestingly, from 1987 until 1995, no speech included a full tech company or U.S. stock narrative. 
Then, in 1996, a narrative of “Technological Dominance” emerged, which was by far the most 
common narrative in this step. This narrative sees tech firms as seeking market dominance, high 
market valuations, and diversification, which is all made possible in the context of a profound shift 
in the economy. The key enablers include constant innovation and technological synergies, while 
factors such as new upstarts and a lack of skills impede tech companies and their ambitions. 
In 2000, one speech possessed a narrative of “Technological Uncertainty,” which views tech 
companies as only able to provide highly uncertain returns, with difficulties in reducing costs and 
increasing revenue posing as major obstacles. Then, in the final sampled speech, a narrative of 
“Technological Shakeup” emerged, in which tech companies were inevitably heading towards a 
shakeup caused by the context of overly exuberant market players.  
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Figure 6.6  Connotation of technology/innovation (by count), 
sampled speeches by U.S. Federal Reserve officials, 1987–2000 
 
 
Figure 6.7  Connotation of technology/innovation (by percentage), 
sampled speeches by U.S. Federal Reserve officials, 1987–2000 
 
Note: Each of the 65 Federal Reserve speeches sampled was categorized according to one, and only one, of the 
five connotations.  
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Table 6.3  Selected quotations and topics for each technology connotation (sampled speeches by U.S. Federal Reserve officials, 1987–2000) 
 
 
Connotation Quotations and topics  
(1987–1993) 
Quotations and topics  
(1994–1995) 
Quotations and topics  
(1996–2000) 
Positive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"…technological change is spurring 
globalization, cheaper and faster information and 
telecommunications systems have been powerful 
contributors to the rapid development of 
international financial markets." 
-Greenspan, Nov. 30, 1988 
No such speeches during this period "On the one hand, the evidence of dramatic 
innovations—veritable shifts in the tectonic 
plates of technology—has moved far beyond 
mere conjecture." 
-Greenspan, Jan. 13, 2000 
Mixed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"These technological developments, which are 
especially well-suited to securities markets, have 
lowered transactions costs appreciably… 
However, these developments…also open up 
new avenues for abuses and new vulnerabilities 
which…could undermine progress." 
-Greenspan, Sept. 24, 1991 
 
"One must truly marvel at the advances in 
computer and communications technologies that 
have been made just in the past five years… 
However, such innovation has also sharply 
increased the complexity of both financial 
instruments and financial management." 
-Phillips, Feb. 24, 1994 
"In conclusion, we can expect financial 
institutions to continue experimenting with new 
technologies and electronic, information-based 
services. I believe that this is an area with great 
potential, yet the uncertainties are large and the 
payoff horizon unknown." 
-Ferguson, Oct. 20, 2000 
N/A 
 
 
 
International markets and competition 
-Heller, May 9, 1988 
 
Commercial and central banks 
-Greenspan, Oct. 10, 1989 
No such speeches during this period Bond Market 
-Meyer, Sept. 12, 1997 
 
Financial market turbulence 
-Rivlin, Mar. 1, 1999 
Chapter 6: The Tech Bubble’s Cognitive Pillar 
 
85 
 
In terms of U.S. stocks, which were rarely mentioned in the sampled speeches, a narrative of 
“Soaring Stocks” emerged in 1998, which sees stocks heading towards extremely high valuations, 
aided by a number of factors such as recent economic stability, technological advancements, and 
low inflation. Lastly, in the final sampled speech, a “Sustainable Stocks” narrative emerged in 
which U.S. stocks were heading towards more sustainable evaluations due to the gross imbalances 
in the economy A full description of all five of these narratives, along with their frequency counts, 
are made available in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 and Figures 6.8 and 6.9 on the next three pages. 
6.2 Institutional features 
The fourth stage of analysis revealed five interrelated means by which boom narratives became 
institutionalized and two reasons why efforts to deinstitutionalize these narratives failed. In terms of 
institutionalization, the five means or methods present in this pillar were: 1) the spread and 
repetition of boom narratives, 2) the transition of a boom narrative to destinator, 3) using 
unequivocal language, 4) rationalizing conflicting evidence, and 5) providing support with expert 
references. These five methods are explained in detail below. 
6.2.1 The spread and repetition of boom narratives   
As shown in the previous section, at the Federal Reserve from 1987 to 2000, several narratives 
emerged and then spread that fit the description of a boom narrative. Concerning the U.S. economy, 
both a “Structural Shift” narrative and a “New Economy” narrative constitute boom narratives that 
would lead investors to believe that investments in many sectors of the U.S. economy would deliver 
significant returns in the near, medium, and long term, particularly in tech-related sectors. At the 
asset level, both a “Technological Dominance” narrative and a “Soaring Stocks” narrative would 
invoke similar projections
22
. From 1987 to 1995, not a single speech expounded one of these boom 
narratives. Then, from 1996 to late 2000, these four narratives became commonplace at the Fed, 
with 26 of the 42 (62 percent) sampled speeches including one or more such narratives, producing a 
total of 37 boom narratives in those years. With the Federal Reserve representing one of the most 
respected sources of U.S. economic analysis, such narratives immediately acquired social 
legitimacy.   
                                                 
22
 As the assessment as to whether any individual narrative constitutes a boom narrative or not is a subjective process, I 
maintained my conservative approach in this process for each pillar. Thus, narratives of “growth,” “expansion,” and 
“stability,” were not categorized as boom narratives, despite their positive connotations.  
  
 
 
Table 6.4  Tech company narratives (sampled speeches by U.S. Federal Reserve officials, 1987–2000) 
Narrative Object Destinator Key enabling forces Key impeding forces Selected quotations 
Technological 
Dominance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Market dominance 
 “Outsized 
rewards” 
 High market 
valuations 
 Diversification 
 
 Profound shift in 
economy 
 Laissez-faire 
capitalism 
 Global 
competition 
 Constant innovation 
 Technological 
synergies 
 Lofty equity values 
(low cost of capital) 
 Productivity growth 
 Lack of skills/education 
 Upstarts/intense 
competition 
 “Wishful thinking” 
"Once proud hi-tech firms are being upended by 
new technologies developed by upstarts. But 
even the latter are lately looking over their 
shoulders at other upstarts with still newer 
technologies. The outsized rewards to high 
skills induce others to emulate them, and hence 
staying at the top has become ever more 
precarious." 
-Greenspan, Feb. 5, 1996 
 
Technological 
Uncertainty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Uncertain returns 
 Increased 
presence 
 High rate of 
adoption of new 
technologies 
 Difficulties 
turning a profit 
 Remarkable 
technological 
innovations 
 Difficulty in reducing 
costs and increasing 
revenue 
"Many internet banks have discovered that they 
are using any savings in "brick and mortar" 
operating costs to pay "bounties," or fees, to 
other Internet sites that refer new customers and 
to operate call centers to field the customer 
inquiries that invariably arise…bank 
management needs to enter these investments 
recognizing that the full benefits may not be 
gained quickly; may, if gained, be competed 
away; and may, indeed, not be captured at all." 
-Ferguson, Oct. 20, 2000 
 
Technological 
Shakeup 
 
 
 Shakeup 
 Rebalancing 
 Over-exuberance  Continued innovation 
and optimism 
 “Untoward events” "Demand for high-tech equipment and fiber 
optics expanded rapidly, but in some segments 
of the market available supply appears to have 
increased even faster." 
-Greenspan, Dec. 5, 2000 
  
 
 
Table 6.5  U.S. stock narratives (sampled speeches by U.S. Federal Reserve officials, 1987–2000) 
Narrative Object Destinator Key enabling forces Key impeding forces Selected quotations 
Soaring Stocks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Extremely high 
valuations 
 
 Laissez-faire 
capitalism 
 Wealth creation 
 Economic stability 
 Confidence 
 Technology 
 Productivity gains 
 Low inflation 
 Low labor costs (high 
profit margins) 
 Margin debt 
 
 Bubbles 
 Instability 
 Lack of savings 
 Limits to income 
growth 
"The American economic stability of the past 
five years has helped engender increasing 
confidence of future stability. This, in turn, has 
dramatically upgraded the stock market's 
valuation of our economy's existing productive 
infrastructure…Coupled with the quickened 
pace of productivity growth, wage and benefit 
moderation has kept growth in unit labor costs 
subdued in the current expansion. This has both 
damped inflation and allowed profit margins to 
reach high levels. That, in turn, apparently was 
the driving force beginning in early 1995 in 
security analysts' significant upward revision of 
their company-by-company long-term earnings 
projections." 
-Greenspan, Sept. 4, 1998 
 
Sustainable 
Stocks 
 
 
 
 More sustainable 
levels of growth 
 Imbalances (of 
supply and 
demand) 
 Well functioning capital 
markets 
 High inflation 
 “Untoward events” 
"Why then, one might ask, is this process of 
reassessment taking place now? In large part, it 
appears to be the expected byproduct of the 
economy's transition to a more sustainable 
balance in the growth of demand and supply." 
-Greenspan, Dec. 5, 2000 
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Figure 6.8  Tech company/U.S. stock narrative (by count), 
sampled speeches by U.S. Federal Reserve officials, 1987–2000 
 
 
Figure 6.9  Tech company/U.S. stock narrative (by percentage), 
sampled speeches by U.S. Federal Reserve officials, 1987–2000 
 
Note: Each of the 65 Federal Reserve speeches was analyzed for the presence of one, and only one, tech 
company narrative and one, and only one, U.S. stock narrative. Thus, an individual speech could include no 
narratives (N/A), one narrative (either a tech narrative or a stock narrative), or two narratives (both a tech 
narrative and a stock narrative). Three speeches in the year 2000, speech #52, #58, and #65, possessed both a 
tech narrative and a stock narrative. Hence, for that year, the total number of counts (17) is three greater than 
the total number of sampled speeches (14).  
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Further analysis of the spread and repetition of boom narratives at the Federal Reserve revealed 
another trend worth noting, which was the role of Chairman Alan Greenspan. As seen in Figure 
6.10 below, Greenspan, who delivered 37 of the 65 sampled speeches, was by far the most 
optimistic of the U.S. economy. As seen below, of the 32 positive U.S. economy speeches, 26 
belonged to Greenspan. Moreover, all four boom narratives in this sample were first expounded by 
Greenspan, often repeated by him several times, and then later found in the speeches of other 
officials. For instance, the “Structural Shift” narrative was first expounded in a 1996 (June 6) 
speech by Greenspan and was then later expounded by both Roger Ferguson in 1999 (Sept. 21) and 
Laurence Meyer in 2000 (June 1). Similarly, the “New Economy” narrative was first expounded in 
1998 (Sept. 9) by Greenspan and then later again by both Ferguson (three times: Feb. 17, 2000; 
May 9, 2000; and Oct. 20, 2000) and Meyer (June 6, 2000). Greenspan’s position of Chairman 
would only serve to increase the social legitimacy of such narratives, likely also at least partially 
explaining their spread amongst Reserve officials.   
  
Figure 6.10  Connotation of U.S. economy/companies by speaker (by count), 
sampled speeches by U.S. Federal Reserve officials, 1987–2000 
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6.2.2 Boom narrative destinator 
In the sample, an interesting trend emerged amongst the transition from one popular narrative to the 
next, that being the transition of a theme from the object of one narrative to the destinator (the 
taken-for-granted context) of a later narrative. This trend is best first explained in the U.S. economy 
narratives that emerged, as presented in Table 6.2. For example, in the first narrative to emerge, 
“Economic Competitiveness,” international competitiveness was viewed as the object of U.S. 
companies, an object they had yet to acquire.  
Later on, in both an “Economic Growth” narrative and a “Structural Shift” narrative, 
international competitiveness was viewed as an acquired object. With this task accomplished, 
international competition was now viewed as merely the context in which the U.S. economy was 
operating and became a frame of reference by which to evaluate new developments—with 
developments that increased international competition being viewed favorably and developments 
that impeded international competition being viewed unfavorably. 
The theme of technology underwent a similar, but even more dramatic, transition. Near the very 
beginning of the sampled period, technology, including references to computers and 
telecommunications, was already discussed in a rather positive manner, such as in the following 
Greenspan (Oct. 11, 1988) quote: “Advances in computer and telecommunications technology have 
enabled both borrowers and lenders to more easily, and at lower cost, obtain and use credit- and 
market-risk information.” However, earlier speeches also included comments on the drawbacks and 
possible dangers of such technological advancements, such as in a speech by H. Robert Heller (Oct. 
25, 1988): “…the increased internationalization of the financial markets causes events in one 
country to reverberate beyond national borders...the global integration is made possible by 
technological advances in communications and computers.”  
By the mid 1990s, while the problems and mixed nature of these advancements were still 
acknowledged, technology was now viewed as the solution to its own problems: “…if it is 
technology that has imparted the current stress to markets, technology can be employed to contain it” 
(Greenspan, April 11, 1995). 
The transition of technology continued into the late 1990s, when technological advancements 
were viewed in an almost exclusively positive manner, as shown in Figures 6.6 and 6.7. During this 
time, technological advancements became the key enabler in the “Structural Shift” narrative. Then, 
in 1998, 1999, and 2000, when the “New Economy” and “Technological Dominance” narratives 
emerged, a profound, technological shift in the U.S. economy became the destinator or context by 
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which new objects (new economic rules and market dominance) could be acquired. That is to say, 
in this sense, the “Structural Shift” boom narrative was heavily institutionalized when it became the 
taken-for-granted context in which the “New Economy” and “Technological Dominance” narratives 
emerged. 
Greenspan’s speech on March 6, 2000 fully illustrates the institutionalized nature of a 
technological, structural shift and its support of “New Economy” and “Technological Dominance” 
narratives (this speech’s transcript and an explanation of its analysis is provided in full in Appendix 
4). In this speech, Greenspan highlights record productivity growth, subdued inflation, and 
“dramatic changes in the way goods and services are produced” as evidence of a new and exciting 
U.S. economy. He also observes that a “flood of startup firms” claim to offer the chance to 
“revolutionize and dominate large shares of the nation’s production and distribution system.” In 
explaining the origin of this “new economy,” Greenspan left little doubt, as he stressed, “my 
remarks today will focus on what is evidently the source of this spectacular performance—the 
revolution in information technology.”  
He goes on to note that “discontinuous shifts in economic structure” result in difficulties 
appraising new companies and that a recent, “special wave of innovative synergies” brought us to 
this “fascinating” and even “unsettling” point in history. Hence, Greenspan’s view is that a “new 
economy” and the market dominance of U.S. tech companies is only possible because of the rapid 
and cumulative changes that the technological revolution has brought about, changes that have 
resulted in a discontinuous, structural shift in the economy. 
6.2.3 Unequivocal language 
Highly interrelated to the discussion above was the use of unequivocal language. Unequivocal 
language refers to the use of matter-of-fact language that suggests that what is stated is clearly the 
case, leaving little to no room for debate. Such language exudes confidence and is likely to confer 
great certainty to readers and listeners, particularly to those that are not nearly as informed as the 
writer or speaker. In these sampled speeches, Federal Reserve officials often used such language, 
including during the articulation of a boom narrative and especially, again, by Alan Greenspan. 
For instance, in the year 2000 alone, Greenspan gave several speeches expounding a “New 
Economy” narrative, with each speech including various styles of unequivocal language. On 
January 13, he commented on the U.S. economy, stating (all emphases are added), “However one 
views the causes of our low inflation and strong growth, there can be little argument that the 
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American economy as it stands at the beginning of a new century has never exhibited so remarkable 
a prosperity for at least the majority of Americans.”  
Two months later, on March 6, he analyzed the implications for the business cycle: “In the last 
few years it has become increasingly clear that this business cycle differs in a very profound way 
from the many other cycles that have characterized post-World War II America.” Then, on April 5, 
he forecasted future productivity trends: “I see no reason that productivity growth cannot remain 
elevated, or even increase further, to the undeniable benefit of American businesses and workers.”  
Lastly, on November 20, two weeks before giving his speech on the shakeup in tech firms and 
stocks, he gave further predictions on the future of markets: “Clearly, we have witnessed a rapid 
evolution of financial markets in recent years, and the likelihood of continuing fundamental change 
is high.”  
Especially when repeated several times in quick succession, the certainty and confidence in such 
language adds to the taken-for-granted aspect of these boom narratives. Additional examples of 
unequivocal language for this and other narratives are presented on the next page in Table 6.6.  
6.2.4 Rationalizing conflicting evidence 
While the period from 1987 to 2000 witnessed a number of favorable economic trends, not all 
trends were positive. When addressing unfavorable events or data during the exposition of a boom 
narrative, Reserve officials, once again primarily Greenspan, would often rationalize, or perhaps 
even “spin,” such evidence to help listeners and readers understand why the evidence is not really 
negative at all and may in fact be further support of a boom narrative. 
This method was used in response to three situations during the sampled period: 1) the lack of 
(or minimal) productivity and output growth during the tech boom, 2) the Asian Financial Crisis, 
and 3) the absence of a comparable tech boom in parts of Europe or Japan. Below I discuss the 
rationalization of each of these situations.  
In the year 1996, both a “Technological Dominance” and a “Structural Shift” narrative emerged. 
However, at that time, U.S. GDP and productivity statistics had yet to exhibit any evidence of a 
marked, upward swing in output or efficiency. Greenspan (Feb. 5, 1996) responded to this lack of 
evidence in the following quote:  
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Table 6.6  Examples of unequivocal language  
(sampled speeches by U.S. Federal Reserve officials, 1987–2000) 
Narrative Selected quotation 
Economic 
Growth 
 
"…financial markets undoubtedly are far more efficient today than ever before." 
-Greenspan, Mar. 3, 1995 
Structural Shift 
 
 
 
"The increasing importance of new insights has, of course, raised the value of 
information creation and transfer in boosting standards of living. Thus, it should be no 
surprise that new computer and telecommunications products have been accorded 
particularly high value by consumers and business and, hence, why companies that 
successfully innovate in this field exhibit particularly high stock market values." 
-Greenspan, Sept. 12, 1997 
 
New Economy 
 
 
 
"The fact that the capital spending boom is still going strong indicates that businesses 
continue to find a wide array of potential high-rate-of-return, productivity-enhancing 
investments. And I see nothing to suggest that these opportunities will peter out any time 
soon." 
-Greenspan, Mar. 6, 2000 
 
Technological 
Dominance 
 
 
"Many of these combinations arise directly from the opportunities created by new 
technology...information technology has almost certainly pushed out the point at which 
scale diseconomies begin to take hold for some industries." 
-Greenspan, Mar. 6, 2000 
 
Soaring Stocks 
 
 
"More recently, however, it has become increasingly difficult to deny that something 
profoundly different from the typical postwar business cycle has emerged." 
-Greenspan, Jan. 13, 2000 
Note: All emphases (italics) are added 
 
 
…it has puzzled many of us that the growth of output as customarily measured has not evidenced a 
corresponding pickup. Of course, output may not be measured correctly. Indeed, the financial markets 
are suggesting that we increasingly expense items which should be capitalized and hence underestimate 
the growth of our GDP and productivity. 
Thus, in Greenspan’s opinion (making use of the unequivocal language “of course”), financial 
markets, meaning stock investors, have it right: many current expenditures, referring to those in 
computing and other related areas, should be treated as assets. If they were, output figures would be 
aligned with the salient improvements in the U.S. economy.  
Later on in the year, and in 1997, Greenspan continued to rationalize the lack of productivity 
growth, such as in a 1996 (Oct. 16) speech: “...like the major technological advances of earlier 
periods, it will take time for our newest innovations to work their way into the nation’s 
infrastructure in a productive manner…” and similarly in a 1997 (Oct. 5) speech: “…despite the 
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benefits we have seen this decade, it may be that the truly significant increases in living standards 
resulting from the introduction of computers and communications equipment still lie ahead.”  
In 2000 (Feb. 17), even Roger Ferguson acknowledged, albeit somewhat cautiously, that 
improper accounting may be at fault: “Others argue that, in this world of knowledge-intensive 
industries, accounting treatments do not accurately measure true economic earnings...” 
As introduced in Chapter 2, in 1997 and 1998 Southeast Asia experienced a rather sharp 
economic correction, particularly in their exchange rates. Rather quickly, contagion from this crisis 
spread to South America, Russia, and even the U.S. banking system. At the time, numerous pundits 
started to question whether free, global markets and laissez-faire capitalism were as beneficial and 
stable as commonly claimed. In his speeches, Greenspan responded to such questions by arguing 
that it was not actually free markets but rather lingering socialist institutions that were responsible 
for the crisis.  
This rationalization was expressed in both a 1998 (April 2) speech: “[The Asian economies in 
crisis] relied on markets in most respects, but they also used elements of central planning in the 
form of credit allocation, and those elements, in my view, turned out to be their Achilles heel…” 
and a 1999 (Oct. 19) speech: “Such institutions [publicly owned banks] rarely exhibit the dynamism 
and innovation that many private banks have employed for their, and their economies’ prosperity.” 
Interestingly, this last quote was from a speech given at a conference with the theme “Do efficient 
financial markets contribute to financial crisis?” Greenspan’s speech was appropriately entitled, 
“Do efficient financial markets mitigate financial crises?” 
Lastly, in the midst of the tech boom mania, the question arose as to why the seemingly obvious 
structural shift and emerging new economy were so pronounced in the U.S. and not as noticeable in 
many European countries or even the veritable behemoth of technological innovation and trade, 
Japan. Greenspan (July 11, 2000) concluded that it was the inflexible labor laws of those countries 
that prevented them from achieving such gains: “…U.S. businesses and workers appear to have 
benefited more from the recent advances in information technology than their counterparts in 
Europe or Japan…The relatively inflexible and, hence, more costly labor markets of these 
economies appear to be a significant part of the explanation.”  
In this situation, as with the previous two mentioned above, with conflicting evidence accounted 
for, all that remained was (often unequivocally) positive and reinforcing evidence of the prevailing 
boom narratives. 
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6.2.5 Expert references 
Closely related to the method of rationalizing conflicting evidence, numerous boom narratives in 
the sampled speeches referenced expert sources—sources that offered further support and conferred 
an objective sense of legitimacy upon the narratives. In speeches by Federal Reserve officials, these 
sources usually included economists at prestigious universities and the Fed itself and studies 
produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
Expert references were frequently used in the practice of rationalizing conflicting evidence, as 
demonstrated by Greenspan in 1996 (Feb. 5): “A number of commentators, particularly Professor 
David of Stanford University, have suggested that much of the wheel spinning...reflects the 
extended time it typically has taken to translate a major new technology into increased productivity 
and higher standards of living…” and in 1999 (Oct. 19): “A recent study by Ross Levine and Sara 
Zervos [two economists] suggests that financial market development improves economic 
performance, over and above the benefits offered by banking sector development alone…It is no 
coincidence that the lack of adequate accounting practices, bankruptcy provisions, and corporate 
governance have been mentioned as elements in several of the recent crises that so disrupted some 
emerging-market countries.”  
In both situations, expert references added substantial support to Greenspan’s optimistic views. 
Table 6.7 on the next page offers further examples of how such references were used.  
Moving on, this stage of analysis also revealed two reasons why efforts to deinstitutionalize 
boom narratives failed. These reasons were: 1) texts that truly attempted to challenge the discourse 
found in boom narratives were found to be in a very small minority, and 2) many of these texts were 
simply reacting to problems that had already occurred. These two reasons are explained in detail 
below. 
6.2.6 Minority status 
The figures in Section 6.1 reveal an overarching trend in discourse at the Federal Reserve from 
1987 to 2000—that being from 1987 until 1995 much of the discourse was either negative or 
balanced in relation to the U.S. economy and technology, while from 1996 to 2000 the majority of 
discourse was overwhelmingly positive. In this latter period, which included 42 speeches, only one 
speech contained a negative connotation of the U.S. economy. This was Alice Rivlin’s March 1, 
1999 speech, in which she foresaw slowing economic growth and opined:  
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Table 6.7  Examples of expert references 
(sampled speeches by U.S. Federal Reserve officials, 1987–2000) 
Narrative Selected quotation 
Structural Shift 
 
 
 
"Professor David suspects, with many good reasons, that the ability of computer-based 
technologies to become fully reflected in our overall national productivity is being 
delayed, as the infrastructure gradually, but progressively, adjusts to new modes of 
production. With the ongoing turnover of the capital stock, computer-related synergies 
will, presumably, substantially raise real value added per hour in the years ahead." 
-Greenspan, Oct. 16, 1996 
 
New Economy 
 
 
 
"Oliner and Sichel [two economists on the Federal Reserve Board staff] estimate that, if 
one consolidates all the influences of high-tech investments, they account for about two-
thirds of the acceleration in productivity since 1995. This research supports the view that 
fundamental changes are under way in our economy." 
-Ferguson, May 9, 2000 
 
Technological 
Dominance 
 
 
"The growth of high-tech industry here in the Research Triangle, as well as in Silicon 
Valley and Boston—all areas rich in educational and research institutions—is no 
accident. In the private sector, a number of major corporations have invested in their own 
internal training centers—so-called corporate universities. Some labor unions have done 
the same. More broadly, recent surveys by the Bureau of Labor Statistics indicate that 
the provision of formal education on the job has risen markedly in recent years." 
-Greenspan, Sept. 12, 1997 
 
 
The greatest need at the moment is to find a forum for continuous and constructive communication and 
consensus-building among the major industrial and emerging market countries to hammer out new ways 
of strengthening world financial systems and both preventing and mitigating future financial crises and 
dealing with them more effectively when they occur…There is plenty to work on if even modest 
progress is to be made in finding ways for international financial markets to function more efficiently 
and with less costly swings and turbulence. 
After her speech, a similar “Economic Stability” narrative was repeated only one time in the sample, 
by Laurence Meyer on June 14, 1999, in which he warned, “…the high correlation of risks across 
banks may induce a simultaneous exercise of put options, which could exacerbate or even trigger a 
systemic crisis.” Of important note, while both of these speeches included warnings of systemic 
risks and market turbulence, neither speech directly questioned the boom narratives and optimism 
that was so prevalent in other sampled speeches at the time. 
A few speeches did however raise the possibility that much of the current euphoria and 
astronomical market valuations were the result of irrational expectations and signs of a market 
bubble. The few times such a possibility was raised, though, the speakers concluded that it was 
impossible to tell whether the mania was a bubble and then went on in the same speech or future 
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speeches to continue touting the remarkable performance of the U.S. economy. For instance, in a 
January 13, 2000 speech, Greenspan observed: 
When we look back at the 1990s, from the perspective of say 2010…we may conceivably conclude…the 
American economy was experiencing a once-in-a-century acceleration of innovation, which propelled 
forward productivity, output, corporate profits, and stock prices at a pace not seen in generations, if ever. 
Alternatively, that 2010 retrospective might well conclude that a good deal of what we are currently 
experiencing was just one of the many euphoric speculative bubbles that have dotted human history. 
Less than two months later, on March 6, the possibility of a bubble went unmentioned, with 
Greenspan opening, “My remarks today will focus both on what is evidently the source of this 
spectacular performance—the revolution in information technology…” Then, on April 5, the 
possibility of a bubble returned, but again Greenspan implied that it was impossible for anyone to 
tell: 
As a result, security analysts’ projected five-year growth of earnings for technology companies now 
stands nearly double that for the remaining S&P 500 firms. To the extent that there is an element of 
prescience in these expectations, it would reinforce the notion that technology synergies are still 
expanding and that expectations of productivity growth are still rising. There are many who argue, of 
course, that it is not prescience but wishful thinking. History will judge. 
In a May 9, 2000 speech, in which he noted, “Even the most optimistic of forecasters could not 
have anticipated such a favorable confluence of economic events,” Roger Ferguson expressed 
similar views on the ability to identify a bubble:  
How does the performance of the stock market in recent years fit into this picture? A higher rate of 
technical change that raises the productivity and hence the profitability of capital should elevate the 
valuation of equities. But how much should stock values rise under those circumstances? Are stocks 
today overvalued, correctly valued, or undervalued? I certainly do not know, and I am not aware of 
anyone who does. 
Such discourse by both Ferguson and Greenspan hardly qualify as true attempts to quash the 
prevailing boom narratives, leaving more pessimistic speeches such as Rivlin’s and Meyer’s in a 
very small minority. 
6.2.7 Reactionary discourse 
In mid to late 2000, the overarching discourse shifted from one of unbounded optimism to one of 
cautious pessimism. At this point, such discourse was largely reactionary, as the NASDAQ had 
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already suffered a one-day drop of nearly 10 percent in April amidst a trend of increasingly 
disappointing tech company income and profit results.  
Hence, these speeches questioning the prevailing boom narratives were simply a case of “too 
little, too late.” Interestingly, despite this shift to cautious pessimism, speakers still maintained a 
balanced and even at times optimistic view of the U.S. economy’s overall condition and long-term 
prospects.  
Reactionary discourse was first seen in Meyer’s June 6, 2000 speech: 
I was startled by the bold title of an article that appeared in The Wall Street Journal on December 31, 
1999: “So Long, Supply and Demand.” But it illustrates the unbounded optimism—some might even call 
it irrational exuberance—about economic prospects...Several considerations provide some optimism that 
the outcome will be a benign one—a soft as opposed to a hard landing. 
On October 20, 2000, Ferguson’s “Technological Uncertainty” narrative possessed a similarly 
pessimistic tone: 
In conclusion, we can expect financial institutions to continue experimenting with new technologies and 
electronic, information-based services. I believe that this is an area with great potential, yet the 
uncertainties are large and the payoff horizon unknown. 
Lastly, on December 5 of 2000, Greenspan’s “Economic Transition,” “Technological Shakeup,” 
and “Sustainable Stocks” narratives reacted to the influx of unfavorable news, albeit with a healthy 
dose of optimism: 
Recently, wariness about risk again has increased as default rates on less than investment-grade bonds 
have moved higher, debt downgrades have become more commonplace, and many high-flying dot-com 
ventures have collapsed…To be sure, our current circumstances are in no way comparable to those of 
1998. Financial markets have continued to function reasonably well, and credit continues to flow… 
6.3 Summary  
In summation, from 1987 to 2000, officials at the U.S. Federal Reserve—one of the most closely 
followed sources of U.S. economic reporting and forecasting and an institution with extremely high 
levels of discursive power and direct control over the nation’s economy—gave increased attention 
to the topics of technology, innovation, and the new economy, and really only during the boom 
years of 1995 to 2000. During these boom years, they presented the U.S. economy in an 
increasingly, and nearly exclusively, positive manner, expounding narratives of strong growth, a 
profound structural shift, and a new economy. At the same time, technology and innovation was 
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now viewed as the motor behind the nation’s strong growth, with narratives of technological 
dominance and soaring stocks taking hold.  
Moreover, during these boom years, these extremely optimistic narratives took on a life of their 
own and started to appear as unquestionable and matter-of-fact aspects of a new economic reality. 
The matter-of-fact nature of these narratives became evident in a number of ways, including their 
spread and repetition by Reserve officials, the use of one boom narrative (structural shift) to support 
another boom narrative (new economy), the use of unequivocal language, the rationalization of 
conflicting evidence, and support from expert references. During these years, though, there were 
efforts to challenge the status-quo. However, these efforts were in a very small minority and were 
frequently only in reaction to initial market drops.  
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CHAPTER 7: THE TECH BUBBLE’S NORMATIVE PILLAR 
This chapter presents findings from the normative pillar of institutionalization, referring to the 
values and norms that result from social expectations and moral obligations. Normative sources 
establish what is appropriate—how people should act, think, talk, and so on. For this study, the 
normative pillar is represented by media texts from The New York Times and Fortune magazine. 
From 1987 to 2000, there were 873,412 articles published by The New York Times and 20,420 
articles published by Fortune. Figures 7.1 to 7.6 on the following two pages present the findings 
from the initial sampling stage.  
A few interesting comparisons can be made here. First, articles containing the words “stock(s)” 
and “market(s)” remained fairly steady for both publications over the sample period, with a slight 
surge in results in the early 1990s. In stark contrast, references to technology and the new economy 
varied dramatically over time. Articles from The New York Times saw an almost nine-fold increase 
in title references to technology and a large spike in new economy references in the year 2000, 
while Fortune articles saw a large uptick in technology references as early as 1991 and a surge in 
references to new economy as early as 1993/1994.  
References to “equity (-ies)” and “innovation(s)” remained rather constant for both publications, 
other than a surge in references to equity in The New York Times in the year 2000 and an unusual 
spike in references to innovation in Fortune in the year 1991 (which were all from a section entitled 
“Innovation: Products to Watch”). 
This initial sampling phase resulted in 20,279 New York Times articles and 1,046 Fortune 
articles. This sample was further reduced by selecting the first article (by date of publication) of 
each year for each keyword for each publication. Selecting the first keyword entry by date of 
publication resulted in a large number of articles from the month of January. However, an initial 
viewing of the articles revealed no reason to believe this selection process would bias the findings 
in any way. Quite the contrary, such a selection process resulted in a rather even chronological 
distribution of sampled articles and allowed for comparison of a number of yearly review and 
forecast articles.  
A few of the initially sampled Fortune articles could not be found, neither through a database 
search nor at the forbes.com archive site. These articles were all written anonymously and were 
replaced by the next search result. For seven such searches, there were only anonymous results, so 
those articles were not replaced. 
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Figure 7.1  Keywords in article titles (by count),  
The New York Times, 1987–2000 
 
 
Figure 7.2  Keywords in article titles (by count),  
The New York Times, 1987–2000 
 
 
Figure 7.3  Keywords in article titles (by count),  
The New York Times, 1987–2000 
 
Source for three figures: ProQuest database 
Note: These keywords were searched in all 873,412 articles in The New York Times from 1987 to 2000. While 
each title could include two or more keywords (for example, “equity markets” contains both “equity” and 
“market”), no keyword was counted twice in the same title.  
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Figure 7.4  Keywords in article titles (by count),  
Fortune, 1987–2000 
 
 
Figure 7.5  Keywords in article titles (by count),  
Fortune, 1987–2000 
 
 
Figure 7.6  Keywords in article titles (by count),  
Fortune, 1987–2000 
 
Source for three figures: ProQuest database 
Note: These keywords were searched in all 20,420 articles in Fortune from 1987 to 2000. While each title 
could include two or more keywords (for example, “equity markets” contains both “equity” and “market”), no 
keyword was counted twice in the same title. 
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Also, a few searches produced duplicates, as, for example, an article with the words “stock 
market” in its title would have been sampled twice. In these cases, the duplicate was replaced by the 
next search result. Appendix 2 only provides the final sampled articles.  
Thus, with 14 years, six keywords, and two publications, such a sample would result in 168 
articles. However, there were 26 instances where a keyword returned no results for a given year for 
a given publication and seven instances where an article could not be retrieved or replaced, so the 
final sample consisted of 135 articles.  
Appendix 2 provides the reference information for each of these articles, along with their 
citation codes that will be used throughout this chapter. 
7.1 Narrative analysis 
Figures 7.7 and 7.8 on the next page and Table 7.1 on the following page present results from the 
first step of analysis in this section, the categorization of each article’s connotation of the U.S. 
economy and/or U.S. companies. 
These connotations are best described in two general phases. First, the period from 1987 to 1992 
witnessed a great variety of connotations with the largest number (20 of the 52 articles) being mixed, 
but articles with a negative connotation of the U.S. economy or the performance of U.S. companies 
did outnumber those with a positive connotation by a count of 10 to five.  
As a result, the overall mood of sampled articles from this period was one of anxiety and 
disappointment in reference to U.S. companies, alongside jealousy of foreign companies and 
economies (most frequently referring to Japan and West Germany).  
Second, a shift occurred around 1993 that resulted in the majority of articles (47 of 83) from 
1993 to 2000 having a positive connotation of the U.S. economy or the performance of U.S. 
companies, with very few articles (only 4 of 83) from this period possessing a negative connotation.  
Table 7.1 is organized according to these two phases and provides a few selected quotations 
from each phase.   
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Figure 7.7  Connotation of U.S. economy/companies (by count), 
sampled media articles, 1987–2000 
 
 
Figure 7.8  Connotation of U.S. economy/companies (by percentage), 
sampled media articles, 1987–2000 
 
Note: Each of the 135 media articles sampled was categorized according to one, and only one, of the five 
connotations.  
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Table 7.1  Selected quotations and topics for each U.S. economy connotation (sampled media articles, 1987–2000) 
 
Connotation Quotations and topics  
(1987–1992) 
Quotations and topics  
(1993–2000) 
Positive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
" 'Over all [sic], 1987 should be a good year—by and large as good a year 
as 1986,' Deputy Secretary Clarence Brown said when he released the 690-
page United States Industrial Outlook on Wednesday." 
-The NY Times, 1987 
 
"Stocks jumped in Japan today following the record highs reached last 
week on Wall Street." 
-Reuters, 1992 
"Despite a relentless chorus of bearish prognosticators, the feisty American 
Stock Exchange surged 16.6% for the year, the over-the-counter market 
rose 12.1%, and even the lumbering Big Board was up a respectable 7.6%." 
-Teitelbaum, 1994 
 
"We have had an economy that has been very robust…Consumer 
confidence is at record levels, people feel good about the economy." 
-Truell, 1998 
Negative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
" 'Excess volatility is a serious threat to our nation's capital markets and the 
American economy,' said John J. Phelan Jr., the exchange's [NYSE] 
chairman…the Japanese stock market is now watched as a leader, often 
admired and envied in New York and London." 
-Sterngold, 1990 
 
"For owners of junk bonds, 1989 wasn't just a bad year, it was a nightmare 
on Elm Street." 
-Serwer, 1990 
 
"In this country [the U.S.] real estate looks dubious, and everyone knows 
how illiquid it can be…Bonds may be attractive, but there is real risk in 
buying long-term issues, and little reward from buying short-term ones. 
The banks don't want money, which is why they pay so little for it." 
-Norris, 1993 
 
"The recent dive in technology stocks is making more than a few investors 
nervous about the potential for a more serious market break." 
-Kover, 1997 
 
Mixed 
 
 
 
 
 
"Since the October 1987 market crash, the broad market indexes have more 
than recouped their losses, but small stocks have lacked the momentum to 
rebound." 
-Hylton, 1991 
"Measured by the performance of the major stock markets, the year was a 
thorough downer: The Big Board slipped 5.8%, Nasdaq dropped 7.4%, and 
the American Stock Exchange fell no less than 11.8%...With signs 
abounding that the economy is still strong, the Fed could keep raising 
rates—bad news for stocks." 
-Michels, 1995 
Neutral 
 
Stock options 
-Stewart, 1990 
China stealing technology 
-Schmitt, 1999 
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Not surprisingly, in step two, the media sample produced a large number (12 in total) of U.S. 
economy and/or company narratives, which are outlined in Table 7.2 on the next three pages. On 
the following page, Figures 7.9 and 7.10 present the frequency trends of these narratives over the 
sample period.  
These narratives are best described in four groups: first, those that are primarily negative in their 
connotation (which are colored in various shades of red or blue in Figures 7.9 and 7.10); second, 
those that are essentially neutral in their connotation (colored purple); third, those that are 
moderately positive in their connotation (colored various shades of green); and fourth, those that are 
extremely positive in their connotation (colored various shades of orange and yellow).  
Five of the narratives were primarily negative or at the very least possessed an attitude of 
skepticism towards the U.S. economy or U.S. companies. The narrative of “Economic Decline” was 
perhaps the most negative. This narrative sees U.S. companies that were once the envy of the world 
losing market share and technological prowess to several foreign competitors, particularly those in 
Japan and West Germany.  
In this narrative, U.S. companies are essentially fighting for their survival, being helped by 
aggressive cost cutting, new product introduction, and even government rescues while being 
hindered by over-regulation, high interest rates and taxes, and soft demand. This narrative appeared 
nine times, mostly in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
Also quite negative, an “Economic Uncertainty” narrative emerged in the late 1980s, appearing 
three times. This narrative portrays the U.S. economy as extremely unpredictable and risky. In a 
climate of slowing growth, only risk-taking entrepreneurs, aided by low interest rates, can win 
despite being impeded by excessive regulations, high inflation, and widespread defaults.  
Similar to that described in the cognitive pillar, a narrative of “Economic Competitiveness” 
emerged in this sample. This narrative, which appeared nine times, mostly in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, focuses on the difficulties U.S. companies face competing with powerful foreign and 
domestic rivals. While some U.S. companies are successful due to factors such as innovation and 
product differentiation, others struggle amidst widespread price wars, high labor costs, and 
overcapacity.  
  
 
 
Table 7.2  U.S. economy/company narratives (sampled media articles, 1987–2000)
Narrative Object Destinator Key enabling forces Key impeding forces Selected quotations 
Economic 
Decline 
 
 
 
 
 Declining revenue 
 Survival 
 Slump 
 Inferiority to 
foreign companies 
 Past success 
 Recent crises 
 Profit motives 
 Laissez-faire 
capitalism 
 New contracts/products 
 Cost cutting 
 Price increases 
 Gov’t help/rescue 
 Cheap funding 
 Training/innovation 
 
 Over-regulation/taxes 
 High costs/low demand 
 Poor management 
 High interest rates 
 Market volatility 
 Excessive risk 
 
" 'We're losing our creative edge. American 
industry is on the decline because U.S. 
managers are too concerned about protecting 
short-term earnings to innovate.' "   
-quote of James Clark, owner of Silicon 
Graphics, in Dumaine, 1991 
Economic 
Uncertainty 
 
 
 
 
 Uncertainty 
 Risk 
 Entrepreneurial 
spirit 
 Slowing growth 
 Laissez-faire 
capitalism 
 
 Risk-taking 
 Entrepreneurs 
 Funding/capital 
 Low interest rates 
 
 Over-regulation 
 Inflation 
 Defaults 
 
"In these uncertain times many investors are 
loath to give up the safety of Treasury bonds… 
Unnerved by some highly publicized defaults 
among big junk bond issuers, investors exited 
the market in droves, driving down prices." 
-Serwer, 1990 
Economic 
Competitiveness 
 
 
 
 
 International and 
domestic 
competitiveness 
 Price wars 
 Profit motives 
 Global 
competition 
 Laissez-faire 
capitalism 
 
 Innovation/technology 
 Meeting consumer 
demands 
 Differentiation 
 Foreign investment 
 Gov’t help 
 Takeovers/acquisitions 
 
 Int’l and domestic 
competition 
 Gov’t red tape 
 Demanding consumers 
 High labor costs 
 Overcapacity 
 Aging equipment 
 
"Like the rest of the domestic industry, National 
Steel had been hurt by foreign competition, 
industry overcapacity, aging equipment and a 
bulging work force."  
-Hickspittsburgh, 1989 
Economic 
Transition 
 
 
 
 Sustainable 
growth 
 Slowdown 
 Unsustainable 
growth 
 Business cycles 
 Strong corporate 
earnings 
 Growth in tech sector 
 Retail investors 
 Low interest rates 
 Euphoria/bubbles 
 Lackluster consumer 
spending 
 Inflation 
 Global turmoil 
"Through restructurings, heavy layoffs, and 
ample use of leverage, corporate profits have 
been growing two to four times faster than the 
underlying economy since 1991." 
-Hylton, 1996b 
  
 
 
Table 7.2  U.S. economy/company narratives (sampled media articles, 1987–2000) (continued)
Narrative Object Destinator Key enabling forces Key impeding forces Selected quotations 
Economic 
Euphoria 
 
 
 
 
 Euphoria 
 Irrational 
exuberance 
 Jumping on the 
bandwagon 
 Alleged shift in 
economy 
 History of boom-
bust cycles 
 Growing presence 
of technology 
 Radical innovations 
 Enthusiastic investors 
 Poor product quality 
 Copycat behavior 
 Fierce competition 
 Gov’t censorship 
 
"For any commercial enterprise getting ready to 
start a site on the World Wide Web: Resolve to 
scotch your plans immediately unless you can 
honestly answer the question, 'Why?'…(Please 
note that 'Everyone is doing it' is not one of the 
listed responses.)" 
-Caruso, 1996 
 
Economic 
Cycles 
 
 
 
 
 Cycles 
 Recession and 
recovery 
 Recent recessions 
and growth 
 Laissez-faire 
capitalism 
 
 Modest investment 
during growth 
 International sales 
 Rebounding sectors 
 
 Lack of skilled labor 
 Weak credit market 
 Low gov’t assistance 
 High oil prices 
 Debt overhang 
 
"Shipowners recall that in the past big orders 
were placed in the middle of an upswing in 
cargo rates and the ships were delivered several 
years later, when the industry was in a 
recession." 
-Salpukas, 1990 
Moderate 
Economic 
Growth 
 
 
 
 
 Moderate growth 
 Tame business 
cycle 
 Manufacturing in 
decline 
 Recent economic 
disruptions 
 Laissez-faire 
capitalism 
 
 Tech manufacturers 
 Service sector (mutual 
funds, consulting, etc.) 
 Low inflation 
 Low interest rates 
 Demographic forces 
 International 
competition 
 Deficits 
 Oil shocks 
 Protectionism 
 Entitlement programs 
 
" 'The growth will be broader across all 
industries than in recent years although 
somewhat shallower for all,' Mr. Brown 
said…'A broader range of industries will 
participate in the overall moderate growth.' " 
-The NY Times, 1987 
Sound Economy 
 
 
 
 Trustworthy, 
reliable economy 
and regulation 
 Healthy private 
sector 
 Robust economy 
(shielded from 
contagion) 
 Dangers of int’l 
investment 
 High risks in 
developing 
countries 
 Laissez-faire 
capitalism 
 Strong institutions 
(such as SEC) 
 Rule of law 
 Low unemployment 
 Corporate profit growth 
 Foreign investment 
 Low interest rates 
 Corruption/fraud 
 Manipulation (insider 
trading) 
 Inflation 
 Stock bubbles 
 Global turmoil 
"The good news is that the U.S. economy 
remains fundamentally sound. Our ever resilient 
private sector is ready to bounce back; all it 
really needs are calm, sensible policies at the 
top." 
-Krugman, 1997 
  
 
 
Table 7.2  U.S. economy/company narratives (sampled media articles, 1987–2000) (continued) 
Narrative Object Destinator Key enabling forces Key impeding forces Selected quotations 
Economic 
Growth 
 
 
 
 
 Growth 
 Profits 
 Market share 
 Laissez-faire 
capitalism 
 Global 
competition 
 Profit motives 
 Recent success of 
U.S. economy 
 
 Strong leadership 
 Int’l expansion 
 Market targeting 
 Quality products 
 Innovation/R&D 
 M&A 
 Bull market in stocks 
 Int’l and domestic 
competition 
 Executive feuds 
 Risky lending 
 Trade barriers 
 Gov’t interference 
 Cyclical sectors 
 
"U.S. exports to Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria rose an 
estimated 25% in 1992 over 1991, to about $1.5 
billion. A big battle currently being fought on 
billboards and TV ads pitches PepsiCo, the 
current champ of the cola market, against Coca-
Cola." 
-Michaels, et al., 1993 
Economic 
Revival 
 
 
 
 
 Revival 
 Resurgence 
 Efficiency 
 Interdependence 
 Recent recessions 
and poor 
economic 
performance 
 Laissez-faire 
capitalism 
 
 Outsourcing 
 Cost cutting 
 Growth in tech sector 
 
 Complexity of new 
technologies 
 
"For IBM, outsourcing recalls a bygone era of 
fat profits, when instead of selling its computers 
and punch-card machines to customers, it leased 
them, complete with service." 
-Kirkpatrick, 1991 
Economic 
Leadership 
 
 
 
 
 Global leadership  U.S.’s historical 
achievements 
 Laissez-faire 
capitalism 
 Global 
competition 
 Technological 
leadership 
 Strong institutions 
 Strong economy 
 Venture capitalists 
 Risk-taking 
 
 Global competition 
 High investment costs 
 
"Last April, pipsqueak upstart Ipsilon 
Networks…introduced a technology called IP 
switching that's forcing the rest of the industry 
to follow suit…Cisco Systems, IBM, 3Com, and 
most recently Cascade Communications have all 
announced versions of IP switches." 
-Schonfeld, 1997 
 
New Economy 
 
 
 
 “New economy” 
 Unprecedented 
growth 
 Technological 
shift 
 Displacement of 
traditional 
business 
 Human progress 
 Technological advances 
 New skills/knowledge 
 Global competition 
 Entrepreneurs 
 Acquisitions 
 Lack of skills/education 
 Resistance to change 
 Gov’t interference 
 Complexities of new 
business models 
"Possibility: The job, as we know it, will cease 
to exist…Possibility: Ours will be an economy 
of one-person organizations…Electronic 
networks will effectively make the world a 
single market." 
-Kiechel and Schonfeld, 1994 
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Figure 7.9  U.S. economy/company narratives (by count), 
sampled media articles, 1987–2000 
 
 
Figure 7.10  U.S. economy/company narratives (by percentage), 
sampled media articles, 1987–2000 
 
Note: Each of the 135 media articles sampled was categorized according to one, and only one, of the 12 
narratives, except for 50 articles that did not possess a full narrative and were coded as N/A.  
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The last two narratives in this group were largely skeptical in their forecasts of the U.S. 
economy. First, similar to that in the cognitive pillar, an “Economic Transition” narrative, appearing 
three times in the mid 1990s, sees current growth as unsustainable and predicts a slowdown as 
lackluster consumer spending, inflation, and global turmoil start to outweigh the recent benefits 
from growth in the technology sector and the sudden surge in corporate earnings.  
Closely related to this narrative, an “Economic Euphoria” narrative, which appeared only once 
(in 1996), is skeptical of the alleged shift in the economy and cites the historical prevalence of 
boom-bust cycles as evidence that copycat behavior and intense competition will likely result in a 
future crash in the now euphoric stock prices. 
The one neutral narrative, entitled “Economic Cycles,” appeared four times. This narrative takes 
a more objective view and observes that economies periodically experience recessions due to the 
tendency of companies to overinvest during growth periods and then suffer from debt overhang 
during slowdowns. As a result, this narrative sees international sales as a key enabler and low 
government assistance during slowdowns as a key impeding force.  
Three of the narratives to emerge can be grouped as moderately positive. First, a narrative of 
“Moderate Economic Growth” was present twice in the late 1980s. This narrative forecasts 
moderate growth and a tamer business cycle, with the U.S.’s decline in manufacturing being 
compensated by its growing service sector. Enablers such as low inflation and low interest rates will 
help to balance impeding forces such as large trade and fiscal deficits and potential oil shocks.  
Similar in tone, a “Sound Economy” narrative expounds a rather balanced view of the U.S. 
economy and praises the U.S. for being one of the most reliable and trustworthy markets in the 
world. The U.S. benefits from its strong institutions and rule of law, while other, mostly developing, 
countries suffer from endemic corruption, fraud, and manipulation. This narrative was present three 
times in the mid 1990s.  
Lastly in this group, and similar to that in the cognitive pillar, an “Economic Growth” narrative 
dominated the mid 1990s and was present 28 times in the sample. This narrative is more optimistic 
about the U.S. economy and focuses on the recent gains made by U.S. companies, largely due to 
factors such as great executive leadership, international expansion, innovation, and a bull market in 
stocks. However, this narrative also notes that factors such as formidable international competitors, 
executive feuds, and cyclical sectors are preventing U.S. companies from obtaining higher profits 
and greater market share. 
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In contrast, the final three narratives were extremely positive in their view of the U.S. economy 
and U.S. companies. The first of these, “Economic Revival,” was present once in 1991. This 
narrative characterizes the performance of U.S. companies, particularly those in the tech sector, as 
experiencing a strong resurgence and return to higher margins and efficiency. New corporate 
practices such as outsourcing are seen as the key enablers in making this resurgence possible. Next, 
an “Economic Leadership” narrative emerged in the mid 1990s and was present seven times in the 
sample. This narrative almost exclusively reports on the recent technological leadership 
demonstrated by U.S. companies, which are seen as far superior to most international competitors, 
aided by the growth of venture capitalists and a strong economy.  
Finally, again similar to that in the cognitive pillar, a “New Economy” narrative emerged in the 
mid 1990s and became the dominant narrative by the year 2000. This narrative proclaims that the 
U.S. is entering a new period in which a technological shift will force the widespread displacement 
of traditional, “old economy” business models. While a lack of skills and resistance to change will 
exclude some from the benefits of this new era, the new economy’s momentum is seen as 
unstoppable. 
In step three, the categorization of each article’s connotation of technology and innovation, 
three general phases can be described. First, from 1987 to 1991, the majority of articles that 
discussed technology carried a relatively positive connotation. These articles frequently stressed the 
importance of investment in new technologies and praised the efforts of organizations that 
successfully made such investments.  
Then, from 1992 to 1996, while the majority of articles discussing technology remained positive, 
a large number of mixed connotations emerged. Thus, overall, the media remained optimistic about 
the future of technology and tech companies, but several articles did start to criticize the euphoria 
surrounding tech stocks.  
Lastly, from 1997 to 2000, an overall positive connotation remained, but now mixed 
connotations were replaced with negative ones, with several articles reporting on periodic drops in 
tech stocks and others adamantly stating that a bust was about to occur. Figures 7.11 and 7.12 on 
the next page show the count and percentage of these connotations, while Table 7.3 on the 
following page provides a few quotations and topics for each connotation in each of the three 
phases.  
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Figure 7.11  Connotation of technology/innovation (by count), 
sampled media articles, 1987–2000 
 
 
Figure 7.12  Connotation of technology/innovation (by percentage), 
sampled media articles, 1987–2000 
 
Note: Each of the 135 media articles sampled was categorized according to one, and only one, of the five 
connotations.  
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Table 7.3  Selected quotations and topics for each technology connotation (sampled media articles, 1987–2000) 
 
Connotation Quotations and topics  
(1987–1991) 
Quotations and topics  
(1992–1996) 
Quotations and topics  
(1997–2000) 
Positive 
 
 
 
 
"Technology companies are likely to outperform 
the rest of American manufacturing in 1987, the 
Government predicted in an annual forecast." 
-The NY Times, 1987 
 
 
"The biggest propellant in this trend toward 
smaller, even singular organizations: information 
technology (or IT), the computer network in 
particular, which substitutes market 
mechanisms…for the intracorporate coordination 
that used to go on…among the departments of a 
big, bureaucratic company." 
-Kiechel and Schonfeld, 1994 
 
"From his offices in Half Moon Bay, Calif., Mr. 
Murphy, 56, argues that most investors are 
seriously underweighted in technology, which is 
the main sector in what he calls the 'new 
economy,' and seriously overweighted in the 
venerable corporations of the 'old economy.' " 
-Vickers, 1998 
 
 
Negative 
 
 
 
 
 
"Says John B. Jones Jr., Montgomery Securities' 
computer analyst: 'Technology stocks always had 
high risk and high reward. Now they have high 
risk and low reward. On a relative basis, 
technology sucks.' " 
-Sellers, 1989 
No such speeches during this period "Unfortunately, he adds, when it comes to 
Internet stocks, 'investors have elevated current 
mindshare to articles of faith. Religion does that 
too, and it's nonprofit.' Amen."   
-Interview with David Simons, managing director 
of Digital Video Investments, in Norris, 1993 
 
Mixed 
 
 
 
 
 
"Many funding boards seem obsessed with 
'innovation.' As a result, innovation can mean 
desperation. You strive to be innovative. Yet, if 
someone thinks you're no longer innovative, your 
funding may be taken away." 
-Anderson, 1988 
"In all, there have been some pretty loony goings-
on in tech, and many investors have lost money. 
But this is not the end of technology's reign. It is, 
as Churchill once said, just the end of the 
beginning. There are some in this industry…that 
are breaking away from the wild, younger pack." 
-Serwer, 1996 
 
"The good news is that while Marimba's not 
going to sport a $10 billion valuation, it's also 
much less likely to flame out as some of its 
highflying IPO brethren undoubtedly will." 
-Warner, 1999 
 
Neutral 
 
Workers moving from shipyards to high-tech  
-Salpukas, 1990 
No such speeches during this period China stealing technology 
-Schmitt, 1999 
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Similar to the U.S. economy narratives, the seven tech company narratives that emerged in step 
four are best organized according to their connotation. These narratives are outlined in Table 7.4 on 
the next two pages, while their frequency trends are provided in Figures 7.13 and 7.14 on the 
following page (and possess a similar color scheme to that for the economy narratives). Four of 
these narratives were negative or skeptical in their connotation.  
First, a “Technological Decline” narrative, which was present four times, highlights a current 
slump in the previously successful technology sector. This narrative views tech companies as 
struggling due to soft demand, rising interest rates, and tough global competition, but also notes that 
new product development and government assistance can help these companies in difficult times.  
Second, a “Technological Competitiveness” narrative, present seven times, mostly in the mid 
1990s, stresses the competitive parity amongst tech companies. As consumers are demanding on 
both price and product attributes and new product development is extremely costly, tech companies 
frequently engage in price wars, making patents extremely valuable. Similar to that in the cognitive 
pillar, a “Technological Shakeup” narrative, present one time in 2000, notes that basic economic 
theory would predict a future winnowing of tech companies, where all but the most successful tech 
companies are likely to go bust. Also implying a future bust in the tech sector, a “Technological 
Euphoria” narrative, present twice during the stock run-up, sees the copycat behavior of tech 
companies and looming international competitors as key reasons that a boom-bust cycle is likely to 
repeat sometime in the near future.  
In contrast, three of the narratives to emerge were rather positive in their connotation. A 
“Technological Growth” narrative, present 16 times, mostly in the mid 1990s, stresses the 
remarkable growth of the technology sector. Tech companies are seen as aided by strong executive 
leadership, venture capitalists, skilled workers, and mergers and acquisitions, while these same 
companies are impeded by imports, local competitors, executive feuds, and government red tape. 
Also stressing the strong growth in tech companies, a “Technological Revival” narrative, present 
twice, focuses on the recent resurgence in the technology sector, which is due in large part to factors 
such as outsourcing, economies of scale, cost savings, and the growing need for data processing.  
Lastly, as in the cognitive pillar, a “Technological Dominance” narrative emerged. This 
narrative, which was present 22 times throughout the mid to late 1990s, sees the tech sector as 
fundamentally changing the U.S. economy. Risk-taking by tech-savvy entrepreneurs, who are aided 
by countless “obsessive” workers, is seen as the key driver of this transition to a new economy.  
  
 
 
Table 7.4  Tech company narratives (sampled media articles, 1987–2000) 
 
  
Narrative Object Destinator Key enabling forces Key impeding forces Selected quotations 
Technological 
Decline 
 
 
 Declining revenue 
 Slump  
 Inferiority to 
foreign companies 
 Past success 
 Recent slump 
 Laissez-faire 
capitalism 
 Rise of foreign 
competitors 
 
 New product 
development 
 Gov’t help 
 Soft demand 
 International and 
domestic competitors 
 Rising interest rates 
"Computer companies' profit gains outpaced 
U.S. industry for a decade until 1986, but 
increases since then have run 39% below the 
all-industry average." 
-Sellers, 1989 
Technological 
Competitiveness 
 
 
 
 International and 
domestic 
competitiveness 
 Price wars 
 Profit motives 
 Global 
competition 
 Laissez-faire 
capitalism 
 
 Innovation 
 Meeting consumer 
demands 
 Patents 
 Funding 
 
 International and 
domestic competitors 
 Demanding consumers 
 High costs 
 Safety concerns 
"The audio industry spawns new equipment 
with the regularity of a brood hen hatching her 
chicks. Each new flock clamors for attention, 
and with so many products similar in concept 
and performance, it is often difficult to spot the 
standouts." 
-Fantel, 1987 
 
Technological 
Shakeup 
 
 
 
 
 Shakeup 
 Rebalancing 
 Lessons from 
history 
 Basic economic 
theory 
 Innovations 
 U.S. technological 
dominance 
 “New economy” 
 
 Fierce competition 
 
"The problem, however, is that there probably 
aren't more than one or two future Microsofts 
buried in Nasdaq—and at current prices, the 
Nasdaq market seems to be predicting there will 
be battalions of them. Yet in cases where 
companies achieve sky-high profit margins, 
economic theory and history predict that those 
high rates of return will eventually attract a slew 
of nimble, price-cutting rivals that will drive 
down the leaders' margins and profit growth." 
-Tully, 2000 
  
 
 
 
Table 7.4  Tech company narratives (sampled media articles, 1987–2000) (continued) 
Narrative Object Destinator Key enabling forces Key impeding forces Selected quotations 
Technological 
Euphoria 
 
 
 
 Euphoria 
 Bubble 
 Jumping on the 
bandwagon 
 History of boom-
bust cycles 
 Growing presence 
of tech sector 
 Recent stock highs 
 Ubiquitous nature of 
tech sector 
 “Faith” in tech stocks 
 Poor product quality 
 Gov’t interference 
 Copycat behavior 
 Int’l competition 
 Business cycles 
"But Wall Street's naïveté about what 
technology can deliver (and the mass media's 
parroting of this so-called expertise) have 
consistently fed nasty boom-and-bust cycles that 
make only a few people very rich, very 
quickly." 
-Caruso, 1996 
 
Technological 
Growth 
 
 
 
 
 Growth/profits 
 Above-average 
returns 
 Market share 
 Technological 
breakthroughs 
 Laissez-faire 
capitalism 
 Decline in other 
sectors 
 Profit motives 
 
 Tech manufacturers 
 Great leadership 
 Innovation/R&D 
 Venture capitalists 
 Skilled workers 
 Int’l sales/M&A 
 Imports 
 Local competitors 
 Executive feuds 
 Slow mgmt procedures 
 Trade barriers 
 Patents/red tape 
 
"In contrast to the highly speculative takeovers 
typical of the merger boom of the 1980's, the 
1994 deals were dominated by corporations 
making strategic moves to increase their reach 
in industries like telecommunications…and high 
technology." 
-Zuckerman, 1995 
 
Technological 
Revival 
 
 
 
 
 Revival 
 Turnaround 
 Resurgence 
 Recent slump 
 Growing 
importance of tech 
sector 
 Laissez-faire 
capitalism 
 
 Outsourcing 
 Data processing 
 Cost savings 
 Economies of scale 
 R&D/new products 
 Knowing consumers 
 
 Competition (including 
from corporate IT 
departments) 
 Low margins in 
hardware 
 Recessions 
 
"Says Richard Pashley, general manager of 
Intel's memory components division: 'We're 
expecting the flash market to explode'—to $2 
billion in 1995, from $130 million last year." 
-Solo, 1992 
Technological 
Dominance 
 
 
 
 
 Market dominance 
 Fundamentally 
shape and change 
economy 
 Riches 
 “Revolution” 
 Profound shift in 
economy 
 Laissez-faire 
capitalism 
 Entrepreneurial 
spirit 
 “New economy” 
 Constant innovation 
 Increased importance of 
tech sector 
 Risk-taking 
 Stock options 
 Obsessive workers 
 Venture capitalists 
 Weakness in other 
sectors 
 Burnout 
 Human resistance 
 Gov’t interference 
 Complexities of new 
business models 
"Digitized information has become the lingua 
franca of our time. Transmitting that precious 
cargo is as critical to our economy today as the 
galleons transporting gold were to the economy 
of 16th-century Spain." 
-Serwer, 1995 
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Figure 7.13  Tech company narratives (by count), 
sampled media articles, 1987–2000 
 
 
Figure 7.14  Tech company narratives (by percentage), 
sampled media articles, 1987–2000 
 
Note: Each of the 135 media articles sampled was categorized according to one, and only one, of the seven 
narratives, except for 81 articles that did not possess a full narrative and were coded as N/A.  
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Step four also revealed nine U.S. stock narratives, which are presented in a similar fashion in 
Table 7.5 on the next three pages and Figures 7.15 and 7.16 on the following page. Four of these 
narratives were negative in their connotation. First, a “Stock Decline” narrative comments on a 
current or coming decline or correction in stock values, which are boosted by low interest rates and 
a strong economy but impeded by the opposite. This narrative appeared twice in the sample. Second, 
a “Stock Uncertainty” narrative, which appeared eight times, stresses the volatility and risk inherent 
in a specific group of, or all, stocks. This narrative notes that aggressive brokers and even 
speculators and a gullible public can help boost the market, while regulators, program (computer-
driven) traders, and stock futures can increase the risk in stock purchases.  
Third, a “Stock Shakeup” narrative, which appeared once in 1996, sees market euphoria as 
driving prices and predicts a shakeup or rebalancing of stock prices in the near future. Similarly, a 
“Stock Euphoria” narrative, present seven times, mostly in the late 1990s, stresses that stock prices 
are at unsustainable levels and are fueled in part by the recent surges in mutual funds and 401(k) 
plans.  
A “Stock Cycles” narrative was present six times, mostly earlier in the sample period. This 
narrative observes that stock prices, just like the economy, are prone to cycles and gyrations due to 
investor psychology, rises and falls in interest rates, and various market disruptions such as a spike 
in oil prices.  
The remaining four narratives were all quite positive. A “Stock Bargains” narrative was present 
twice and views drops in stock prices as ideal opportunities to buy. This narrative notes that fear 
and “misconceptions” will result in several investors missing out on the current buying opportunity. 
Similar to a “Sound Economy” narrative, a “Sound Stocks” narrative, which was present twice, sees 
U.S. stocks as a reliable long-term investment, primarily due to the U.S.’s strong institutions, rule of 
law, low interest rates, and low rate of inflation. Slightly more positive, a “Stock Growth” narrative, 
which was present three times, observes or predicts a healthy bull market in stocks and recommends 
buying in select sectors, particularly the strong tech sector and stocks of innovative companies or 
those that are currently expanding globally.  
Lastly, a “Soaring Stocks” narrative, as was present in the cognitive pillar and appeared eight 
times in this sample, reports on the sky-high valuations of U.S. corporations. Tech sector IPOs, 
mutual fund flows, 401(k) growth, a robust economy, an increasing number of retail investors, and 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are all seen as key propellants of the U.S. stock surge.  
  
 
 
 
Table 7.5  U.S. stock narratives (sampled media articles, 1987–2000) 
  
Narrative Object Destinator Key enabling forces Key impeding forces Selected quotations 
Stock Decline 
 
 
 Downturn 
 Decline 
 Correction 
 Recent sharp 
rise/volatility 
 Investor culture 
 
 Low interest rates 
 
 Poorly performing 
sectors 
 Rising interest rates, the 
result of a strong 
economy 
"With signs abounding that the economy is still 
strong, the Fed could keep raising rates—bad 
news for stocks. A number of experts think 
there's a correction in the offing: By several 
measures, such as the pallid 2.9% annual 
dividend yield of the S&P 500, stocks are 
overvalued." 
-Michels, 1995 
 
Stock 
Uncertainty 
 
 
 
 Uncertainty/risk 
 Volatility 
 Inefficiency 
 Entrepreneurial 
spirit 
 Large gains and 
losses in stocks 
 Wary public 
 Stability in foreign 
markets 
 
 Deregulation 
 Shareholder rights 
 Low interest rates 
 SEC (regulators) 
 
 Gullible public 
 Int’l markets (Japan) 
 Program trading 
 Stock futures 
 Weak economy 
 Irrationality 
 Brokers/speculators 
"The aspect of the Japanese market's 
performance gaining the most attention is its 
relative stability. Today Tokyo, not New York, 
is more and more being looked on as a possible 
model of how a stock market should be run…" 
-Sterngold, 1990 
 
Stock Shakeup 
 
 
 
 Shakeup 
 Rebalancing 
 Wall Street greed 
 Investor culture 
 Strong performance of 
tech stocks 
 
 Speculation/euphoria 
 Manipulation 
 Poor corporate results 
 Institutional investors 
dumping stocks 
 Large, institutional 
investors 
"The tech-stock shakeout of recent months isn't 
just a matter of the changing fortunes of high-
tech companies. It's about big gambles, wild 
emotions, full-throttle greed, and possibly even 
market manipulation." 
-Serwer, 1996 
  
 
 
 
Table 7.5  U.S. stock narratives (sampled media articles, 1987–2000) (continued) 
 
  
Narrative Object Destinator Key enabling forces Key impeding forces Selected quotations 
Stock Euphoria 
 
 
 Euphoria 
 High prices 
 Unsustainable 
levels 
 Bubble 
 Investment culture 
 Laissez-faire 
capitalism 
 Recent stock run-
up 
 Wall Street greed 
 
 Tech stocks 
 401k’s 
 GDP growth 
 
 Euphoria 
 Mutual fund managers 
 Low corporate earnings 
 Oversupply 
 Wall Street analysts 
 News media 
 New investors/risk 
"In short, the New Economy doctrine made no 
sense at all, and without that intellectual 
justification there was no way to regard the 
great stock market boom as anything other than 
a bubble. Yet as long as inflation stayed low and 
the market continued to rise, skeptical voices 
were ignored." 
-Krugman, 1997 
 
Stock Cycles 
 
 
 
 Cycles/gyrations 
 Steady long-term 
returns 
 Recession and 
recovery 
 Investor 
psychology 
 Recent market 
turmoil 
 
 Optimism 
 Large pool of investors 
 Steady investments 
 Low interest rates 
 
 Pessimism/overselling 
 Market disruptions 
 High oil prices 
 Alternative investments 
(bonds) 
 
"…Elliott [accountant R. N. Elliott] had found 
objective proof that markets move in recurring 
cycles reflecting investor psychology." 
-Elliott, 1987 
 
Stock Bargains 
 
 
 
 
 Bargains  Investment culture 
 “Beat the market” 
mentality 
 Low prices in certain 
sectors 
 Low growth, inflation, 
and interest rates 
 Strong fundamentals 
 Tech stocks 
 
 Risk 
 Investor fear 
 “Misconceptions” 
 
"The technology sector finished 1997 down 
nearly 14 percent from its yearly high. Do you 
think that presents an opportunity? [Michael 
Murphy:] Yes…But instead of buying them [big 
tech companies] at whatever P-E they are and 
getting killed on the stock price, buy them only 
when they're down."  
-Vickers, 1998 
  
 
 
 
Table 7.5  U.S. stock narratives (sampled media articles, 1987–2000) (continued) 
 
 
Narrative Object Destinator Key enabling forces Key impeding forces Selected quotations 
Sound Stocks 
 
 
 Trustworthy, 
reliable 
 Well-regulated 
 Safe investment 
 Need for public 
trust in stock 
market 
 Investor culture 
 
 Strong institutions 
 Rule of law 
 Strong economy 
 Low interest rates 
 Low inflation 
 Mutual fund growth 
 
 Corruption/fraud 
 Insider trading 
 Manipulation 
 Illiquidity 
 Debt overhang 
 Poor corp. results 
"But the outlook for stocks for the rest of the 
decade—a decade in which inflation has all but 
died, interest rates have been tame and the 
economy has continued to chug along—appears 
sound at this point." 
-Wyatt, 1996 
Stock Growth 
 
 
 
 Bull market/rally 
 Healthy returns 
 Investor culture 
 Laissez-faire 
capitalism 
 Improving stock 
performance 
 
 Innovation 
 Knowing customers 
 Strong tech sector 
 Product development 
 M&A 
 Global expansion 
 
 Market bears 
 Corporate slowdown 
 “Profit taking” by 
institutional investors 
"It was the Chinese Year of the Rooster, but 
investors who ignored Chicken Little probably 
had something to crow about in 1993." 
-Teitelbaum, 1994 
 
Soaring Stocks 
 
 
 
 Extremely high 
valuations 
 Laissez-faire 
capitalism 
 Strong recent 
returns/bull 
market 
 Tech sector (IPOs) 
 Mutual fund flows 
 401k’s 
 Retail investors 
 Robust economy 
 M&A 
 Foreign investment 
 Low interest rates 
 Euphoria/bubbles 
 Possible slowdown in 
mutual funds 
 SE Asia turmoil 
 
"Morgan Stanley's index of 35 bellwether tech 
companies, which includes giants like 
Microsoft, Intel, and IBM, was up 57.6% last 
year, following a 34.7% rise in 1994. In 
contrast, the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index 
rose 34.7%. The 57% increase also masks 
whopping climbs in various subsectors of 
technology." 
-Hylton, 1996a 
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Figure 7.15  U.S. stock narratives (by count), 
sampled media articles, 1987–2000 
 
 
Figure 7.16  U.S. stock narratives (by percentage), 
sampled media articles, 1987–2000 
 
Note: Each of the 135 media articles sampled was categorized according to one, and only one, of the nine 
narratives, except for 96 articles that did not possess a full narrative and were coded as N/A.  
 
 
  
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 
Stock Decline 
Stock Uncertainty 
Stock Shakeup 
Stock Euphoria 
Stock Cycles 
Stock Bargains 
Sound Stocks 
Stock Growth 
Soaring Stocks 
N/A 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
90% 
100% 
1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 
Stock Decline 
Stock Uncertainty 
Stock Shakeup 
Stock Euphoria 
Stock Cycles 
Stock Bargains 
Sound Stocks 
Stock Growth 
Soaring Stocks 
N/A 
Preston B. Teeter 
 
124 
 
7.2 Institutional features 
For the normative pillar, the fourth stage of analysis revealed six interrelated means by which boom 
narratives became institutionalized and two reasons why efforts to deinstitutionalize these narratives 
failed. In terms of institutionalization, the normative pillar possessed four means that were similar 
to the cognitive pillar, which were 1) the spread and repetition of boom narratives, 2) the transition 
of a boom narrative to destinator, 3) rationalizing conflicting evidence, and 4) providing support 
with expert references. Two additional means of institutionalization were present in this pillar, those 
being 5) the use of emotional triggers and 6) carefully selected historical data. These six methods 
are explained in detail below.  
7.2.1 The spread and repetition of boom narratives 
As demonstrated in the previous section, a large variety of boom narratives emerged and spread in 
the media sample. Looking at the U.S. economy narratives that emerged in this sample, an 
“Economic Revival,” “Economic Leadership,” and “New Economy” narrative all imply that 
investments in the U.S. economy should deliver significant returns for the foreseeable future, thus 
constituting boom narratives.  
From 1987 to 1993, these narratives accounted for only one of the 62 media articles, while 17 of 
the 62 articles possessed a rather negative economic narrative. In contrast, from 1994 to 2000, 22 of 
the 73 articles (30 percent) expounded a boom narrative, while only 8 of the 73 articles (11 percent) 
possessed a negative or at least skeptical economic narrative. 
At the asset level, first looking at tech company narratives, both a “Technological Revival” and 
a “Technological Dominance” narrative would constitute boom narratives. From 1987 to 1993, only 
two of the 62 articles included such a narrative, while five the 62 articles possessed rather negative 
tech company narratives. Again, a huge shift occurred starting in 1994. From 1994 to 2000, a 
“Technological Dominance” narrative was present in 22 of the 73 articles, while only nine of these 
73 articles (12 percent) possessed a negative or skeptical tech company narrative.  
When reviewing U.S. stock narratives, the media was somewhat more balanced in the late 
1990s, but the shift in discourse over the entire sample period was almost as dramatic. From 1987 to 
1993, the media sample did not include a single boom narrative on U.S. stocks, while six of the 62 
articles (10 percent) possessed a negative or skeptical narrative. Then, from 1994 to 2000, eight of 
the 73 articles expounded the boom narrative of “Soaring Stocks,” while 12 of the 73 articles (16 
percent) possessed a negative or skeptical stock narrative. 
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Hence, overall, from 1987 to 1993, 62 articles produced only three instances of a boom 
narrative, while from 1994 to 2000, 73 articles produced 52 counts of a boom narrative
23
. This 
dramatic shift in discourse occurred at two of the most well-respected media outlets in the U.S., if 
not world, particularly in terms of their credibility in reporting economic and financial market news. 
As a result, these narratives and this overall shift in discourse acquired widespread social legitimacy.   
7.2.2 Boom narrative destinator 
Quite similar to the trend described in the cognitive pillar, the theme of technology underwent a 
significant transition in discourse over the sample period, with a rapid technological shift eventually 
becoming the destinator of the “New Economy” narrative.  
At the beginning of the sample period, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, several articles 
possessed a rather negative or pessimistic view of tech companies, particularly U.S. tech companies, 
which were seen as struggling to keep up with technologically (and managerially) superior Japanese 
firms. Previously provided quotes in Sellers’ (1989) article express such negativity, along with the 
following quote from an interview with Dr. Frank Moore, who was the program manager of the 
Ohio Advanced Technology Center in 1990 (in McInnis, 1990): 
“It’s not so much that we lack technology,” he added. “Where we seem to fail is in moving that 
technology to the marketplace. You’d be hard pressed to find an American-made microwave oven. We 
invented it. We just didn’t stay competitive.” 
Over the next few years, while a few articles did provide favorable reviews of tech companies, 
the tech sector was often altogether ignored, particularly in the discourse on U.S. stocks. For 
instance, Teitelbaum (1991) predicts an imminent economic recovery and advises readers to get 
back in the market: “With many economists—including FORTUNE’s own—expecting an economic 
rebound sometime during the first half of 1991, it’s a smart time to load up on stocks.” While the 
article provides a few recommendations, such as investments in the leisure sector, there is no 
mention of tech stocks.  
Similarly, Norris (1993) recommends equities as the best place for investment and even notes a 
recent 16 percent rise in the NASDAQ; however, also similarly, tech stocks go completely 
unmentioned. In the same year, portfolio manager William Nasgotivz (Nasgovitz and Sheeline, 
1993) also agrees that stocks are the best means of investment at the time and recommends several 
sectors: “The stocks of regional brokerage companies are amazingly cheap…There’s a feeding 
                                                 
23
 Remember that a single article was analyzed for the presence of up to three narratives. Thus, 52 here does not 
constitute 52 of the 73 articles. 
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frenzy on Wall Street right now for restaurant stocks.” As with the previous two examples, though, 
tech companies were not even on the radar.  
In the mid 1990s, however, the theme of technology underwent a swift transition, being not only 
discussed more but also discussed in a much more positive manner. During these years, tech 
companies, and their suppliers, were often promoted as great stock buys: 
Mark Koprucki, an analyst at Ohio Co., expects net income [at Applied Innovation, which mainly sells to 
the telecommunications industry] in 1994 to surge 67%, to $6 million, on a 66% increase in revenues, to 
$25 million. (Labate, 1994a) 
Ann Schwetje, an analyst at Smith Barney, expects net income [at Cable Design Technologies (CDT)] 
for the fiscal year ending July 1994 to surge 62% to $9.7 million, on a 14% rise in revenues, to $145 
million…CDT has carefully picked its electronic cable niches. The Pittsburgh company designs and 
produces copper and fiber-optic cables for some of the fastest-growing sectors in the high-speed data 
market. Half its sales come from supplying cables for companies upgrading their computer networking 
operations, including Bell Atlantic and Citibank. CDT’s other products include wires for the innards of 
mainframe computers, sold to original equipment manufacturers like IBM. (Labate, 1994b) 
This transition continued, with technology soon being viewed as the underlying force propelling 
both U.S. stocks and the U.S. economy to new heights: 
A new, quirky, more democratic U.S. economy is emerging, its information technology-laced networks 
of services and goods taking the ground once towered over by huge corporate ziggurats of the old 
industrial system. (Kiechel and Schonfeld, 1994) 
Technology stocks have been the Road Runner of this bull market. Like that gravity-defying cartoon 
character, tech has zoomed to ever higher heights after each setback and left the rest of the market in the 
dust. (Hylton, 1996a) 
Thus, by the mid 1990s, when a “Technological Dominance” narrative became the prevailing 
tech narrative, technology’s profound impact on the economy—alongside the U.S.’s remarkably 
sudden reclamation of its leadership role in technology—became the taken-for-granted context that 
enabled a “new economy” to emerge.  
7.2.3 Rationalizing conflicting evidence 
As with the cognitive pillar, several expounders of boom narratives—in this case primarily 
journalists, analysts, consultants, and the like—were confronted with unfavorable information or 
trends. In these situations, individuals frequently rationalized such information as being either 
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irrelevant or, in some cases, supportive of their claims. This method was used in response to three 
situations in the media sample: 1) sky-high stock valuations, in which P/E ratios and other 
economic indicators read similar to those during previous stock bubbles, 2) falling stock prices, and 
3) some analysts ignoring the tech sector in their market coverage.  
As early as 1993, some financial journalists noted that stocks were in fact rather expensive when 
compared to historical P/E ratios and other market indicators. In the sample, Norris (1993) 
comments, “It is not, of course, that stocks are cheap. By most valuation standards, they are far 
from that…And much of that money is going into the riskiest funds, the kind that buy small stocks 
and hope they will soar…It is tempting to dismiss such things as euphoria and the kind of 
overconfidence that is present at market tops. And it may be correct to do so.”  
As stock prices continued to rise into the mid 1990s, P/E ratios stretched even further from their 
historical averages, conveying that stocks may well be overvalued and already in bubble territory. 
These sky-high valuations were, however, rationalized by several analysts and journalists, as 
demonstrated in the following excerpt (from Hylton, 1996a): 
Investors can also ease their anxiety with the knowledge that today’s craze differs from past manias in 
several respects:  
First, despite their spectacular price increases, many of the most profitable computer software and 
hardware companies are still selling at reasonable multiples to 1996 estimated earnings, book value, and 
cash flow. The semiconductor sector, for example, is selling at an average trailing P/E ratio of 20 and a 
1996 estimated P/E of only 13. The current P/E of the S&P 500 is roughly 17. Since 1980, the peak P/E 
range for tech stocks has been between 31 and 34. Currently the 250 top tech stocks have an estimated 
1996 P/E of 25.  
Second, the three-year to five-year growth-rate estimates for those 250 companies is a robust 25% a year, 
according to IBES, a research firm that tracks Wall Street’s earnings forecasts.  
Third, demand for computer-related products is picking up steam all over the world—and in all 
categories. In the U.S., for example, technology now absorbs 50% of capital spending, vs. 33% eight 
years ago. In Europe, PC sales are increasing at double-digit rates. 
Thus, sky-high stock valuations were justified as reasonable because some P/E ratios had in fact 
been higher before, growth estimates were favorable, and the tech sector’s influence was now 
spreading across the globe. These were certainly not the only means of rationalization. Tully (2000) 
notes that analysts also referred to massive inflows of money (from foreign investors, mutual funds, 
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and 401(k)’s), shrinking risk premiums, and various forms of “new economy” arguments as to why 
quickly rising P/E ratios should not be a concern.  
A second scenario conflicting with the various boom narratives of the mid 1990s was that stocks 
did occasionally drop, sometimes rather swiftly, with the years 1996 and especially 1998 witnessing 
rather steep falls. Individuals in the media sample were able to rationalize these drops in two ways. 
First, claims were made that steep drops were not signs of trouble but rather were buying 
opportunities, as seen in the following two excerpts: 
With fund managers licking their wounds, and analysts injecting some new realism into their forecasts, 
there’s a chance that technology stocks will once again be viewed as vehicles for investment, not 
speculation. And while you wait for that happy turn, you can pick up some of America’s finest 
technology companies at today’s bargain prices. (Serwer, 1996) 
But there was some logic to why stocks rose from an apparent abyss to solid double-digit gains for the 
year. On Oct. 1, when financial markets appeared on the verge of imploding, the Dow Jones industrial 
average fell by more than 210 points and closed less than 100 points above 7,539.07, the low it hit on 
Aug. 31. Since then, foreign markets have staged a comeback. The steep slide in United States stock 
prices was seen by many as a buying opportunity. Third-quarter earnings were not as bad as expected. 
Perhaps most important, the Federal Reserve Board and more than 50 central banks around the world 
have cut interest rates. (Gilpin, 1999) 
In other words, during those drops, stocks were momentarily undervalued and represented 
bargain buying opportunities. In a similar line of reasoning, other individuals rationalized that 
market drops were merely signs of profit-taking by large, institutional investors. Such an argument 
actually presented market drops in a rather positive manner, as slumps indicated investors were 
making healthy profits and would surely be back in the market soon enough, as exemplified in the 
following two excerpts: 
…but what we’re seeing here is simply some profit taking in big-cap stocks. A lot of institutional 
investors moved to the sidelines in the early part of December and raised cash by taking profits on 
winners. I wouldn’t be surprised to see a bounce later in the month. (quote of Gordon Fines, owner of 
stock fund, in Amour and Fines, 1997) 
“It was a good quarter for us,” said Daniel J. Schaub, senior vice president and director of corporate 
finance at A.G. Edwards & Company in St. Louis, but he added that business had slowed down earlier 
than usual. “It appeared institutions locked their profits in early,” and took off for a slightly longer 
vacation than usual, he said. (Truell, 1998) 
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A final scenario that emerged in the sample was when Michael Murphy, one of the most widely 
followed tech investors of the era, was questioned in 1998 as to why some analysts still ignored or 
overlooked the tech sector in their broader market analysis and recommendations. Murphy (while 
expounding a “Stock Bargains” narrative) rationalized this conflicting evidence with the following: 
More than 90 percent of analysts are still covering the old economies, either the old mass-production 
economy, which is where most of the big, comfortable corporate names are, or the even older industrial 
economy. The reason…is that Wall Street puts its research where the investment banking fees are going 
to be. (Vickers, 1998) 
In all three scenarios, the rationalization of conflicting evidence left various boom narratives as 
seemingly unquestionable. And in some cases, instead of conflicting evidence being viewed as 
reason to possibly doubt the prevailing narrative, this evidence was used to support the view that all 
was well in both the economy and the tech sector.  
7.2.4 Expert references 
A final means of institutionalization that was similar to that explained in the cognitive pillar was the 
use of expert references. In contrast to the Federal Reserve speeches, where the vast majority of 
expert references were to economists, the media sample consisted of a much broader array of expert 
sources, including numerous types of analysts, traders, tech company executives, professors (mainly 
in business and economics), venture capitalists, consultants, and investment bankers.  
References to these sources were plentiful and remained fairly consistent over the sampled texts 
(other than the observation that venture capitalists were referenced more and more during the rise of 
the tech sector), and thus the narratives present in the media sample were just as much a sample of 
these sources as they were of financial journalists. 
References to a wide array of experts conferred a sense of further legitimacy upon each boom 
narrative. That is to say, the narrative could not be seen as merely the journalist’s individual opinion, 
but rather it could be portrayed as consensus view amongst a wide variety of market participants.  
The following quotes from various market analysts, and the selected quotes in Table 7.6 (next 
page) of a broader variety of experts, demonstrate the legitimacy and authority such sources added 
to each boom narrative: 
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Table 7.6  Examples of expert references (sampled media articles, 1987–2000) 
Narrative Expert Selected quotation 
Technological 
Dominance 
 
 
 
Tech executive "Nevertheless, Junkins [CEO of Texas Instruments (TI)] is confident 
that his innovations will prove indispensable. Says he: 'We are 
providing the technology that is enabling the digital revolution to take 
place.' Wall Street seems to agree. Already enjoying a boost because 
of the surge in semiconductor stocks, TI shares got an additional push 
when the company announced better than expected financial results in 
late January. There's more than smoke and mirrors to what Jerry 
Junkins is up to at TI." 
-Schonfeld, 1995 
 
New Economy Professor 
 
 
 
 
"Says Howard Stevenson, professor at the Harvard Business School: 
'The old economy was built on a revolution in isometric standards. So 
mass production was the key to getting rich. Today there is a 
revolution in transmission. That means, to get rich, take advantage of 
transmitting information.'  " 
-Serwer, 1995 
 
Soaring Stocks Research 
analyst 
 
 
 
 
"Says Laszlo Birinyi, who runs his own research firm out of 
Greenwich, Connecticut, of today's tech run-up: 'This is not an 
irrational market for these stocks. You might call it a lower-case 
mania, but remember that this is a sector with enormous earnings and 
growth potential. In the early 1980s the multiples on many of these 
stocks were higher than they are now.' " 
-Hylton, 1996a 
 
Soaring Stocks Investment 
banker 
 
 
 
 
"What kept the markets so robust, Mr. Birle [a managing director in 
equity capital markets at Merrill Lynch] said, was 'the continued flow 
of funds into equity markets from mutual funds, asset-allocation 
adjustments, the continued cross-border flows of capital' and 'the vast 
number of privatizations.' " 
-Truell, 1998 
 
Technological 
Dominance 
Venture 
capitalist 
 
 
 
" 'Is it ethical to fund a company [Napster] that's doing something 
illegal, knowing that eventually we'll figure out a way to do it legally?' 
he [an anonymous venture capitalist] wondered aloud over lunch 
recently." 
-Warner, 2000 
 
Soaring Stocks Consultant 
 
 
 
" 'I would be surprised if January is not an extremely good month, 
regardless of what happened in December,' said Avi Nachmany, a 
partner at Strategic Insight, a New York mutual fund consultant." 
-Wyatt, 1997b 
 
And if there are negative earnings surprises in 1996, the temporary downturn may be more vicious. So 
far, however, that eventuality looks remote. Concludes Robert Austrian, a technology analyst at Morgan 
Stanley: “No matter how you slice it, tech stocks have had a huge run, and there will be pauses along the 
way. But the long-term trend is very positive.” (Hylton, 1996a) 
The last change like this was in the early 1990’s. The people who earned the really high returns 
recognized that a new economy was under way and shifted assets into that area. (spoken by Michael 
Murphy, in Vickers, 1998) 
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Few expect the current enthusiasm to continue. But the excitement generated among investors by the 
Internet’s potential is justified, analysts said. “The Internet is the most exciting business phenomenon 
since the airplane or television,” Mr. Wien of Morgan Stanley said. “It is truly a dramatic life-changing 
event, an open-ended situation investors have not been confronted with for some time. To say that this is 
a fad is an easy trap to fall into. But this is bigger than that.” (Gilpin, 1999)  
7.2.5 Emotional triggers 
Unique to the media sample was the frequent use of emotional triggers, which can be defined as the 
practice of appealing to emotions in an argument or story. These emotional appeals convey a clear 
sense of social legitimacy to an argument and shift the debate from “This is one way of doing 
something” to “This is how something should be done” or even “This is what everyone is doing.” In 
the sample, two broad types of emotional triggers were present, which were the use of 1) envy and 2) 
fear, mainly the fear of missing out. 
As early as 1994, news articles were already reporting on the vast amounts of wealth made by 
tech entrepreneurs and executives: “ ‘The software industry in the United States grew up 
dramatically and made a lot of millionaires before anyone thought we should patent any of this,’ 
said Michael Kurtz, vice president and legal counsel of Oracle…” (Markoff, 1994). The 
extraordinary sums of money being made conferred even more legitimacy to the entrepreneurs, 
executives, and investors in the tech sector—and their advice. For example, the title of a 1997 
Fortune article (Armour and Fines, 1997) read: “A big fan of big stocks: The head of an $11 billion 
growth fund is bullish on big-cap stocks with global clout. He’s also betting on health care, 
telecoms, and agribusiness.”  
But these stories of riches being made in the technology sector conveyed much more than just 
legitimacy to tech executives and investors. They also conveyed a powerful sense of amazement, 
possibility, and envy to the reader, as seen through the following two excerpts: 
...Page Net’s initial public offering coined ten new millionaires. “People want stock, and it feels damn 
good when it works out,”…Don’t bother telling that to David W. Huggins, 64, founder and CEO of RMS 
Technologies. He’s already made a fortune bulldozing bits and bytes. RMS does consulting in the data 
transfer business...Given the demand for that kind of service, it’s not surprising Huggins’s company has 
doubled revenues to $115 million over the past six years...One change, though: invitations to join boards 
of directors. Huggins serves on a dozen, including those of the Philadelphia Fed and Drexel University. 
(Serwer, 1995) 
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[Jim] Clark’s story is classically American; he is a Gatsby fated to endless self-reinvention. A high 
school dropout from Plainview, Texas, he spent the first part of his life acquiring grudges—against his 
wastrel father, his hometown, and the Navy. Success, writes Lewis, “became a form of revenge.” In the 
early `60s, Clark got a Ph.D. in the then-new discipline of computer science and lived as an academic 
gypsy until, nearing 40, he settled at Stanford and developed a complex computer chip called the 
Geometry Engine. Clark’s chip made possible the first computer-generated three-dimensional graphics, 
which enabled the design of nearly anything on a computer—cars, airplanes, and the dinosaurs of 
Jurassic Park. The new chip spawned his first company, Silicon Graphics. After a restless few years, he 
abandoned Silicon Graphics to co-found Netscape with Marc Andreessen, whose browser opened the 
Internet to the masses. By the early `90s, Clark was a billionaire and more. (Ferguson, 1999) 
The success stories of both Huggins and Clark are extremely enticing. Moreover, some articles 
conveyed the sense that one did not even need to work in the tech sector to share in the riches. 
Kelley (2000) describes the trend in nonprofits raising money by buying discounted shares before 
tech companies went public: “Other nonprofit agencies are also trying to use the phenomenal 
growth of Internet companies to finance their operations. The Community Foundation Silicon 
Valley has been given many directed shares, and the right to buy others at insider prices, by several 
Internet companies.”  
Other articles conveyed the sense that mostly ordinary (and even boring) individuals were the 
ones making millions: “Mothersbaugh spoke to one guy who said he made ‘routing systems,’ and 
was worth $250 million. But the guy has no idea what to do with his money and figures he’ll just go 
start another company. And people thought Devo was weird” (Warner, 2000). Thus, by the late 
1990s, seemingly everyone could make money off the tech sector’s rise to market dominance.   
Fear, mainly the fear of missing out, was another frequent emotional trigger used in the media 
sample. Early on in the sample, in 1993 and 1994, those who bet against the market were often 
disparaged, being referred to as “losers” and compared to Chicken Little:  
The big losers were professional short-sellers, who bet that stocks they deemed to be overvalued would 
decline. (Norris, 1993) 
It was the Chinese Year of the Rooster, but investors who ignored Chicken Little probably had 
something to crow about in 1993. (Teitelbaum, 1994) 
This persecution of market bears continued into the mid 1990s, including warnings that 
spending four years earning a degree may result in readers missing out on the current technological 
shift: 
Chapter 7: The Tech Bubble’s Normative Pillar 
 
133 
 
Technology changes so rapidly that it may be a better idea not to go to school for four years because so 
much of what you have learned is obsolete. (And your diploma is in classics?). (Kiechel and Schonfeld, 
1994) 
Even if `74 [when stocks fell by 26 percent] rings a bell, avoiding the market remains a risk, 
too…Investors hoping for another year of better-than-30-percent gains in stock prices are likely to be 
disappointed. But fearful investors who stay on the sidelines will probably be worse off. (Wyatt, 1996) 
Hence, individuals who bet against market gains may be given derogatory labels such as “loser,” 
while those who stand on the sidelines or make alternative investments (such as in a bachelor’s 
degree) are likely to miss out on the new economy and its potential windfall gains. The power of 
fear in turning skeptics into euphoric market bulls was noted several times in articles expounding 
critical views of sky-high stock prices, as commented by Serwer (1996), “Any fund manager who 
doubted the profit potential of tech stocks felt chastened indeed, and many then joined in…” and 
Hylton (1996b), “Every market tends to be met with skepticism most of the way up, but there 
comes a point when the fear of risk is overtaken by the fear of missing out.”  
7.2.6 Carefully selected historical data 
A final means of institutionalization, which was also unique to the media sample, was the use of 
carefully selected historical data. When discussing recent trends in stock price movements, the tech 
sector, or the U.S. economy, journalists and quoted sources in the media sample made use of a wide 
variety of historical data, which here refers to the use of statistics, examples, and anecdotes of past 
performance.  
Certainly, any use of historical data requires a selection process. That is to say, the journalist or 
source must decide on not only what type of data to use but also the cutoff dates (where to start and 
stop the statistics or example), the source of the data (what country, company, research entity, etc.), 
how much data to include (and what to leave out), and even how to present the data (in a positive or 
negative tone, etc.). Such a complex selection process arguably gives the journalist or source more 
power than the data itself. 
The importance and power of this selection process became apparent when tech companies and 
their stocks, many of which were listed on the NASDAQ, staged a revival in the mid 1990s and 
then soared to astronomical levels a few years later. When this happened, several articles 
expounding the boom narratives of “Technological Dominance” and “Soaring Stocks” reported on 
this phenomenon in an almost exclusively positive manner by selecting only positive historical data, 
as seen in the following excerpts: 
Preston B. Teeter 
 
134 
 
And the Nasdaq, weighted heavily with technology company stocks, performed amazingly, rising 29.45 
percent, just shy of its best quarter ever. (Gilpin, 1999) 
According to IPO Monitor, since Jan. 1 some 52 Internet companies have gone public, with nearly three-
quarters racing into the market at a value more than 40% above their offering price. (Warner, 1999) 
Last year, the three major American stock indexes produced double-digit returns for the fifth consecutive 
year—an unprecedented feat—and the technology-heavy Nasdaq index popped off the charts. 
(Fuerbringer, 2000) 
In these excerpts, journalists made the decision to focus solely on the terrific recent gains in U.S. 
tech stocks. Such a decision also required the journalists to omit data on the volatile performance 
and stock returns of tech companies in the late 1980s and early 1990s (as discussed in earlier 
articles such as in Sellers, 1989), the ongoing drop in the tech-heavy Japanese markets (which was 
almost entirely ignored in the sampled articles), and, in many cases, the historical similarity 
between current price levels and past market bubbles (such as the 1920s stock bubble, which was 
not mentioned a single time in the sampled articles). 
 However, the technique of carefully selected historical data took on even more power in 
instances where articles gave the impression that above-average returns were always the case with 
U.S. stock markets, as seen in the following excerpt:  
An investor in a mutual fund that matched the performance of the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index, 
among the most watched market indicators, would not have suffered an annual loss of more than 5 
percent in any year since 1977. Seven times in those 18 years, the annual return on the S.& P. 500 
exceeded 20 percent, assuming all dividends were reinvested...Even in 1987, when stocks took a frantic 
tumble, falling 22 percent in one day, the S.& P. index finished the year with a gain of 5 percent. (Wyatt, 
1996) 
This excerpt seemingly implies that U.S. stocks have always been a safe place for investment. 
Of course, starting the data in the year 1977 and only mentioning the S&P 500 are crucial in 
conveying such an argument—with the steep market drops of the 1930s, 1960s, and 1970s and the 
tepid returns of the 1940s and, at times, the NASDAQ providing a much different story.  
Similarly, other articles gave the impression that, despite countless instances of historical 
downturns, you simply could not lose in U.S. stocks. Such an impression was strongest when 
articles reported on individuals or organizations with almost no expertise or in-depth knowledge of 
tech companies or U.S. stocks making fortunes in the market: 
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The nonprofit agency’s board must approve stock purchases, even at advantageous prices, because of the 
risk that the stock could drop below its initial offering price. So far, Mouse’s board has not lost money 
on any stock, and it has made enough in profits to create an endowment worth more than $500,000. The 
earnings of that pool of capital finance the organization’s work in schools. (Kelley, 2000, emphasis 
added) 
While also almost certainly triggering envy amongst other nonprofits that are not in the market, 
the careful selection of stock winners (again, with no mention of the historically unprecedented P/E 
ratios or the (im)probability that all of their stock purchases would remain in the black) provides a 
powerful source of institutionalization. 
The power of carefully selected historical data, along with the other five means of 
institutionalization explained above, also helps to explain why efforts to counter the boom 
narratives associated with the tech bubble failed. In addition to these factors, this stage of analysis 
revealed two specific reasons why efforts to deinstitutionalize the prevailing boom narratives were 
not successful: 1) as in the cognitive pillar, but not quite as unbalanced, texts that truly attempted to 
challenge the discourse found in boom narratives were the minority, and 2) those who did challenge 
the prevailing euphoria were, at times, discredited. These two reasons are further explained below.  
7.2.7 Minority status 
As noted at the beginning of this section on institutional features, from 1987 to 2000 the media 
sample became increasingly positive, particularly towards the U.S. economy and the tech sector. In 
fact, from 1995 to 2000, only one article (Kover, 1997) possessed a strictly negative connotation of 
the U.S. economy, while the remaining articles with slightly negative or skeptical economic 
narratives still maintained a balanced (mixed) view of economic prospects. Similarly, but not quite 
as unbalanced, during that same time period there were only six articles that possessed a strictly 
negative view of tech companies. Thus, overall, while the idea of forever-soaring stock prices was 
frequently challenged in the media, the view that U.S. companies were entering an entirely new 
economic era propelled by the unprecedented advancements in information technology (thanks 
mostly to innovations at U.S. companies) went largely unchallenged. 
When looking solely at the U.S. stock narratives, an interesting finding is that from 1995 to 
1997, at the beginning of the market run-up, eight of the 30 articles (27%) possessed a negative or 
skeptical stock narrative, while from 1998 to 2000, the peak of the market run-up, only four of the 
31 articles (13%) possessed such narratives. That is to say, in contrast to the reactionary discourse 
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found at the Federal Reserve, the media texts frequently argued that prices were too high at the start 
of the bubble, but these efforts seem to have withered as prices continued to soar higher.  
7.2.8 Discrediting skeptics 
This last observation may help to explain the presence of another apparent reason why efforts to 
deinstitutionalize the tech bubble’s boom narratives failed, that being the act of discrediting skeptics. 
As already mentioned in the subsection on emotional triggers, market bears were sometimes 
referred to as both “losers” and “Chicken Little.” In fact, several articles seemed to express 
satisfaction with the observation that bearish economists were proved wrong: 
Despite a relentless chorus of bearish prognosticators, the feisty American Stock Exchange surged 16.6% 
for the year, the over-the-counter market rose 12.1%, and even the lumbering Big Board was up a 
respectable 7.6%. (Teitelbaum, 1994) 
With more and more signs that the economy is not slowing down as forecast by many economists… 
(Fuerbringer, 1999) 
This satisfaction with the apparently inaccurate forecasts of market bears was taken one step 
further in the following excerpt:  
About the only people still around to rekindle the memories of those dark days, and to warn that the good 
times will not last, are financial journalists. And many of them have been wrong about stocks for nearly 
a decade. Simply put, the biggest risk to individual investors in recent times has come from not being 
invested in the market. (Wyatt, 1996) 
Seemingly, those brave enough to warn of market euphoria were not only sometimes disparaged 
but also discredited as having been wrong time after time. As a result, the skeptics of 1995 to 1997 
looked increasingly foolish from 1998 to 2000 as stocks continued their upward climb. Perhaps 
embarrassed by their “blunder” or afraid of further persecution, these media skeptics may have 
toned down their criticism at the precise time that markets truly lost all connection with reality.  
7.3 Summary  
In this chapter, I demonstrated how, from 1987 to 2000, articles from The New York Times and 
Fortune, two media outlets that possessed great power over societal discourse, gave increased 
attention to the topics of technology and a new economy, particularly at the peak of the tech bubble 
circa 1999 and 2000. Additionally, around the year 1993, their portrayal of the U.S. economy 
shifted from a pessimistic outlook to an overwhelmingly positive outlook, as narratives of strong 
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growth, economic leadership, and a new economy flourished. Similarly, a narrative of technological 
dominance became commonplace, with contrasting narratives of decline and euphoria falling into a 
small minority. 
During these years, the boom narratives expounded in these two media sources acquired 
widespread legitimacy and appeared as thoroughly institutionalized. Six factors were identified in 
this regard, those being the spread and repetition of these narratives, the use of one boom narrative 
(technological dominance) to support another (new economy), the rationalization of conflicting 
evidence, support via expert references, the use of emotional triggers such as fear and envy, and the 
selection of only positive historical data. Quite a few media articles did, however, attempt to 
challenge the euphoria surrounding (tech) stocks. While somewhat common at the beginning of the 
tech bubble, though, these efforts appeared to dissipate over time as share prices climbed higher and 
higher. In addition, those early skeptics were frequently discredited as the bubble continued to grow, 
which may explain their almost complete disappearance as prices started to peak.    
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CHAPTER 8: THE TECH BUBBLE’S REGULATIVE PILLAR 
This chapter presents findings from the regulative pillar of institutionalization, which refers to 
established rules and laws that coerce and constrain actions and behaviors. Regulative sources are 
noted for possessing great institutional power, for they have the ability to punish and penalize non-
compliance. For this study, the regulative pillar is represented by hearings from the United States 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. From 1987 to 2000, there were 259 
full committee hearings held by this committee. The findings of the initial sampling stage are 
presented in Figure 8.1 below.  
Two important observations can be made from this preliminary search. First, while the words 
“stock(s),” “equity/security (-ies, -ization),” and “market(s)” appear throughout the sample period, 
their frequency spikes in both 1987/1988 and 1999/2000. Of important note is that four of the five 
references made in 1987 occurred before the stock market crash of October 19, while all of the 
remaining references in 1987/1988 are in response to the crash.  
 
 
Figure 8.1  Keywords in hearing titles (by count), full committee hearings by the Senate Committee 
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 1987–2000 
 
Source: U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
Notes: These keywords were searched in all 259 full committee hearings from 1987 to 2000. Included were all 
oversight, legislative, and field hearings. Oversight hearings review a law, issue, or activity; legislative hearings 
are held on measures or issues that may become public law; and field hearings are any type of hearing held 
outside of Washington, D.C. Titles searched were those provided in the Committee’s legislative calendar, which 
are available on the Committee’s website. While each title could include two or more keywords, no keyword 
was counted twice in the same title (only one relevant case was found for this situation). 
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Second, throughout the sample period, there is only one reference to technology, in the year 
1990, entitled “Declining competitiveness in America’s industrial, technological, and financial base,” 
with no references at all to innovation or the new economy throughout. 
The 18 hearings that included these keywords thus became the sample data for this chapter, with 
those hearings representing seven percent of all hearings from the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs from 1987 to 2000
24
. Each of these 18 hearings consisted of 
statements (both prepared and unprepared), testimony, and discussion by a number of senators and 
witnesses. Thus, for this pillar, each speaker and his or her statements were treated as an individual 
item and coded as such
25
. In total, 200 items were present in these 18 hearings. Appendix 3 provides 
the reference information for each of these items, along with their citation codes that will be used 
throughout this chapter.  
8.1 Narrative analysis 
The results from step one, the categorization of each item’s connotation of the U.S. economy and/or 
U.S. companies, are presented on the following two pages in Figures 8.2 and 8.3 and Table 8.1.  
For this pillar, these connotations are best described in three general phases. First, from 1987 to 
1990, the vast majority of the connotations were negative (88 of the 123 items, or nearly 72 percent), 
with most of the remainder being mixed. Only five items during this period were positive, all in 
1987. This negative tonality was primarily the result of the 1987 stock market crash but was also 
caused by discovery of insider trading abuses and other instances of market manipulation on the 
major exchanges.  
  
                                                 
24
 Three of the 18 full committee hearings were held for more than one day (100-481, 100-649, and 102-991). For these 
hearings, only the first day of statements and testimony was analyzed. This decision was made for several reasons. One, 
analyzing all statements and testimony from such hearings would have given them a heavy bias in the results section, 
such as Senate Hearing 100-649, which lasted four days and thus included far more individual statements and testimony 
than other hearings. Second, including additional days would have resulted in an extra 1,000 pages of data to analyze, 
with Senate Hearing 102-991 alone almost totaling 1,000 pages. As all of the hearings for this sample were rather 
lengthy and included numerous voices, I felt that this sample, sans these extra days, contained sufficient data to 
represent the regulative pillar. Again, my goal was not an exhaustive analysis of all discourse during this period (which 
would be impossible anyway) but rather a probing, sophisticated analysis of a very relevant sample from this period.  
25
 An individual’s statements were not necessarily confined to one continuous section. For instance, an individual may 
give an opening statement but then be questioned later on in the hearing during a panel discussion. All of these 
statements by an individual were analyzed as a collective whole, not separately. That being said, statements were only 
analyzed collectively for any one given hearing. Thus, if the same individual spoke at two or more hearings (which was 
quite common), those statements were analyzed separately. A final note here is that some documents, such as research 
papers, were attached to the hearing report at the request of a witness or senator. These documents were not analyzed 
but all references to them were.  
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Figure 8.2  Connotation of U.S. economy/companies (by count),  
sampled Senate statements, 1987–2000 
 
 
Figure 8.3  Connotation of U.S. economy/companies (by percentage), 
sampled Senate statements, 1987–2000 
 
Notes: Each of the 200 statements sampled was categorized according to one, and only one, of the five 
connotations. Also, while the years 1987 and 1988 resulted in a large number of individual statements, this 
relative imbalance had no impact upon the findings of this chapter. The only effect of such a large sample from 
these years was that a great deal of extra, and largely redundant, analysis was required for this time period. In 
contrast, keyword searches for the years 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, and 1998 did not result in any 
hearings/statements. However, the years in between resulted in a sufficient number of statements/hearings to 
allow for a historical comparison of the narratives that emerged at the U.S. Senate. 
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Table 8.1  Selected quotations and topics for each U.S. economy connotation (sampled Senate statements, 1987–2000) 
 
Connotation Quotations and topics  
(1987–1990) 
Quotations and topics  
(1992–1994) 
Quotations and topics  
(1996–2000) 
Positive 
 
 
 
 
"When we look at what makes America different 
than any other countries [sic], it is the ability to 
raise capital for American businesses, and with 
that, the highest standard of living in the world, 
the best wages and the best working conditions." 
-Hecht, April 22, 1987 
 
"Again, I would just like to emphasize, it looks 
easy to raise capital now in a bull market." 
-Carson, Feb. 25, 1994 
 
"I don't think there has ever been a better period 
in our history for investors. These are good 
economic times and good times for capital 
formation." 
-Schwab, Feb. 29, 2000 
 
Negative 
 
 
 
"We heard what I found to be very disturbing 
testimony yesterday from representatives of the 
Securities Industry Association that many, many 
individual investors have simply left the market." 
-Sanford, April 20, 1988 
 
"The United States is projecting a very weak 
recovery from the recession." 
-Sarbanes, April 17, 1992 
 
No such speeches during this period 
Mixed 
 
 
 
 
 
"As we all know, the market events of October 
were dramatic and historic, and their effects are 
still being felt. While these events showed how 
resilient our markets are, they also revealed 
weaknesses. In particular, we now know that 
market structures and trading strategies at times 
can cause volume and volatility that overwhelm 
the current capacities of our markets." 
-Ruder, March 31, 1988 
 
"…[mutual to stock] conversions for the most part 
are beneficial…However, the conversion process 
can be and has been misused." 
-D'Amato, Feb. 25, 1994 
"While I believe that both industries [futures and 
securities industries] have created the world's 
most liquid markets, I am concerned that certain 
key equity market structure issues, if not properly 
addressed, could have a detrimental impact on 
healthy competition and on investor protection." 
-Brodsky, May 8, 2000 
 
Neutral 
 
Globalization of capital markets 
-Karnes, Oct. 13, 1987 
No such speeches during this period Liquidity of securities 
-Bennett, April 13, 2000 
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From 1992 to 1994, connotations were evenly mixed, with a few positive (3 of the 12), negative 
(5 of the 12), and mixed (4 of the 12) connotations. Then, from 1996 to 2000, the mood shifted 
dramatically to being overwhelmingly positive, with 46 of the 65 (nearly 71 percent) items being 
positive and not a single instance of a negative connotation. 
Due to the large number of items in this sample, as expected, step two produced a large number 
(19 in total) of U.S. economy and/or company narratives. These narratives are outlined in Table 8.2 
on the next five pages. Figures 8.4 and 8.5 on the following page reveal the frequency trends of 
these narratives. 
Similar to the previous two chapters, these narratives are color-coded according to their 
connotation, with negative narratives coded shades of red or blue, neutral narratives coded purple, 
moderately positive narratives coded shades of green, and extremely positive narratives coded 
shades of orange and yellow.  
Nine of the narratives were largely negative or pessimistic about the U.S. economy and future 
prospects or changes. The vast majority of these narratives appeared between the years 1987 and 
1994, as seen in Figure 8.4. An “Economic Crisis” narrative formed early on and eventually 
appeared 70 times in response to the market crash of October 1987. This narrative comments on and 
foresees turbulence and volatility in the nation’s economy and stock markets, arguing that only 
tougher regulation, a balanced Federal budget, and stricter margin requirements can subdue the 
crisis, which was caused by factors such as investor irrationality, program trading, derivatives, and 
past policy blunders.  
Even before the crash, though, many speakers expounded a “Shaken Economy” narrative, which 
appeared 10 times in 1987. This narrative sees a recent spate of scandals on Wall Street as shaking 
investor confidence in U.S. markets, a problem that requires tougher penalties and greater 
surveillance of market activity.  
After the crash, mostly in the year 1990, a narrative of “Economic Decline” was common, 
appearing eight times. This narrative notes a worldwide economic downturn and sees the U.S. as 
losing its competitive edge to foreign powers such as Japan and Germany. Only increased 
investment in research and development and new technology and better long-term planning can 
prevent the U.S. from falling further behind these competing exporters.  
 
  
 
 
Table 8.2  U.S. economy/company narratives (sampled Senate statements, 1987–2000) 
  
Narrative Object Destinator Key enabling forces Key impeding forces Selected quotations 
Economic  
Crisis 
 
 
 
 
 Crisis 
 Turbulence 
 Volatility 
 Loss of faith 
 Recent market 
crash 
 U.S. as historic 
market power 
 Regulation/oversight 
 Margin requirements 
 Int’l cooperation 
 Balanced budget 
 Budget/trade deficits 
 Taxes/protectionism 
 Irrationality 
 Technology 
 Policy blunders 
"One of the most severe fallouts of the recent 
'crash', 'panic', 'correction' or 'adjustment' is that 
it seems to have completely shaken the faith in 
the viability of the economy." 
-D'Amato, Nov. 4, 1987 
Shaken 
Economy 
 
 
 
 
 Shaken 
 Losing confidence 
 Scandals 
 Strong capital 
markets 
(historically) 
 Regulators 
 Surveillance 
 Technology 
 Penalties 
 Int’l cooperation 
 Greed 
 Complexity 
 Uncertainty 
 Weak penalties 
 Int’l markets 
"…I think there could be a major problem with 
public confidence in the market and in the 
fairness and the freeness of the market, not just 
the fact that it's a free market." 
-Giuliani, April 22, 1987 
 
Economic 
Decline 
 
 
 
 
 Decline 
 Losing 
competitiveness 
 Struggle 
 Worldwide 
economic 
slowdown 
 Scandals on Wall 
Street 
 R&D/technology 
 Long-term planning 
 Better education 
 Productivity 
 Exports 
 Wall Street greed 
 Foreign competition 
 Budget crisis 
 Predatory behavior of 
Japanese 
"Too many investment bankers, too many 
lawyers, too many M.B.A.'s appear to be 
looking only for a fast buck profit, and yet the 
fast bucks are being made at the expense, I fear, 
of America's competitiveness and particularly 
our industrial competitiveness…" 
-Heinz, April 22, 1987 
 
Economic 
Abuse 
 
 
 
 Abuse 
 Manipulation 
 Recent stock 
scandals 
 Significant 
changes in 
business 
environment 
 Prompt regulatory 
response 
 Reform 
 Greed 
 Lax regulations 
"Insiders at mutual savings bank—the very 
trustees who have a fiduciary duties [sic] to the 
depositors—may seek to convert the institution 
to stock form in order to profit financially from 
stock options and other preferential stock 
distributions." 
-D'Amato, Feb. 25, 1994 
  
 
  
Table 8.2  U.S. economy/company narratives (sampled Senate statements, 1987–2000) (continued) 
 
Narrative Object Destinator Key enabling forces Key impeding forces Selected quotations 
Economic 
Uncertainty 
 
 
 
 
 Uncertainty 
 Troubles 
 Weak recovery 
 Japan’s crash 
 Problems in 
Europe 
 Problems in real 
estate and banking 
 Productivity 
 Exports 
 Healthy banks 
 Stimulus/easing 
 Stock stability 
 Int’l turmoil 
 Bank failures 
 Stagnant economy 
 Tax burdens 
 Fraud 
"…I take if you took it because you see the U.S. 
economy as weak, and the possibility of what 
some are now calling a triple dip recession. And 
we need, obviously, to explore that possibility." 
-Sarbanes, April 17, 1992 
Economic 
Competitiveness 
 
 
 
 
 Int’l and domestic 
competitiveness 
 Getting left 
behind 
 Efficiency 
 Increased foreign 
deregulation 
 Tough int’l 
competition 
 Strong markets 
 Deregulation 
 Prudent policies 
 Quality control 
 Customer focus 
 R&D/education 
 Out-dated regulations 
 Foreign competition 
 Trade barriers 
 Budget deficits 
 Congress inaction 
"Because we generally deny firms the ability to 
offer both commercial and investment banking 
services in the United States, we unnecessarily 
limit the ability of our own firms to compete in 
the various markets around the world and we 
restrain the growth of our own markets." 
-Mendoza, Oct. 13, 1987 
 
Unfair 
Economy 
 
 
 
 
 Unequal, unfair 
economic gains 
 Income inequality 
 Asset holding 
inequality 
 Fair laws and policies  Fees for poorer 
households 
"I think it's fairly clear that the 39 percent of all 
American families that have less than $1,000 in 
total financial assets will not benefit in the least 
from increased entry into mutual funds by bank 
holding companies." 
-Fox, Aug. 6, 1987 
 
Economic  
Risk 
 
 
 
 Risk, risky 
changes 
 Fragile financial 
system 
 Strong corporate 
sector 
 Global 
competition 
 Strong banks 
 Risk management 
 Fair accounting rules 
 Safeguards 
 Prudent policies 
 Increased deregulation 
 Poor efficiency of U.S. 
banks 
"I have deep reservations about the wholesale 
repeal of the act unless certain issues are 
considered and resolved…will the explicit and 
implicit deposit insurance guarantee propagate 
to the securities activities of the bank?" 
-Heinz, Aug. 6, 1987 
  
 
 
Table 8.2  U.S. economy/company narratives (sampled Senate statements, 1987–2000) (continued) 
 
Narrative Object Destinator Key enabling forces Key impeding forces Selected quotations 
Public’s 
Economy 
 
 
 
 
 Public benefit (not 
just private) 
 Increased 
deregulation 
 Competition 
 Lower costs 
 Increased supply 
 Safeguards 
 Unknowns "I want to see us identify and evaluate the 
benefits and costs to the public—I repeat, to the 
public—of permitting bank holding companies 
to underwrite mutual funds, mortgage-backed 
securities, and municipal revenue bonds…" 
-Proxmire, Aug. 6, 1987 
 
Economic 
Cycles 
 
 
 
 
 Cycles 
 Recessions and 
recovery 
 Historical industry 
cycles 
 Recent recessions 
and bull markets 
 Long-term, patient 
capital 
 Strategic alliances 
 Stable regulations 
 Technology/R&D 
 Int’l competition, 
primarily from Japan 
and Europe 
"The downturns and the inevitable upturns in 
our industry require careful investment and 
planning by investors and managers." 
-Schacht, Sept. 14, 1990 
 
Economic 
Expansion 
 
 
 
 
 Expansion 
 Competition 
 Growth 
 Undersupply in 
securities market 
 Changing 
financial 
marketplace 
 Deregulation 
 Investment 
infrastructure 
 Red tape/burdensome 
regulations 
"…it certainly seems that the public will 
ultimately be the winner by allowing increased 
competition in the securities area." 
-Karnes, Aug. 6, 1987 
Moderate 
Economic 
Growth 
 
 
 Moderate growth  Recovery from 
crash 
 Recent recession 
 Low inflation 
 Stronger financial 
markets 
 
 Stock volatility 
 Foreign competition 
 Market abuses 
 Strict regulations 
"We continue to believe that the economy is 
well-balanced, with prospects for continued 
moderate growth. I am pleased to see this 
morning the GNP figures of good, solid growth, 
with a lowering of the rate of inflation." 
-Brady, Oct. 26, 1989 
  
 
 
Table 8.2  U.S. economy/company narratives (sampled Senate statements, 1987–2000) (continued) 
 
 
  
Narrative Object Destinator Key enabling forces Key impeding forces Selected quotations 
Sound  
Economy 
 
 
 
 
 Strength, health 
 Stability 
 High U.S. working 
and living 
standards 
 Recent scandals 
 Great business minds 
 Wall Street 
 Regulation 
 Prudent policies 
 High trading volume 
 Strong capital markets 
 
 Over-regulation 
 Overreaction by 
Congress 
 Greed 
 Piecemeal reform 
"Wall Street has served America very well, and 
before we undertake drastic changes, we should 
proceed with extreme caution." 
-Hecht, April 22, 1987 
Economic 
Growth 
 
 
 
 High growth 
 International 
growth 
 Vitality 
 Global investment 
environment 
 Largest capital 
markets in the 
world (U.S.) 
 
 Tech companies 
 Small businesses 
 Venture capitalists 
 Deregulation 
 Retail investors 
 Out-dated regulations 
 Excess investment fees 
 Foreign competition 
 Regulatory overlap 
"The bill will create a new category of 
unregistered private investment companies that 
will help venture capitalists tap the capital 
market to fund new start-up companies." 
-D'Amato, June 5, 1996 
 
Economic 
Revival 
 
 
 
 
 Recovery 
 Resurgence 
 Stock rebound 
 Renewed growth 
 Regained investor 
confidence 
 Prudent policies 
 Strong capital markets 
 Rash policies 
 Overreaction by 
Congress 
 Low savings rate 
 Leverage/speculation 
"Further, the markets have recovered somewhat 
as investor confidence has slowly been 
regained. Ample economic evidence of these 
trends is contained in Chairman Greenspan's 
testimony." 
-D'Amato, March 31, 1988 
 
Explosive 
Growth 
 
 
 
 Explosive growth  U.S. with 
dominant capital 
markets 
 Rapid tech 
advancements 
 Tech sector/start-ups 
 Effective regulations 
 Free markets 
 Privatization 
 Burdensome regulations 
 Excess transaction fees 
"The explosive growth of securities market 
activity in the past several years...have caused 
the amount of fees collected to greatly exceed 
the SEC's budget." 
-Helsby, Feb. 28, 2000 
  
 
 
Table 8.2  U.S. economy/company narratives (sampled Senate statements, 1987–2000) (continued) 
 
 
 
 
Narrative Object Destinator Key enabling forces Key impeding forces Selected quotations 
Economic 
Leadership 
 
 
 
 
 Worldwide 
economic 
leadership 
 Respect from all 
countries 
 U.S. with world’s 
strongest capital 
markets 
 Tech revolution 
 Strong leadership 
 Tech start-ups 
 Prudent policies 
 Transparency 
 Integrity 
 Burdensome regulations 
 Market fragmentation 
 Excess transaction fees 
 Protectionism 
"Participants in our equity markets have 
succeeded in concentrating a great depth of 
liquidity that is the envy of other nations and a 
symbol of the United States as the world's 
preeminent financial power." 
-Greenspan, April 13, 2000 
 
Structural Shift 
 
 
 
 
 Radical 
transformation 
 Rapid growth 
 Growing U.S. 
economy 
 Tech revolution 
 Economic 
leadership 
 
 Technological 
advancements 
 Competition 
 Free markets 
 Burdensome regulations 
 Global competition 
 Fear of change 
"My concern is that in our human tendency to 
fear change, we tend to bask in legacies of past 
successes, forgetting that we can also become 
victimized by them." 
-Paulson, Feb. 29, 2000 
 
New Economy 
 
 
 
 “New economy” 
 Unprecedented 
growth and 
change 
 Information age 
 Tech revolution 
 World’s pre-
eminent capital 
markets 
 Tech start-ups 
 Venture capitalists 
 Competition 
 Privatization 
 
 Burdensome regulation 
 Excess transaction fees 
 Market fragmentation 
 Fear of change 
"New technology and dramatic change represent 
a wave of creative destruction; this new 
technology will create and destroy vast fortunes. 
I believe the net result will be a dramatic 
improvement in the efficiency of the American 
economy, and when the American economy can 
generate capital more efficiently then everybody 
in America, at least in the aggregate, is a 
winner." 
-Gramm, Sept. 28, 1999 
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Figure 8.4  U.S. economy/company narratives (by count), sampled Senate statements, 1987–2000 
 
 
Figure 8.5  U.S. economy/company narratives (by %), sampled Senate statements, 1987–2000 
 
Note: The legend in Figure 8.4 also applies to Figure 8.5. 
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Appearing six times in 1994 was a narrative of “Economic Abuse.” This narrative criticizes the 
Wall Street greed and lax regulations that resulted in numerous cases of abuse and manipulation on 
stock exchanges and in the private sector. Also appearing in the mid 1990s were narratives of 
“Economic Uncertainty” (four times) and “Economic Competitiveness” (five times). These 
narratives were similar to those explained in previous chapters, while in the Senate, speakers tended 
to focus on how tax burdens, inaction at Congress, and budget deficits were key impediments to a 
healthy economy. 
Two highly interrelated narratives of “Unfair Economy” and “Public’s Economy” appeared in 
1987, each one time. Both narratives argued for more equality in the nation’s economic benefits, 
with an “Unfair Economy” narrative stressing that poorer households were getting left behind and a 
“Public’s Economy” narrative focusing on how regulatory changes should primarily benefit the 
public, not private interests. A final negative narrative to appear, three times in 1987, was an 
“Economic Risk” narrative. This narrative warns that legislative changes could have side effects 
and damage an already fragile financial system and argues that numerous safeguards and risk 
management practices are needed to prevent unintended consequences.  
One neutral narrative, an “Economic Cycles” narrative, appeared twice in 1994. Similar to the 
previous pillar, this narrative notes that recessions are followed by recoveries but also that bull 
markets result in downturns. Long-term, patient capital, as is common in Japan, is seen as the key to 
business prosperity.  
Expounding a positive view of the economy were the narratives of “Economic Expansion,” 
“Moderate Economic Growth,” “Sound Economy,” and “Economic Growth.” These narratives were 
very common in the years 1987 and 1996. An “Economic Expansion” narrative was the only new 
narrative in this group, with the others being very similar to those explained in previous chapters. 
An “Economic Expansion” narrative, present ten times, argues that increased competition is good 
for expansion and growth and thus Congress should remove red tape and burdensome regulations 
on businesses. This narrative was mainly in response to the proposed removal of the Glass-Steagall 
restrictions on commercial banks.  
Lastly, five narratives expounded an extremely positive view of the U.S. economy. These 
included narratives of “Economic Revival,” “Explosive Growth,” “Economic Leadership,” 
“Structural Shift,” “and “New Economy.” These narratives were dominant in the years 1999 and 
2000. “Explosive Growth” was the only new narrative in this group. Similar to an “Economic 
Growth” narrative, this narrative comments on the growth and vitality of U.S. companies, due in 
large part to growth in the tech sector and the benefits of privatization and securitization. However, 
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an “Explosive Growth” narrative stresses the unprecedented rate of growth in the private sector and 
sees Congress and its burdensome regulations as the only real impediments to U.S. business success.  
In step three, the categorization of each item’s connotation of technology and innovation, three 
phases can be described, as delineated on the next two pages in Figures 8.6 and 8.7 and Table 8.3. 
First, the period from 1987 to 1990 witnessed a large variety of connotations, but these connotations 
become increasingly negative in this period, with the vast majority (8 out of 9 or 89 percent) of 
connotations in 1990 being negative.  
During this period, while the benefits of technological progress were often noted, speakers 
increasingly focused on how the U.S. was losing ground in terms of technology and innovation to 
both Japan and Europe. In addition, speakers highlighted the dangers of computer-driven program 
trading, a recent innovation that was blamed for much of the recent volatility on exchanges.  
In the second phase, from 1992 to 1996, technology and innovation were rarely mentioned, with 
a few positive connotations appearing in the year 1996. Then suddenly, in 1999 and 2000, 
technology was not only mentioned in great number but also often the focus of or a key issue in 
most statements. In this final period, technology was seen as almost exclusively positive (with not a 
single negative connotation in these years), as speakers noted the recent revolution in information 
technology, the unprecedented growth in the NASDAQ exchange, and the many benefits of 
technological advances for retail investors and smaller exchanges.  
The fourth step of analysis for this pillar first revealed three technology company narratives, all 
of which were present in the normative pillar. Overall, from 1987 to 1996, very few of these 
narratives emerged (only nine narratives in the first 155 items). The years 1989 and 1990 saw a 
surge in a “Technological Decline” narrative, which was present seven times in those years.  
Similar to the normative pillar, this narrative sees U.S. tech companies as falling behind their 
foreign companies, particularly the “predatory” Japanese. Speakers urged Congress to remove any 
trade barriers that may be preventing U.S. firms from competing on an equal footing with foreign 
rivals. Investment in research and development, long-term planning, and improving the quality of 
math and science education in the U.S. were all seen as key enablers that would help the U.S. catch 
up in the coming decades.   
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Figure 8.6  Connotation of technology/innovation (by count), 
sampled Senate statements, 1987–2000 
 
 
Figure 8.7  Connotation of technology/innovation (by percentage), 
sampled Senate statements, 1987–2000 
 
Notes: Each of the 200 statements sampled was categorized according to one, and only one, of the five 
connotations.  
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Table 8.3  Selected quotations and topics for each technology connotation (sampled Senate statements, 1987–2000) 
 
Connotation Quotations and topics  
(1987–1990) 
Quotations and topics  
(1992–1996) 
Quotations and topics  
(1999–2000) 
Positive 
 
 
 
 
"We live now in a global market. Technology has 
made an enormous difference, and we have been 
able to make time virtually disappear in the 24-
hour markets." 
-Proxmire, Oct. 13, 1987 
 
"Venture-backed companies have included Apple, 
Federal Express, Intel, and Sun Microsystems, 
Inc. These companies and others like them have 
created new jobs usually paying higher wages 
than the average...They develop leading 
technology through innovation and spend 
substantial sums on research and development." 
-Brody, June 5, 1996 
 
"We are seeing technological advances and 
innovations that are unprecedented. For example, 
the introduction of new electronic markets now 
extend trading hours of on-line trading." 
-Sarbanes, Sept. 28, 1999 
 
Negative 
 
 
 
"The U.S. share of technology markets is eroding 
at an alarming rate. In 1980, we had 90 percent of 
the domestic color TV market, we now have 10 
percent. We had 100 percent of the machine tool 
market, we now have less than 30 percent." 
-Bryan, Oct. 26, 1989 
 
No such speeches during this period 
 
No such speeches during this period 
Mixed 
 
 
 
 
 
"…whether we like it or whether we don't like it, 
the computer is here to stay." 
-Gramm, May 24, 1988 
 
No such speeches during this period "The advent of new electronic trading systems has 
caused us some concern about increasing market 
fragmentation. These new electronic trading 
systems are…positive developments; they are a 
result of the technology revolution..." 
-Komansky, Feb. 29, 2000 
 
Neutral 
 
"We live in an increasingly information-intensive 
computerized age. Everything seems to happen 
faster than it used to." 
-Dixon, Feb. 2, 1988 
New electronic filing system 
-Breeden, April 17, 1992 
Question about electronic exchanges 
-Bennett, April 13, 2000 
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In 1996, two “Technological Growth” narratives emerged. This narrative views U.S. tech 
companies as now competing rather well with foreign rivals, aided by low taxes and venture 
capitalists but still impeded by overly strict regulations passed by Congress.  
Lastly, a “Technological Dominance” narrative emerged in 1999 and was present 35 times in 
1999 and 2000. Similar to previous pillars, this narrative portrays U.S. tech firms as revolutionizing 
the way business is done. Tech start-ups, venture capital, and free global markets are viewed as the 
key enablers under this narrative, while over-reaching regulations and the uncertainty of future 
changes being key impediments.  
Step four also revealed 18 U.S. stock narratives
26
. Narratives negative in tonality were 
particularly common in the years 1987, 1988, 1989, and 1994. A narrative of “Stock Turbulence,” 
which was present 59 times, all the in years 1987 and 1988, is particularly negative and sees the U.S. 
markets as in the midst of a dramatic financial meltdown due to factors such as investor irrationality, 
program trading, and the federal deficit. Only strict regulations, expanded SEC power, tougher 
margin requirements, circuit breakers, and a balanced federal budget would ensure such a meltdown 
did not happen again.  
Present 13 times in 1989, a narrative of “Stock Volatility” notes that while the crash had passed, 
stocks remain extremely volatile and unpredictable, largely due to computer-driven program trading, 
leverage, and speculation. Increased regulation and computer capacity for exchanges are viewed as 
the two key enablers to prevent such volatility.  
Similar to “Shaken Economy,” a “Shaken Stocks” narrative, present 11 times in 1987, warns 
that investors are losing trust in the stock market, which was increasingly viewed as a rigged market 
where only insiders can profit. This rigged market is further impeded by a wave of very complex 
mergers and can only be saved by greater surveillance, tougher penalties, and prosecution of 
criminal behavior.  
As present in the previous pillar, a “Stock Decline” narrative, which was present only one time 
in the year 1990, sees stocks as declining in value due to tougher foreign competition (particularly 
the Japanese) and growing federal deficits, while long-term planning and better educational 
outcomes in math and science are viewed as key enabling factors.  
                                                 
26
 In this pillar, senators and witnesses often used the word “securities” instead of “stock” or “stocks.” In most cases, 
these speakers were referring to stocks or options sold on the major U.S. exchanges, but they were also sometimes 
referring to U.S. bonds, both government and corporate. Due to the high degree of overlap in these speeches, I coded 
any speech that referred to both stocks and bonds using the word “securities” as a stock narrative and coded any speech 
that referred exclusively to U.S. bonds as N/A for a stock narrative. This latter coding was extremely rare, with only a 
handful of occurrences.   
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A narrative of “Stock Abuse,” present seven times in the year 1994, notes that while the 
economy is relatively healthy, instances of stock manipulation and abuse are still widespread, most 
notably in mutual-to-stock conversions. Greed and lax regulations are seen as the primary culprits 
for these abuses.  
A “Stock Uncertainty” narrative, which occurred twice in the year 2000, was very uncertain 
over the near future of stock markets, stressing that while technological advancements and greater 
investor participation were driving stocks up, the rapid pace of change and higher interest rates 
made the future quite unpredictable.  
Similar to an “Economic Competitiveness” narrative, a “Stock Competitiveness” narrative, 
present only one time in the year 1996, stresses that U.S. exchanges are falling behind foreign 
exchanges due to out-dated, burdensome regulations. 
Somewhat less negative, the narratives of “Unfair Stocks” and “Stock Risk,” both present once 
in 1987, were very similar to their economic counterparts. A narrative of “Stock Myopia” became 
common in the year 1990 and was present four times in that year. This narrative sees U.S. investors 
as overly focused on the next quarter, while Japanese investors were much more patient, allowing 
Japanese corporations the time to better plan for the future.  
The only neutral narrative in this group was, again, a narrative of “Stock Cycles.” This narrative 
was present one time in the year 1994 and notes that markets are composed of recessions and 
recoveries and bull and bear markets. As a consequence, overly strict regulations during upturns can 
pose huge threats to corporate expansion during inevitable downturns.  
Similar to an “Economic Expansion” narrative, a “Stock Expansion” narrative was present early 
on, appearing 12 times in the year 1987. This narrative argues that U.S. exchanges and participants 
in U.S. securities markets need to be deregulated to keep up with foreign rivals, most notably the 
Europeans. Out-dated regulations such as Glass-Steagall are seen as burdensome, while 
deregulation is still noted as risky and thus requires appropriate safeguards and diversification 
measures.  
After the upheaval caused by the 1987 crash, speakers eventually observed a recovery in stock 
exchanges. A narrative of “Stock Recovery” thus emerged, and was present four times in the year 
1988. Expounders of this narrative stress that markets are actually quite healthy and that any 
overreaction by Congress, such as by imposing overly strict margin requirements or additional 
regulatory requirements, would only serve to frighten off returning investors and send stocks back 
into the doldrums.  
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Somewhat similar, a narrative of “Sound Stocks” stresses that U.S. markets are rather stable and 
still admired by the rest of the world. Piecemeal reforms, rash policies, and excessive deregulation 
are warned against, while carefully crafted, prudent policies and comprehensive reform are advised. 
A “Sound Stocks” narrative was present five times, all before 1993.  
The remaining four narratives were all very positive and were all mostly present in the years 
1996, 1999, and 2000. A narrative of “Stock Growth,” present seven times, lauds U.S. exchanges 
for the recent growth and vitality. Wall Street, great business minds, self-regulation, and venture 
capitalists are seen as the key enablers of such growth. On the other hand, Congress and its 
excessive red tape are noted as a key impediment to future success.  
A narrative of “Preeminent Stocks,” appearing 12 times, sees U.S. markets as the undisputable 
envy of the world. Tech companies, venture capital, mutual fund growth, and low taxes are viewed 
as key enablers, while out-dated SEC regulations are highlighted as key impediments.  
The final two narratives of “Stock Transformation” and “Soaring Stocks” were both extremely 
positive and optimistic and both noted that stock exchanges were now operating in a new economy 
driven by information technology.  
A “Stock Transformation” narrative, appearing 17 times, all in the years 1999 and 2000, sees 
huge efficiency gains as occurring in U.S. markets. These gains are achieved by technological 
advances, derivative products such as options and futures contracts, privatization, and the increased 
presence of retail investors. However, such a narrative warns that fear of change, market 
fragmentation, and regulatory arbitrage could prevent the U.S. from reaping extra gains from such a 
transformation.  
A “Soaring Stocks” narrative, which was present four times in 1987 (before the crash) and 17 
times in 1999 and 2000, took the euphoria a step further. This narrative, as present in previous 
pillars, focuses on the explosive growth in stock markets of late. Tech companies are seen as the 
primary enablers of such growth, but also factors such as increased competition, deregulation, and 
mutual fund growth are included. Key impediments to these soaring values include international 
competitors, excess investment fees, and out-dated regulations.  
Tables and figures for the tech company narratives and U.S. stock narratives are available on the 
following eight pages.  
 
  
 
 
Table 8.4  Tech company narratives (sampled Senate statements, 1987–2000) 
 
 
Narrative Object Destinator Key enabling forces Key impeding forces Selected quotations 
Technological 
Decline 
 
 
 
 
 Decline 
 Inferior to foreign 
competitors 
 Past U.S. 
dominance 
 Globalization 
 Recent slump 
 Innovation 
 R&D 
 Good policies 
 Education 
 Long-term planning 
 Foreign competitors 
 Predatory behavior of 
Japanese firms 
 Trade barriers 
 Inaction at Congress 
"For example, the U.S. semiconductor capital 
equipment, semiconductor, and computer 
industries are already in grave trouble, and are 
likely to suffer fatal damage over the next 
several years." 
-Ferguson, Sept. 14, 1990 
 
Technological 
Growth 
 
 
 
 Growth  Growing, healthy 
U.S. economy 
 Venture capital 
 Start-ups 
 Prudent policies 
 Low taxes 
 Greater savings 
 Burdensome regulation "It is my hope that these changes will encourage 
greater investment in companies and 
technologies like those which have emerged 
from the national labs in my home State. Start-
up, high-tech companies create jobs and allow 
us to compete in a growing global economy, and 
I hope that this new law will assist in the 
creation of the next Intel or Microsoft. 
-Domenici, June 5, 1996 
 
Technological 
Dominance 
 Dominance 
 Revolution 
 Strong economy 
and stock markets 
 Unprecedented 
technological 
advances 
 “New economy” 
 Globalization 
 IT companies 
 Start-ups 
 Venture capital 
 Free markets 
 Over-reaching 
regulations 
 Competitive change 
 Global competition 
"Let me begin by saying that the whirlwind of 
change driven by technology and globalization 
is dramatically changing the landscape of our 
markets, and how both individuals and 
institutions buy and sell securities." 
-Paulson, Feb. 29, 2000 
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Figure 8.8  Tech company narratives (by count), 
sampled Senate statements, 1987–2000 
 
 
Figure 8.9  Tech company narratives (by percentage), 
sampled Senate statements, 1987–2000 
 
Notes: Each of the 200 items sampled was categorized according to one, and only one, of the three narratives, 
except for 156 items that did not possess a full narrative and were coded as N/A.  
 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 
Technological Decline 
Technological Growth 
Technological Dominance 
N/A 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
90% 
100% 
1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 
Technological Decline 
Technological Growth 
Technological Dominance 
N/A 
  
 
 
Table 8.5  U.S. stock narratives (sampled Senate statements, 1987–2000) 
 
  
Narrative Object Destinator Key enabling forces Key impeding forces Selected quotations 
Stock 
Turbulence 
 
 
 
 
 Turbulence 
 Meltdown 
 Crash 
 Recent 500 point 
crash in Dow 
 Historically strong 
markets 
 Recent scandals 
 Margin requirements 
 Strict regulations 
 SEC power 
 Balanced budgets 
 Circuit breakers 
 Irrationality/greed 
 Technology 
 Federal deficit 
 Poor policy 
 Derivatives 
"But looking for a cause based on the 
fundamentals is bound to be insufficient. For 
such explanations try to account for an irrational 
occurrence in rational terms. The stock market 
crash was the product of excesses, not sober 
calculation." 
-Proxmire, Nov. 4, 1987 
 
Stock  
Volatility 
 
 
 Volatility  Recent crash and 
turbulence 
 U.S. with strong, 
liquid markets 
 
 Regulators/oversight 
 Computer capacity 
 Program trading 
 Foreign competition 
 Leverage/speculation 
 Deficits 
 
"But the markets need to be a stable bridge that 
links corporations in need of capital with 
investors…Frankly, I am worried that what 
Wall Street has constructed still looks more like 
a roller coaster than a stable bridge." 
-Heinz, Oct. 26, 1989 
 
Shaken  
Stocks 
 
 
 
 Losing confidence 
and trust 
 Insider game 
 Wall Street 
scandals 
 Historically strong 
markets 
 SEC power 
 Lawyers 
 Computers/technology 
 Penalties 
 Greed/lack of ethics 
 Complexity 
 Investment bankers 
 “Merger mania” 
"Increasingly, there is a perception that the 
markets are rigged and unfair." 
-Dodd, April 22, 1987 
 
Stock  
Decline 
 
 
 Decline  Global markets 
 Increased 
competition 
 Higher savings 
 Longer planning 
horizons 
 Education 
 Deficits 
 Regulatory barriers 
 Foreign competition 
"… concerns that have been expressed by many 
responsible Americans about the declining 
competitive state of our country's industrial, 
technological, and financial base." 
-Riegle, Sept. 14, 1990 
  
 
 
Table 8.5  U.S. stock narratives (sampled Senate statements, 1987–2000) (continued) 
 
  
Narrative Object Destinator Key enabling forces Key impeding forces Selected quotations 
Stock 
Abuse 
 
 
 
 
 Abuse 
 Manipulation 
 Abuse in mutual-
to-stock 
conversions 
 Relatively healthy 
U.S. economy 
 Prompt regulatory 
response 
 Process reform 
 Tougher standards 
 Greed 
 Lax regulations 
"But we believe that this year's gold model for 
chutzpah and greed perhaps ought to be 
awarded to the current gang of conversion 
artists at work on the Nation's mutual savings 
institutions." 
-Lewis, Feb. 25, 1994 
 
Stock 
Uncertainty 
 
 
 
 Uncertainty  Recent losses in 
stock markets 
 Information age 
 Productivity 
 Technological 
advancements 
 New investors 
 Raising interest rates 
 Rapid pace of change 
"…if these losses will affect the Fed's monetary 
policies…I am concerned that the Fed's 
economic models are truly not up to date. I do 
not believe they factor in the huge worker 
productivity we have experienced." 
-Bunning, April 13, 2000 
 
Stock 
Competitiveness 
 
 
 
 Staying 
competitive with 
foreign 
competition 
 More efficient 
 Global 
marketplace 
 Prudent policies 
 Improving efficiency 
 Out-dated, burdensome 
regulations 
"…it could be even a better bill and it could 
make our markets more efficient and more 
competitive in what is an increasingly global 
capital marketplace." 
-Saltzman, June 5, 1996 
 
Unfair  
Stocks 
 
 
 Investment only 
for the wealthy 
 Increased 
concentration of 
asset holdings 
 
 Fair laws  Fees on poorer 
households 
 Income inequality 
"Asset holdings in the United States are very 
concentrated, more highly concentrated than 
family income, according to studies conducted 
by the Federal Reserve Board." 
-Fox, Aug. 6, 1987 
  
 
 
Table 8.5  U.S. stock narratives (sampled Senate statements, 1987–2000) (continued) 
 
  
Narrative Object Destinator Key enabling forces Key impeding forces Selected quotations 
Stock 
Risk 
 
 
 
 
 Risk, risky 
changes 
 Increased 
deregulation and 
international 
competition 
 Prudent policies  Excessive linkages 
between banks and 
corporations 
 Collusion amongst big 
banks 
"…we should not create enormous monolithic 
financial organizations that could wield 
collusive and anticompetitive economic power 
and have a detrimental impact on the domestic 
market…" 
-Sasser, Oct. 13, 1987 
 
Stock  
Myopia 
 
 
 
 Myopia 
 Overly focused on 
near future/next 
quarter 
 Global markets 
 Past U.S. strength 
 Increased 
competition 
 Shareholder rights 
 Long-term planning 
 R&D 
 Patient capital 
 Institutional investors 
 Budget crisis 
 Low savings 
"The Japanese have given new definition to the 
term, patient capital. Some Japanese managers 
are basing their strategies on time horizons that 
stretch out over many decades." 
-Schacht, Sept. 14, 1990 
 
Stock  
Cycles 
 
 
 
 Cycles 
 Recessions and 
recoveries 
 Recent downturn  Well-functioning 
capital markets 
 Confidence 
 Prudent policies 
 Overly strict regulations "But the issue is this kind of legislation may 
look attractive in the background of what has 
happened in the last year and a half, but could 
be very unattractive at a time when capital is 
difficult to raise and when there might be broad 
needs for capital to be raised." 
-Carson, Feb. 25, 1994 
 
Stock 
Expansion 
 
 
 
 Expansion  Difficulty 
competing with 
foreign banks 
 Changing 
financial markets 
 Deregulation 
 Competition 
 Safeguards 
 Liquidity 
 Securitization 
 Foreign competition 
 Red tape 
 Burdensome regulation 
 Risks 
"…allowing bank holding companies to 
increase their participation in the securities 
market will ultimately benefit the consumer." 
-Karnes, Aug. 6, 1987 
  
 
 
Table 8.5  U.S. stock narratives (sampled Senate statements, 1987–2000) (continued) 
 
 
  
Narrative Object Destinator Key enabling forces Key impeding forces Selected quotations 
Stock 
Recovery 
 
 
 
 
 Recovery 
 Rebound 
 Recovery of 
stocks from 1987 
crash 
 Prudent policy 
 Mutual fund growth 
 Pension growth 
 Congressional/U.S. 
government action 
 
 Overreaction by 
Congress 
"There are monthly numbers on initial public 
offerings which are revealing which show a 
substantial recovery since late October." 
-Gould, May 24, 1988 
Sound  
Stocks 
 
 
 
 (Return to) 
Stability 
 Healthy banking 
sector 
 Calls for 
deregulation 
 Healthy banks 
 Efficiency 
 Prudent policies 
 Comprehensive reform 
 Deregulation 
 Conflicts of interest 
 Piecemeal reform 
 Rash policies 
"Our markets are the safest, soundest and most 
efficient in the world. It would be a shame to 
take unwarranted actions to shake investor 
confidence at this time." 
-D'Amato, March 31, 1988 
 
Stock  
Growth 
 
 
 
 Vitality 
 Great confidence 
 Large trading 
volume 
 High U.S. 
working/living 
conditions 
 Wall Street 
scandals 
 
 Wall Street 
 Great business minds 
 Self-regulation 
 Venture capital 
 Mutual fund growth 
 Congress/red tape 
 Greed/fraud 
 “Lack of scruples” 
 Tax burdens 
"…as financial planning continues to grow 
rapidly as a vital service to American families 
and small businesses, it is important to maintain 
uniform regulation on the State level." 
-Wechsler, June 5, 1996 
 
Preeminent 
Stocks 
 
 
 
 Envy of the world 
 Greatest capital 
markets 
 Solid economic 
growth 
 Record IPO 
offerings 
 Globalization 
 Technology 
 Venture capital 
 Prudent policy 
 Investor confidence 
 Foreign investment 
 Out-dated SEC 
regulations 
 Fraud 
"Furthermore, the American capital markets are 
the envy of the world and we shouldn't allow 
that to change. No other nation enjoys the 
international reputation of our capital 
markets..." 
-Dodd, June 5, 1996 
  
 
 
Table 8.5  U.S. stock narratives (sampled Senate statements, 1987–2000) (continued) 
 
 
  
Narrative Object Destinator Key enabling forces Key impeding forces Selected quotations 
Stock 
Transformation 
 
 
 
 
 Transformation of 
markets 
 Huge efficiency 
gains 
 Information age 
 New economy 
 Strong economic 
performance 
 Electronic markets 
 Technological advances 
 Privatization 
 Derivatives 
 Integrity 
 SEC oversight 
 Retail investors 
 
 Fear of change 
 Burdensome regulation 
 Market fragmentation 
 Conflicts of interest 
 Excess fees 
"…the announced plans by the New York Stock 
Exchange and The Nasdaq Stock Market to 
demutualize—which are the result of, among 
other things, innovations in technology. For 
over 200 years, the New York Stock Exchange 
has been an icon which has provided this Nation 
with a combination of a source of liquidity to 
which businesses can turn to get the resources 
they need to create jobs and grow, a place for 
Americans to invest with confidence, and a 
brand name which provides listed companies 
with a financial 'Good Housekeeping' seal of 
approval." 
-Grams, Sept. 28, 1999 
 
Soaring  
Stocks 
 
 
 Stock boom 
 Extraordinary rise 
 Explosive growth 
 New economy 
 Information age 
 Technological 
change 
 Strong, growing 
markets 
 Global investment 
environment 
 Tech companies 
 Mutual fund growth 
 Competition/free 
markets 
 International 
investment 
 Deregulation 
 Excess investment fees 
 International 
competition 
 Out-dated regulations 
"It is clear that the information age, which we 
are only on the edge of, is going to dramatically 
alter the way we sell equities in America. 
Because the value of equities is primarily 
related to knowledge, when people can have 
massive amounts of knowledge at almost zero 
cost, that is bound to have a profound impact on 
the equity markets of America and the world." 
-Gramm, Sept. 28, 1999 
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Figure 8.10  U.S. stock narratives (by count), sampled Senate statements, 1987–2000 
 
 
Figure 8.11  U.S. stock narratives (by %), sampled Senate statements, 1987–2000 
 
Note: The legend in Figure 8.10 also applies to Figure 8.11. 
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8.2 Institutional features 
In the regulative pillar, the fourth stage of analysis unveiled five interrelated means by which boom 
narratives were institutionalized and two reasons why efforts to deinstitutionalize boom narratives 
ultimately failed.  
Four of the five means of institutionalization were similar to those found in previous pillars, 
which were 1) the spread and repetition of boom narratives, 2) the transition of a boom narrative to 
destinator, 3) the opinions of experts, and 4) using unequivocal language. A new, fifth mean of 
institutionalization in this pillar was the practice of 5) market idolatry. These five categories are 
explained in detail below.  
8.2.1 The spread and repetition of boom narratives 
As exemplified in the previous section, particularly after 1996, a large variety of boom narratives 
emerged and spread at the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. First, 
looking at the U.S. economy narratives that emerged, narratives of “Economic Revival,” “Explosive 
Growth,” “Economic Leadership,” “Structural Shift,” and “New Economy” would all imply that 
investments in the U.S. economy would deliver significant returns for the foreseeable future, thus 
constituting boom narratives.  
From 1987 to 1996, these narratives were present in only six of the 155 statements, or less than 
four percent. All six of these instances were narratives of “Economic Revival” after the 1987 crash. 
However, in the years 1999 and 2000, the 45 statements consisted of 36 boom narratives, which is 
exactly 80 percent (with five of the remaining nine statements possessing no economic narrative at 
all).  
At the asset level, the tech narrative of “Technological Dominance” constitutes a boom narrative. 
This narrative was not present a single time before 1999. Then, in the years 1999 and 2000, it was 
present in 35 of the 45 statements, or nearly 78 percent. Concerning the U.S. stock markets, 
narratives of “Preeminent Stocks,” “Stock Transformation,” and “Soaring Stocks” would all qualify 
as boom narratives. Before 1996, these narratives were only present four times, all in the lead up to 
the 1987 crash. Then, from 1996 to 2000, these narratives were present 46 times in 65 statements, 
or nearly 71 percent.  
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Thus, overall, statements made at these U.S. Senate hearings underwent a dramatic shift from 
1987 to 2000. This shift from pessimism and skepticism to overwhelming optimism appeared at the 
highest level of U.S. government and at the very committee in charge of overseeing the country’s 
financial markets and banking system. As a result, such discourse acquired widespread legitimacy 
and became a taken-for-granted portrayal of the country’s investment environment. 
The data from this pillar also demonstrated rather vividly just how rapidly certain narratives and 
even language can spread amongst a well connected community. This phenomenon is best 
illustrated by the notion that the U.S. possessed the world’s “preeminent” stock markets. As 
explained above, from 1987 to 1994, many of the statements and narratives in this pillar were rather 
negative regarding the U.S. stock exchanges and U.S. companies. Circa 1996, however, most 
statements became rather positive. This included the claim that the United States now (once again) 
possessed the world’s preeminent markets, as stated by Senator Alfonse D’Amato on June 5, 1996: 
The Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996 is a significant piece of legislation that will ensure that 
the U.S. securities market remains the preeminent securities market in the world. 
The phrase “preeminent markets” or “market preeminence” then appeared numerous times in 
the sample, by a range of different speakers, including Senator Paul Sarbanes, Senator Chris Dodd, 
Richard Grasso (CEO of the NYSE), Henry Paulson (CEO of Goldman Sachs & Company), Philip 
Purcell (CEO of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Company), Allen Wheat (CEO of Credit Suisse 
First Boston), and Alan Greenspan (Chairman of the Federal Reserve). Below, I provide a select 
sample of seven such statements from these individuals (all emphases are added). 
Of course, we retain our preeminent position in the world in this regard. As a matter of fact, the Wall 
Street Journal reported not too long ago that German venture capitalists plan to take the German 
companies public on the U.S. market. (Sarbanes, June 5, 1996) 
It is vital to our economy that U.S. equity markets remain preeminent in the world. (Dodd, Sept. 28, 1999) 
I look forward to working with the Committee and the Commission to ensure America maintains its 
preeminent role in global capital markets. (Grasso, Feb. 29, 2000) 
We look forward to working with you and with those who directly regulate us to keep American markets 
the preeminent capital markets in the world. (Paulson, Feb. 29, 2000) 
…the time has come for us to reevaluate critically our major markets, the overall market structure and 
the regulatory structure to ensure that the U.S. maintains its global preeminence by offering investors the 
fairest and most technologically advanced, competitive and efficient markets—markets that are 
adaptable to changes spurred by the new economy. (Purcell, Feb. 29, 2000) 
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If the U.S. is to retain its role as the preeminent world equities market, then it will need to embrace and 
master the new trading technology. (Wheat, Feb. 29, 2000) 
Participants in our equity markets have succeeded in concentrating a great depth of liquidity that is the 
envy of other nations and a symbol of the United States as the world’s preeminent financial power. 
(Greenspan, April 13, 2000) 
The widespread agreement in these years that the U.S. possessed the world’s greatest financial 
markets worked towards further institutionalizing the idea that stocks were a great investment, 
particularly “new economy” stocks.  
8.2.2 Boom narrative destinator 
Similar to the previous two pillars, in the regulative pillar the theme of technology transitioned from 
being viewed in a negative and impeding manner, to being almost entirely ignored, to eventually 
being viewed as the underlying force and context by which a “new economy” was emerging and 
stock values were soaring.  
As discussed earlier in this chapter, at the beginning of the sample period, connotations of 
technology were initially mixed. While a few positive statements highlighted the technological 
progress of some U.S. companies and industries and the exchanges, statements became increasingly 
negative, particularly in the years 1989 and 1990. This negative transition was primarily due to two 
factors: 1) the (perceived) dangers of new, computer-driven program trading, and 2) the U.S. losing 
market share in high-tech industries to both Japan and Europe. 
Program trading, which is the simultaneous purchase and sale of a large number of stocks and 
futures contracts with the use of a computer program, was identified soon after the 1987 crash as 
one of the primary culprits of the calamity. In short, program trading was blamed for the excessive 
volatility because it allowed extremely large blocks of stocks to be traded almost instantaneously 
and thus allowed for increased speculation and arbitrage opportunities. The following quotes from 
Senators John Heinz, Richard Shelby, and Bob Graham exemplify this concern:  
What happened was an intersection of technology with new products—the technology being such things 
as direct order transfer program trading, the new products being the stock index futures contracts traded 
on the Chicago Mercantile—and we saw extensive volatility. (Heinz, Nov. 4, 1987) 
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Computers trade large blocks of stock in seconds. The New York Stock Exchange pulled the plug on 
program trading; many of my constituents would like the computers unplugged for good. (Shelby, Nov. 
4, 1987) 
Technology has allowed us to convert a capital’s market into a daily, 24-hour, worldwide casino. 
(Graham, Nov. 4, 1987) 
At this time, many, but not all, Senators worried that program trading and other related 
technological advances on the exchanges were creating a rigged, casino atmosphere that was 
scaring away the everyday retail investor, whose confidence was critical to the future of both the 
U.S. exchanges and the U.S. economy. Such fear was most poignantly described by Senator 
Alfonse D’Amato: 
I was away on vacation. My gosh, I was harassed by this little old lady at the most inopportune time. She 
said, are you who I think you are, and was grabbing my arm, and I was trying to do something else with 
my arm. And she kept saying, you have to stop it, you have to stop it. You have to stop that program 
trading; it is a terrible thing. And all night she harassed me. The next morning, believe it or not, I was out 
to take this taxicab and, my God, the same little old lady appeared. And she said, you better stop it, that 
program trading. (D’Amato, Feb. 2, 1988) 
In the early 1990s, while the concern over program trading faded, concern for U.S. tech 
industries was paramount, with numerous senators and experts warning that the U.S. was already 
significantly lagging Japan and Europe in both emerging technologies and basic research and 
development. Senator Donald Riegle and Donald Petersen (Chairman Emeritus of Ford Motor Co.) 
were two speakers with such concerns:  
This past spring, the Commerce Department released a report noting the United States was losing 
leadership in the electronic industry. It attributed this to the fact that other countries such as Japan had 
coordinated national policies to strengthen this industry, while we did not. In another report identifying 
12 important emerging technologies, the Commerce Department warned that current trends would soon 
leave us lagging behind Japan in all 12. (Riegle, Sept. 14, 1990) 
Many foreign competitors have been aggressively building up their research and development 
infrastructure over the past two decades while U.S. federal funding for university research plants and 
facilities has declined by 95 percent in real terms. (Petersen, Sept. 14, 1990) 
Such concern was voiced most starkly by witness Charles Ferguson, a consultant to U.S. high-
tech companies and investors: 
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…which make it increasingly clear that the United States is simply unprepared for the advent of the 
information age. If the United States continues on its present course, it would be no exaggeration to say 
that over the next twenty years, the U.S. will come to resemble an underdeveloped country such as 
Argentina more than it will resemble the most advanced economies in the world as exemplified by Japan, 
Germany, Singapore, and other nations. (Ferguson, Sept. 14, 1990) 
Interestingly, despite these grave concerns in 1990, the theme of technology was largely ignored 
in the sample until the year 1999. In a rare mention in the year 1996, though, a key shift occurred. 
In a speech by A.B. Krongard (Chairman of the Securities Industry Association and future 
Executive Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)), Krongard argues that technology is 
now the “driving force” behind U.S. growth and the strength of U.S. markets: 
Technology is the driving force of change and opportunity in the securities industry. Computers, 
modems, and sophisticated telecommunications systems have created previously unimaginable 
efficiencies and opportunities in the markets…Technology has helped our industry improve efficiency, 
handle increased volume, provide new products and services, and expand information gathering and 
storage capabilities. It has also greatly increased the choices for the financial services consumer. 
(Krongard, June 5, 1996) 
By 1999, numerous speakers observed that a technological revolution was underway, with the 
U.S. leading, and this revolution became the context in which a new economy and soaring stock 
values were possible. The following quotes by Senator Phil Gramm, Leopold Korins (CEO of the 
Securities Traders Association), Charles Schwab (Chairman of Charles Schwab and Company), and 
Allen Wheat reveal this markedly new and exciting portrayal of technology in the U.S.:  
It is clear that the information age, which we are only on the edge of, is going to dramatically alter the 
way we sell equities in America. Because the value of equities is primarily related to knowledge, when 
people can have massive amounts of knowledge at almost zero cost, that is bound to have a profound 
impact on the equity markets of America and the world. (Gramm, Sept. 28, 1999) 
Therefore, the fees deter capital from flowing to the entrepreneurial, high technology companies that 
have driven the new economy and the largest expansion in U.S. history. (Korins, Feb. 28, 2000) 
But technology is the great equalizer, and we saw an interesting thing happen with the growth and 
success of the Internet. Technology suddenly made the markets accessible to the average investor and 
gave them the tools they need to compete in the market. (Schwab, Feb. 29, 2000) 
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The U.S. is the center of the technological revolution that is a driving force behind many of these market 
changes. (Wheat, Feb. 29, 2000) 
Hence, by the years 1999 and 2000, technology had completed a dramatic shift from being a 
dangerous and gloomy topic to being the very impetus for the U.S.’s economic resurgence. Serving 
now as the context by which the economy and stock values were evaluated, the U.S.’s technological 
dominance became a taken-for-granted, institutionalized context by which investors would now 
make decisions.  
8.2.3 Expert opinion 
Similar to the previous two pillars, speakers in this pillar often referred to experts to support their 
claims. References to major news outlets such as The New York Times, Fortune, Forbes, The Wall 
Street Journal, The Economist, and The Washington Post were common, particularly earlier on in 
the sample.  
References to economists, professors, market regulators, and various government reports were 
also common, but much less so than media quotes. However, in contrast to previous pillars, these 
references played a minor role, and almost disappeared altogether, during the boom years of 1996 to 
2000.  
Where expert opinion did come to play a major role in this pillar was in the testimony of 
numerous expert witnesses, who are called upon by this committee to testify over matters of Senate 
debate, such as new legislation or important economic or banking events and reforms.  
In this regard, these witnesses have enormous power over discourse at the Senate, as they are 
viewed as market insiders who can help the Senate to better understand key issues and legislate 
effectively—and thus avoid unintended consequences of new policies.  
As seen in Table 8.6 on the next page, of the 79 witnesses in this sample, the majority came 
from the four groups of banking and securities (34 percent of the witnesses), SEC/CFTC (17 
percent), stock exchanges (12 percent), and other government, which included representatives of 
various states, cities, agencies, and task forces (11 percent).  
Outside of these groups and Alan Greenspan’s five appearances, other witnesses such as 
lawyers, professors, and consumer advocates received very few opportunities.  
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Table 8.6  Witness count by group (sampled Senate statements, 1987–2000) 
Group Count Group Count 
Banking/securities 27 Legal 2 
SEC/CFTC 14 Academic 2 
Stock exchanges 10 Consumer groups 2 
Other government 9 Real estate 2 
Federal Reserve 5 Tech industry 2 
Other private industry 3 Church affiliation 1 
 
 
As already shown in this chapter, statements by all speakers became increasingly positive in the 
late 1990s. In the years 1999 and 2000, when boom narratives flourished, expert witnesses 
accounted for 27 of the 45 statements, or 60 percent.  
As such, the boom narratives expounded during these years acquired even greater legitimacy, 
for these experts had a very powerful microphone and a very important audience—that being the 
U.S. Senate and the political media in the room. Such power gave these experts the ability to 
influence both federal legislation and public opinion. 
Examples of boom narratives and extremely positive discourse provided by these experts are 
numerous, as exemplified in Table 8.7 on the next page. Below, I provide a short excerpt from a 
speech by Bradley Skolnik, President of the North American Securities Administrators, Inc. In this 
excerpt, Mr. Skolnik lauds the explosive growth in stock markets, just weeks after the NASDAQ 
suffered a 10 percent drop and a few months before the exchange would begin its 80 percent freefall: 
Tens of millions of Main Street investors—the numbers are growing every week—are investing 
their hard-earned savings and pensions in the markets. (Skolnik, May 8, 2000) 
8.2.4 Unequivocal language 
As seen in the cognitive pillar, the use of unequivocal language was also prevalent at the U.S. 
Senate. Such language was particularly prevalent during the boom years of 1996 to 2000. 
Consequently, the boom narratives that circulated during these years exuded great confidence and 
certainty. As such language was pervasive at the U.S. Senate, this confidence was then 
institutionalized as it became common discourse during the late 1990s. 
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Table 8.7  Examples of expert opinion (sampled Senate statements, 1987–2000) 
Narrative Expert Selected quotation 
Technological 
Dominance 
 
Philip Purcell, 
CEO, Morgan 
Stanley Dean 
Witter & Co. 
 
"The record trading volumes the U.S. markets have 
been experiencing reflect the quality and variety of 
financial services in this country and the ever-evolving 
technology used to deliver these services." 
-Purcell, Feb. 29, 2000 
 
New Economy 
 
 
 
Charles Schwab, 
Chairman, 
Charles Schwab 
& Co. 
 
"To some it's market fragmentation. I prefer to call it 
market democracy. It's a new democracy that's 
furiously creating fresh opportunities for investors and 
entrepreneurs." 
-Schwab, Feb. 29, 2000 
 
Economic 
Leadership 
 
 
Robert Seijas, 
Executive Vice 
President, Fleet 
Specialists 
 
"Our specialists are at the heart of the auction market 
of the world's most active stock exchange." 
-Seijas, Feb. 28, 2000 
Explosive 
Growth 
Keith Helsby, 
Senior Vice 
President, 
NYSE  
"Specifically, market activity has greatly increased to 
a level unforeseen in 1996...At the end of 1996, the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average was 6,448. At the end 
of 1999, the Dow was 11,497. This represents an 
increase of 78%."  
-Helsby, Feb. 28, 2000 
 
Preeminent 
Stocks 
 
 
Frank Zarb, 
CEO, National 
Association of 
Securities 
Dealers, Inc.  
 
"One thing that we both feel very strongly about is the 
need to keep the United States of America's capital 
markets the center of the universe with respect to 
global financial exchanges." 
-Zarb, Sept. 28, 1999 
Stock 
Transformation 
 
Arthur Levitt, 
Chairman, SEC 
"At this critical point in the evolution of our markets, I 
remain solidly optimistic about the future." 
-Levitt, Feb. 29, 2000 
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As can be seen in Section 8.2.1, this language is easily exemplified in narratives that saw the 
U.S. as possessing the world’s “preeminent” markets. From 1996 to 2000, numerous speeches 
included similar rhetoric, leaving little doubt that—despite the crash, volatility, abuse, manipulation, 
fraud, and uncertainty prevalent in the late 1980s and early 1990s—the U.S. once again possessed 
the world’s safest and greatest financial markets (all emphases are added): 
The U.S. financial markets continue to be the best in the world, due in no small part to the regulatory 
system which makes them the safest in the world. (Harris, June 5, 1996) 
…the United States continues to maintain its reputation as having the highest quality securities markets 
in the world, the one which best protects investors. (Sarbanes, Sept. 28, 1999) 
Our markets are the most efficient and the most trusted. We have to maintain both. (Schumer, Sept. 28, 
1999) 
For over two centuries the United States has boasted the largest, most liquid and well regulated 
securities markets in the world. (Purcell, Feb. 29, 2000) 
They [financial markets] are important to working Americans because half of all Americans own equities, 
either directly or indirectly, and because the fact that we have the best capital market in the world means 
we also have the best working conditions and the highest living standards in the world. (Grams, May 8, 
2000) 
While the European exchanges were occasionally praised for their technological improvements 
and widespread deregulation (almost always in statements urging further deregulation of the U.S. 
exchanges), such unequivocal praise for U.S. markets dominated discourse during these years. 
Table 8.8 on the following page provides further examples of how speakers used unequivocal 
language in their statements.  
8.2.5 Market idolatry 
The last means of institutionalization present in this pillar is somewhat similar to the use of 
unequivocal language but, in a sense, takes the assumed greatness of U.S. markets and exchanges 
even one step further. This last means is called market idolatry, which can be defined as the 
expression of immoderate praise and trust in the markets similar to that of a person worshipping a 
god or deity. 
 
  
Chapter 8: The Tech Bubble’s Regulative Pillar 
 
173 
 
Table 8.8  Examples of unequivocal language (sampled Senate statements, 1987–2000) 
Narrative Selected quotation 
Preeminent Stocks "I can only imagine that Americans today are more investment literate 
than at any time in history, and some of the protections that might have 
been appropriate in an earlier era were felt by us to be too stringent…" 
-Levitt, June 5, 1996 
 
Technological 
Dominance 
 
 
 
"Let there be no doubt—technology has been our partner, not our 
adversary, making possible the explosive growth we have witnessed over 
the past 10 years and presenting the exchange with the opportunity for 
further growth as the clock ticks out on the 20th century." 
-Grasso, Sept. 28, 1999 
 
Soaring Stocks 
 
"I don't think there has ever been a better period in our history for 
investors." 
-Schwab, Feb. 29, 2000 
 
Stock 
Transformation 
"America is always the dominant country in providing the markets that 
raise capital." 
-Gramm, Feb. 29, 2000 
Note: all emphases are added 
 
An initial expression of market idolatry can be seen in claims that the U.S. possessed the 
world’s preeminent, safest, most efficient, and most liquid markets. In this vein, many speakers 
noted that U.S. markets were now the “envy of the world” as all other nations sought to emulate the 
design of U.S. exchanges and financial markets (all emphases are added): 
Furthermore, the American capital markets are the envy of the world and we shouldn’t allow that to 
change. No other nation enjoys the international reputation of our capital markets… (Dodd, June 5, 1996) 
Due in part to rigorous oversight, U.S. markets have become the deepest, most liquid, and most fair. In 
short, they are the envy of the world. (Schumer, April 13, 2000) 
Our securities markets are the envy of the world because they are fair, transparent and well-regulated. 
(Skolnik, May 8, 2000) 
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While such discourse of world envy represents excessive praise and trust in markets, 
particularly just before their steep fall, other rhetoric at the U.S. Senate expressed an even stronger 
form of praise as speakers expounded a form of deep respect for and even reverence towards U.S. 
markets and exchanges. Such reverence is most explicitly voiced by Chairman of the Committee 
Senator Philip Gramm in the year 2000: 
I never come to Wall Street, I never come to the financial markets in New York City, that I don’t [sic] 
become acutely aware that this is the nerve center of American capitalism. And knowing what capitalism 
has meant to America and the world, to me this is a holy place. (Gramm, Feb. 29, 2000, emphasis added) 
Such idolatry was rather common in the late 1990s, as speakers often commented that the U.S. 
capital markets were the nation’s “greatest asset” and that the major exchanges should be given 
their “proper respect.” As a result, market regulators and executives, such as Alan Greenspan and 
the heads of the major exchanges, were seemingly omniscient and could do no wrong. Table 8.9 on 
the following page provides examples of such rhetoric. 
This unadulterated respect and trust in the markets was rather surprising, especially considering 
how negative the rhetoric was in the late 1980s and early 1990s. For example, Philip Purcell’s quote 
on the following page of a confidence from individual investors being “nurtured over many decades” 
contrasts sharply with that of Senator John Heinz in 1988: 
…small investors taking their cash, their savings, and investing it in the market, those people have said, 
"Hell, no, I’m not going to go. I’m going to keep my money someplace else," but the last place they are 
putting it is in the equities markets. (Heinz, May 24, 1988) 
Speakers at the U.S. Senate expressing forms of market idolatry has very real and immediate 
regulative and legislative effects. That is to say, if the markets can do no wrong and if market 
executives know more than the regulators, then the best regulatory approach is a hands-off approach. 
Going one step further, legislators eventually argued that regulations should always add value to the 
markets, and never constrain them.  
These sentiments are expressed in the following quotes from SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt and 
Banking Committee Chairman Philip Gramm: 
This truth defines our [SEC’s] mandate: Ensuring that competitive forces continue to shape our 
marketplace so that the market’s natural genius is permitted to fully unfold. (Levitt, Feb. 29, 2000) 
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Table 8.9  Examples of market idolatry (sampled Senate statements, 1987–2000) 
Speaker Selected quotation 
Senator  
Bob Bennett 
"Both of you [Richard Grasso and Frank Zarb, CEOs of the NYSE and 
NASDAQ, respectively] represent institutions that are national treasures and 
tremendous forces internationally. We talk about how things should be done 
in the future, we should remember that we are dealing with that kind of an 
asset here, and we should give it the proper respect." 
-Bennett, Sept. 28, 1999 
 
Senator  
Philip Gramm 
(Committee Chair) 
 
 
 
"Our greatest economic asset is our capital markets." 
-Gramm, Feb. 29, 2000 
 
"Today, we are doing something that this Committee, that the Congress and 
the Nation often does, and that is call on the expertise of Chairman 
Greenspan. I guess it is obvious that Chairman Greenspan has become a 
national asset—and not just in doing his job at the Federal Reserve, but in 
being the Nation's teacher and adviser on these kinds of issues."  
-Gramm, April 13, 2000 
 
Philip Purcell, CEO, 
Morgan Stanley 
Dean Witter & Co. 
 
"Indeed, the increasing rate of individual investor participation in the equity 
markets, whether directly or through mutual and pension funds, indicates the 
confidence investors have in the integrity of our markets, a confidence 
nurtured over many decades."  
-Purcell, Feb. 29, 2000 
 
Senator  
Rodney Grams 
"For over 200 years, the New York Stock Exchange has been an icon which 
has provided this Nation with a combination of a source of liquidity to which 
businesses can turn to get the resources they need to create jobs and grow, a 
place for Americans to invest with confidence, and a brand name which 
provides listed companies with a financial 'Good Housekeeping' seal of 
approval."  
-Grams, Sept. 28, 1999  
Note: all emphases are added 
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Finally, with a competitive world market, where we could lose our preeminence in financial markets, it is 
imperative that we go back and look at every regulation and every law that governs our financial markets 
and that we then apply what I would call a value-enhancing test. That test is: does this regulation, does 
this law, add more value to our markets than it adds costs? (Gramm, Feb. 29, 2000) 
The practice of market idolatry and the other four means of institutionalization explained in this 
chapter also partially explain the failure of efforts to deinstitutionalize the boom narratives of the 
late 1990s. In addition, this stage of analysis also revealed two specific reasons why boom 
narratives could not be deinstitutionalized: 1) an almost complete lack of texts attempting to 
challenge the boom narratives of the period, placing skeptical or negative texts in a very small 
minority, and 2) the few texts that were skeptical were mostly in reaction to initial market falls. 
These two reasons are explained in detail below. 
8.2.6 Minority status 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, while texts from this pillar were rather negative in their 
tonality and narratives from 1987 to 1994, a dramatic shift occurred circa 1995, resulting in texts 
from 1996 to 2000 being overwhelmingly positive.  
Consequently, of the 65 texts from 1996 to 2000: 1) not one possessed a strictly negative 
connotation of the U.S. economy, U.S. companies, or technology; 2) only three possessed a slightly 
negative narrative concerning the U.S. economy (“Economic Uncertainty” once in 1996 and then 
once in 2000 and “Economic Competitiveness” once in 1996); 3) not one possessed a negative 
technology narrative; and 4) only three possessed a slightly negative narrative concerning U.S. 
stocks (“Stock Competitiveness” once in 1996 and “Stock Uncertainty” twice in 2000). That results 
in a total of six slightly negative narratives from 1996 to 2000, compared with 117 boom narratives 
from these years—placing these negative or skeptical narratives in a very, very small minority.  
A closer look at the negative narratives from 1996 reveals that they still possessed many 
positive elements. Moreover, these two speeches both occurred in June of 1996, which would be at 
just the very beginning of the boom in stock prices. Thus, these speeches would hardly constitute a 
challenge to the ensuing boom narratives of this period. To exemplify, below is an excerpt from 
Senator Duncan Faircloth’s speech, in which he expounded an “Economic Uncertainty” narrative. 
Despite his concerns over economic matters, though, he remains solidly optimistic about 
investments in the stock market and expounds a “Stock Growth” narrative in the same speech: 
Further, I think a majority of Americans are trying to save more because they have less confidence that 
Social Security will be there for them when they retire. Also, the stability of company pension plans is 
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questionable, so Americans are trying to save for themselves by investing in the stock market. (Faircloth, 
June 5, 1996) 
Paul Saltzman, Senior Vice President of the Public Securities Association, gave a speech 
expounding themes of stock and economic competitiveness at the same hearing. However, as seen 
below, this speech is also somewhat positive, and is largely an effort to persuade Congress to reduce 
regulatory fees and other burdens on U.S. stock transactions: 
A continuously evolving system of regulation is vital to maintaining the efficiency of the U.S. securities 
markets. The continued ability of public and private securities issuers in the United States to raise capital 
cheaply and efficiently will help ensure that our economy remains competitive. (Saltzman, June 5, 1996) 
Hence, aside from these moderately negative statements, from 1996 until the initial market drop 
of April 2000—the period in which stock prices soared to unprecedented levels—this sample did 
not include a single speech expounding a skeptical or pessimistic assessment of the U.S. economy 
or U.S. stocks. This was somewhat surprising considering how many senators were quick to label 
the run-up in stock prices in the late 1980s as an “irrational bubble” fueled by greed and 
manipulation. Even the possibility of such factors being at play in the late 1990s went entirely 
unmentioned in this sample. Only Alan Greenspan, on April 13, 2000, noted that: “Since 1996, for 
example, price-earnings ratios of NYSE stocks have risen by half.” But he did not suggest at all that 
this rise could be the sign of a bubble. Rather, he saw it as further proof that the U.S. markets were 
the envy of the world.  
8.2.7 Reactionary discourse 
The remaining two speeches that possessed slightly negative narratives, both of uncertainty in the 
year 2000, were in reaction to the steep falls on the NASDAQ in April of 2000. Senators James 
Bunning and Rodney Grams were the only two speakers to comment on such losses: 
I also would like to hear from Chairman Greenspan about the recent losses in the securities markets. 
Specifically, I would like to know if he believes these losses have changed his views about the “wealth 
effect.” I would like to know if these losses have him concerned about the overall state of our economy. 
(Bunning, April 13, 2000) 
Last week, the Nasdaq experienced its highest volume and most volatile intraday trading in history. 
(Grams, April 13, 2000) 
As these two statements occurred after the peak in stock prices, they could do little to prevent 
the large crash ahead. Also somewhat revealing, despite observing the “most volatile intraday 
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trading in history,” Senator Grams goes on to expound a “Sound Economy” narrative in the same 
statement: 
Given the combination and the combined impact of a sound economy, many new investors entering the 
market, and the astonishing impact which technological improvements have made on the securities 
markets, I have no reason to believe that the pace of change is going to slow down. (Grams, April 13, 
2000) 
It seems at this point that even the most volatile trading day in history could do little to counter 
the prevailing narratives of soaring stock prices, U.S. technological dominance, and a thriving, 
“new” economy.  
8.3 Summary  
In summation, the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs—one of the 
nation’s most powerful sources of regulative authority—gave heightened attention to the topics of 
stocks, markets, and equities just before (and after) the 1987 crash and the bursting of the tech 
bubble circa 1999 and 2000. Somewhat amazingly, their connotation of the U.S. economy shifted 
from almost 100 percent negative to nearly 100 percent positive within that period, with narratives 
transitioning from themes of crisis, abuse, and decline to themes of leadership, explosive growth, 
and a new economy. Similarly, the U.S. tech base shifted from being viewed as in a state of rapid 
decline to being viewed as a dominant global force. 
At the peak of the tech bubble, these boom narratives were legitimized at one of the highest 
levels of government discourse. Five factors were identified in this regard, those being the spread 
and repetition of these narratives, the use of one boom narrative (technological dominance) to 
support another (new economy), the use of expert opinion, unequivocal language, and market 
idolatry. During the market run-up, speakers at this committee expounded very few narratives that 
attempted to challenge the status-quo, and the few that did were mostly in reaction to initial market 
falls. Hence, the U.S. Senate, one of the nation’s peak regulatory bodies, made almost no attempt to 
deinstitutionalize the euphoria behind the tech bubble.          
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CHAPTER 9: SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
This chapter includes a summary and further analysis of the findings presented in Chapters 5 
through 8. This chapter is divided into three parts.  
First, on the following three pages in Tables 9.1 and 9.2, I provide a summary of the three 
pillars and a timeline of the tech bubble’s event history and narrative analysis. These tables are 
designed to provide a brief overview of the core findings from the previous four chapters. They also 
allow for some preliminary comparisons. 
Second, in Section 9.1 below, I construct the process story (Langley, 1999, p. 695) of the tech 
bubble’s boom narratives. This story is constructed from the totality of my data and, aside from 
providing a concise, chronological summary of my findings, clarifies the sequences and 
relationships of my data. In this story, sequences and relationships allow me to explore the linkages 
between narratives and events (Pettigrew, 1990). While this stage of analysis provides a broad 
overview of my findings, it still remains highly contextualized in the tech boom of the 1990s. Thus, 
this stage of analysis—while achieving greater parsimony— remains high in accuracy but still low 
in generality (Weick, 1979).  
Drawing on this process story, in Section 9.2 I arrive at a set of overarching conclusions of how 
the tech bubble’s boom narratives were institutionalized and why efforts to deinstitutionalize these 
narratives ultimately failed. This section thus outlines the key empirical insights and contributions 
of my study. These empirical insights then serve as the foundation of a narrative theory of asset 
bubble formation, which is described in detail in Chapter 10.  
9.1 The process story of the tech bubble’s boom narratives  
Below, I construct the process story of the tech bubble’s boom narratives, as seen through the 
totality of my empirical data. This process story is divided into five sections, as seen in Table 9.2, of 
two and three-year intervals. As noted above, this story is designed to be concise and focus on the 
interrelationships between narratives and events. As such, this story focuses on the major themes 
and trends of the data, as opposed to the detailed counts and individual sources presented in 
Chapters 5 through 8. 
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Table 9.1 Summary of three pillars 
Aspect Cognitive pillar Normative pillar Regulative pillar 
Attention to stock(s) 
(in title) 
 
None Frequent throughout, 
surge in 1990s 
Surges in 1987/1988 and 
1999/2000 
Attention to equity       
(-ies) (securities)     
(in title) 
 
Very rare Common throughout Surges in 1987/1988 and 
1999/2000 
Attention to market(s) 
(in title) 
 
Frequent throughout Frequent throughout, 
surge in 1990s 
Surges in 1987/1988 and 
1999/2000 
Attention to technology  
(-ies, -ical) (in title) 
 
Frequent starting in 1995 Dramatic surge in 1990s Very rare 
Attention to 
innovation(s) 
(in title) 
 
Common starting in 1995 Common throughout None 
Attention to new 
economy (in title) 
 
Only common in 1998 
and 2000 
Common starting in mid 
1990s 
None 
Connotation of U.S. 
economy/companies 
 
 
Transition from negative 
to mixed (1994) to 
positive (1997) 
Transition from 
mixed/negative to 
positive (1993) 
Transition from negative 
to mixed (1992) to 
positive (1996) 
U.S. economy/company 
narrative 
 
 
 
Transition from narrative 
of competition, to 
stability, to growth, to 
structural shift, to new 
economy, to transition 
Transition from 
narratives of decline, 
uncertainty, and 
competitiveness to 
growth, leadership, and 
new economy 
 
Transition from 
narratives of crisis, 
decline, and abuse to 
expansion and growth to 
leadership and new 
economy 
Connotation of 
technology/innovation 
 
 
Transition from no 
connotation to mixed 
(1994) to positive (1996) 
Transition from positive 
to positive/mixed (1992) 
to positive/neg. (1997) 
 
Transition from 
mixed/negative to 
ignored (1992) to 
positive (1996) 
 
Tech company narrative 
 
 
 
 
Transition from no 
narrative to one of 
dominance (1996) to 
uncertainty and shakeup 
(2000) 
 
Transition from no/mixed 
narrative to mostly 
growth (1994) and 
dominance (1995) 
Transition from decline 
to growth (1996) to 
dominance (1999)  
U.S. stock narrative 
 
 
 
Transition from no 
narrative to one of 
soaring stocks (1998) to 
sustainable stocks (2000) 
Transition from no/mixed 
narrative to mix of 
negative/positive 
narratives (1995) 
Transition from negative 
narratives to growth, 
preeminence, and soaring 
stocks (1996) 
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Table 9.1 Summary of three pillars (continued) 
Aspect Cognitive pillar Normative pillar Regulative pillar 
Methods of 
institutionalization 
 
 
 
 
 Spread and repetition 
of boom narratives 
(approx. 50% of 
speeches from 1995 to 
2000) 
 Boom narrative 
destinator  
(“Structural Shift” 
narrative transitions to 
destinator) 
 Unequivocal language 
(especially by 
Chairman Alan 
Greenspan) 
 Rationalizing 
conflicting evidence 
(lack of output growth, 
SE Asia crisis, and 
absence of tech boom 
in Europe/Japan) 
 Expert references 
(primarily economists 
and BLS studies) 
 
 Spread and repetition 
of boom narratives   
(52 counts in 73 
articles from 1994 to 
2000) 
 Boom narrative 
destinator 
(“Technological 
Dominance” serves as 
destinator) 
 Emotional triggers 
(envy and fear (mainly 
the fear of missing 
out)) 
 Rationalizing 
conflicting evidence 
(sky-high P/E ratios, 
falling stock prices, and 
some analysts ignoring 
the tech sector) 
 Expert references 
(broad array, numerous 
analysts and bankers) 
 Carefully selected 
historical data 
 
 Spread and repetition 
of boom narratives 
(117 counts in 65 
statements from 1996 
to 2000) 
 Boom narrative 
destinator 
(“Technological 
Dominance” serves as 
destinator) 
 Unequivocal language 
(world’s “safest” and 
“greatest” financial 
markets) 
 Market idolatry 
(markets as “envy of 
the world,” “holy 
place,” “nation’s 
greatest asset,” and 
“icons”) 
 Expert opinion   
(mainly from banking, 
SEC/CFTC, exchanges, 
and government) 
Reasons for failed 
deinstitutionalization 
 
 
 
 
 Minority status of 
negative discourse (one 
negative connotation of 
U.S. economy from 
1996 to 2000) 
 Reactionary discourse 
(new, pessimistic 
narratives emerged 
after influx of negative 
news) 
 Minority status of 
negative discourse (one 
negative connotation of 
U.S. economy from 
1995 to 2000) 
 Discrediting skeptics 
(referred to as “losers” 
and “Chicken Little”) 
 Minority status of 
negative discourse (no 
negative connotation of 
U.S. economy from 
1996 to 2000) 
 Reactionary discourse 
(two narratives of 
uncertainty after 
market falls in April) 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 9.2  Timeline of tech bubble event history and narrative analysis 
 
 
Event 
history 
 
 
 Markets crash (1987) 
 Fall of Berlin Wall 
 Fed raises rates to 9% 
 Hostile takeovers/LBOs 
 401(k) emergence 
 Brief recession 
 Soviet Union dissolved 
 Fed lowers rates to 3% 
 Union membership falls 
 401(k)’s double 
 Stocks up 50% (1990–95) 
 Fed raises rates to 6% 
 Inflation/unemploy. fall 
 Mutual funds common 
 Internet/PC sales take off 
 Int’l crises (1997–1998) 
 Fed lowers rates to 5% 
 Telecom deregulated 
 CEO pay/options soar 
 Derivatives/SPVs spread 
 Stocks peak 
 Fed raises rates to 6% 
 Glass-Steagall repealed 
 Venture capital growth 
 Day traders/financial news 
 
 
 
Cognitive 
pillar 
 
 
 
 Negative connotation of 
U.S. economy 
 Narrative of 
competitiveness and then 
stability 
 No connotation of 
technology or innovation 
 No tech narrative 
 Various connotations of 
U.S. economy 
 Narrative of growth 
 No connotation of 
technology or innovation 
 No tech narrative 
 Mixed connotation of U.S. 
economy 
 Narrative of growth 
 Mixed connotation of 
technology and innovation 
 No tech narrative 
 Positive connotation of 
U.S. economy 
 Narrative of structural shift 
 Positive connotation of 
technology and innovation 
 Narrative of technological 
dominance 
 Narrative of soaring stocks 
 Positive connotation of 
U.S. economy 
 Narrative of new economy 
and then transition 
 Positive connotation of 
technology and innovation 
 Narrative of technological 
uncertainty and shakeup 
 
 
 
Normative 
pillar 
 
 
 
 Mixed connotation of U.S. 
economy 
 Narratives of 
competitiveness, decline, 
and growth 
 Positive tech connotation 
 Few/negative tech and 
stock narratives 
 
 Negative/mixed 
connotation of U.S. 
economy 
 Narratives of decline and 
cycles 
 Positive/mixed tech conn. 
 Narratives of technological 
growth and revival 
 Few stock narratives 
 Mostly positive 
connotation of U.S. 
economy 
 Narratives of growth and 
new economy 
 Positive tech connotation 
 Narratives of technological 
growth and dominance 
 Various stock narratives 
 Positive connotation of 
U.S. economy 
 Narratives of growth and 
new economy 
 Various tech connotations 
 Narratives of technological 
growth and dominance 
 Skeptical stock narratives 
 Positive connotation of 
U.S. economy 
 Narratives of new 
economy and leadership 
 Various tech connotations 
 Narrative of technological 
dominance 
 Narrative of soaring stocks 
 
 
 
Regulative 
pillar 
 
 
 
 Negative connotation of 
U.S. economy 
 Narrative of expansion, 
then crisis 
 Increasingly negative tech 
connotation 
 No tech narrative, stock 
turbulence 
 
 Negative connotation of 
U.S. economy 
 Narratives of decline, then 
uncertainty 
 Negative tech connotation 
 Narrative of tech decline 
 Narratives of stock myopia 
and sound stocks 
 Mixed connotation of U.S. 
economy 
 Narrative of abuse 
 Tech ignored 
 No tech narrative 
 Narrative of stock abuse 
 Positive connotation of 
U.S. economy 
 Narrative of growth 
 Tech mostly ignored, but 
positive when mentioned 
 Narrative of tech growth 
 Narratives of stock growth 
and preeminence 
 Positive connotation of 
U.S. economy 
 Narratives of leadership 
and new economy 
 Positive tech connotation 
 Tech dominance 
 Transformation and 
soaring stocks 
Year 1987–1989 1990–1992 1993–1995 1996–1998 1999–2000 
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9.1.1 The story of 1987–1989 
As my data started in the year 1987, the year in which worldwide markets crashed and the Dow 
plummeted 22 percent in one day, it is no surprise that the discourse and narratives of this year were 
particularly negative. However, even before the crash, skeptical narratives emerged at the U.S. 
Senate that saw the U.S. markets as rigged and unfair amidst a Wall Street culture of greed and 
“merger mania.” Such narratives coincided with the wild spread of hostile takeovers and LBOs.  
After the crash, attention to the stock markets surged at the Senate, both media sources, and the 
Federal Reserve. During this surge of attention, all three sources expounded an extremely negative 
view of the U.S. economy. Negative narratives of economic crisis, economic decline, stock 
turbulence, stock uncertainty, and the need for economic competitiveness and stability (as seen in 
Japan) dominated discourse. While narratives at the three sources were similar in their tonality, 
prescriptions for economic growth and recovery were fundamentally different. Media sources and 
Reserve officials agreed that U.S. companies were overregulated and thus saw deregulation and 
lower taxes as key enablers in a recovery. In contrast, U.S. Senators argued that individual investors 
were leaving the markets in droves, a trend that required stricter regulations and tougher margin 
requirements to restore confidence. 
By 1989, however, fears of a full-blown financial crisis were allayed and the negative discourse 
subsided—allowing the Fed to raise rates from seven to nine percent. While the connotation of the 
U.S. economy and companies was still somewhat negative at the Senate, attention to markets, 
securities, and stocks dropped off dramatically at all three sources. When mentioned, speakers 
frequently expounded the narrative that U.S. companies needed to expand internationally, requiring 
the government to remove any regulations impeding such a process. 
What was particularly interesting in the late 1980s was the discourse surrounding technology 
and innovation. In general, very little attention was given to technology and tech companies, but 
when speakers did raise the subject, they frequently expounded rather negative views of U.S. tech 
companies and recent innovations.  
As highlighted in Chapter 8, computer-driven program trading was repeatedly lambasted for its 
role in stock volatility, particularly at the U.S. Senate. In addition, by 1989, both the Senate and the 
media sources expounded narratives of U.S. technological decline, citing how the U.S. was losing 
market share (to the “predatory” Japanese) in numerous critical tech sectors such as TVs, computers, 
and semiconductors. As a result, tech investments were often viewed as “high risk and low reward.”  
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9.1.2 The story of 1990–1992 
In 1990, as the U.S. economy slowly slipped into a recession, attention to stock markets, tech 
companies, and innovation was low at all three sources. When mentioned, however, all three 
sources expounded a rather negative view of both the U.S. economy and U.S. tech companies. This 
negativity was strongest at the U.S. Senate and the media, as they viewed the U.S. in a state of 
severe economic decline where the country and its myopic investors were quickly losing its 
competitive edge to the leader of “patient capital,” the Japanese.  
Speakers frequently stressed that U.S. companies needed to innovate to keep up with foreign 
competitors and that without rapid improvements in its technological base, the U.S. would start to 
resemble an “underdeveloped country.” While the Fed started to expound a narrative of economic 
growth, Reserve officials noted that deregulation and improved innovation were the keys to future 
success. Combined with a decline in GDP, such rhetoric compelled the Fed to start lowering interest 
rates.  
In the media, negative sentiments of the U.S. economy continued into 1991, where journalists 
and interviewees gave increased attention to the tepid growth in stock prices, the lack of skilled 
labor available for U.S. corporations, and—despite recent moves by the Fed—the high interest rates 
preventing economic expansion. At the same time, though, discourse at the media and the Fed 
shifted somewhat in this year. Due to the success stories of companies such as Intel and Sun 
Microsystems, a few media articles started to expound narratives of technological growth and 
revival, marking the beginning of boom narratives in tech companies in the sampled texts. Over at 
the Fed, with the fall of communist regimes in Germany and the Soviet Union, alongside the 
continued decline in union membership in the U.S., Greenspan was now able to declare the 
superiority of market-based economic systems. 
A bit of optimism continued into 1992, as media articles shifted to a narrative of economic 
competitiveness, albeit while bemoaning the high labor costs faced by U.S. corporations, and many 
U.S. Senators viewed the markets as a sound investment environment (and in turn argued that 
stricter regulations were unnecessary). However, all three sources shared in the view that the U.S. 
economic recovery was subpar and that the future was still very uncertain. Accordingly, the threat 
of a “triple dip recession” still loomed large. This perceived threat resulted in Greenspan and the 
Fed embarking on a series of further cuts, with rates tumbling from nine percent in 1990 to three 
percent in 1992, the lowest they had been in 30 years. Perhaps somewhat ironically, these cuts 
impelled U.S. citizens to take money out of long-term, secure investments in CDs and move it into 
the stock markets, a trend that was only just getting started.   
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9.1.3 The story of 1993–1995 
In 1993, attention to stock markets, technology, and innovation remained extremely low at both the 
Fed and the U.S. Senate—with almost no mention of a “new economy.” In contrast, the media 
sources continued to give increased attention to stock markets, equities, and, especially, technology. 
While unemployment and inflation were dropping, a trend that would continue throughout the 
decade, media articles gave a mixed portrayal of the economy. Several journalists shifted from a 
narrative of economic competitiveness to one of growth, but many were quick to point out that 
economic investment was riddled with problems, with “illiquid” real estate and long-term bonds 
still being viewed as risky options.  
Such a lack of alternatives seemingly left stocks as the only real place to earn a fair return, with 
a few articles expounding a narrative of stock bargains. However, not all shared this view, with 
other articles already noting the euphoria in stock markets and claiming that current P/E ratios were 
unsustainable. After stocks continued to climb, though, these “bearish prognosticators” and their 
short-selling counterparts were, at times, branded as “the big losers” and “Chicken Littles” of the 
year.  
While stock markets received increased media attention at this time, tech stocks did not. The 
media did comment that mergers were now more strategic and often conducted for entry into the 
telecommunications and high-tech industries, but tech’s overall connotation remained mixed. The 
World Wide Web was now becoming a frequent media topic, and in turn PC sales and internet 
usage started to take off.  
As the economy was still on the rebound in 1994, the SEC found it difficult to regulate options 
reporting. The U.S. Senate held hearings on the economic and stock abuse in which insiders 
profited from numerous mutual-to-stock conversions, but Senators were hopeful of the recent bull 
market. Over at the Fed, the dangers of financial innovation were still given some attention, but 
only fleeting at this point.  
At the two media sources, 1994 represented a landmark year as discourse underwent a 
remarkable shift. Suddenly, there was a surge in attention to the “new economy” and texts became 
increasingly positive about the state of economic affairs. As 1993 provided good returns on the 
markets and Japan was now in the midst of an unprecedented economic slump, articles now 
frequently expounded a narrative of economic leadership, where the U.S. was now reclaiming its 
role as technological leader of the world. Such an assumption led to a marked surge in boom 
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narratives in this year, including numerous instances of a “new economy” narrative and a 
technological dominance narrative.  
The “new economy” narrative saw the U.S. as experiencing a profound technological shift, a 
shift that would result in numerous businesses and even entire industries changing for good. New 
skills would be needed, new business models would be necessary, e-networks would eliminate the 
inefficiencies endemic in big bureaucratic corporations, and tech-savvy entrepreneurs would be the 
biggest beneficiaries. The U.S.’s technological dominance made digitized information the “lingua 
franca” of the time, and stock options and risk-taking venture capitalists were key enablers of such a 
transition. As some of these lucky entrepreneurs and venture capitalists were already making 
fortunes on IPOs, the media was quick to report on this newfound wealth—fueling amazement and 
envy in the public. Some journalists were even criticizing the nation’s youth for spending four years 
in college learning obsolete skills and “wasteful” knowledge such as found in the classics, all when 
they could have been jumping on the road to high-tech riches. Amid such optimism, the Fed was 
able to raise rates, causing markets to slip. But this slip was extremely short-lived.  
This almost unbounded optimism continued in the media into 1995. Attention to technology 
surged again, and the U.S. economy was viewed in an almost exclusively positive manner, marking 
a full-scale turnaround from the negativity of four years prior. Narratives of economic growth, 
economic leadership, a “new economy,” and technological dominance dominated discourse. Adding 
to the legitimacy of such narratives, numerous references such as to tech executives and elite 
business school professors offered expert support to the media’s rhetoric. While a few narratives of 
economic/stock decline, economic/stock cycles, and technological competitiveness were present, 
these represented minor parts of the overall discourse. Many of these negative narratives were in 
fear that the Fed would keep raising rates into the next millennium, a fate that would not come to be 
until the year 2000. 
Adding further fuel to the growing tech mania, the Federal Reserve now suddenly gave 
increased attention to the themes of technology and innovation. While officials were wary of 
inflation, they became optimistic that technology could contain the stress it added to financial 
markets and propel the U.S. economy towards further growth. Concluding that the recession was 
now long past, the Fed opined that U.S. financial markets were “undoubtedly far more efficient than 
ever before.”  
Both retail and institutional investors took note of this restored confidence in financial markets. 
Over the five-year period to 1995, 401(k) investment doubled, with all major stock exchanges 
experiencing 50 percent gains.  
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9.1.4 The story of 1996–1998 
1996 represented a landmark year at all three sources. At the Federal Reserve, attention to 
technology and innovation soared. Officials lauded the “five year economic recovery,” and 
connotations of the U.S. economy became increasingly positive. Amid such optimism, numerous 
boom narratives emerged. Greenspan now declared that the U.S. had officially entered a period of 
structural shift, in which the economy was undergoing a radical economic transformation that 
would result in higher living standards for all U.S. citizens. This “rare, once-in-a-century event” 
was enabled by unprecedented technological advancements, risk-taking venture capitalists, and the 
government’s recent efforts at deregulation. 
The tonality surrounding technology and innovation was also extremely positive at the Fed, 
resulting in the emergence of a technological dominance narrative. One small problem with such a 
narrative was that the U.S. economy had yet to show any statistical evidence of an increase in 
output or efficiency from this alleged technological shift. Greenspan easily rationalized this 
problem, however, by explaining that such improvements would “take time” and offered the expert 
support of elite university professors to legitimize such a claim.  
Over at the U.S. Senate, a similar shift in discourse occurred, as connotations of the U.S. 
economy became increasingly positive. A narrative of economic growth became common, and 
Senators viewed the tech industry as the primary driver of such growth. Tech companies were 
admired for creating new, cutting-edge jobs that paid higher wages and required greater investment 
in R&D. For this reason, the Senate vehemently argued for, and passed, legislation enabling venture 
capitalists to raise new sources of capital for high-tech startups. 
At this time, U.S. Senators also became fixated on the U.S. stock markets and their continued 
growth. In almost universal agreement, Senators noted that U.S. markets held a preeminent position 
in the world. Due to the success of tech companies and venture capitalists, these markets were now 
“the envy of the world,” “the safest in the world,” and, clearly, “the best in the world.” SEC 
Chairman Arthur Levitt testified that Americans were now “more investment literate than at any 
time in history” and thus argued they required less protection in their financial decision-making. 
In the media sources, attention remained high for technology, innovation, stock markets, and 
equities. In general, journalists and interviewees expressed positive views of the growing U.S. 
economy, as narratives of technological dominance continued to spread. Thus, across the board, the 
three pillars of institutional reality presented glowing reviews of the U.S. economy. Investors, 
submerged in this discursive context, now started to place bigger bets on future market gains, with 
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the Dow, S&P 500, and NASDAQ all shifting toward steeper hikes by the end of the year. An 
extremely low rate of inflation (assisted by the Boskin Commission), allowed the Fed to lower rates 
to five percent, further fueling the beginnings of a market frenzy. Large corporations competed for 
executives by offering larger and larger pay packages, with many companies using financial 
innovations in derivatives and SPVs to (at times, illegally) further boost share prices.  
Not all discourse from this year was positive though. While the Fed and U.S. Senate possessed 
almost exclusively positive assessments of the economy and stock markets, several media articles 
started to question the soaring IPO valuations and gains of start-up tech companies (often with very 
little revenue backing up such valuations). Tech was given a mixed assessment in these articles, 
with several journalists commenting on the “loony goings-on in tech.” These journalists criticized 
companies for engaging in copycat behavior and posting unsustainable growth rates in their profits. 
Many warned of a slowdown ahead. Concerning the stock market, skeptical views were now 
widespread. A growing majority of articles expounded narratives of stock euphoria, warning of an 
imminent stock shakeup. These articles frequently pointed at rookie mutual fund managers, new 
investors, and untrustworthy analysts as touting an unfounded “faith” in tech stocks. 
Surprisingly, in 1997, such skeptical narratives in the media started to dissipate. While tech still 
received a mixed view, narratives concerning the U.S. economy became very positive. Boom 
narratives of economic leadership and a “new economy” abounded. In response to the skepticism of 
some journalists, articles started to contend that recent market gains were not signs of a mania but 
were, in fact, justified. Expert references to bankers, analysts, consultants, and tech executives 
helped to legitimize the claim that valuations were justified on the basis that tech companies still 
had high growth projections and record sales levels. As markets did not fall off a cliff, skeptics were 
discredited, and experts warned that “avoiding the market remains a risk.” 
Over at the Fed, despite Greenspan’s questioning of “irrational exuberance” in late 1996, 
discourse became almost exclusively positive concerning the U.S. economy and technology. A 
structural shift narrative was now dominant, as Greenspan commented that it was “no surprise” that 
tech companies had high stock market valuations. While economic statistics had still yet to show 
signs of marked improvement, Greenspan promised, with the aid of similar expert references, that 
“the truly significant increases in living standards” lie ahead.  
Investors believed him. While 1997 witnessed a brief drop in tech stocks, overall gains 
continued almost unabated. Mutual funds continued their meteoric growth, and deregulation by 
Congress allowed the telecommunications industry to embark on an unprecedented borrowing binge. 
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With now almost unboundedly positive discourse supporting the tech revolution, the tech bubble 
entered its wildest years. 
In 1998, as the SE Asia crisis reached is climax and panic spread to Russia and Latin America, 
stocks dropped off. Around the same time, the CFTC proposed to probe the regulation of new 
financial derivatives, which remained poorly understood by most of the general public, including 
large parts of the investment community. Such events could have spelled the end of a very brief one 
or two-year tech bubble. But that was not to be the case. Greenspan responded to the crisis by 
lowering rates—the origin of the “Greenspan Put”—and, with the help of Robert Rubin, 
successfully shelved the CFTC’s proposal. Also, in spite of the economic chaos across the globe, 
economic discourse in the U.S. became even more positive. 
Increased positivity was apparent at both the Fed and the media. At the Fed, Greenspan and his 
fellow officials praised the “new economy” and highlighted its eventual effects on altering 
production, trade, and the delivery of most goods and services. Greenspan justified soaring stock 
prices on the higher productivity of tech companies, which were able to keep costs (and thus 
inflation, enabling his rate cut) low. Greenspan quickly rationalized the SE Asia crisis as the result 
of excessive central planning, meaning capitalist forces had no part to play. 
At the media sources, skeptical or negative narratives all but disappeared. Boom narratives, in 
contrast, took over. Expert references in the media, often tech investors and analysts, claimed that 
the recent dips in tech stocks were merely signs of profit-taking by institutional investors and thus 
tech stocks represented “bargain” deals. These experts warned that many investors were “seriously 
underweighted in technology stocks,” while warnings of euphoria and shakeup went entirely absent 
from the sample. Such rationalizations were well received, and by the end of 1998, venture 
capitalists, hedge funds, and mutual funds were pouring money into the tech sector with reckless 
abandon, resulting in extraordinary IPO valuations and gains in this year.  
 9.1.5 The story of 1999–2000 
In 1999, discourse at the U.S. Senate underwent a dramatic shift. In this year, the U.S. Senate gave 
increased attention to stock markets and spoke with almost unadulterated positivity about the U.S. 
economy. Amid such optimism, economic boom narratives proliferated. While the narrative of a 
“new economy” started to spread, one of economic leadership became equally popular. In this 
narrative, the U.S. was now (once again) the worldwide economic leader, and this leadership was 
driven primarily by the rejuvenated tech sector. Such narratives were not only expounded by 
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Senators but also by numerous expert witnesses, many of whom represented the banking and 
securities industries and the major stock exchanges. 
At the same time, Senators and witnesses viewed technology in a very positive manner, with 
Senators recognizing the “unprecedented” technological advances of the past few years. As a result, 
a technological dominance narrative emerged and spread rapidly. Optimism over the tech sector 
also led to optimism over the stock markets. Narratives of soaring stocks and a stock transformation 
took over. A stock transformation narrative saw new, privatized markets powered by IT 
representing the “most efficient and the most trusted” markets in the world. Senator Philip Gramm, 
Chair of the Committee at the time, summed up the soaring stock narrative best when he opined: 
Because the value of equities is primarily related to knowledge, when people can have massive amounts 
of knowledge at almost zero cost, that is bound to have a profound impact on the equity markets of 
America and the world. 
Amid this optimism, Congress saw no reason to clamp down on conflicts of interest at 
investment banks and consulting firms and thus stifled an attempt by the SEC to further regulate 
these industries. Sticking to their continued efforts at deregulation, Glass-Steagall was finally 
repealed.  
Similarly, over at the Federal Reserve, attention to the markets and technology soared, with 
Reserve officials granting a very positive assessment of U.S. economic affairs. A structural shift 
narrative was now widely accepted and became the context by which a “new economy” narrative 
was able to dominate discourse. The adoption of a structural shift narrative was further legitimized 
by references to research by economists that revealed how two-thirds of the nation’s productivity 
gains since 1995 were due to high technology. During this year, only one sampled speech presented 
a negative view of the U.S. economy, that of Alice Rivlin, who possessed far less influence and 
power than the continuously optimistic Chairman, Alan Greenspan. While Lawrence Meyer also 
warned of potential bank risks, neither of these two dissenters questioned the tech boom narratives 
of the time. 
At the media sources, positive connotations of the U.S. economy continued, with boom 
narratives of a “new economy” and economic leadership taking over. While a few articles noted the 
increased frequency of IPO busts, a technological dominance narrative was still in the majority. 
This narrative was further institutionalized by various experts, such as investment bankers and 
analysts, who claimed that the Internet was “truly a dramatic life-changing event”—thus justifying 
the sky-high valuations of tech companies. 
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While the media regained its skepticism of stock valuations, the euphoria surrounding tech 
companies and the riches being made was hard to ignore. In the sample, stories of newly made tech 
billionaires such as Jim Clark were ubiquitous. Stories of non-profits even benefitting from the tech 
boom, in order to fund their operations, were reported without a trace of caution. And once again, 
“bearish prognosticators” were discredited. 
Thus, overall, in the year 1999, attention to markets and tech companies soared and boom 
narratives proliferated with great legitimacy at all three pillars of institutionalization. Despite sky-
high P/E ratios, investors could not escape their institutional, discursive reality. In response, 
investors doubled-down. Margin debt soared, share turnover reached unprecedented levels, and 
household savings collapsed to historic lows. As CNBC-addicted day traders grew in numbers, 
stocks soared higher each month, with the NASDAQ doubling within a year.  
Fueled by their accurate predictions of years past, all three sources became even more positive 
in early 2000. The media sources saw another surge in attention to stock markets, technology, and 
the “new economy.” Connotations remain positive, and narratives of a “new economy” and 
technological dominance are present in the vast majority of articles. Surprisingly, articles skeptical 
of recent stock gains now account for a very small minority, and narratives of soaring stock 
valuations gain traction. Moreover, articles report almost exclusively positive data and statistics 
concerning U.S. stock markets. Topics such as historically high P/E ratios, the volatility and 
bubbles of the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the continued falls in stocks over in tech-heavy Japan 
are almost completely ignored. As a result, readers are left with the impression that stocks 
seemingly always go up and represent a rather safe, even risk-free investment at this time.  
Attention to markets and securities also surges at the U.S Senate, where Senators and witnesses 
continue to expound very positive views of the economy. For example, in February of 2000, witness 
Charles Schwab opined, “I don’t think there has ever been a better period in our history for 
investors.” Narratives of a “new economy,” structural shift, and explosive growth spread. A 
narrative of technological dominance is now ubiquitous at the Senate, while Senators continue to 
lambast numerous “over-reaching regulations.”  
Witnesses at the U.S. Senate continue to voice narratives of booming stock prices, without a 
mention of the bubbles or market manipulation of a decade ago. Even SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt 
was thoroughly confident of continued economic growth, claiming in February, “At this point in the 
evolution of our markets, I remain solidly optimistic about the future.” Going a step further, 
numerous speakers expressed feelings of deep reverence towards the stock markets, with Wall 
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Street now referred to as a “holy place” and Alan Greenspan introduced as the “Nation’s teacher 
and adviser.” Senators concluded that these idolized assets were in no need of any further regulation. 
Over at the Fed, attention to technology, innovation, and the “new economy” doubles, while 
officials express an exclusively positive connotation of the U.S. economy. In May, Roger Ferguson 
comments that “even the most optimistic of forecasters could not have anticipated such a favorable 
confluence of economic events.” Almost every sampled speech at this time revealed a “new 
economy” narrative. The “new economy” was now heavily institutionalized at the Federal Reserve, 
as officials noted the economy was “profoundly different” from previous business cycles and that 
information technology had “almost certainly” pushed out the point at which scale diseconomies 
take hold. In response to why the tech-savvy Japanese were not experiencing a similar tech boom, 
Greenspan quickly rationalized that Japan’s, and Europe’s, inflexible labor laws prevented them 
from benefitting from recent advances in IT. 
With the economy in good shape, Greenspan became concerned that the tech boom was going to 
result in wage inflation and decided to raise rates to six percent in March. Before such time, he 
expressed some concerns of a stock bubble but concluded that it was impossible to tell and that 
“history will judge” if a bubble exists. Almost instantly, history came to fruition. Within a month, 
stocks tumbled, with the NASDAQ dropping 10 percent on one day alone. Hedge funds and mutual 
funds, knowing that markets were thinly stretched, decided to abandon ship and quickly became 
aggressive sellers of tech stocks.  
Near the end of the year 2000, Reserve officials started to comment on the recent drops. Roger 
Ferguson noted that it was becoming difficult to turn a profit in the tech sector. In December, 
Greenspan forecasted a transition to “more modest rates of growth” as tech supply had clearly 
outstripped demand. Greenspan remained calm, though, and ensured his audience that “to be sure, 
our current circumstances are in no way comparable to those of 1998.” 
These reactionary comments were still far too optimistic. The aggressive selling by institutional 
investors continued almost unabated, and over the next two years U.S. markets experienced an 
unprecedented collapse, with the NASDAQ losing 80 percent of its value.  
9.2 Overarching conclusions from empirical data 
Drawing on the process story outlined above, in this section I arrive at a set of overarching 
conclusions of how the tech bubble’s boom narratives were institutionalized and why efforts to 
deinstitutionalize these narratives ultimately failed. These conclusions thus represent the major 
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empirical insights and contributions of this study. As in the previous section, these conclusions 
remain highly contextualized in the tech boom of the 1990s. In the next chapter, these insights serve 
as the foundation of a narrative theory of asset bubble formation.  
Based on the findings of this study, I reached eight overarching and interrelated empirical 
conclusions. These include five conclusions as to how the boom narratives of the 1990s were 
institutionalized and three conclusions as to why efforts at deinstitutionalization ultimately failed. 
Concerning the former, boom narratives became institutionalized during the late 1990s through: 1) 
the full alignment of narratives at the three institutional pillars just before and during the market 
run-up, creating an inescapably optimistic context in which investors made decisions; 2) the one-
sided narratives at the (reputedly) more prudent cognitive and regulative sources; 3) the transition 
from negative to mixed to positive discourse and narratives; 4) the emergence of a broader narrative 
of a technological, structural shift, which became the context by which a “new economy” and 
various soaring stock narratives made sense; and 5) the reliance on numerous alternatives to 
detailed, fundamental analysis, which included the use of unequivocal language, emotional triggers, 
rationalizations of conflicting evidence, expert references, carefully selected historical data, and 
market idolatry. 
Concerning the latter, efforts at deinstitutionalizing these narratives failed because 1) despite 
some early skepticism from normative texts, negative narratives comprised a very small minority of 
discourse just before and during the market run-up; 2) these early skeptics were, at times, 
discredited and disparaged as the markets climbed higher; and 3) the most skeptical narratives 
emerged after markets peaked, thereby only further fueling the steep falls ahead.  
Below, I explain each of these eight overarching conclusions.  
9.2.1 Full alignment of institutional pillars 
From 1987 to 1993, texts from all three pillars expounded a rather negative portrayal of the U.S. 
economy and U.S. companies. Concurrently, technology and U.S. tech companies were largely 
ignored, but when they were mentioned, they were frequently used as examples of the U.S.’s 
economic decline. During these years, speakers warned that unless the U.S. improved its 
technological base, the country would likely continue in its slump and potentially fall far behind the 
technological leaders of Japan and Germany, for instance.  
The years 1994 and 1995 saw the emergence of quite a few boom narratives, mostly at the 
media sources. However, during these years, attention to stock markets and technology remained 
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low at the U.S. Senate, while Reserve officials remained somewhat cautious in their economic 
assessments. 
The year 1996, however, truly represented a landmark year in the sampled data. All three 
sources were now producing a clear majority of positive texts, with boom narratives starting to 
dominate discourse. Narratives of a structural shift, a “new economy,” technological dominance, 
soaring stocks, and stock preeminence took over. While a few media texts remained critical of stock 
valuations, these texts comprised a very small minority of the sample data from this year, a point 
that will be further elaborated upon in Section 9.2.6.  
Thus in the year 1996, the three sources were fully aligned in their promulgation of boom 
narratives and increasingly positive economic forecasts. As such, the discursive, institutional 
context was inescapably optimistic for investors in this year, providing a well-defined and well-
structured social reality that foresaw continued gains for the U.S. economy and U.S. (tech) 
companies. Investors responded to such optimism, with the following year of 1997 being the year 
stocks took off. From 1997 to early 2000, the three sources not only remained aligned but they also 
continued to produce texts of increasing optimism—matching the historic rise in stock valuations 
and P/E ratios. 
The data counts supporting this trend were remarkably one-sided. Collectively, from 1987 to 
1993, the three pillars produced a total count of only 13 boom narratives. By 1996, boom narratives 
proliferated. From the cognitive pillar, 26 of the 42 sampled speeches from the years 1996 to 2000 
included at least one boom narrative, producing a total of 37 boom narratives in those speeches. 
From the normative pillar, from 1994 to 2000, 73 articles produced 52 counts of a boom narrative. 
From the regulative pillar, in just the two years 1999 and 2000, 45 statements resulted in 36 
economic boom narratives and 35 technological boom narratives. From 1996 to 2000, the regulative 
pillar produced 46 stock boom narratives in just 65 statements. While the texts from each pillar 
differed in content, style, and length, they all shared the same overwhelmingly optimistic portrayals 
of the U.S. economy, U.S. tech companies, and U.S. stock markets in the latter half of the decade. 
As noted in Chapter 4, these sources represent the highest level of institutional discourse for 
each respective pillar. The U.S. Federal Reserve, the U.S. Senate, The New York Times, and 
Fortune magazine were (and still are) extremely well-trusted and powerful sources of institutional 
dialogue—for both investors and non-investors. Their collective production of almost exclusively 
positive economic texts from 1996 to early 2000 thus demonstrates the full alignment of the 
institutional pillars during these manic years. 
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9.2.2 One-sided discourse at cognitive and regulative sources 
As noted above, from 1994 to 2000, normative media texts expounded a large number of boom 
narratives, placing these narratives and the positive discourse surrounding them in the majority. 
However, normative texts also revealed some degree of balance in the discourse and narratives 
produced.  
This balance was largely achieved through the media’s U.S. stock narratives. As early as 1993, 
the media sample produced texts skeptical of recent stock gains, expounding a stock euphoria 
narrative. Then, from 1995 to 1997, the vast majority of stock narratives produced were ones of 
stock euphoria, stock cycles, stock shakeup, or stock decline, leaving narratives of soaring stocks, 
stock bargains, and stock growth in the minority. Overall, from 1994 to 2000, the media texts 
produced 50 percent more negative or skeptical stock narratives than the boom narrative of soaring 
stocks. 
Such balance could not be found, though, in the cognitive and regulative texts, where narratives 
and the discourse surrounding these narratives became one-sidedly positive in the latter half of the 
decade. From the cognitive pillar, the 42 speeches from 1996 to 2000 resulted in only one negative 
connotation of the U.S. economy, only three negative or skeptical economic narratives, not a single 
negative connotation of U.S. tech companies, and only three negative or skeptical stock narratives 
(both after initial market falls). In the regulative texts, such negativity proved even more elusive. 
From 1996 to 2000, 65 texts produced not a single strictly negative connotation of the U.S. 
economy or U.S. tech companies, only three slightly negative economic narratives, and only three 
slightly negative stock narratives. Combined with the continued promulgation of boom narratives, 
as was highlighted in the section above, discourse at the cognitive and regulative sources was 
surprisingly one-sided in its optimistic assessments and forecasts during these boom years.  
What makes this one-sided discourse so surprising is that the cognitive and regulative pillars 
represent (at least reputedly) more prudent sources of economic discourse. While the media and 
other normative texts (such as informal conversations, meetings, and blogs) are often blamed for 
hyping various investments, cognitive and regulative texts (such as research publications, textbooks, 
and government speeches) are usually thought to promote more rational and conservative discourse. 
Thus, as in this sample, when these more cautious sources of economic discourse become 
increasingly one-sided in their narratives, even the more skeptical of investors (the type perhaps less 
interested in what CNBC talk show hosts say) become submerged in an overwhelmingly optimistic 
institutional environment.  
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9.2.3 Transition from negative to mixed to positive narratives 
As detailed in Section 9.1, from 1987 to 2000, the discourse and narratives produced at the three 
pillars transitioned from negative to mixed to positive tonalities. For each phase, the narratives 
produced had a very strong alignment with the actions of those with market power, which 
ultimately influenced everyday retail investors in several direct and indirect ways.  
The negative phase of discourse started in 1987, the year markets crashed, and continued 
throughout the recession until the year 1992. During these years, narratives of competitiveness, 
decline, and crisis dominated economic discourse, while most speakers ignored the tech sector and 
voiced concerns over stock turbulence and myopia. At the Fed, newly-in-charge Greenspan 
responded in line with these negative sentiments by cutting interest rates several times, down from 
nine percent in 1990 to three percent in 1992, a dramatic cut that resulted in rates reaching their 
lowest levels in 30 years. This large cut, as intended, had the immediate impact of influencing 
investors to take money out of long-term deposits and move it into riskier investments. With real 
estate mostly ignored or regarded as dangerously “illiquid,” investors responded by moving money 
into stocks.  
As the U.S. economy recovered and markets started to climb, 1993 to 1995 represented a period 
of mixed discourse. Narratives of economic and technological growth emerged, but many texts 
remained skeptical of recent stock gains and the continued international expansion of U.S. 
companies. These economic conditions convinced most U.S. Senators that the U.S. was once again 
a sound investment environment (and thus the strict regulations advocated after the 1987 crash were 
not necessary) and that U.S. companies needed government assistance in order to compete 
internationally (and thus further deregulation was necessary). In response, over the next few years, 
the U.S. Senate would embark on numerous deregulatory campaigns, such as passing legislation 
that helped venture capitalists raise new sources of capital for tech start-ups (which, as already 
portrayed in the media, were the drivers of the U.S.’s economic revival) and the deregulation of the 
telecommunications industry. A potential feedback loop emerged here, where a mixed economic 
outlook led to efforts at deregulation. Such deregulation encouraged immediate investment (and 
speculation), raising asset values and economic indicators, which in turn convinced Senators that 
deregulation was working. 
As interest rates remained relatively low and deregulation took effect, stocks started to take off, 
marking the beginning of a period of positive discourse from 1996 to 2000. During this time, the 
vast majority of narratives viewed the tech sector (not low interest rates or deregulation) as the 
primary driver of economic and stock growth. With loose credit, decreasing regulation, and the 
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control over large pools of savings from retail investors, institutional investors such as mutual funds, 
hedge funds, and investment banks started to place big bets on tech stocks. During this period, a 
very powerful feedback loop emerged for stock investments. That is, as boom narratives spread, 
large institutional investors and a growing number of day traders poured (increasingly borrowed) 
money into U.S. stocks, particularly tech stocks. This flood of investment caused those stocks to 
immediately spike, which further supported the prevailing boom narratives and allowed market 
bulls to continue discrediting the skeptics of years past.  
Equally important at this time, very few texts were skeptical of the market run-up, particularly 
at the Federal Reserve or U.S. Senate. As such, neither the Federal Reserve nor the U.S. Senate saw 
any need to prick a bubble, for, in their view, one did not even exist.  
This laissez-faire approach enabled speculation to continue for a few years, until a rate hike in 
2000 caused markets to slip. After this slip, skeptical discourse emerged, and savvy institutional 
investors pushed the investment loop in the opposite direction, as negative discourse can also fuel 
market selling, which in turn can fuel negative discourse.  
9.2.4 Context of structural, technological shift 
As in the overall discourse over the sample period, at all three pillars, the theme of technology 
underwent a remarkable transition in just the ten years from 1987 to 1997. At the beginning of the 
sample period, texts from all three pillars lamented the decline of U.S. tech companies. Once 
viewed as the leaders in producing and exporting new technologies, the U.S. was now quickly 
falling far behind the Japanese and Germans. Making matters worse, technology was viewed as (at 
least partially) responsible for the extreme volatility on the once-steady but now-mercurial U.S. 
stock exchanges. 
By the year 1993, however, such discourse quickly subsided and technology was now either 
ignored by most sources or viewed in a rather favorable manner—often as a solution to the 
problems it created. Especially in the media sample, texts started to note the rising fortunes made in 
the telecommunications and computer networking sectors. 
Just a few years later, by 1996, technology became the main discussion point, and narratives of 
technological dominance and a concomitant structural, economic shift abounded. U.S. tech 
companies and their regained international prowess were now viewed as the driver of economic 
growth and expansion, swiftly pulling the U.S. out of recession and into a new and exciting future 
marketplace. A key finding from my sample is that this technological dominance and once-in-a-
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century economic shift went largely unquestioned and unchallenged, especially during the market 
run-up of 1997 to early 2000. 
With this remarkable technological shift as the now taken-for-granted context in which U.S. 
companies operated, narratives of a “new economy,” economic leadership, explosive growth, stock 
transformation, and soaring stock valuations proliferated. Important here is that these narratives 
only made sense in the context of a technological shift. In other words, if the U.S. was not regaining 
its technological prowess and the endless stream of internet start-ups did not represent the future of 
commerce, then soaring P/E ratios and a new and exciting e-network economy would be hard to 
justify. However, such a debate never emerged. U.S. tech companies were creating the future 
marketplace, and everyone wanted a seat on the ride. The only debate that did take place during 
these boom years was by how much would stocks continue to rise and who would get the largest 
share of the spoils. 
9.2.5 Alternatives to detailed, fundamental analysis 
As explained in Chapter 2, the tech boom of the 1990s presented investors with a situation of great 
uncertainty. Widespread innovations in computing and information technology gave rise to a host of 
new organizations and services. Similar to the widespread adoption of automobile and radio 
technologies, it was difficult to use past examples as a template or guide as to how business would 
change and, more importantly, how such changes would affect living standards and the market 
valuations of the ever-growing number of start-up firms.  
In the sample, numerous texts acknowledged this uncertainty, and very few even feigned an 
attempt at using detailed, fundamental analysis to support the claim that a “new economy” was 
emerging and thus skyrocketing P/E ratios were justified. Instead, texts from all three pillars relied 
on a range of “alternatives” to fundamental analysis in support of their boom narrative claims. 
These alternatives included the use of unequivocal language, emotional triggers, rationalizations of 
conflicting evidence, expert references, carefully selected historical data, and market idolatry.  
Of these six alternatives, the use of expert opinion was by far the most common, appearing at all 
three pillars. Such references offered a seemingly objective sense of legitimacy to the boom 
narratives being expounded. At the Fed, references were frequently to economists at prestigious 
universities, such as Greenspan’s frequent references to Professor Paul David of Stanford 
University in support of his structural shift narrative, but also to a variety of studies produced by the 
BLS. In the media texts, references to analysts, traders, tech executives, venture capitalists, 
consultants, and investment bankers formed the majority. As is well known, many of these sources 
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had a vested interest in promoting a positive outlook for economic and stock growth. At the Senate, 
the voice of experts often took center stage at these hearings, with the banking and securities 
industries represented in twice the numbers as market regulators.  
The practice of rationalizing conflicting evidence was present in both cognitive and normative 
texts. In cognitive texts, Greenspan responded to the lack of fundamentals (such as output or 
efficiency gains) supporting his claims of a structural shift by rationalizing that tech-related 
expenditures should be treated as assets and that the true benefits of recent technological advances 
would take time to seep their way into the nation’s economy. He later rationalized both the SE Asia 
crisis and the lack of any tech boom in Japan as caused by excessive government intervention in the 
banking sectors and labor markets, respectively. In the media texts, skyrocketing P/E ratios were 
argued to be reasonable based on the favorable growth estimates and the expanding presence of the 
tech sector. Falling stock prices were rationalized as “buying opportunities” or signs of “profit 
taking by institutional investors,” while the observation that some analysts still ignored the tech 
sector was rationalized as a sign of these analysts chasing investment banking fees. Interestingly, at 
both pillars, numerous discussions of conflicting evidence were used as further opportunities to 
support the prevailing boom narratives.  
The frequent use of matter-of-fact, unequivocal language was found in both cognitive and 
regulative texts, which are, again, reputedly more cautious sources of economic discourse. 
Greenspan, U.S. Senators, and Senate witnesses all excelled in the use of overly optimistic and 
unreserved language. While Greenspan claimed in 1995 that “financial markets undoubtedly are far 
more efficient today than ever before,” Charles Schwab concluded in 2000, two months before the 
bubble popped, that “I don’t think there has ever been a better period in our history for investors.” 
The continued and widespread use of such language at two of the reputedly most conservative 
sources of economic discourse conferred great certainty to investors and non-investors alike.  
The other three alternatives were only present in one pillar each, suggesting their use was 
confined to certain forms of institutional discourse. Surprisingly, perhaps the most emotive form of 
support for economic and market gains, the practice of market idolatry, was only present at the U.S. 
Senate, and mostly by the Senators themselves. Perhaps less surprising was the use of the emotional 
triggers of fear and envy and the careful selection of historical data found in media texts.  
While each of these six alternatives would likely be ineffective in-and-of-themselves, combined, 
they offered a powerful and unrelenting stream of varied support to the spread of overly optimistic 
economic, tech, and stock narratives from the mid to late 1990s.  
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9.2.6 Minority status of negative narratives 
As already explained in Section 9.2.2, the normative pillar did in fact question narratives of soaring 
stock valuations as early as 1993, with such skepticism continuing throughout the sample period in 
numerous normative texts. However, aside from this early skepticism of a soaring stocks narrative 
at the normative pillar, the majority of narratives expounded just before and during the market run-
up were positive in their connotation of the economy, technology, and stock markets, with much of 
the remainder taking on a mixed tonality. This positive shift and alignment of the three pillars has 
already been rather thoroughly discussed in this chapter.  
The positive stream of narratives produced in the mid to late 1990s stands in stark contrast to 
the negative and skeptical narratives found earlier in the sample period. For instance, in the 
cognitive pillar, only four of the 23 sampled speeches from 1987 to 1995 possessed a positive 
connotation of the U.S. economy, while not a single one of these speeches contained a boom 
narrative. In normative texts, only nine of the first 62 articles from 1987 to 1992 possessed a 
positive connotation of the economy, and in regulative texts, only five of the first 123 statements 
from 1987 to 1990 viewed the economy in a positive light. The point being, from 1987 to at least 
1992, negative economic, tech, and stock narratives were supported by a bevy of similar views, and 
as a result, positive economic outlooks could do little to change the tide. From 1995 to early 2000, 
though, just the opposite occurred. With positive narratives now in the clear majority, narratives 
skeptical of soaring stock valuations and “new economy” claims had little effect.  
A few other factors further constrained the discursive influence of these skeptical narratives. At 
the Federal Reserve, the more negative opinions of Alice Rivlin and Laurence Meyer stood up 
against the relentless positivity of the much more influential Alan Greenspan. While Greenspan 
himself did mention the possibility of a bubble on a few occasions, he continued to conclude that 
bubbles were impossible to identify before their bursting. In the media texts, skepticism was much 
more common at the beginning of the market run-up, circa 1996. Then, from 1998 to 2000, when 
P/E ratios truly lost touch with reality, skepticism halved. Lastly, a similar theme of early 
skepticism was found at the U.S. Senate, and these early skeptics still included many positive 
elements in their texts. Hence, overall, these negative narratives exerted minimal discursive and 
institutional influence.  
9.2.7 Discrediting and disparaging of skeptics 
As just mentioned, an interesting feature of the skeptical normative texts was their dissipation over 
time, just as P/E ratios started to reach historic levels. From 1995 to 1997, 27 percent of the 
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sampled media texts possessed a negative or skeptical stock narrative, a frequency that collapsed to 
13 percent of sampled media texts during the manic years of 1998, 1999, and early 2000.  
As theorized in Chapter 7, a possible explanation for this drop is the presence of numerous 
media texts that publically discredited and even disparaged these early skeptics. As early as 1993, 
articles (such as Norris, 1993 and Teitelbaum, 1994) referred to bearish investors as “the big losers” 
and “Chicken Littles” of the past year.  
Such texts were eager to point out the inaccurate forecasts of some skeptical economists as the 
markets soared, while other texts noted (without providing any support) that financial journalists 
had “been wrong about stocks for nearly a decade.” As markets started to heat up in 1996, these 
discrediting texts largely concluded that the biggest risk that investors could take was “not being 
invested in the market.”  
As a result, and quite ironically, skeptics either toned down their bearish forecasts or were given 
less media presence (the institutional effects being equal) when markets turned sharply higher and 
P/E ratios soared. The skeptical texts of years past had been “proven wrong” and the twin fears of 
looking foolish as either a skeptic or a bench-sitter replaced any fear of the risky investments in 
unproven start-up firms.  
9.2.8 Reactionary narratives 
Starting in April of 2000, sampled texts became increasingly negative. At both the cognitive and 
regulative pillars, texts lost their unbounded optimism over the economy and the market valuations 
of start-up tech firms. As the NASDAQ had already suffered a large intraday 10 percent collapse 
and numerous tech firms started to fold amidst tightening credit conditions, these pessimistic 
narratives were purely reactionary. Making matters worse, such discourse likely only further fueled 
the selling of the next few years, with institutional investors being the first to abandon ship.  
Somewhat surprising, though, is that despite the recent volatility and drops on stock exchanges 
and the growing mountain of dot-bomb collateral, even these negative texts managed to present a 
somewhat balanced view of the situation. For example, while Laurence Meyer criticized the 
“irrational exuberance” of some financial journalists, he predicted a “benign” outcome to the 
unfolding events.  
At the Senate, Senator Rodney Grams started his statement by noting the NASDAQ just 
experienced its most volatile trading day in history, but then went on to expound a narrative of a 
sound economy in which “many new investors were entering the market.”  
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Alongside Alan Greenspan’s assurances in December of 2000 that “our current circumstances 
are in no way comparable to those of 1998,” elements of unbounded optimism lingered on well into 
the market crash.  
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CHAPTER 10: TOWARDS A NARRATIVE THEORY OF ASSET BUBBLE FORMATION 
This final chapter outlines the main theoretical contributions of this study. Building on the I/N 
perspective explained in Chapter 3 and the findings of the empirical study presented in Chapters 5 
through 9, this chapter is devoted to the development of a narrative theory of asset bubble formation.  
This theory provides an argument and detailed account of the role that narratives play in asset 
bubble formation. By shifting from the empirical to the theoretical, this account thus provides an 
explanation of how some other asset bubbles may have formed in the past (aside from the U.S. tech 
bubble) and a prediction of how future bubbles can develop. 
This chapter is divided into four parts. In the first section, I explain in detail the central 
argument and boundary conditions of the narrative theory of asset bubble formation. As this theory 
proposes three narrative phases in which bubbles form, I then explain each phase and its key 
conditions. I also include a few examples of how this theory is supported by previous bubbles, 
particularly the U.S. tech bubble.  
In Section 10.2, I explore some of the more important implications of this theory for research, 
policy, and business practice. As the narrative theory provides a novel and rather detailed 
description of how large-scale bubbles can form, the theory serves to complement, integrate, and 
challenge existing thought on these episodes. In addition, given the central role that powerful 
institutional actors, such as central bank officials and government representatives, play in this 
theory, numerous implications arise for both policy makers and business practitioners. Section 10.2 
details these theoretical and practical implications. 
Section 10.3 then focuses on the limitations of this study and offers a number of suggestions as 
to how future research can start to test, expand, and build upon the narrative theory. Finally, in 
Section 10.4, I provide a few concluding remarks.  
10.1 A narrative theory of asset bubble formation  
In this section, I outline a theory of how narratives drive asset bubble formation. This theory is built 
on the assumptions of the I/N perspective described in Chapter 3 and the empirical findings of my 
study presented in Chapters 5 through 9. This theory is a product of a further step of analysis, which 
was temporal bracketing.  
In this final step of analysis, I abstracted the data from my study and explored areas of 
continuity and discontinuity. As a result, this theory remains closely grounded in the events and 
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narratives of the U.S. tech bubble, but it also allows for analysis, understanding, and prediction of 
other bubbles. 
In short, the narrative theory of asset bubble formation argues that asset bubbles are driven 
primarily by narratives and that bubbles can form through a three-phase process of crisis, recovery, 
and boom. The theory contends that, during these three phases, certain conditions, particularly when 
combined, can account for the rapid growth of numerous large-scale bubbles.  
In the first phase, narrating a crisis, powerful market actors are largely aligned in their 
exposition of negative narratives and view overregulation and business constraints as critical 
impediments in the economy. In the second phase, narrating a recovery, the dominant narratives 
tend to view continued deregulation as an economic enabler and the possibility of stricter 
regulations as a dangerous impediment, while normative texts start to produce increasingly positive 
narratives over time. In the third and final phase, narrating a boom, powerful market actors, 
particularly from the more prudent and powerful cognitive and regulative pillars, expound 
increasingly positive and optimistic narratives, while a range of alternatives to fundamental analysis 
start to dominate discourse. 
If all of these conditions are met, the theory predicts that several outcomes will follow. First, 
they will result in the creation and maintenance of a number of reinforcing institutions such as 
deregulation, privatization, lowered rates, expanding credit, and lowered taxes that will support and 
boost asset prices, particularly in the sector viewed as driving economic recovery.  
Second, calls for stricter regulations will be ignored and crowded out, while market skeptics will 
easily be discredited and disparaged. Third, a large number of investors, including a flood of 
newcomers, copycats, and swindlers, will be directed into increasingly similar investment decisions, 
which will require increasingly greater leverage and result in increasingly emotional and irrational 
decision-making. 
Each phase of this theory is explained in detail in the subsections below, with each subsection 
exploring the linkages between narratives and actions/events and vice versa. The following 
subsections also provide a few examples of the conditions mentioned above. Table 10.1 on the 
following page provides an overview of each phase and its respective narratives and direct and 
indirect results.  
  
  
 
Table 10.1  Overview of the narrative theory of asset bubble formation 
Phase Description Dominant narratives Direct actions/results Indirect actions/results 
Phase 1: Narrating a 
crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Powerful market actors expound 
negative narratives 
 Regulations and constraints viewed as 
impediments 
 Over time, negativity and attention to 
crisis recedes 
 Boom narratives very rare 
 
 Decline 
 Crisis/turbulence 
 Competitiveness 
 Abuse/unfairness 
 Uncertainty 
 Myopia 
 Stability 
 Reinforcing institutions to 
allay crisis 
 Central banks lower rates 
 Deregulation/privatization 
 Negative bubbles emerge 
 
 Investors forced back into 
riskier assets 
 New markets, companies, 
and business opportunities 
appear 
 Quick gains can be reaped 
by risk-takers 
Phase 2: Narrating a 
recovery 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Market actors expound 
mixed/balanced narratives 
 Deregulation viewed as enabler, while 
strict reg. viewed as impediment 
 Over time, narratives become 
increasingly positive 
 Collective boom narratives emerge 
 
 (Moderate) growth 
 Cycles 
 Soundness 
 Expansion 
 Recovery 
 Strict regulations 
abandoned/loosened 
 Increased deregulation and 
government assistance 
 Asset values rise 
 Skeptics emerge 
 
 Risk-taking increases 
 Copycats and newcomers 
start to emerge 
 Deregulation feedback 
loop 
 Skeptics disparaged 
 
Phase 3: Narrating a 
boom 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Powerful market actors expound 
positive narratives 
 Fundamental valuations replaced with 
range of alternatives  
 Over time, narratives become 
increasingly exuberant 
 Boom narratives now institutionalized 
 Structural shift 
 New era 
 Dominance 
 Leadership 
 Soaring prices 
 Revival 
 Explosive growth 
 Transformation 
 Legislation passed to boost 
economic drivers 
 Rates kept low/lowered 
 Skeptics discredited 
 Asset values soar 
 
 Flood of copycats and 
newcomers 
 Skeptics recede 
 Borrowing surges/savings 
collapses 
 Asset price feedback loop 
 Illegal activity now 
common 
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Lastly, it is necessary here to mention what the theory is not, so as not to confuse readers. As the 
narrative theory is highly grounded in the events of the U.S. tech bubble, it is first and foremost a 
theory of how narratives drove speculation during one of the largest and most important bubbles in 
recent history. As such, the theory should also provide an accurate description of how other large-
scale bubbles during technological transitions may have occurred in the past and could occur in the 
future. That is not to say that all bubbles of this kind have followed or will follow the same process. 
With each bubble being deeply rooted in its prevailing social, cultural, and political climate, some 
of these episodes are likely to form in both predictably and unpredictably different ways. It follows 
that bubble episodes not of this kind, such as bubbles in precious metals, may potentially form 
under very different conditions.  
All of that being said, it is my intention that this theory will enable researchers, policy makers, 
and practitioners to better understand, predict, and prevent all large-scale bubbles. In Sections 10.2 
and 10.3, I further explain how this can be accomplished along with how future studies can start to 
test, clarify, extend, and build upon what is proposed in this thesis.   
10.1.1 Phase 1: Narrating a crisis 
Perhaps counter-intuitive to most, the first narrative phase in which some large-scale asset bubbles 
form is one of crisis. The central argument is thus that when market actors, particularly those with 
profound institutional power, narrate a crisis, they may in fact be sowing the very seeds of a future 
bubble. 
The term “crisis” is meant to be understood rather broadly. While the term includes the typical 
large-scale economic crises of stock market crashes, banking collapses and panics, dramatic drops 
in trade, and severe, prolonged recessions and depressions, I intend for the term to also refer to 
more subtle forms of crises such as an extended period of high unemployment, an extended or rapid 
loss of competitiveness to other countries, various forms of social strife and tension, or simply just a 
nationwide loss of confidence. In the case of the tech bubble, the period of 1987 to 1992 included 
several of these events, such as the 1987 stock market crash and a recession in the early 1990s. The 
contention here is that large-scale bubbles form not because of the type of crisis a nation may be 
facing, but rather they form because of how market actors narrate, and hence make sense of, a crisis.  
Two conditions in this first phase, as revealed through my data, help to explain how an asset 
bubble can eventually emerge. First, market actors, again particularly those with high levels of 
institutional power such as central bank governors and chairmen, government representatives, and 
journalists at the nation’s premier news outlets, give increased attention to the economy and its 
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markets and expound negative narratives that view the economy, its markets, and its companies in a 
state of crisis, turbulence, decline, uncertainty, and/or myopia. Abuse and unfairness are likely to be 
highlighted, while calls for greater stability and economic competitiveness abound. Certain sectors, 
such as the tech sector in the late 1980s and early 1990s, will be singled out as examples of the 
nation’s decline. While some positive narratives may be present, these narratives will have little 
influence against a near or complete alignment of the cognitive, normative, and regulative aspects 
of the institutional realm. 
 The second condition is related to the dominant impeding forces present in these narratives. If a 
loss of trust in the markets and widespread corporate fraud are identified as the sole culprits of the 
crisis, then stricter regulations are likely to follow and a large-scale bubble is unlikely to form 
anytime soon. Such elements were at least partially present during the Great Depression, which led 
to the introduction of Glass-Steagall in 1933. However, if the dominant narratives of the time 
identify overregulation and burdensome constraints on business as primary impeding forces, then 
deregulation, privatization, and lower taxes are likely to follow. During the tech bubble, complaints 
of burdensome regulations became exceedingly common from the late 1980s well into the early 
1990s, while calls for stricter regulations, though present, became exceedingly sparse.  
As a result of these two conditions, being the institutional alignment of negative narratives and 
the identification of overregulation and constraints as key impeding forces, powerful market actors 
are likely to respond with a range of reinforcing measures to help businesses expand and grow, 
thereby allaying the current crisis. Common measures include the lowering of interest rates, which 
dropped from nine percent to three percent in the early 1990s, deregulation and privatization, which 
can create entirely new business opportunities, and the lowering of various taxes. For these 
conditions, it can easily be inferred that the greater the power possessed by regulative and cognitive 
sources, the greater the power and influence of their narratives. 
Following these measures, investors are both forced and encouraged back into riskier assets, 
such as stocks and real estate. As asset values may have dropped below fundamental valuations 
during the crisis, resulting in negative bubbles, risk-taking investors (sometimes referred to as 
“vultures”) can reap quick gains at this point, as prices are likely to rebound rather quickly after 
such measures are taken. Such quick gains are also likely to attract the attention of normative texts, 
thereby encouraging similar actions and invoking notions that nations “always recover” from crises. 
While such gains may also result in a handful of boom narratives predicting an immediate economic 
revival, these opinions remain in a very small minority and hence have little institutional influence.  
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At the end of this phase, fears of a deeper crisis subside and attention to markets starts to recede. 
Attention shifts from focusing on the crisis to focusing on competitiveness. At this point, a large-
scale asset bubble is certainly not imminent, nor is one guaranteed to arise. However, the seeds of 
lowered rates, expanding credit, deregulation, and privatization have been sown. How market actors 
continue to narrate and respond to unfolding events will determine how dangerous these reinforcing 
conditions will be. 
An important distinction can be made here, namely that this theory views an excessively 
negative reaction to a crisis as the primary cause of, what at times can be, excessive efforts at 
expanding credit and deregulation, which can then be important causes of excessive lending, 
speculation, and expansion. For instance, the stagflation of the 1970s in the U.S. is noted as 
resulting in a “national moroseness” (Morris, 1999, p. 94), which was immediately followed by a 
wave of deregulatory efforts, which was then followed by a series of bubbles, culminating in the 
1987 market crash.  
10.1.2 Phase 2: Narrating a recovery 
Equally as important in determining whether a large-scale bubble will form is the second narrative 
phase, narrating a recovery. In this phase, market actors can all but ensure a bubble will form if the 
dominant narratives of the time meet two new conditions.  
First, the dominant narratives of this recovery period, which was from 1993 to 1995 during the 
tech bubble, are likely to be largely neutral and mildly positive in their tonalities and include 
narratives of (moderate) growth, economic and business cycles, soundness in investments and 
institutions, expansion, and recovery. Concomitantly, attention to markets will drop off somewhat at 
regulative sources, while cognitive texts will produce cautious assessments of an economic rebound. 
As the economy and various sectors are still recovering, the impeding and enabling forces identified 
play a critical role. In this regard, the first condition that can further boost asset values is when the 
dominant recovery narratives of the time view the previous efforts at deregulation and business 
expansion as key enablers in the recovery but also view efforts at stricter regulation as major 
impediments. 
If such a condition is met, three results are likely to follow. First, continued calls by expounders 
of narratives of abuse and unfairness for stricter regulations to punish those guilty for the past crisis 
and prevent further crises will receive decreased attention and seemingly fall on deaf ears. As the 
economy is still viewed as in a precarious and fragile state, stricter regulations will be viewed as 
dangerous and even unnecessary measures, for a recovery is already in process. Second, powerful 
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market actors, primarily regulative and cognitive ones, will continue to push for deregulation and 
increased assistance at business expansion. The new enablers of this recovery are the likeliest to 
receive such assistance. In the case of the tech bubble, venture capitalists were quickly identified as 
enablers of a resurgent tech sector, and hence they quickly became the focal point of senate 
proposals.  
A third result, as just mentioned, is that asset values will rise, particularly those most directly 
related to the new measures at expansion. Government efforts at deregulation and possible further 
easing by central banks encourage and create investment and, increasingly, speculation in the 
sectors viewed as receiving the most support. A potentially dangerous feedback loop emerges here 
as deregulation and credit expansion can result in immediate investment and speculation, which can 
lead to a quick spike in asset values, which can convince powerful market actors that those 
measures are working, resulting in further calls for deregulation and expansion.  
The corollary to this first condition is that if the dominant narratives of a recovery view efforts 
at deregulation and expansion as having achieved their goals and stricter regulations as necessary to 
deter and prevent further crises, then regulations will be tightened, expansion will be eased off, rates 
may be put on hold or even rise slightly, speculation will be subdued, and, consequently, asset 
values are likely to rise only modestly—if at all. Such results would all but ensure a large-scale 
bubble does not form in the near future. 
This first condition, as powerful as it may be in promoting investment and inciting speculation, 
will likely prove insufficient in creating any sort of large-scale bubble, particularly in societies with 
powerful and influential normative texts. This leads us to the second condition, which postulates 
that asset prices can be further boosted if normative texts produce increasingly positive narratives 
over time.  
Normative texts, such as media articles and shows, blogs, forums, and even word-of-mouth 
hearsay and advice, are the likeliest to give first attention to new trends and fashions. In the tech 
bubble, media texts gave increased coverage to the tech sector far earlier than cognitive and 
regulative sources. Boom narratives started to become more common in the early years of the 
recovery, but media texts also produced a number of early skeptics who doubted the sustainability 
of the rise in asset values and the fundamental factors supporting the recovery. At this delicate point, 
if skeptics start to outnumber optimists, then retail investors and potential copycats will be put off 
the latest trend. However, if, as in the tech bubble, optimists slowly start to grow in number and 
boom narratives become collectively shared amongst large communities, particularly at highly 
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influential normative sources such as premier news outlets and widely watched TV shows, a 
growing asset bubble starts to look like a near certainty. 
The overall argument from this phase is thus that if market actors, particularly those with high 
levels of institutional power, view increased expansion as an enabler and stricter regulations as an 
impediment and produce normative texts that are increasingly positive over time, an institutional 
reality starts to coalesce that directs a large number of speculators, newcomers, and copycats to 
make increasingly similar investment decisions. Indirectly, such decisions provide a further boost to 
asset values, and normative skeptics can quickly be discredited for any short-term predictions. 
Following this first rush of excitement, economic indicators are likely to turn positive, resulting in 
increased attention to markets and the new driving force of business growth from cognitive and 
regulative sources. By the end of this phase, boom narratives of leadership, dominance, and a new 
era start to emerge, with experts and their increasingly matter-of-fact rhetoric further legitimizing 
such ideas. Further fueling the flames of speculation, normative texts can now easily report on 
numerous examples of rising fortunes in this new and exciting sector, leading to feelings of jealousy, 
envy, and fear of missing out and enticing newcomers to begin borrowing to leverage their future 
gains.  
At the end of this phase, high valuations and predictions of continued gains for certain assets, 
especially the new drivers of the economic recovery, are very likely. The important distinction at 
this point is that the three pillars of institutionalization must start to work in unison and become 
mutually supportive of one another. If normative texts begin to doubt cognitive or regulative 
sources, or if regulative and cognitive narratives result in tighter credit conditions, then a large-scale 
bubble becomes increasingly unlikely. For example, as documented by Garber (2000), both the 
South Sea Company and the Mississippi Company were well supported by discourse from 
government officials at extremely high levels of institutional power. But also meeting the second 
condition, accounts also remark on how John Law’s exaggerations of the wealth in The New World 
and news of the fortunes made in his scheme reaching England influenced the public to pour their 
savings into such schemes (Bammer, 2002; Sheeran and Spain, 2004).  
10.1.3 Phase 3: Narrating a boom 
The final narrative phase of asset bubble formation, narrating a boom, determines how large a 
bubble grows. By the beginning of this phase, circa 1996 in the tech bubble, a small-scale or brief 
bubble is almost certain to occur, for too much institutional momentum is supporting the valuations 
of certain assets. However, this institutional momentum can still be reversed, thus pricking the 
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bubble, or it can be accelerated, with boom narratives now becoming fully institutionalized and 
serving as the taken-for-granted context by which investors make decisions. Three conditions can 
allow this acceleration to enter full force.  
First, despite asset prices beginning to surpass most common fundamental measurements, the 
reputedly more prudent yet commonly more powerful cognitive and regulative pillars continue to 
expound a majority of positive and optimistic narratives, with boom narratives of a structural shift, 
new era, dominance, leadership, soaring prices, revival, explosive growth, and/or transformation 
dominating discourse.  
As long as these narratives continue to dominate discourse at these high and influential levels of 
institutionalization, ceteris paribus, a few results are likely to follow. First, with optimism over the 
future continuing to dominate rhetoric, any claims of euphoria or the possibility of a bubble will 
receive little attention. Such was the case with the (less institutionally powerful) speeches of Alice 
Rivlin and Laurence Meyer during the tech bubble. As a result, policy makers and banking officials 
will see very little, if any, need to prick a bubble, for one seemingly does not even exist. Second, 
with no bubble in sight, legislation may continue to boost the new drivers of economic growth, such 
as the tech sector was supported well into the late 1990s. Third, again with a bubble appearing a 
remote possibility, interest rates are more likely to remain low or only inch upwards. Furthermore, 
central banks can reserve the option to further lower rates at the first sign of economic hardship, as 
happened after the Russian and LTCM fiasco in the late 1990s, or disappointingly low inflation 
numbers. All of these actions, particularly in combination, will continue to boost asset values.  
As in the previous phase, the normative pillar continues to play a very important role in the 
creation of institutional reality. That being, at this point, while a large-scale bubble becomes almost 
a certainty, normative texts can still dampen the speculation by expounding narratives critical of 
asset values and the institutions supporting those valuations. However, if at this point normative 
texts continue to discredit skeptics and produce a majority of positive narratives, then institutional 
reality for investors will becoming overwhelmingly, and inescapably, optimistic about continued 
gains. Investors, both large and small, old and young, institutional and retail, will be left with no 
choice but to place bets on further economic gains and higher valuations in the new driver of this 
growth.  
With the institutional pillars fully aligned and easy credit and regulations supporting the 
economy, asset prices can now easily reach historic values. Skeptics, while still present, may recede, 
partially out of fear of further embarrassment. A flood of newcomers and copycat organizations will 
enter the market, all trying to make easy money by mimicking the bets being made in the 
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marketplace. With gains appearing so easy, borrowing surges and savings collapses. At this time, a 
very dangerous asset price feedback loop enters full swing, with increased borrowing and 
speculation further fueling price gains, which in turn creates narratives of these gains, which can 
then fuel further speculation.  
It is also at this point that illegal activity in the market becomes increasingly common. 
Swindlers and the less scrupulous of society cannot resist the easy gains to be made by simply 
doctoring up financial statements and making promises that they cannot keep. Many of these 
swindlers, along with the more seasoned institutional investors, know that the market is already 
stretched, but they also know that a continued flow of new entrants can prop up valuations. The 
increasingly positive narratives at the regulative pillar also ensures these criminals are less likely to 
be pursued, at least for the time being.  
While these two conditions may seem sufficient in inflating the largest of bubbles, there remains 
the tricky issue of how to support claims that prices, despite their historic heights, are not in a 
bubble and are in fact reasonable valuations of the new driver of economic growth. While 
fundamental measurements, such as profit statements and rental gains, offer no support, a range of 
alternatives to fundamental analysis must start to dominate discourse in order to sustain the 
euphoria and excitement of this new growth. As identified in this thesis, these alternatives can take 
on many forms, including claims of a profound, structural shift in the economy, unequivocal 
language, emotional triggers such as envy and fear, rationalizations of conflicting evidence, a range 
of expert references (though primarily market insiders), carefully selected historical data, and pure 
market idolatry. These reinforcing alternatives, while likely insufficient and arguably even childish 
in isolation, can seduce even the most cautious investors. Their continued promulgation drowns out 
random cries of a bubble and market euphoria and markets become increasingly emotional and 
irrational. Such was the state in 1999 and 2000 during the tech bubble, when valuations of 
inexperienced startup firms with no profits and paltry revenue streams reached meteoric levels. 
Eventually, the bubble reaches such levels that valuations are supported by no more than the 
airy narratives behind them. At this final stage, as numerous insiders and perceptive investors know 
that markets cannot take any more, even a modest rise in interest rates can send markets swinging 
wildly in reverse, with negative, reactionary discourse further inciting a stampede out the door. 
10.2 Implications for researchers, policymakers, and practitioners 
The narrative theory of asset bubble formation, as developed through an in-depth study of the U.S. 
tech bubble, has several implications for research, policy, and business practice. Perhaps most 
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obvious is that this narrative theory offers a novel and detailed description of how large-scale 
bubbles can form, particularly during technological transitions. Through attention to both narratives 
and events and sensitivity to the longitudinal processes and interrelationships in these phenomena, 
this theory also offers a new and nuanced understanding of how bubbles form, an understanding 
that complements, integrates, and challenges existing thought on these episodes.  
An important insight gleaned from this study that is largely ignored in extant theory is the role 
and importance of narratives and actions during a crisis and recovery. Much of extant theory 
focuses almost solely on the decisions, actors, and events during the boom years immediately 
preceding a market crash, but the findings of this study demonstrate just how influential the crisis 
and recovery years can be. The argument of the narrative theory is such that without the reinforcing 
institutions of low rates, deregulation, privatization, low taxes, abandonment of proposed 
regulations, and extended government assistance, the tech bubble could not have reached such 
frenzied heights. All of these conditions, along with the practice of discrediting and disparaging 
market skeptics, were direct results of narratives and sense-making efforts during the crisis and 
recovery years preceding the tech boom. Thus, a first implication of this study is that future studies 
and future theory on these events must account for the narratives and actions that occur well before 
market euphoria kicks in.  
It should be noted here that a few current theories do give some attention to the recovery phase. 
Most prominent amongst these is Minsky’s (1986, 1992) now well-cited theory that overconfidence 
arises during long periods of stability, which in turn encourages excessive risk-taking and 
innovation. The findings of my study support such a conclusion, but also demonstrate how it is 
incomplete. The narratives and decisions made during a period of crisis can have profound 
implications for the conditions that exist during a recovery, thus the argument that bubbles arise 
during periods of stability will, in many cases, only tell part of the story.  
A second important insight is the highly influential and, arguably, surprising role that cognitive 
and regulative texts played in the growth of the tech bubble. After a bubble bursts, a common 
accusation is that the media is to blame for hyping the asset, frequently stocks or housing. Several 
studies and prominent scholars have even offered support for such a conclusion (e.g., Akerlof and 
Shiller, 2009; Bhattacharya et al., 2009; Hartz and Steger, 2010; Shiller, 2005). Again, while my 
findings show how such an observation is not entirely wrong, the remarkably one-sided narratives 
at the institutionally powerful U.S. Federal Reserve and U.S. Senate during the tech bubble, 
alongside the relatively balanced rhetoric in the media—particularly concerning stock valuations—
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strongly suggests that the media and other normative sources may in fact be the most balanced 
component of institutional discourse during these events. 
In relation to mainstream economic explanations of these events, the findings of this study offer 
a clear and detailed account of just how seldom fundamental factors were used to support claims of 
rising asset values during the tech bubble. In the sampled texts, rising valuations were supported by 
vague and passing notions of a structural shift in the economy, amazingly matter-of-fact language, 
emotionally charged statements, simple and unsupported rationalizations of evidence to the contrary, 
anecdotal claims from market insiders, biased and partial data representations, and even reverence 
to market officials and the abstract markets themselves. These examples, especially in combination, 
add to the mounting pile of evidence demonstrating how pure fundamentals and rationality do not 
drive decision-making during bubble episodes.  
That is not to say that all mainstream economists need to abandon ship before their fundamental 
theories of market speculation sink in a rising sea of irrationality. In fact, in light of my findings, 
some mainstream theories do seem to hold some weight. The first such theory is the possibility and 
extent of rational speculators (Akerlof et al., 1993; Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004; DeLong et al., 
1990; Doblas-Madrid, 2012; Flood and Hodrick, 1990; Griffin et al., 2011). The findings of my 
study demonstrate that it could actually be rather easy for all kinds of investors to anticipate and 
knowingly participate in a bubble’s growth. Immediately preceding the euphoric years of the tech 
bubble, the growing stream of both narratives and reinforcing institutions supporting the U.S. 
economy and its technology sector offered clear signals that tech stocks would be buttressed and 
thus resilient to small shocks, such as the crisis in Southeast Asia. There is also evidence to suggest 
that institutional investors such as hedge funds and mutual funds had considerable influence on 
stock prices during the late 1990s (Griffin et al., 2011).  
Hence, in the tech bubble and likely in other similar types of large-scale speculative events, it 
appears very possible that rational speculators play a role in driving up prices. The evidence from 
my study, however, demonstrates how such speculation could only be one part of a much bigger 
picture. The narrative evidence in this thesis suggests that such speculators—rather than creating the 
tech bubble—simply took advantage of institutional conditions that offered strong, artificial support 
for tech stocks. Without such conditions, their ability to manipulate stock prices would have been 
greatly reduced, if not entirely muted. 
Another mainstream theory with relevance to my findings is the notion of “sunspots” (see, e.g., 
Azariades, 1998), where extrinsic factors are widely and mistakenly relied upon to assess asset 
values. The relevance of this theory to the tech bubble is the finding of increasingly optimistic, and 
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seldom contested, narratives concerning the U.S. economy, where narratives of a structural shift, 
new economy, and economic leadership, for example, went almost entirely unchallenged during the 
late recovery and boom phases of this event. The discourse around these narratives can be 
contrasted with that concerning stock prices at the same time, where actors, particularly in the 
normative realm, did in fact challenge or at least question the euphoria over tech companies. 
However, amidst a harmonious chorus of economic euphoria, such skepticism was increasingly 
drowned out.  
Hence, with so much uncertainty over the future performance of numerous untested tech start-
ups, investors clearly responded to the growing optimism over the U.S. economy and the transition 
to a profoundly different economic era. Such a transition was erroneously considered 
unquestionable support for constantly rising stock prices. The lack of debate over this transition and 
the economic implications of this transition is an interesting area in need of further research.  
As with suspicions of rational speculators, though, the notion that sunspots fueled the tech 
bubble is not supported by my findings. As explained in the narrative theory, a wide range of actors 
and conditions coalesced to create the necessary institutional reality that offered seemingly 
relentless support for the tech sector in the late 1990s. The widespread belief in a new, structurally 
changed U.S. economy certainly played a role in the fevered rush to buy tech stocks, but this belief 
is far from sufficient to propel valuations of unproven tech firms to such historic heights. 
The findings of this study and the narrative theory developed in this chapter also serve to 
integrate and complement fragmented theories from behavioral and sociological disciplines, thus 
providing a much more comprehensive understanding of these events. Of greatest relevance, the 
narrative theory offers a much more complete account of how herd behavior (De Martino et al., 
2013; Galariotis et al., 2015; Hommes et al., 2008; Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011; Roy and 
Kemme, 2012; Schoenberg and Haruvy, 2012) emerges. According to the narrative theory, critical 
conditions in the emergence of herd behavior include the reinforcing institutions created as a result 
of narratives during the three phases of a bubble’s formation, the narratives expounded in 
institutionally powerful normative texts (particularly the reporting of fortunes being made in the 
new sector driving economic growth), and the numerous alternatives to fundamental analysis that 
come to dominate discourse. These factors help to answer questions concerning how herd behavior 
is even possible in the first place, before our human inclinations take over. 
As the real world of investing is vastly different from the controlled experiments conducted 
within university walls, the question that must be asked from such experiments is how precisely do 
investors come to predict and mimic the behavior of others, especially when fundamental valuations 
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are difficult or impossible to obtain. In the case of the tech bubble, the findings of this study show 
that such predictions and mimicry can be rather straightforward and, eventually, almost impossible 
to prevent. 
As outlined in the narrative theory, starting with the crisis phase of an asset bubble, traders can 
start to predict the moves of other investors. In such a phase, when powerful market actors start to 
expound views that overregulation and constraints are impeding economic recovery, traders can 
start to anticipate an environment with lower rates and deregulated and privatized sectors. 
Additionally, the specific sectors mentioned in such narratives, such as the technology sector in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, can be predicted to receive the most assistance. As low rates hurt savers, 
investors will also start to anticipate the movement of funds from savings accounts into riskier 
assets such as stocks and real estate.  
Confidence in such predictions will likely grow stronger in the recovery phase of an asset 
bubble, when further deregulation and the abandonment of strict regulations are announced. 
Furthermore, as the new drivers of economic growth are repeatedly praised in institutional texts, 
investors can now easily anticipate where government assistance will be allocated. Lastly, in the 
boom phase of a bubble, predictions and mimicry can appear all too tempting. The now widespread 
institutional promulgation of increasingly similar boom narratives and a bevy of claims supporting 
the new drivers of economic growth allow, and now likely compel, investors and speculators to 
mimic bets of the now-rich first movers.  
In relation to this thesis, an interesting finding of almost all behavioral experiments on asset 
bubbles is that traders (participants) tend to bid up prices well beyond fundamental valuations even 
without (most of) these institutional conditions present. Clearly, once investors, arguably with these 
same natural tendencies, are placed in an institutional environment of overwhelming optimism and 
support for one or a few key sectors, the possibility of herd behavior turns into a near certainty.  
As detailed in Chapter 2, a recent spate of sociological studies largely focus on institutional and 
regulatory failures during these events (e.g., Abolafia, 2010a; Campbell, 2010; Davis, 2010; 
Engelen et al., 2012; Hirsch and Morris, 2010). As already explained, the narrative theory offers a 
more complete account of how and why institutional measures and regulations tend to reinforce one 
another during boom years. Thus, future studies in this area would benefit by offering a more 
historical account of the passing of such regulations, such as by taking into consideration 
motivations for economic recovery and expansion and the fear of deeper economic contractions (for 
an example of how this can be accomplished, see Hansen, 2014). As with the behavioral studies 
above, though, my findings demonstrate how such regulatory explanations remain incomplete. The 
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normative and cognitive aspects of increasing euphoria during asset bubbles are far too powerful to 
be left for footnotes or afterthoughts.  
As the narrative theory of asset bubble formation emphasizes the role that cognitive and 
regulative sources play in these events, several direct implications arise for economic policy. First, 
policy makers, especially at high levels of institutional discourse and power, must take great care 
during the crisis and recovery phases not to exaggerate economic hardship and overemphasize the 
reinforcing institutions of low rates, deregulation, privatization, low taxes, government assistance, 
and the abandonment of stricter regulations to prevent future crises. While such narratives and 
measurements certainly draw attention to imperative economic matters and may help to allay the 
crisis in the near term, policy makers may in fact be sowing the seeds of a future, even bigger, crisis 
during these early years.  
Perhaps the most realistic advice here is that policy makers should be cautious during economic 
recoveries when policies and proposals tend to all support the same or similar drivers of economic 
growth. While such measures will more than likely have an immediate effect and boost economic 
indicators, these drivers—such as the tech sector during the 1990s—are likely already well 
supported by a range of normative texts and hence already in danger of overheating.  
For practitioners, including investors, business owners, and managers, the narrative theory 
should offer a useful blueprint of how speculative events can coalesce and grow over time. Such a 
blueprint should assist such actors in avoiding the perils of investments just before and during 
market peaks. Ideally, the narrative theory developed in this thesis will alert practitioners to the 
common signs of a bubble forming and growing, resulting in increasingly wary decision-making 
during such events, and thus helping to dampen the excesses seen in bubbles of recent history.  
Unfortunately, if powerful institutional actors such as central bank officials and government 
representatives direct investment into the same or similar sectors during crises and recoveries, many 
practitioners will be hard-pressed to pass up an easy opportunity at quick capital gains. Such a 
revelation underscores the importance of institutional caution during economic recoveries. 
10.3 Limitations and suggestions for future research  
While the findings of this study offer strong support for the narrative theory developed in Section 
10.1 and the implications mentioned above, this study also includes a few limitations that lead to 
several opportunities for future research in this area.  
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A first limitation of this study is that I was only able to investigate one bubble episode, being 
the U.S. tech bubble. While using a single case study design allowed for the depth and complexity 
revealed in my findings and theoretical constructs, it also tempers the potential applicability of my 
findings to other situations. There are at least three different kinds of scenarios that can be 
examined in this regard. First, researchers can explore how my findings compare to similar 
investigations of bubbles that form during similar types of technological transitions. As observed by 
Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2008), similar speculative events have coincided with 
breakthroughs in railroads, electricity, automobiles, radio, microelectronics, PCs, and biotechnology. 
Whether future transitions will occur in genomics, nanotechnology, robotics, and the like remains to 
be seen.  
A second type of scenario involves testing the applicability of these findings across other types 
of large-scale bubbles, such as housing and bond bubbles. While notions of deregulation, 
government assistance, normative euphoria, and the discrediting of skeptics seems to ring true to 
several of these events, I leave it to future studies to provide much more thorough examinations and 
comparisons than I could ever fit into the final pages of this thesis. A third and final type of scenario 
is the smaller or less publicized bubbles that tend to emerge in precious metals, emerging markets, 
and localized assets. While I surmise that many of the same factors and conditions are influential in 
these events, one can easily imagine how these bubble episodes may follow a noticeably different 
growth process. For instance, spikes in the price of gold can often immediately follow periods of 
crisis, with gold being viewed as a safe-haven asset to hold in times of uncertainty.  
A related issue here is how bubbles form in countries or in time periods with fundamentally 
different economic institutions and discourse. Comparisons of how the neoliberal, laissez-faire 
discourse of the 1990s compares to incidents under more restrictive or socialist policies would be of 
great interest in this regard. Similarly, with the rise of program trading and the power of highly 
complex algorithms to move markets, future studies could develop a more nuanced view of how 
these changes are affecting the role and power that narratives play in such events.   
A second limitation concerns data collection. Within the three broadly defined and overlapping 
pillars, there are surely countless sources that one could probe to identify the narratives and trends 
present during a certain period. What is more, within each source, samples will always need to be 
taken, whether by keyword, by month or year, or by some other means. Such a vast ocean of data 
options presents researchers with a very difficult sampling decision. In this thesis, I decided to 
probe, using keyword searches, the highest and most influential sources of institutional texts 
regarding the U.S. tech bubble. Future studies could follow a similar path to investigate other 
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bubbles, or scholars could probe a different or even wider range of institutional texts to test for 
similarities and differences. For example, relevant normative texts are almost endless, with blogs, 
TV shows, forums, chat rooms, and interviews representing just a few of the options.  
A third limitation would be that this thesis employed a series of qualitative methods that, while 
allowing for more open and nuanced analysis, make research replication extremely difficult and 
time-consuming. This raises the possibility of using a more closed, software-based analysis 
procedure that allows for faster replication. Whether and how that can be accomplished, though, I 
will leave for future studies. 
Aside from these limitations, the findings of this study and narrative theory developed as a 
result lead to a wide range of future research questions. As outlined in Chapter 3, the I/N 
perspective itself raises numerous questions about the origin and spread of boom narratives, many 
of which remain unanswered (see Table 3.1). Just looking at the findings of this study, numerous 
questions could be raised, such as “What is the precise relationship between the different pillars 
during these events, i.e., how exactly do they influence one another?”, “How did narratives come to 
be markedly one-sided at the more prudent cognitive and regulative pillars?”, and “What role do 
alternatives to fundamental analysis play outside of the boom years?”. Taking the perspective a step 
further, scholars could also investigate to what degree the framework developed in this thesis and 
the findings of this study can be used to understand broader economic cycles of growth and 
recession.  
Upon reading this thesis, more critical scholars may question to what extent the narratives 
examined in this study represent the true beliefs, views, and intentions of the actors involved (cf., 
Alvesson, 2003). In other words, the argument could be made that, for instance, government 
representatives were acutely aware of a tech bubble but worried that constant reference to a bubble 
would in fact be the very cause of its bursting and thus give them direct responsibility over such a 
catastrophic event. Or perhaps a more nefarious accusation would be that certain actors used their 
discursive power to intentionally inflate a bubble so as to benefit from its growth (similar to the 
contention made in theories of rational speculators). 
While these arguments more than likely have a certain degree of truth to them, and hence 
warrant continued study, the assumptions and findings of this study serve to diminish the 
importance and possibility of such accusations, for several reasons. One, the primary argument 
behind the I/N perspective is that the output of, not intentions behind, one’s institutional world is 
what rules and governs, incentivizes and constrains. That is to say, it is not the intentions of a 
regulation but rather the direct and indirect effects of a regulation that determine its institutional 
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force. Certainly, one can imagine a situation where government representatives argue vehemently 
for a certain law but in fact, perhaps deep down, feel rather confused and undecided about the 
whole matter. While such a scenario may have very important implications for the future, they do 
not make an official’s narrative supporting the legislation or the eventual passing of that legislation 
any less effectual.  
Two, in terms of the possibility of nefarious actors working to inflate and profit from a bubble’s 
growth, the narratives revealed in this study make such an accusation very difficult to support, at 
least for the case studied. The tech bubble was supported by a wide range of narratives expounded 
from a diverse group of actors throughout its emergence, development, and growth. The theory that 
all of these actors, many of them holding positions requiring a cautious view of rapid asset 
fluctuations, conspired to produce one of the largest bubbles in recent history appears to hold no 
water. However, given the positions and responsibilities of various Reserve officials and U.S. 
Senators included in this study, an assertion that belief was often replaced with hope in their 
narratives may be hard to refute.  
10.4 Conclusion 
I began this thesis by noting the great sense of frustration felt by academics over our current 
understanding of asset bubbles. As asset bubbles are now becoming rather frequent and globalized 
catalysts of banking crises, asset misallocation, and severe social strife, the academic community 
must accept a certain level of blame for failing to provide an adequate explanation of events with 
such devastating and immediate social and economic impacts.  
In Chapter 2, I underscored two oversights of extant research, being a lack of understanding as 
to why some assets develop bubbles while others do not and a lack of investigation into why 
bubbles cannot be “popped” before they reach their euphoric, and ultimately catastrophic, heights. I 
believe that this thesis, by probing the central yet overlooked role that narratives play in driving 
market speculation, offers insight in both regards.  
By first investigating how boom narratives became institutionalized during the U.S. tech bubble, 
my findings and the narrative theory developed from those findings offer a rather comprehensive 
answer as to how tech stocks (as opposed to, say, housing prices) reached such frenzied heights in 
the 1990s. In brief, the narrative theory argues that, first, from 1987 to 1992, powerful market actors 
were aligned in their promulgation of negative narratives that enabled the reinforcing institutions of 
low rates, deregulation, and government assistance. Then, from 1993 to 1995, dominant narratives 
enabled continued deregulation and prevented the passing of strict regulations designed to prevent 
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future crises, while normative texts produced increasingly positive narratives that directed attention 
toward the new driver of economic growth, that being tech companies. Finally, from 1996, to 2000, 
market actors, particularly those from the more prudent and powerful cognitive and regulative 
pillars, expounded increasingly positive and optimistic narratives that kept rates low and enabled 
further assistance to the tech sector. At the same time, a range of alternatives to fundamental 
analysis started to dominate discourse, offering a relentless stream of support to the valuations of 
unproven tech firms. 
This study also offers some preliminary insight into why efforts at deinstitutionalization, or 
popping the bubble, failed. In the case of the tech bubble, the answer appears rather clear. First, 
despite a number of early skeptics present in normative texts, these skeptics were increasingly 
outnumbered over time. Second, as cognitive and regulative narratives resulted in the creation of a 
number of reinforcing institutions, tech stocks continued to rise, thus allowing the discrediting and 
disparaging of those skeptics. Lastly, during the boom years, supported by a relentless stream of 
positive narratives and seductive alternatives to fundamental valuations, rising stock prices made 
skeptics look all the more foolish, causing them (or at least their rhetoric) to recede from the 
institutional spotlight. The most skeptical narratives to emerge at this point did not gain traction 
until markets had already peaked, thereby only fueling the steep falls ahead.  
While this thesis provides a number of important findings and a nuanced understanding of asset 
bubble formation, it is by no means an exhaustive account of the complexities that underlie asset 
bubbles. It is my hope that this study serves as a useful foundation and inspiration for future 
scholars wishing to further probe the sociological origins of these rather destructive events. Only 
through a commitment to research that is both rigorous in its analysis and novel in its design can we 
hope to stay one step ahead of (as opposed to our current two steps behind) the mysteries of market 
speculation.  
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Presenter Date Title Location Conference, etc. 
1 Heller,      
Mar. 6, 1987 
H. Robert 
Heller 
March 6, 1987 Future directions in the financial services 
industry: The international markets 
Washington, D.C. Nat’l conf. co-sponsored by Georgetown 
Law Center and School of Bus. Admin. 
2 Heller,       
May 9, 1988 
H. Robert 
Heller 
May 9, 1988 The internationalization of world financial 
markets—It’s a small world 
San Francisco, 
California 
1988 Financial Analysts Federation Annual 
Conference 
3 Heller,      
Sept. 19, 1988 
H. Robert 
Heller 
Sept. 19, 1988 Reform and integration of world financial 
markets 
Washington, D.C. Presidential Leadership Summit 
4 Greenspan, 
Oct. 11, 1988 
Alan 
Greenspan 
Oct. 11, 1988 Innovation and regulation of banks in the 
1990s 
Honolulu, Hawaii American Bankers Association  
5 Heller,       
Oct. 25, 1988 
H. Robert 
Heller 
Oct. 25, 1988 Managing money in volatile markets Cromwell, 
Connecticut 
Connecticut Institute for Certified 
Financial Planners 
6 Angell,     
Nov. 2, 1988 
Wayne D. 
Angell 
Nov. 2, 1988 A prop. to rely on market interest rates on 
intraday funds to reduce pay. system risk 
Washington, D.C. 1988 CATO Institute Conference 
7 Heller,      
Nov. 2, 1988 
H. Robert 
Heller 
Nov. 2, 1988 Governing banking’s future: Markets 
versus regulation 
Washington, D.C. CATO Conference on Banking Regulation 
8 
 
Greenspan, 
Nov. 30, 1988 
Alan 
Greenspan 
Nov. 30, 1988 Implications of global economic 
integration on equity markets 
Boca Raton, 
Florida 
Annual Convention of the Securities 
Industry Association  
9 
 
Angell,     
Sept. 4, 1989 
Wayne D. 
Angell 
Sept. 4, 1989 Mon. policy in a centrally planned econ.: 
Restruct. tow. a market-orien. soc. system 
Moscow, U.S.S.R. The Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada 
10 
 
Greenspan, 
Oct. 10, 1989 
Alan 
Greenspan 
Oct. 10, 1989 Commercial banks and the central bank in 
a market economy 
Moscow, U.S.S.R. Spaso House 
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11 Greenspan, 
May 2, 1990 
Alan 
Greenspan 
May 2, 1990 Regulation of futures and options markets Washington, D.C. Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
and the Futures Industry Institute 
12 Angell,      
May 14, 1990 
Wayne D. 
Angell 
May 14, 1990 Cooperative approaches to reducing risks 
in global financial markets 
New York, N.Y. Conference on Regulating International 
Financial Markets: Issues and Policies 
13 Angell,      
May 23, 1991 
Wayne D. 
Angell 
May 23, 1991 Financial market integration in a global 
economy: A central bank perspective 
Tokyo, Japan Third Annual Tokyo International Finance 
Symposium 
14 Greenspan, 
Sept. 24, 1991 
Alan 
Greenspan 
Sept. 24, 1991 Fundamental role of contract law and the 
supervision of markets systems 
Washington, D.C. 16
th
 Annual Conference of the 
International Organization of Sec. Comm. 
15 Kelley,      
May 4, 1992 
Edward W. 
Kelley, Jr. 
May 4, 1992 The return to capital markets of selected 
Latin American countries 
San Salvador,     
El Salvador 
XXIX Meeting of the Governors of Central 
Banks of the American Continent 
16 Greenspan, 
Nov. 18, 1992 
Alan 
Greenspan 
Nov. 18, 1992 The state of bank loan markets and related 
banking issues 
New York, N.Y. 55
th
 Annual Dinner of the Tax Foundation 
17 Greenspan, 
May 25, 1993 
Alan 
Greenspan 
May 25, 1993 The transition of centrally planned 
economies to a market-based system 
Dallas, Texas Management Briefing of the Edwin L. Cox 
School of Business, SMU 
18 
 
Phillips,     
Feb. 24, 1994 
Susan M. 
Phillips 
Feb. 24, 1994 Capital market innovations in the fixed 
income markets 
Orlando, Florida 14
th
 Annual Bond Conference of the Fixed 
Income Analyst Society, Inc. 
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Greenspan, 
Mar. 3, 1995 
Alan 
Greenspan 
March 3, 1995 Changes in global financial markets and 
their implications for public policy 
Coral Gables, 
Florida 
Financial Markets Conference of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 
20 
 
Greenspan, 
April 11, 1995 
Alan 
Greenspan 
April 11, 1995 Challenges for central banks: Global 
finance and changing technology 
Stockholm, 
Sweden 
Annual Monetary Policy Forum 
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21 Phillips,   
April 23, 1995 
Susan M. 
Phillips 
April 23, 1995 Derivatives, technology, and challenges 
ahead 
San Antonio, 
Texas 
Conference of State Bank Supervisors 
22 Greenspan, 
May 11, 1995 
Alan 
Greenspan 
May 11, 1995 Financial innovations and the supervision 
of financial institutions 
Chicago, Illinois 31
st
 Annual Conference on Bank Structure 
and Competition 
23 Kelley,     
Aug. 23, 1995 
Edward W. 
Kelley, Jr. 
Aug. 23, 1995 Fostering strong financial markets through 
prudential supervision 
Buenos Aires, 
Argentina 
Pan-American Conference on Banking 
Supervision 
24 Greenspan, 
Feb. 5, 1996 
Alan 
Greenspan 
Feb. 5, 1996 Technology and the economy Washington, D.C. National Governors’ Association 
25 Greenspan, 
Mar. 18, 1996 
Alan 
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Mar. 18, 1996 Technology and the financial economy 
worldwide 
New Orleans, 
Louisiana 
New Orleans Forum 
26 Greenspan, 
May 2, 1996 
Alan 
Greenspan 
May 2, 1996 Banking regulation and technology Chicago, Illinois 32
nd
 Annual Conference on Bank Structure 
and Competition 
27 Greenspan, 
June 6, 1996 
Alan 
Greenspan 
June 6, 1996 Technological change and the economy Chatham, 
Massachusetts 
40
th
 Economic Conference of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston 
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Greenspan, 
Oct. 7, 1996 
Alan 
Greenspan 
Oct. 7, 1996 U.S. Treasury securities market: Lessons 
from Alexander Hamilton 
New York, N.Y. Annual Public Service Awards Dinner of 
the Public Securities Association 
29 
 
Greenspan, 
Oct. 16, 1996 
Alan 
Greenspan 
Oct. 16, 1996 Technological advances and productivity New York, N.Y. 80
th
 Anniversary Awards Dinner of The 
Conference Board 
30 
 
Greenspan, 
Nov. 18, 1996 
Alan 
Greenspan 
Nov. 18, 1996 Banking in the global marketplace Tokyo, Japan Federation of Bankers Association of 
Japan 
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31 Phillips,    
Nov. 25, 1996 
Susan M. 
Phillips 
Nov. 25, 1996 Supervisory and regulatory responses to 
financial innovation and industry dynamics 
Washington, D.C. Seminar on Regulatory Policy Changes, 
sponsored by Bank Admin. Institute 
32 Greenspan, 
April 12, 1997 
Alan 
Greenspan 
April 12, 1997 The evolution of banking in a market 
economy 
Arlington, 
Virginia 
Annual Conference of the Association of 
Private Enterprise Education 
33 Greenspan, 
May 1, 1997 
Alan 
Greenspan 
May 1, 1997 Technological change and the design of 
bank supervisory policies 
Chicago, Illinois Conf. on Bank Structure and Competition 
of the Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago 
34 Greenspan, 
June 10, 1997 
Alan 
Greenspan 
June 10, 1997 The embrace of free markets New York, N.Y. Woodrow Wilson Award Dinner of the 
Woodrow Wilson Intl. Center for Scholars 
35 Greenspan, 
Sept. 12, 1997 
Alan 
Greenspan 
Sept. 12, 1997 Education, technology, and economic 
growth 
Chapel Hill, N.C. Building Dedication Ceremonies at the 
Kenan-Flagler Business School, UNC 
36 Meyer,     
Sept. 12, 1997 
Laurence H. 
Meyer 
Sept. 12, 1997 Monetary policy and the bond market: 
Complements or substitutes? 
Washington, D.C. Fixed Income Summit of PSA The Bond 
Market Trade Association 
37 Greenspan, 
Oct. 5, 1997 
Alan 
Greenspan 
Oct. 5, 1997 Technological change and the economy Boston, 
Massachusetts 
Annual Convention of the American 
Bankers Association  
38 
 
Greenspan, 
April 2, 1998 
Alan 
Greenspan 
April 2, 1998 The ascendance of market capitalism Washington, D.C. Annual Convention of the American 
Society of Newspaper Editors 
39 
 
Greenspan, 
July 10, 1998 
Alan 
Greenspan 
July 10, 1998 The implications of technological changes Charlotte, N.C. Charlotte Chamber of Commerce 
40 
 
Greenspan, 
Sept. 4, 1998 
Alan 
Greenspan 
Sept. 4, 1998 Question: Is there a new economy? Berkeley, 
California 
Haas Annual Business Faculty Research 
Dialogue 
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41 Meyer,     
Sept. 18, 1998 
Laurence H. 
Meyer 
Sept. 18, 1998 Recent developments in banking and 
financial markets 
Knoxville, 
Tennessee 
Financial Institutions Center, University of 
Tennessee 
42 Ferguson,   
Feb. 25, 1999 
Roger W. 
Ferguson, Jr. 
Feb. 25, 1999 Evolution of financial institutions and 
markets: Private and policy implications 
New York, N.Y. Money Marketeers of New York 
University 
43 Rivlin,      
Mar. 1, 1999 
Alice M. 
Rivlin 
Mar. 1, 1999 Learning from financial market turbulence Washington, D.C.  Institute of International Bankers 
44 Greenspan, 
April 16, 1999 
Alan 
Greenspan 
April 16, 1999 Technology and trade Dallas, Texas Dallas Ambassadors Forum 
45 
 
Greenspan, 
June 2, 1999 
Alan 
Greenspan 
June 2, 1999 Trade and technology Boston, 
Massachusetts 
Alliance for the Commonwealth, 
Conference on Intl. Business 
46 
 
Meyer,      
June 14, 1999 
Laurence H. 
Meyer 
June 14, 1999 Market discipline as a complement to bank 
supervision and regulation 
New York, N.Y. Conference on Reforming Bank Capital 
Standards 
47 Ferguson, 
Sept. 21, 1999 
Roger W.  
Ferguson, Jr. 
Sept. 21, 1999 Is info. technology the key to higher prod. 
growth in the U.S. and abroad? 
Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania 
2000 Global Economic and Investment 
Outlook Conference, CBI 
48 
 
Greenspan, 
Sept. 30, 1999 
Alan 
Greenspan 
Sept. 30, 1999 Trade and technology Minneapolis, 
Minnesota 
Minnesota Meeting 
49 Greenspan, 
Oct. 19, 1999 
Alan 
Greenspan 
Oct. 19, 1999 Do efficient financial markets mitigate 
financial crises? 
Sea Island, 
Georgia 
1999 Financial Markets Conference of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 
50 Ferguson,  
Oct. 28, 1999 
Roger W. 
Ferguson, Jr. 
Oct. 28, 1999 Financial market lessons for bankers and 
bank supervisors 
New York, N.Y. The Bond Market Association 
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51 Greenspan, 
Nov. 2, 1999 
Alan 
Greenspan 
Nov. 2, 1999 Mortgage markets and economic activity Washington, D.C. America’s Community Bankers Conf. on 
Mortgage Markets and Econ. Activity 
52 Greenspan, 
Jan. 13, 2000 
Alan 
Greenspan 
Jan. 13, 2000 Technology and the economy New York, N.Y. Economic Club of New York 
53 Ferguson,  
Feb. 17, 2000 
Roger W. 
Ferguson, Jr. 
Feb. 17, 2000 The new economy: Unanswered questions 
for 2000 
New York, N.Y. Downtown Economists Club 
54 Greenspan, 
Mar. 6, 2000 
Alan 
Greenspan 
Mar. 6, 2000 The revolution in information technology Boston, 
Massachusetts 
Boston College Conference on the New 
Economy 
55 
 
Greenspan, 
April 5, 2000 
Alan 
Greenspan 
April 5, 2000 Technological innovation and the economy Washington, D.C. White House Conference on the New 
Economy 
56 Greenspan, 
April 7, 2000 
Alan 
Greenspan 
April 7, 2000 Technological innovation and its economic 
impact 
St. Louis, 
Missouri 
National Technology Forum 
57 
 
Greenspan, 
April 14, 2000 
Alan 
Greenspan 
April 14, 2000 Technology and financial services Washington, D.C. Journal of Financial Services Research and 
the American Ent. Inst. Conference 
58 Ferguson,   
May 9, 2000 
Roger W. 
Ferguson, Jr. 
May 9, 2000 Conversation with leaders of the “new 
economy” 
Portola Valley, 
California 
New Economy Forum, Haas School of 
Business, Univ. of California, Berkeley 
59 Meyer,      
June 1, 2000 
Laurence H. 
Meyer 
June 1, 2000 The roles of banks, supervisors, and the 
market in advancing risk management 
Chicago, Illinois Risk Management Planning Conference 
60 
 
Meyer,      
June 6, 2000 
Laurence H. 
Meyer 
June 6, 2000 The new economy meets supply and 
demand 
Boston, 
Massachusetts 
Boston Economics Club 
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61 Greenspan, 
July 11, 2000 
Alan 
Greenspan 
July 11, 2000 Structural change in the new economy State College, 
Pennsylvania 
National Governors’ Association, 92nd 
Annual Meeting 
62 Ferguson,  
Oct. 11, 2000 
Roger W. 
Ferguson, Jr. 
Oct. 11, 2000 Perspectives on innovation in the retail 
payments system 
Chicago, Illinois Workshop on Promoting the Use of 
Electronic Payments, Chicago Fed. 
63 Ferguson,  
Oct. 20, 2000 
Roger W. 
Ferguson, Jr. 
Oct. 20, 2000 Information technology in banking and 
supervision 
St. Louis, 
Missouri 
Financial Services Conference, 2000 
64 
 
Greenspan, 
Nov. 20, 2000 
Alan 
Greenspan 
Nov. 20, 2000 Technology and banking Washington, D.C. Sixth Annual Reception for Regulators 
65 Greenspan, 
Dec. 5, 2000 
Alan 
Greenspan 
Dec. 5, 2000 Structural changes in the economy and 
financial markets 
New York, N.Y. America’s Community Bankers 
Conference 
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1 Toner, 1987 Robin Toner Jan. 1, 1987 Oh, what the new year might bring: Rep. and Dem. take stock after a 
dizzying year 
The New York Times 
2 Reuters, 1987 Reuters Jan. 1, 1987 Canadians start mortgage market The New York Times 
3 The NY Times, 1987 Anonymous Jan. 2, 1987 Technology seen as a top sector The New York Times 
4 Elliott, 1987 Margaret A. Elliott Jan. 5, 1987 Robert Prechter: The champion market forecaster Fortune 
5 Holden, 1987 Stephen Holden Jan. 14, 1987 Stage: ‘Take me along’ at the equity library The New York Times 
6 Fantel, 1987 Hans Fantel Jan. 18, 1987 SOUND: Awards cite innovations in amplifiers and tuners The New York Times 
7 Katz, 1987 Donald R. Katz Jan. 19, 1987 Meet the prince of penny stocks: Meyer Blinder Fortune 
8 Janofsky, 1987 Michael Janofsky Mar. 17, 1987 N.F.L. faces a new economy The New York Times 
9 Reif, 1988 Rita Reif Jan. 1, 1988 From the sublime to locker tags, 1987 was a year for record prices 
despite the stock market’s tumble 
The New York Times 
10 Flynn, 1988 Julia M. Flynn Jan. 2, 1988 Japanese becoming a force on exchanges in Chicago: Japanese gains 
on Chicago markets 
The New York Times 
11 Anderson, 1988 Jack Anderson Jan. 3, 1988 On the high price of awards for innovation The New York Times 
12 O’Reilly, 1988 Brian O’Reilly Jan. 4, 1988 John Sculley growing Apple anew for the business market Fortune 
13 Holusha, 1988 John Holusha Jan. 4, 1988 G.M. sets trade show to aid image: G.M. plans technology exhibition The New York Times 
14 AP, 1988 Associated Press Jan. 8, 1988 Pan Am Pilots to cut wages $58 million for equity stake The New York Times 
15 Fromson, 1988 Brett D. Fromson Jan. 18, 1988 A champion stock promoter Fortune 
16 Labich, 1988 Kenneth Labish Feb. 29, 1988 Technology: The shootout in supercomputers Fortune 
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17 Nasar, 1988 Sylvia Nasar Sep. 26, 1988 Preparing for a new economy Fortune 
18 O’Toole, 1988 Patricia O’Toole Oct. 23, 1988 The untrustworthy made simple: UNDERSTANDING THE NEW 
ECONOMY by Alfred L. Malabre Jr.  
The New York Times 
19 Maturi, 1989 Richard J. Maturi Jan. 1, 1989 Taking stock of investment clubs The New York Times 
20 Saul, 1989 Louise Saul Jan. 1, 1989 Helping the elderly keep their homes: Several ways to tap equity gain 
acceptance 
The New York Times 
21 Grundberg, 1989 Andy Grundberg Jan. 1, 1989 A review of the year’s innovations The New York Times 
22 Luxenberg, 1989 Stan Luxenberg Jan. 1, 1989 Prospering as others struggle: By focusing on niches or regional 
markets, three restaurant chains have avoided the industry’s travails 
The New York Times 
23 Hickspittsburgh, 1989 J. Hickspittsburgh Jan. 1, 1989 Despite Nippon Kokan’s cash and technology, National Steel remains 
an also-ran.: Japan slips 
The New York Times 
24 Brownstein, 1989 Vivian Brownstein Jan. 2, 1989 Where all the money comes from: Cash for deals is flying in from 
everywhere—savings, pension funds, home equity, overseas lenders. 
The corporate borrowing binge does not seem too risky—yet.  
Fortune 
25 Sheeline, 1989 William E. Sheeline Jan. 2, 1989 Unbundled stocks: How they work Fortune 
26 Tully, 1989 Shawn Tully Jan. 16, 1989 Nestle shows how to gobble markets Fortune 
27 Sellers, 1989 Patricia Sellers Aug 28, 1989 Tandem: A rose among the technology thorns Fortune 
28 Sterngold, 1990 James Sterngold Jan. 1, 1990 Tokyo market: Now a leader: Tokyo stock market becomes the leader The New York Times 
29 McInnis, 1990 Doug McInnis Jan. 1, 1990 Industry group formed to exploit technology developed by military The New York Times 
30 Brozan, 1990 Nadine Brozan Jan. 2, 1990 Innovations help the neediest The New York Times 
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31 Salpukas, 1990 Agis Salpukas Jan. 1, 1990 Longer lives for aging cargo ships: Shipyard capacity is tight, even as 
freight rates increase shippers seek longer life for aging cargo ships—
Companies fear the market will decline before new vessels arrive 
The New York Times 
32 Serwer, 1990 Andrew Serwer Jan. 1, 1990 How to find gems in a rough bond market Fortune 
33 Stewart, 1990 Thomas A. Stewart Jan. 1, 1990 The trouble with stock options Fortune 
34 Cowan, 1990 Alison Cowan Feb. 16, 1990 Industrial Equity sues Cummins The New York Times 
35 Clines, 1990 Francis Clines Apr. 27, 1990 Gorbachev urges new economy, otherwise ‘our society will die’ The New York Times 
36 Hylton, 1991 Richard D. Hylton Jan. 2, 1991 Experts were wrong: Small stocks lagged The New York Times 
37 Greenhouse, 1991 Steven Greenhouse Jan. 1, 1991  Czechs begin shift to free market The New York Times 
38 Broad, 1991 William J. Broad Jan. 1, 1991 Rotors and gears for tiny robots: Transforming the decade: 10 new 
technologies 
The New York Times 
39 Hamilton, 1991 Robert A. Hamilton Jan. 6, 1991 Classroom innovations encourage students and teachers to excel The New York Times 
40 Loomis, 1991 Carol J. Loomis Jan. 14, 1991 Money & markets: Citicorp’s world of troubles Fortune 
41 Celis, 1991 William Celis Jan. 19, 1991 Parents sue Alabama over school financing: Seeking equity between 
rich and poor districts 
The New York Times 
42 Teitelbaum, 1991 Richard Teitelbaum Jan. 28, 1991 Which stocks will lead when the market turns up? Fortune 
43 Kirkpatrick, 1991 David Kirkpatrick Sep. 23, 1991 Technology: Why not farm out your computing? Fortune 
44 Dumaine, 1991 Brian Dumaine Dec. 2, 1991 Closing the innovation gap Fortune 
45 Freudenheim, 1992 Milt Freudenheim Jan. 1, 1992 Though markets vary, drugs work anywhere The New York Times 
46 Reuters, 1992 Reuters Jan. 6, 1992 Tokyo stocks up sharply The New York Times 
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47 Truscott, 1992 Alan Truscott Jan. 6, 1992 Alvin Roth’s latest book shows that he is still a pioneer after 50 years 
of innovation 
The New York Times 
48 Lloyd, 1992 Barbara Lloyd Jan. 13, 1992 Powerful technology riding gentle breezes The New York Times 
49 Fortune, 1992 Anonymous Jan. 13, 1992 Waste management change with the market or die Fortune 
50 Kuhn, 1992 Susan E. Kuhn Jan. 13, 1992 A safer way to play the rally in small stocks Fortune 
51 Faison, 1992 Seth Faison Jr. Jan. 14, 1992 Shearson suspends 2 equity executives The New York Times 
52 Solo, 1992 Sally Solo Mar. 23, 1992 Sharp: From technology to market—first Fortune 
53 Vogel, 1993 Carol Vogel Jan. 1, 1993 The art market The New York Times 
54 Norris, 1993 Floyd Norris Jan. 3, 1993 Stocks are expensive, but does it matter? The New York Times 
55 Lewis, 1993 Peter H. Lewis Jan. 3, 1993 New technology on one hand is clutter on another The New York Times 
56 Nasgovitz and Sheeline, 
1993 
William Nasgovitz 
William Sheeline 
Jan. 11, 1993 Portfolio talk: Cashing in on the small-stock surge Fortune 
57 Gould, 1993 Carole Gould Jan. 24, 1993 A shift in the role of equities The New York Times 
58 Teitelbaum, 1993 Richard Teitelbaum Jan. 25, 1993 Companies to watch: Zebra Technologies Fortune 
59 Michaels et al., 1993 Daniel Michaels 
Rick Tetzeli 
Justin Martin 
Allison McCormick 
Jan. 25, 1993 Eastern Europe is one hot market Fortune 
60 Reed, 1993 M. H. Reed Mar. 7, 1993 Italian classics and some innovations The New York Times 
61 Kraar, 1993 Louis Kraar May 31, 1993 Korea’s drive for a new economy Fortune 
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62 Spiers, 1993 Joseph Spiers May 31, 1993 New Democrats try again—growth with equity by Martin Neil Fortune 
63 Nash, 1994 Nathaniel C. Nash Jan. 1, 1994 Tougher regulators police emerging Argentine market The New York Times 
64 The NY Times, 1994 Anonymous Jan. 1, 1994 Indian leader bars key aide from quitting in stock scam The New York Times 
65 Markoff, 1994 John Markoff Jan. 3, 1994 A high-technology outcry against the U.S. patent system The New York Times 
66 Riordan, 1994 Teresa Riordan Jan. 10, 1994 A cash prize for individual investors is expected to be part of a new 
$6.5 million innovation program 
The New York Times 
67 Labate, 1994a John Labate Jan. 10, 1994 Companies to watch: Applied Innovation Fortune 
68 Echikson, 1994 William Echikson Jan. 24, 1994 Hottest new stock market Fortune 
69 Teitelbaum, 1994 Richard Teitelbaum Jan. 24, 1994 The best & worst stocks of 1993 Fortune 
70 Passell, 1994 Peter Passell Jan. 30, 1994 Tapping home equity to cushion old age The New York Times 
71 Labate, 1994b John Labate Feb. 7, 1994 Technology: Companies to watch Fortune 
72 Kiechel and Schonfeld, 
1994 
Walter Kiechel III 
Erick Schonfeld 
Apr. 4, 1994 A manager’s career in the new economy Fortune 
73 Holmes, 1994 Steven A. Holmes Jul. 24, 1994 A rights leader minimizes racism as a poverty factor: Cites new 
economy as ‘the bigger culprit’ 
The New York Times 
74 Seligman, 1994 Daniel Seligman Nov 28, 1994 Great moments in gender equity Fortune 
75 Johnson, 1995 Lawrence Johnson Jan. 1, 1995 Technology view: Packing ever more into orderly all-in-one boxes The New York Times 
76 Perlez, 1995 Jane Perlez Jan. 1, 1995 In Ukraine, a free-market lesson learned too well The New York Times 
77 Zuckerman, 1995 L. Zuckerman Jan. 2, 1995 New stock and bond issues fell by almost 33% in 1994 The New York Times 
 
  
 
APPENDIX 2: TECH BUBBLE NORMATIVE PILLAR TEXTS (CONTINUED) 
No. Citation Code Author Date Title Outlet 
78 Gould, 1995 Carole Gould Jan. 14, 1995 Equity-income category shines for 3 years The New York Times 
79 Graves, 1995 Jacqueline Graves Jan. 16, 1995 Guns legislation fires up the arms market Fortune 
80 Michels, 1995 Antony J. Michels Jan. 16, 1995 The best & worst stocks of 1994 Fortune 
81 Serwer, 1995 Andrew E. Serwer Feb. 20, 1995 Paths to wealth in the new economy: Periods of great change—like the 
one now under way—favor entrepreneurs with an eye beyond business 
Fortune 
82 Calem, 1995 Robert E. Calem Feb. 26, 1995 Innovations on innovations The New York Times 
83 Labate, 1995 John Labate Apr. 3, 1995 Companies to watch: Equity Marketing Fortune 
84 Schonfeld, 1995 Erick Schonfeld Apr. 17, 1995 Stetsons off to Texan technology Fortune 
85 The NY Times, 1996a Anonymous Jan. 1, 1996 Tracking the markets: January 1, 1996 The New York Times 
86 Caruso, 1996 Denise Caruso Jan. 1, 1996 Technology: Digital commerce The New York Times 
87 Wyatt, 1996 Edward Wyatt Jan. 2, 1996 What now?: Even if `74 rings a bell, avoiding the stock market remains 
a risk, too 
The New York Times 
88 Hylton, 1996a Richard S. Hylton Jan. 15, 1996 Why the mania for tech stocks should survive the latest jolt Fortune 
89 Tabor, 1996 Mary B. W. Tabor Feb. 1, 1996 Western Publishing gives Snyder an equity stake The New York Times 
90 The NY Times, 1996b Anonymous Feb. 4, 1996 Gentrified innovation: Coffee bar also sells bagels The New York Times 
91 Serwer, 1996 Andrew Serwer Feb. 19, 1996 Making sense of the technology stock shakeout Fortune 
92 Hylton, 1996b Richard S. Hylton Apr. 1, 1996 Is the stock market too pricey? Fortune 
93 Teitelbaum, 1996 Richard Teitelbaum Apr. 29, 1996 What’s driving return on equity Fortune 
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94 Perlez, 1996 Jane Perlez May 14, 1996 A bourgeoisie blooms and goes shopping: Poland’s market reforms 
take hold: A bourgeoisie blooms and then goes shopping in Poland’s 
new economy 
The New York Times 
95 The NY Times, 1997 Anonymous Jan. 1, 1997 Markets closed The New York Times 
96 Wyatt, 1997a Edward Wyatt Jan. 2, 1997 The aging bull’s fate may be wrapped in stock mutual funds The New York Times 
97 Fabrikant, 1997 Geraldine Fabrikant Jan. 2, 1997 One challenger to cable TV fades as another appears via satellite: The 
new weapons are customer service and technology 
The New York Times 
98 Wyatt, 1997b Edward Wyatt Jan. 11, 1997 Stock funds again booming after slowing in December: After a bad 
December, equity mutual funds take off again 
The New York Times 
99 Armour and Fines, 
1997 
Lawrence Armour 
Gordon Fines 
Jan. 13, 1997 A big fan of big stocks Fortune 
100 Schonfeld, 1997 Erick Schonfeld Feb. 17, 1997 The technology that may save the net Fortune 
101 Krebs, 1997 Michelle Krebs Mar. 2, 1997 Innovations for cars of the near-future The New York Times 
102 Kover, 1997 Amy Kover Apr. 14, 1997 What’s best in a bear market? Fortune 
103 Krugman, 1997 Paul Krugman Nov 10, 1997 Requiem for the new economy Fortune 
104 Markoff, 1997 John Markoff Dec. 29, 1997 The soul of a new economy The New York Times 
105 Truell, 1998 Peter Truell Jan. 1, 1998 $319.5 billion in securities offerings sets a record: Mergers bolstered 
stock and bond issues in the face of a crisis in Asia 
The New York Times 
106 Reuters, 1998 Reuters Jan. 1, 1998 Colombian heroin dominates U.S. market, government says The New York Times 
107 Vickers, 1998 Marcia Vickers Jan. 4, 1998 Still high on low-flying technology stocks The New York Times 
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108 IHT, 1998 Intl. Herald Tribune Jan. 10, 1998 Collapse of equity sale leaves Peregrine Investments in crisis The New York Times 
109 Burkhart, 1998 Ford Burkhard Jan. 12, 1998 David Clark, 73; Furthered nuclear research: One innovation would 
provide more precise analyses of materials 
The New York Times 
110 Armour, 1998 Lawrence Armour Feb. 2, 1998 It’s bond market heaven Fortune 
111 Greenberg, 1998 Herb Greenberg Feb. 2, 1998 Beware of net stocks bearing ad tidings Fortune 
112 Lewis, 1998 Michael Lewis Feb. 8, 1998 Dinosaurs of the new economy The New York Times 
113 Rimer, 1999 Sara Rimer Jan. 1, 1999 An idea + a philanthropist = a market The New York Times 
114 Gilpin, 1999 Kenneth N. Gilpin Jan. 1, 1999 Stocks soar phoenix-like in big 4
th–quarter turnaround The New York Times 
115 Schmitt, 1999 Eric Schmitt Jan. 1, 1999 G.O.P. Senator urges action on China technology report The New York Times 
116 Altman, 1999 Lawrence Altman Jan. 8, 1999 Paul M. Zoll is dead at 87; Pioneered use of pacemakers: Innovations 
in cardiology in the 1950’s led to the develop. of coronary-care units 
The New York Times 
117 Siegel, 1999 Matt Siegel Jan. 11, 1999 The worst stock on the S&P 500  Fortune 
118 Eckholm, 1999 Erik Eckholm Jan. 25, 1999 China’s disabled are victims of a new economy The New York Times 
119 Fuerbringer, 1999 J. Fuerbringer Feb. 13, 1999 U.S. treasuries fall, sending stocks down: U.S. treasuries tumble and 
send equity prices lower 
The New York Times 
120 Fox, 1999 Justin Fox Mar. 1, 1999 Efficient markets? Hah! Fortune 
121 Schrage, 1999 Michael Schrage Mar. 29, 1999 When best practices meet the intranet, innovation takes a holiday Fortune 
122 Warner, 1999 Melanie Warner Jun. 21, 1999 A technology star gets her net valuation Fortune 
123 Ferguson, 1999 Andrew Ferguson Nov 22, 1999 Lewis and Clark find the new economy Fortune 
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124 Kelley, 2000 Tina Kelley Jan. 1, 2000 Before stocks go public, some will go to charity The New York Times 
125 Banerjee, 2000 Neela Banerjee Jan. 1, 2000 Heartened investors give stock market a lift The New York Times 
126 Race, 2000 Tim Race Jan. 1, 2000 Technology sprints, but users set their own pace The New York Times 
127 Fuerbringer, 2000 J. Fuerbringer Jan. 3, 2000 Foreign stocks outperformed U.S. equities The New York Times 
128 McLean, 2000 Bethany McLean Jan. 10, 2000 Why these biotechs are as hot as net stocks Fortune 
129 Powers, 2000 Ann Powers Jan. 14, 2000 Bounce and innovation for lovers of Irish music The New York Times 
130 Sanger, 2000 David E. Sanger Jan. 16, 2000 Lost in cyberspace: Whistling past the new economy The New York Times 
131 Tully, 2000 Shawn Tully Jan. 24, 2000 Has the market gone mad? Fortune 
132 Gunther and Gashurov, 
2000 
Marc Gunther 
Irene Gashurov 
Mar. 6, 2000 When technology attacks! Fortune 
133 Warner, 2000 Melanie Warner Apr. 17, 2000 The new wave meets the new economy Fortune 
134 Schrage, 2000 Michael Schrage Jul. 10, 2000 Nice building, but the real innovation is in the process Fortune 
135 Schukat, 2000 Anne Schukat Sep. 4, 2000 VCs build equity—and lots of debt Fortune 
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1 Proxmire, April 22, 1987 
 
Senator 
Proxmire 
100-76 April 22, 1987 Improper activities in the securities industry Oversight 
2 Heinz, April 22, 1987 
 
Senator 
Heinz 
100-76 April 22, 1987 Improper activities in the securities industry Oversight 
3 Shelby, April 22, 1987 
 
Senator 
Shelby 
100-76 April 22, 1987 Improper activities in the securities industry Oversight 
4 D’Amato, April 22, 1987 
 
Senator 
D’Amato 
100-76 April 22, 1987 Improper activities in the securities industry Oversight 
5 Riegle, April 22, 1987 
 
Senator 
Riegle 
100-76 April 22, 1987 Improper activities in the securities industry Oversight 
6 Hecht, April 22, 1987 
 
Senator 
Hecht 
100-76 April 22, 1987 Improper activities in the securities industry Oversight 
7 Garn, April 22, 1987 
 
Senator 
Garn 
100-76 April 22, 1987 Improper activities in the securities industry Oversight 
8 Dixon, April 22, 1987 
 
Senator 
Dixon 
100-76 April 22, 1987 Improper activities in the securities industry Oversight 
9 Dodd, April 22, 1987 
 
Senator 
Dodd 
100-76 April 22, 1987 Improper activities in the securities industry Oversight 
10 Sasser, April 22, 1987 
 
Senator 
Sasser 
100-76 April 22, 1987 Improper activities in the securities industry Oversight 
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11 Chafee, April 22, 1987 
 
Senator 
Chafee 
100-76 April 22, 1987 Improper activities in the securities industry Oversight 
12 Giuliani, April 22, 1987 
 
Rudolph 
Giuliani 
100-76 April 22, 1987 Improper activities in the securities industry Oversight 
13 Lynch, April 22, 1987 
 
Gary Lynch 100-76 April 22, 1987 Improper activities in the securities industry Oversight 
14 Proxmire, Aug. 6, 1987 
 
Senator 
Proxmire 
100-254 Aug. 6, 1987 New securities powers for bank holding companies Oversight 
15 D’Amato, Aug. 6, 1987 
 
Senator 
D’Amato 
100-254 Aug. 6, 1987 New securities powers for bank holding companies Oversight 
16 Garn, Aug. 6, 1987 
 
Senator 
Garn 
100-254 Aug. 6, 1987 New securities powers for bank holding companies Oversight 
17 Dixon, Aug. 6, 1987 
 
Senator 
Dixon 
100-254 Aug. 6, 1987 New securities powers for bank holding companies Oversight 
18 Heinz, Aug. 6, 1987 
 
Senator 
Heinz 
100-254 Aug. 6, 1987 New securities powers for bank holding companies Oversight 
19 Chafee, Aug. 6, 1987 
 
Senator 
Chafee 
100-254 Aug. 6, 1987 New securities powers for bank holding companies Oversight 
20 Karnes, Aug. 6, 1987 
 
Senator 
Karnes 
100-254 Aug. 6, 1987 New securities powers for bank holding companies Oversight 
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21 Kaufman, Aug. 6, 1987 
 
George 
Kaufman 
100-254 Aug. 6, 1987 New securities powers for bank holding companies Oversight 
22 Fox, Aug. 6, 1987 
 
Alan Fox 100-254 Aug. 6, 1987 New securities powers for bank holding companies Oversight 
23 Sabin, Aug. 6, 1987 
 
Stan Sabin 100-254 Aug. 6, 1987 New securities powers for bank holding companies Oversight 
24 Colton, Aug. 6, 1987 
 
Kent Colton 100-254 Aug. 6, 1987 New securities powers for bank holding companies Oversight 
25 Geltman, Aug. 6, 1987 
 
Richard 
Geltman 
100-254 Aug. 6, 1987 New securities powers for bank holding companies Oversight 
26 Guthman, Aug. 6, 1987 
 
Richard 
Guthman 
100-254 Aug. 6, 1987 New securities powers for bank holding companies Oversight 
27 Proxmire, Oct. 13, 1987 Senator 
Proxmire 
100-481 Oct. 13, 1987 Changes in our financial system: Globalization of 
capital markets and securitization of credit 
Oversight 
 
28 Dixon, Oct. 13, 1987 
 
Senator 
Dixon 
100-481 Oct. 13, 1987 Changes in our financial system: Globalization of 
capital markets and securitization of credit 
Oversight 
 
29 Sasser, Oct. 13, 1987 
 
Senator 
Sasser 
100-481 Oct. 13, 1987 Changes in our financial system: Globalization of 
capital markets and securitization of credit 
Oversight 
 
30 Garn, Oct. 13, 1987 
 
Senator 
Garn 
100-481 Oct. 13, 1987 Changes in our financial system: Globalization of 
capital markets and securitization of credit 
Oversight 
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31 
 
D’Amato, Oct. 13, 1987 
 
Senator 
D’Amato 
100-481 Oct. 13, 1987 Changes in our financial system: Globalization of 
capital markets and securitization of credit 
Oversight 
 
32 
 
Karnes, Oct. 13, 1987 Senator 
Karnes 
100-481 Oct. 13, 1987 Changes in our financial system: Globalization of 
capital markets and securitization of credit 
Oversight 
 
33 
 
Heimann, Oct. 13, 1987 John 
Heimann 
100-481 Oct. 13, 1987 Changes in our financial system: Globalization of 
capital markets and securitization of credit 
Oversight 
 
34 
 
Levich, Oct. 13, 1987 Richard 
Levich 
100-481 Oct. 13, 1987 Changes in our financial system: Globalization of 
capital markets and securitization of credit 
Oversight 
 
35 
 
Mendoza, Oct. 13, 1987 Roberto 
Mendoza 
100-481 Oct. 13, 1987 Changes in our financial system: Globalization of 
capital markets and securitization of credit 
Oversight 
 
36 
 
Proxmire, Nov. 4, 1987 Senator 
Proxmire 
100-536 Nov. 4, 1987 Volatility and panic in the nation’s financial markets Oversight 
37 
 
D’Amato, Nov. 4, 1987 Senator 
D’Amato 
100-536 Nov. 4, 1987 Volatility and panic in the nation’s financial markets Oversight 
38 Riegle, Nov. 4, 1987 
 
Senator 
Riegle 
100-536 Nov. 4, 1987 Volatility and panic in the nation’s financial markets Oversight 
39 Heinz, Nov. 4, 1987 
 
Senator 
Heinz 
100-536 Nov. 4, 1987 Volatility and panic in the nation’s financial markets Oversight 
40 Shelby, Nov. 4, 1987 
 
Senator 
Shelby 
100-536 Nov. 4, 1987 Volatility and panic in the nation’s financial markets Oversight 
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41 
 
Hecht, Nov. 4, 1987 Senator 
Hecht 
100-536 Nov. 4, 1987 Volatility and panic in the nation’s financial markets Oversight 
42 
 
Sasser, Nov. 4, 1987 Senator 
Sasser 
100-536 Nov. 4, 1987 Volatility and panic in the nation’s financial markets Oversight 
43 
 
Gramm, Nov. 4, 1987 Senator 
Gramm 
100-536 Nov. 4, 1987 Volatility and panic in the nation’s financial markets Oversight 
44 
 
Sanford, Nov. 4, 1987 Senator 
Sanford 
100-536 Nov. 4, 1987 Volatility and panic in the nation’s financial markets Oversight 
45 
 
Graham, Nov. 4, 1987 Senator 
Graham 
100-536 Nov. 4, 1987 Volatility and panic in the nation’s financial markets Oversight 
46 
 
Dixon, Nov. 4, 1987 Senator 
Dixon 
100-536 Nov. 4, 1987 Volatility and panic in the nation’s financial markets Oversight 
47 
 
Sarbanes, Nov. 4, 1987 Senator 
Sarbanes 
100-536 Nov. 4, 1987 Volatility and panic in the nation’s financial markets Oversight 
48 Dodd, Nov. 4, 1987 
 
Senator 
Dodd 
100-536 Nov. 4, 1987 Volatility and panic in the nation’s financial markets Oversight 
49 Domenici, Nov. 4, 1987 
 
Senator 
Domenici 
100-536 Nov. 4, 1987 Volatility and panic in the nation’s financial markets Oversight 
50 Ruder, Nov. 4, 1987 
 
David Ruder 100-536 Nov. 4, 1987 Volatility and panic in the nation’s financial markets Oversight 
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51 Proxmire, Feb. 2, 1988 Senator 
Proxmire 
100-649 Feb. 2, 1988 “Black Monday”, the stock market crash of October 
19, 1987 
Oversight 
52 
 
Garn, Feb. 2, 1988 Senator 
Garn 
100-649 Feb. 2, 1988 “Black Monday”, the stock market crash of October 
19, 1987 
Oversight 
53 
 
Riegle, Feb. 2, 1988 Senator 
Riegle 
100-649 Feb. 2, 1988 “Black Monday”, the stock market crash of October 
19, 1987 
Oversight 
54 
 
D’Amato, Feb. 2, 1988 Senator 
D’Amato 
100-649 Feb. 2, 1988 “Black Monday”, the stock market crash of October 
19, 1987 
Oversight 
55 
 
Dixon, Feb. 2, 1988 Senator 
Dixon 
100-649 Feb. 2, 1988 “Black Monday”, the stock market crash of October 
19, 1987 
Oversight 
56 
 
Sasser, Feb. 2, 1988 Senator 
Sasser 
100-649 Feb. 2, 1988 “Black Monday”, the stock market crash of October 
19, 1987 
Oversight 
57 
 
Bond, Feb. 2, 1988 Senator 
Bond 
100-649 Feb. 2, 1988 “Black Monday”, the stock market crash of October 
19, 1987 
Oversight 
58 
 
Wirth, Feb. 2, 1988 Senator 
Wirth 
100-649 Feb. 2, 1988 “Black Monday”, the stock market crash of October 
19, 1987 
Oversight 
59 Heinz, Feb. 2, 1988 
 
Senator 
Heinz 
100-649 Feb. 2, 1988 “Black Monday”, the stock market crash of October 
19, 1987 
Oversight 
60 Graham, Feb. 2, 1988 
 
Senator 
Graham 
100-649 Feb. 2, 1988 “Black Monday”, the stock market crash of October 
19, 1987 
Oversight 
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61 Gramm, Feb. 2, 1988 Senator 
Gramm 
100-649 Feb. 2, 1988 “Black Monday”, the stock market crash of October 
19, 1987 
Oversight 
62 
 
Sanford, Feb. 2, 1988 Senator 
Sanford 
100-649 Feb. 2, 1988 “Black Monday”, the stock market crash of October 
19, 1987 
Oversight 
63 
 
Chafee, Feb. 2, 1988 Senator 
Chafee 
100-649 Feb. 2, 1988 “Black Monday”, the stock market crash of October 
19, 1987 
Oversight 
64 
 
Shelby, Feb. 2, 1988 Senator 
Shelby 
100-649 Feb. 2, 1988 “Black Monday”, the stock market crash of October 
19, 1987 
Oversight 
65 
 
Brady, Feb. 2, 1988 Senator 
Brady 
100-649 Feb. 2, 1988 “Black Monday”, the stock market crash of October 
19, 1987 
Oversight 
66 
 
Greenspan, Feb. 2, 1988 Alan 
Greenspan 
100-649 Feb. 2, 1988 “Black Monday”, the stock market crash of October 
19, 1987 
Oversight 
67 
 
Proxmire, March 31, 
1988 
Senator 
Proxmire 
100-686 March 31, 1988 Legislative recommendations concerning the stock 
market break of 1987 
Oversight 
68 
 
D’Amato, March 31, 
1988 
Senator 
D’Amato 
100-686 March 31, 1988 Legislative recommendations concerning the stock 
market break of 1987 
Oversight 
69 Sasser, March 31, 1988 Senator 
Sasser 
100-686 March 31, 1988 Legislative recommendations concerning the stock 
market break of 1987 
Oversight 
70 Sanford, March 31, 1988 Senator 
Sanford 
100-686 March 31, 1988 Legislative recommendations concerning the stock 
market break of 1987 
Oversight 
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71 Chafee, March 31, 1988 Senator 
Chafee 
100-686 March 31, 1988 Legislative recommendations concerning the stock 
market break of 1987 
Oversight 
72 Dixon, March 31, 1988 Senator 
Dixon 
100-686 March 31, 1988 Legislative recommendations concerning the stock 
market break of 1987 
Oversight 
73 Greenspan, March 31, 
1988 
Alan 
Greenspan 
100-686 March 31, 1988 Legislative recommendations concerning the stock 
market break of 1987 
Oversight 
74 
 
Ruder, March 31, 1988 David Ruder 100-686 March 31, 1988 Legislative recommendations concerning the stock 
market break of 1987 
Oversight 
75 
 
Gramm, March 31, 1988 Wendy 
Gramm 
100-686 March 31, 1988 Legislative recommendations concerning the stock 
market break of 1987 
Oversight 
76 
 
Smith, March 31, 1988 Sherwood 
Smith 
100-686 March 31, 1988 Legislative recommendations concerning the stock 
market break of 1987 
Oversight 
77 
 
Proxmire, April 20, 1988 Senator 
Proxmire 
100-655 April 20, 1988 Intermarket frontrunning and other financial market 
manipulations 
Oversight 
78 
 
Dixon, April 20, 1988 Senator 
Dixon 
100-655 April 20, 1988 Intermarket frontrunning and other financial market 
manipulations 
Oversight 
79 Sasser, April 20, 1988 Senator 
Sasser 
100-655 April 20, 1988 Intermarket frontrunning and other financial market 
manipulations 
Oversight 
80 Sanford, April 20, 1988 Senator 
Sanford 
100-655 April 20, 1988 Intermarket frontrunning and other financial market 
manipulations 
Oversight 
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81 Kirby, April 20, 1988 Robert 
Kirby 
100-655 April 20, 1988 Intermarket frontrunning and other financial market 
manipulations 
Oversight 
82 Machold, April 20, 1988 Roland 
Machold 
100-655 April 20, 1988 Intermarket frontrunning and other financial market 
manipulations 
Oversight 
83 Kanter, April 20, 1988 Robert 
Kanter 
100-655 April 20, 1988 Intermarket frontrunning and other financial market 
manipulations 
Oversight 
84 
 
Sperandeo, April 20, 
1988 
Victor 
Sperandeo 
100-655 April 20, 1988 Intermarket frontrunning and other financial market 
manipulations 
Oversight 
85 
 
Wunsch, April 20, 1988 R. Steven 
Wunsch 
100-655 April 20, 1988 Intermarket frontrunning and other financial market 
manipulations 
Oversight 
86 
 
Proxmire, May 24, 1988 Senator 
Proxmire 
100-787 May 24, 1988 The conclusions and recommendations of the 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets 
Oversight 
87 
 
Garn, May 24, 1988 Senator 
Garn 
100-787 May 24, 1988 The conclusions and recommendations of the 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets 
Oversight 
88 
 
Dixon, May 24, 1988 Senator 
Dixon 
100-787 May 24, 1988 The conclusions and recommendations of the 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets 
Oversight 
89 Bond, May 24, 1988 
 
Senator 
Bond 
100-787 May 24, 1988 The conclusions and recommendations of the 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets 
Oversight 
90 Gramm, May 24, 1988 
 
Senator 
Gramm 
100-787 May 24, 1988 The conclusions and recommendations of the 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets 
Oversight 
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91 Hecht, May 24, 1988 Senator 
Hecht 
100-787 May 24, 1988 The conclusions and recommendations of the 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets 
Oversight 
92 D’Amato, May 24, 1988 Senator 
D’Amato 
100-787 May 24, 1988 The conclusions and recommendations of the 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets 
Oversight 
93 Sanford, May 24, 1988 Senator 
Sanford 
100-787 May 24, 1988 The conclusions and recommendations of the 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets 
Oversight 
94 Karnes, May 24, 1988 Senator 
Karnes 
100-787 May 24, 1988 The conclusions and recommendations of the 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets 
Oversight 
95 Heinz, May 24, 1988 Senator 
Heinz 
100-787 May 24, 1988 The conclusions and recommendations of the 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets 
Oversight 
96 
 
Sasser, May 24, 1988 Senator 
Sasser 
100-787 May 24, 1988 The conclusions and recommendations of the 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets 
Oversight 
97 
 
Chafee, May 24, 1988 Senator 
Chafee 
100-787 May 24, 1988 The conclusions and recommendations of the 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets 
Oversight 
98 
 
Gould, May 24, 1988 George 
Gould 
100-787 May 24, 1988 The conclusions and recommendations of the 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets 
Oversight 
99 
 
Greenspan, May 24, 1988 Alan 
Greenspan 
100-787 May 24, 1988 The conclusions and recommendations of the 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets 
Oversight 
100 
 
Ruder, May 24, 1988 David Ruder 100-787 May 24, 1988 The conclusions and recommendations of the 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets 
Oversight 
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101 W. Gramm, May 24, 
1988 
Wendy 
Gramm 
100-787 May 24, 1988 The conclusions and recommendations of the 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets 
Oversight 
102 Dodd, Oct. 26, 1989 
 
Senator 
Dodd 
101-475 May 18*,      
Oct. 26, 1989 
The Market Reform Act of 1989. S. 648 (*May 18 
hearing held by Sec. Subcommittee, thus not analyzed) 
Legislative 
103 Heinz, Oct. 26, 1989 Senator 
Heinz 
101-475 May 18*,      
Oct. 26, 1989 
The Market Reform Act of 1989. S. 648 (*May 18 
hearing held by Sec. Subcommittee, thus not analyzed) 
Legislative 
104 Riegle, Oct. 26, 1989 Senator 
Riegle 
101-475 May 18*,      
Oct. 26, 1989 
The Market Reform Act of 1989. S. 648 (*May 18 
hearing held by Sec. Subcommittee, thus not analyzed) 
Legislative 
105 Garn, Oct. 26, 1989 Senator 
Garn 
101-475 May 18*,      
Oct. 26, 1989 
The Market Reform Act of 1989. S. 648 (*May 18 
hearing held by Sec. Subcommittee, thus not analyzed) 
Legislative 
106 
 
Sarbanes, Oct. 26, 1989 Senator 
Sarbanes 
101-475 May 18*,      
Oct. 26, 1989 
The Market Reform Act of 1989. S. 648 (*May 18 
hearing held by Sec. Subcommittee, thus not analyzed) 
Legislative 
107 
 
D’Amato, Oct. 26, 1989 Senator 
D’Amato 
101-475 May 18*,      
Oct. 26, 1989 
The Market Reform Act of 1989. S. 648 (*May 18 
hearing held by Sec. Subcommittee, thus not analyzed) 
Legislative 
108 
 
Dixon, Oct. 26, 1989 Senator 
Dixon 
101-475 May 18*,      
Oct. 26, 1989 
The Market Reform Act of 1989. S. 648 (*May 18 
hearing held by Sec. Subcommittee, thus not analyzed) 
Legislative 
109 
 
Gramm, Oct. 26, 1989 Senator 
Gramm 
101-475 May 18*,      
Oct. 26, 1989 
The Market Reform Act of 1989. S. 648 (*May 18 
hearing held by Sec. Subcommittee, thus not analyzed) 
Legislative 
110 
 
Shelby, Oct. 26, 1989 Senator 
Shelby 
101-475 May 18*,      
Oct. 26, 1989 
The Market Reform Act of 1989. S. 648 (*May 18 
hearing held by Sec. Subcommittee, thus not analyzed) 
Legislative 
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111 Mack, Oct. 26, 1989 Senator 
Mack 
101-475 May 18*,      
Oct. 26, 1989 
The Market Reform Act of 1989. S. 648 (*May 18 
hearing held by Sec. Subcommittee, thus not analyzed) 
Legislative 
112 Bryan, Oct. 26, 1989 Senator 
Bryan 
101-475 May 18*,      
Oct. 26, 1989 
The Market Reform Act of 1989. S. 648 (*May 18 
hearing held by Sec. Subcommittee, thus not analyzed) 
Legislative 
113 Brady, Oct. 26, 1989 Nicholas 
Brady 
101-475 May 18*,      
Oct. 26, 1989 
The Market Reform Act of 1989. S. 648 (*May 18 
hearing held by Sec. Subcommittee, thus not analyzed) 
Legislative 
114 
 
Schwab, Oct. 26, 1989 Charles 
Schwab 
101-475 May 18*,      
Oct. 26, 1989 
The Market Reform Act of 1989. S. 648 (*May 18 
hearing held by Sec. Subcommittee, thus not analyzed) 
Legislative 
115 
 
Riegle, Sept. 14, 1990 Senator 
Riegle 
101-1104 Sept. 14, 1990 Declining competitiveness in America’s industrial, 
technological, and financial base 
Oversight 
116 
 
Shelby, Sept. 14, 1990 Senator 
Shelby 
101-1104 Sept. 14, 1990 Declining competitiveness in America’s industrial, 
technological, and financial base 
Oversight 
117 
 
Dixon, Sept. 14, 1990 Senator 
Dixon 
101-1104 Sept. 14, 1990 Declining competitiveness in America’s industrial, 
technological, and financial base 
Oversight 
118 
 
Sanford, Sept. 14, 1990 Senator 
Sanford 
101-1104 Sept. 14, 1990 Declining competitiveness in America’s industrial, 
technological, and financial base 
Oversight 
119 
 
D’Amato, Sept. 14, 1990 Senator 
D’Amato 
101-1104 Sept. 14, 1990 Declining competitiveness in America’s industrial, 
technological, and financial base 
Oversight 
120 
 
Petersen, Sept. 14, 1990 Donald 
Petersen 
101-1104 Sept. 14, 1990 Declining competitiveness in America’s industrial, 
technological, and financial base 
Oversight 
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121 Schacht, Sept. 14, 1990 
 
Henry 
Schacht 
101-1104 Sept. 14, 1990 Declining competitiveness in America’s industrial, 
technological, and financial base 
Oversight 
122 Elkus, Sept. 14, 1990 
 
Richard 
Elkus 
101-1104 Sept. 14, 1990 Declining competitiveness in America’s industrial, 
technological, and financial base 
Oversight 
123 
 
Ferguson, Sept. 14, 1990 
 
Charles 
Ferguson 
101-1104 Sept. 14, 1990 Declining competitiveness in America’s industrial, 
technological, and financial base 
Oversight 
124 
 
Riegle, April 17, 1992 Senator 
Riegle 
102-991 April 17, 1992 The effect of the decline in the Japanese markets on the 
U.S. economy 
Oversight 
125 
 
Sarbanes, April 17, 1992 Senator 
Sarbanes 
102-991 April 17, 1992 The effect of the decline in the Japanese markets on the 
U.S. economy 
Oversight 
126 
 
Greenspan, April 17, 
1992 
Alan 
Greenspan 
102-991 April 17, 1992 The effect of the decline in the Japanese markets on the 
U.S. economy 
Oversight 
127 
 
Breeden, April 17, 1992 Richard 
Breeden 
102-991 April 17, 1992 The effect of the decline in the Japanese markets on the 
U.S. economy 
Oversight 
128 
 
Riegle, Feb. 25, 1994 Senator 
Riegle 
103-510 Feb. 25, 1994 Hearing on mutual to stock conversions. S. 1801 Legislative 
129 
 
D’Amato, Feb. 25, 1994 Senator 
D’Amato 
103-510 Feb. 25, 1994 Hearing on mutual to stock conversions. S. 1801 Legislative 
130 
 
Hove, Feb. 25, 1994 Andrew 
Hove 
103-510 Feb. 25, 1994 Hearing on mutual to stock conversions. S. 1801 Legislative 
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131 Fiechter, Feb. 25, 1994 
 
Jonathan 
Fiechter 
103-510 Feb. 25, 1994 Hearing on mutual to stock conversions. S. 1801 Legislative 
132 Cephas, Feb. 25, 1994 
 
Derrick 
Cephas 
103-510 Feb. 25, 1994 Hearing on mutual to stock conversions. S. 1801 Legislative 
133 
 
Drumm, Feb. 25, 1994 William 
Drumm 
103-510 Feb. 25, 1994 Hearing on mutual to stock conversions. S. 1801 Legislative 
134 
 
Carson, Feb. 25, 1994 David 
Carson 
103-510 Feb. 25, 1994 Hearing on mutual to stock conversions. S. 1801 Legislative 
135 
 
Lewis, Feb. 25, 1994 Chris Lewis 103-510 Feb. 25, 1994 Hearing on mutual to stock conversions. S. 1801 Legislative 
136 
 
D’Amato, June 5, 1996 Senator 
D’Amato 
104-681 June 5, 1996 The Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996—S. 
1815 
Legislative 
137 
 
Gramm, June 5, 1996 Senator 
Gramm 
104-681 June 5, 1996 The Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996—S. 
1815 
Legislative 
138 
 
Dodd, June 5, 1996 Senator 
Dodd 
104-681 June 5, 1996 The Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996—S. 
1815 
Legislative 
139 
 
Mack, June 5, 1996 Senator 
Mack 
104-681 June 5, 1996 The Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996—S. 
1815 
Legislative 
140 
 
Faircloth, June 5, 1996 Senator 
Faircloth 
104-681 June 5, 1996 The Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996—S. 
1815 
Legislative 
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141 Sarbanes, June 5, 1996 Senator 
Sarbanes 
104-681 June 5, 1996 The Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996—S. 
1815 
Legislative 
142 Bond, June 5, 1996 Senator 
Bond 
104-681 June 5, 1996 The Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996—S. 
1815 
Legislative 
143 
 
Grams, June 5, 1996 Senator 
Grams 
104-681 June 5, 1996 The Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996—S. 
1815 
Legislative 
144 
 
Domenici, June 5, 1996 Senator 
Domenici 
104-681 June 5, 1996 The Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996—S. 
1815 
Legislative 
145 
 
Levitt, June 5, 1996 Arthur 
Levitt 
104-681 June 5, 1996 The Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996—S. 
1815 
Legislative 
146 
 
Brody, June 5, 1996 Christopher 
Brody 
104-681 June 5, 1996 The Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996—S. 
1815 
Legislative 
147 
 
Fink, June 5, 1996 Matthew 
Fink 
104-681 June 5, 1996 The Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996—S. 
1815 
Legislative 
148 
 
Harris, June 5, 1996 Dee Harris 104-681 June 5, 1996 The Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996—S. 
1815 
Legislative 
149 
 
Krongard, June 5, 1996 A.B. 
Krongard 
104-681 June 5, 1996 The Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996—S. 
1815 
Legislative 
150 
 
Saltzman, June 5, 1996 Paul 
Saltzman 
104-681 June 5, 1996 The Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996—S. 
1815 
Legislative 
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151 Tomasko, June 5, 1996 
 
Mark 
Tomasko 
104-681 June 5, 1996 The Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996—S. 
1815 
Legislative 
152 Wechsler, June 5, 1996 
 
Marysue 
Wechsler 
104-681 June 5, 1996 The Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996—S. 
1815 
Legislative 
153 Lang, June 5, 1996 Robert Lang 104-681 June 5, 1996 The Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996—S. 
1815 
Legislative 
154 
 
Wallman, June 5, 1996 Steven 
Wallman 
104-681 June 5, 1996 The Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996—S. 
1815 
Legislative 
155 
 
Boigegrain and Powell, 
June 5, 1996 
Boigegrain 
and Powell 
104-681 June 5, 1996 The Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996—S. 
1815 
Legislative 
156 
 
Gramm, Sept. 28, 1999 Senator 
Gramm 
106-917 Sept. 28, 1999 Public ownership of the U.S. stock markets Oversight 
157 
 
Sarbanes, Sept. 28, 1999 Senator 
Sarbanes 
106-917 Sept. 28, 1999 Public ownership of the U.S. stock markets Oversight 
158 
 
Santorum, Sept. 28, 1999 Senator 
Santorum 
106-917 Sept. 28, 1999 Public ownership of the U.S. stock markets Oversight 
159 
 
Bayh, Sept. 28, 1999 Senator 
Bayh 
106-917 Sept. 28, 1999 Public ownership of the U.S. stock markets Oversight 
160 
 
Bennett, Sept. 28, 1999 Senator 
Bennett 
106-917 Sept. 28, 1999 Public ownership of the U.S. stock markets Oversight 
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161 Schumer, Sept. 28, 1999 
 
Senator 
Schumer 
106-917 Sept. 28, 1999 Public ownership of the U.S. stock markets Oversight 
162 Hagel, Sept. 28, 1999 
 
Senator 
Hagel 
106-917 Sept. 28, 1999 Public ownership of the U.S. stock markets Oversight 
163 
 
Grams, Sept. 28, 1999 Senator 
Grams 
106-917 Sept. 28, 1999 Public ownership of the U.S. stock markets Oversight 
164 
 
Dodd, Sept. 28, 1999 Senator 
Dodd 
106-917 Sept. 28, 1999 Public ownership of the U.S. stock markets Oversight 
165 
 
Grasso, Sept. 28, 1999 Richard 
Grasso 
106-917 Sept. 28, 1999 Public ownership of the U.S. stock markets Oversight 
166 
 
Zarb, Sept. 28, 1999 Frank Zarb 106-917 Sept. 28, 1999 Public ownership of the U.S. stock markets Oversight 
167 
 
Levitt, Feb. 28, 2000 Arthur 
Levitt 
Not provided Feb. 28, 2000 The Securities Fees Rationalization Act Field (New York) 
168 
 
Campbell, Feb. 28, 2000 Patrick 
Campbell 
Not provided Feb. 28, 2000 The Securities Fees Rationalization Act Field (New York) 
169 
 
Helsby, Feb. 28, 2000 Keith 
Helsby 
Not provided Feb. 28, 2000 The Securities Fees Rationalization Act Field (New York) 
170 
 
Korins, Feb. 28, 2000 Leopold 
Korins 
Not provided Feb. 28, 2000 The Securities Fees Rationalization Act Field (New York) 
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171 Seijas, Feb. 28, 2000 
 
Robert 
Seijas 
Not provided Feb. 28, 2000 The Securities Fees Rationalization Act Field (New York) 
172 Simmons, Feb. 28, 2000 
 
Hardwick 
Simmons 
Not provided Feb. 28, 2000 The Securities Fees Rationalization Act Field (New York) 
173 
 
Gramm, Feb. 29, 2000 Senator 
Gramm 
Not provided Feb. 29, 2000 The financial marketplace of the future Field (New York) 
174 
 
Grasso, Feb. 29, 2000 Richard 
Grasso 
Not provided Feb. 29, 2000 The financial marketplace of the future Field (New York) 
175 
 
Komansky, Feb. 29, 2000 David 
Komansky 
Not provided Feb. 29, 2000 The financial marketplace of the future Field (New York) 
176 
 
Levitt, Feb. 29, 2000 Arthur 
Levitt 
Not provided Feb. 29, 2000 The financial marketplace of the future Field (New York) 
177 
 
Paulson, Feb. 29, 2000 Henry 
Paulson 
Not provided Feb. 29, 2000 The financial marketplace of the future Field (New York) 
178 
 
Purcell, Feb. 29, 2000 Philip 
Purcell 
Not provided Feb. 29, 2000 The financial marketplace of the future Field (New York) 
179 
 
Schwab, Feb. 29, 2000 Charles 
Schwab 
Not provided Feb. 29, 2000 The financial marketplace of the future Field (New York) 
180 
 
Wheat, Feb. 29, 2000 Allen Wheat Not provided Feb. 29, 2000 The financial marketplace of the future Field (New York) 
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181 Zarb, Feb. 29, 2000 
 
Frank Zarb Not provided Feb. 29, 2000 The financial marketplace of the future Field (New York) 
182 
 
Gramm, April 13, 2000 Senator 
Gramm 
106-939 April 13, 2000 Structure of the securities markets Oversight 
183 
 
Sarbanes, April 13, 2000 Senator 
Sarbanes 
106-939 April 13, 2000 Structure of the securities markets Oversight 
184 
 
Bunning, April 13, 2000 Senator 
Bunning 
106-939 April 13, 2000 Structure of the securities markets Oversight 
185 
 
Schumer, April 13, 2000 Senator 
Schumer 
106-939 April 13, 2000 Structure of the securities markets Oversight 
186 
 
Grams, April 13, 2000 Senator 
Grams 
106-939 April 13, 2000 Structure of the securities markets Oversight 
187 
 
Bennett, April 13, 2000 Senator 
Bennett 
106-939 April 13, 2000 Structure of the securities markets Oversight 
188 
 
Bayh, April 13, 2000 Senator 
Bayh 
106-939 April 13, 2000 Structure of the securities markets Oversight 
189 
 
Greenspan, April 13, 
2000 
Alan 
Greenspan 
106-939 April 13, 2000 Structure of the securities markets Oversight 
190 
 
Grams, May 8, 2000 Senator 
Grams 
Not provided May 8, 2000 Maintaining leadership in the financial marketplace of 
the future 
Field (Chicago, IL) 
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191 Brennan, May 8, 2000 
 
David 
Brennan 
Not provided May 8, 2000 Maintaining leadership in the financial marketplace of 
the future 
Field (Chicago, IL) 
192 Brodsky, May 8, 2000 
 
William 
Brodsky 
Not provided May 8, 2000 Maintaining leadership in the financial marketplace of 
the future 
Field (Chicago, IL) 
193 Dorsch, May 8, 2000 Shawn 
Dorsch 
Not provided May 8, 2000 Maintaining leadership in the financial marketplace of 
the future 
Field (Chicago, IL) 
194 
 
Downey, May 8, 2000 David 
Downey 
Not provided May 8, 2000 Maintaining leadership in the financial marketplace of 
the future 
Field (Chicago, IL) 
195 
 
Forney, May 8, 2000 Robert 
Forney 
Not provided May 8, 2000 Maintaining leadership in the financial marketplace of 
the future 
Field (Chicago, IL) 
196 
 
Gordon, May 8, 2000 Scott 
Gordon 
Not provided May 8, 2000 Maintaining leadership in the financial marketplace of 
the future 
Field (Chicago, IL) 
197 
 
Levitt, May 8, 2000 Arthur 
Levitt 
Not provided May 8, 2000 Maintaining leadership in the financial marketplace of 
the future 
Field (Chicago, IL) 
198 
 
Putnam, May 8, 2000 Gerald 
Putnam, Jr. 
Not provided May 8, 2000 Maintaining leadership in the financial marketplace of 
the future 
Field (Chicago, IL) 
199 
 
Rainer, May 8, 2000 William 
Rainer 
Not provided May 8, 2000 Maintaining leadership in the financial marketplace of 
the future 
Field (Chicago, IL) 
200 
 
Skolnik, May 8, 2000 Bradley 
Skolnik 
Not provided May 8, 2000 Maintaining leadership in the financial marketplace of 
the future 
Field (Chicago, IL) 
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APPENDIX 4: EXAMPLE OF ANALYSIS 
This appendix includes an example of how one item was coded for this thesis. In total, the three 
pillars consisted of 400 items (65 speeches by Federal Reserve officials, 135 media articles, and 200 
statements at U.S. Senate hearings). While each item was unique in its content, each item was coded 
according to the same procedure. Thus, readers can mentally extrapolate this example to understand 
how all 400 items were coded.  
The item chosen for this example is a speech given by Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan in 
March of 2000, entitled “The revolution in information technology.” This item was chosen because 
it includes examples of an economic connotation; a broader, economic narrative; a tech connotation; 
an asset-level, tech narrative; and a few means of both institutionalization and failed 
deinstitutionalization.  
Additionally, as the speech was given by Alan Greenspan, it is also important for the large 
influence that he had on U.S. economic discourse of the late 1990s, as demonstrated in this thesis. 
As the speech was given in March of 2000, it is also an example of one type of discourse that was 
found at the peak of the tech bubble, with stocks suffering their first large drop just a few weeks 
later in April. 
It is important to note that while the following is one example from the year 2000, it is certainly 
not representative of all items from that time period. While this example is largely positive in its 
tonality and narratives, which is indicative of most items from the year 2000, significant variation in 
narratives and discourse was still present in this final year of the sample. Readers should consult the 
empirical chapters of this thesis (Chapters 6 through 9) for a detailed discussion of the variation 
between items.  
The following example on the next seven pages consists of 27 paragraphs, which are labeled as 
such with a number at the beginning of each paragraph (all of these labels are added). I use these 
labels as reference points during my explanation of the analytical procedure, the discussion of 
which immediately follows the example. While the text was formatted to conform to this 
document’s paragraph style, it was not edited or changed in any other way.   
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Speech by Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan 
“The revolution in information technology” 
Before the Boston College Conference on the New Economy, Boston, Massachusetts 
March 6, 2000 
 
(1) In the last few years it has become increasingly clear that this business cycle differs in a very 
profound way from the many other cycles that have characterized post-World War II America. Not 
only has the expansion achieved record length, but it has done so with economic growth far stronger 
than expected. Most remarkably, inflation has remained largely subdued in the face of labor markets 
tighter than any we have experienced in a generation. 
(2) A key factor behind this extremely favorable performance has been the resurgence in 
productivity growth. Since 1995, output per hour in the nonfinancial corporate sector has increased 
at an average annual rate of 3-1/2 percent, nearly double the average pace over the preceding 
quarter-century. Indeed, the rate of growth appears to have been rising throughout the period. 
(3) My remarks today will focus both on what is evidently the source of this spectacular 
performance—the revolution in information technology—and on its implications for key 
government policies. 
(4) When historians look back at the latter half of the 1990s a decade or two hence, I suspect 
that they will conclude we are now living through a pivotal period in American economic history. 
New technologies that evolved from the cumulative innovations of the past half-century have now 
begun to bring about dramatic changes in the way goods and services are produced and in the way 
they are distributed to final users. Those innovations, exemplified most recently by the multiplying 
uses of the Internet, have brought on a flood of startup firms, many of which claim to offer the 
chance to revolutionize and dominate large shares of the nation’s production and distribution 
system. And participants in capital markets, not comfortable dealing with discontinuous shifts in 
economic structure, are groping for the appropriate valuations of these companies. The exceptional 
stock price volatility of these newer firms and, in the view of some, their outsized valuations 
indicate the difficulty of divining the particular technologies and business models that will prevail 
in the decades ahead. 
(5) How did we arrive at such a fascinating and, to some, unsettling point in history? While the 
process of innovation, of course, is never-ending, the development of the transistor after World War 
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II appears in retrospect to have initiated a special wave of innovative synergies. It brought us the 
microprocessor, the computer, satellites, and the joining of laser and fiber-optic technologies. By 
the 1990s, these and a number of lesser but critical innovations had, in turn, fostered an enormous 
new capacity to capture, analyze, and disseminate information. It is the growing use of information 
technology throughout the economy that makes the current period unique. 
(6) However, until the mid-1990s, the billions of dollars that businesses had poured into 
information technology seemed to leave little imprint on the overall economy. The investment in 
new technology arguably had not yet cumulated to be a sizable part of the U.S. capital stock, and 
computers were still being used largely on a stand-alone basis. The full value of computing power 
could be realized only after ways had been devised to link computers into large-scale networks. As 
we all know, that day has arrived. 
(7) At a fundamental level, the essential contribution of information technology is the expansion 
of knowledge and its obverse, the reduction in uncertainty. Before this quantum jump in 
information availability, most business decisions were hampered by a fog of uncertainty. Businesses 
had limited and lagging knowledge of customers’ needs and of the location of inventories and 
materials flowing through complex production systems. In that environment, doubling up on 
materials and people was essential as a backup to the inevitable misjudgments of the real-time state 
of play in a company. Decisions were made from information that was hours, days, or even weeks 
old. 
(8) Of course, large voids of information still persist, and forecasts of future events on which all 
business decisions ultimately depend will always be prone to error. But information has become 
vastly more available in real time—resulting, for example, from developments such as electronic 
data interface between the retail checkout counter and the factory floor or the satellite location of 
trucks. This surge in the availability of more timely information has enabled business management 
to remove large swaths of inventory safety stocks and worker redundancies. Stated differently, 
fewer goods and worker hours are now involved in activities that, although perceived as necessary 
insurance to sustain valued output, in the end produced nothing of value.  
(9) Those intermediate production and distribution activities, so essential when information and 
quality control were poor, are being reduced in scale and, in some cases, eliminated. These trends 
may well gather speed and force as the Internet alters relationships of businesses to their suppliers 
and their customers, a topic to which I shall return in a moment. 
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(10) The process of information innovation has gone far beyond the factory floor and 
distribution channels. Computer modeling, for example, has dramatically reduced the time and cost 
required to design items ranging from motor vehicles to commercial airliners to skyscrapers. In a 
very different part of the economy, medical diagnoses have become more thorough, more accurate, 
and far faster. With access to heretofore unavailable information, treatment has been hastened, and 
hours of procedures have been eliminated. Moreover, the potential for discovering more-effective 
treatments has been greatly enhanced by the parallel revolution in biotechnology, including the 
ongoing effort to map the entire human genome. That work would have been unthinkable without 
the ability to store and process huge amounts of data. 
(11) The advances in information technology also have been an impetus to the ongoing wave of 
strategic alliance and merger activity. Hardly a week passes without the announcement of another 
blockbuster deal. Many of these combinations arise directly from the opportunities created by new 
technology—for example, those at the intersection of the Internet, telecommunications, and the 
media. It is not possible to know which of the many new technologies will ultimately find a firm 
foothold in our rapidly changing economy. Accordingly, many high-tech companies that wish to 
remain independent are hedging their bets by entering into strategic alliances with firms developing 
competing technologies. 
(12) In addition, the new technology has fostered full mergers that allow firms to take greater 
advantage of economies of scale and thus reduce costs. Without highly sophisticated information 
technology, it would be nearly impossible to manage firms on the scale of some that have been 
proposed or actually created of late. Although it will be a while before the ultimate success of these 
endeavors can be judged, information technology has almost certainly pushed out the point at which 
scale diseconomies begin to take hold for some industries. 
(13) The impact of information technology has been keenly felt in the financial sector of the 
economy. Perhaps the most significant innovation has been the development of financial 
instruments that enable risk to be reallocated to the parties most willing and able to bear that risk. 
Many of the new financial products that have been created, with financial derivatives being the 
most notable, contribute economic value by unbundling risks and shifting them in a highly 
calibrated manner. Although these instruments cannot reduce the risk inherent in real assets, they 
can redistribute it in a way that induces more investment in real assets and, hence, engenders higher 
productivity and standards of living. Information technology has made possible the creation, 
valuation, and exchange of these complex financial products on a global basis. 
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(14) At the end of the day, the benefits of new technologies can be realized only if they are 
embodied in capital investment, defined to include any outlay that increases the value of the firm. 
For these investments to be made, the prospective rate of return must exceed the cost of capital. 
Technological synergies have enlarged the set of productive capital investments, while lofty equity 
values and declining prices of high-tech equipment have reduced the cost of capital. The result has 
been a veritable explosion of spending on high-tech equipment and software, which has raised the 
growth of the capital stock dramatically over the past five years. The fact that the capital spending 
boom is still going strong indicates that businesses continue to find a wide array of potential high-
rate-of-return, productivity-enhancing investments. And I see nothing to suggest that these 
opportunities will peter out any time soon. 
(15) Indeed, many argue that the pace of innovation will continue to quicken in the next few 
years, as companies exploit the still largely untapped potential for e-commerce, especially in the 
business-to-business arena, where most observers expect the fastest growth. An electronic market 
that would automatically solicit bids from suppliers has the potential for substantially reducing 
search and transaction costs for individual firms and for the economy as a whole. This reduction 
would mean less unproductive search and fewer workhours more generally embodied in each unit 
of output, enhancing output per hour. Already, major efforts have been announced in the auto 
industry to move purchasing operations to the Internet. Similar developments are planned or in 
operation in many other industries as well. It appears to be only a matter of time before the Internet 
becomes the prime venue for the trillions of dollars of business-to-business commerce conducted 
every year. 
(16) There can be little doubt that, on balance, the evolving surge in innovation is an 
unmitigated good for the large majority of the American people. Yet, implicit in the very forces of 
change that are bringing us a panoply of goods and services considered unimaginable only a 
generation ago are potential financial imbalances and worker insecurities that need to be addressed 
if the full potential of our technological largesse is to be achieved. 
(17) As I testified before the Congress last month, accelerating productivity entails a matching 
acceleration in the potential output of goods and services and a corresponding rise in real incomes 
available to purchase the new output. The pickup in productivity however tends to create even 
greater increases in aggregate demand than in potential aggregate supply. This occurs principally 
because a rise in structural productivity growth, not surprisingly, fosters higher expectations for 
long-term corporate earnings. These higher expectations, in turn, not only spur business investment 
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but also increase stock prices and the market value of assets held by households, creating additional 
purchasing power for which no additional goods or services have yet been produced. 
(18) Historical evidence suggests that perhaps three to four cents out of every additional dollar 
of stock market wealth eventually is reflected in increased consumer purchases. The sharp rise in 
the amount of consumer outlays relative to disposable incomes in recent years, and the 
corresponding fall in the saving rate, is a reflection of this so-called wealth effect on household 
purchases. Moreover, higher stock prices, by lowering the cost of equity capital, have helped to 
support the boom in capital spending. 
(19) Outlays prompted by capital gains in equities and homes in excess of increases in income, 
as best we can judge, have added about 1 percentage point to annual growth of gross domestic 
purchases, on average, over the past half-decade. The additional growth in spending of recent years 
that has accompanied these wealth gains, as well as other supporting influences on the economy, 
appears to have been met in equal measure by increased net imports and by goods and services 
produced by the net increase in newly hired workers over and above the normal growth of the 
workforce, including a substantial net inflow of workers from abroad. 
(20) But these safety valves that have been supplying goods and services to meet the recent 
increments to purchasing power largely generated by capital gains cannot be expected to absorb 
indefinitely an excess of demand over supply. Growing net imports and a widening current account 
deficit require ever-larger portfolio and direct foreign investments in the United States, an outcome 
that cannot continue without limit.  
(21) Imbalances in the labor markets perhaps may have even more serious implications for 
potential inflation pressures. While the pool of officially unemployed and those otherwise willing to 
work may continue to shrink, as it has persistently over the past seven years, there is an effective 
limit to new hiring, unless immigration is uncapped. At some point in the continuous reduction in 
the number of available workers willing to take jobs, short of the repeal of the law of supply and 
demand, wage increases must rise above even impressive gains in productivity. This would 
intensify inflationary pressures or squeeze profit margins, with either outcome capable of bringing 
our growing prosperity to an end. In short, unless we are able to indefinitely increase the rate of 
capital flows into the United States to finance rising net imports or continuously augment 
immigration quotas, overall demand for goods and services cannot chronically exceed the 
underlying growth rate of supply. 
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(22) Our immediate goal at the Federal Reserve should be to encourage the economic and 
financial conditions that will best foster the technological innovation and investment that spur 
structural productivity growth. It is structural productivity growth—not the temporary rise and fall 
of output per hour associated with various stages of the business cycle—that determines how 
rapidly living standards rise over time. Achievement of this goal requires a stable macroeconomic 
environment of sustained growth and continued low inflation. That, in turn, means that the 
expansion of demand must moderate into alignment with the more rapid growth rate of potential 
supply. 
(23) The current gap between the growth of supply and demand for goods and services, of 
necessity, has been reflected in an excess in the demand for funds over new savings from 
Americans, including those savings generated by rising budget surpluses. As a consequence, real 
long-term corporate borrowing costs have risen significantly over the past two years. Presumably as 
a result, many analysts are now projecting that the rate of increase in stock market wealth may soon 
begin to slow. If so, the wealth effect adding to spending growth would eventually be damped, and 
both the rate of increase in net imports as a share of GDP, and the rate of decline in the pool of 
unemployed workers willing to work should also slow. However, so long as these two imbalances 
continue, reflecting the excess of demand over supply, the level of potential workers will continue 
to fall and the net debt to foreigners will continue to rise by increasing amounts. 
(24) Until market forces, assisted by a vigilant Federal Reserve, effect the necessary alignment 
of the growth of aggregate demand with the growth of potential aggregate supply, the full benefits 
of innovative productivity acceleration are at risk of being undermined by financial and economic 
instability. 
(25) The second consequence of rapid economic and technological change that needs to be 
addressed is growing worker insecurity, the result, I suspect, of fear of potential job skill 
obsolescence. Despite the tightest labor markets in a generation, more workers currently report they 
are fearful of losing their jobs than similar surveys found in 1991 at the bottom of the last recession. 
The marked move of capital from failing technologies to those at the cutting edge has quickened the 
pace at which job skills become obsolete. The completion of high school used to equip the average 
worker with sufficient skills to last a lifetime. That is no longer true, as evidenced by community 
colleges being inundated with workers returning to school to acquire new skills and on-the-job 
training being expanded and upgraded by a large proportion of American business. 
(26) Not unexpectedly, greater worker insecurities are creating political pressures to reduce the 
fierce global competition that has emerged in the wake of our 1990s technology boom. Protectionist 
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measures, I have no doubt, could temporarily reduce some worker anxieties by inhibiting these 
competitive forces. However, over the longer run such actions would slow innovation and impede 
the rise in living standards. They could not alter the eventual shifts in production that owe to 
enormous changes in relative prices across the economy. Protectionism might enable a worker in a 
declining industry to hold onto his job longer. But would it not be better for that worker to seek a 
new career in a more viable industry at age 35 than hang on until age 50, when job opportunities 
would be far scarcer and when the lifetime benefits of additional education and training would be 
necessarily smaller? To be sure, assisting those who are already close to retirement in failing 
industries is an imperative. But that can be readily accomplished without distorting necessary 
capital flows to newer technologies through protectionist measures. More generally, we must ensure 
that our whole population receives an education that will allow full participation in this dynamic 
period of American economic history. 
(27) These years of extraordinary innovation are enhancing the standard of living for a large 
majority of Americans. We should be thankful for that and persevere in policies that enlarge the 
scope for competition and innovation and thereby foster greater opportunities for everyone.  
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Analysis results 
Analysis for each item was comprised of Stages 3 and 4 of the analytical procedure, as outlined on 
Table 4.1 in the methods chapter. These two stages are explained below.  
Stage 3: Narrative analysis 
As explained in Chapter 4, this third stage of analysis was designed to capture the emergence and 
characteristics of the various narratives that emerged in each text. This stage was conducted in four 
highly interrelated and iterative steps, as explained below. 
Step 1: Connotation of U.S. economy/companies 
Coding: Positive 
Explanation: The positive tonality of this speech is established in the first paragraph, as 
Greenspan remarks that the current expansion has “achieved record length” with “economic growth 
far stronger than expected.” In the same paragraph, he notes, “inflation has remained largely 
subdued.” This positive connotation continues throughout the entire article, as Greenspan comments 
on how businesses can reduce uncertainty in terms of knowledge of their customers and inventory 
management (paragraph 7), the large number of “blockbuster” alliances and mergers (paragraph 11), 
the ability to take “greater advantage of economies of scale” (paragraph 12), the development of 
risk-reducing derivative instruments (paragraph 13), and the capital spending boom in high-tech 
equipment (paragraph 14). While Greenspan does note two key impeding forces to the current 
boom—those being financial imbalances and worker insecurity—the overall positive tonality of the 
speech is confirmed in the final paragraph, where Greenspan observes, “These years of 
extraordinary innovation are enhancing the standard of living for a large majority of Americans.” 
Step 2: U.S. economy/company narratives 
Coding: New Economy 
Explanation: Such a coding for this speech is first hinted at in the title of the conference, the 
“Boston College Conference on the New Economy,” but Greenspan makes this interpretation of the 
U.S. economy clear throughout.  
First, in the first paragraph, he notes that the current business cycle is clearly different from any 
such cycle over the past 50 years. He notes the record productivity growth (paragraph 2), subdued 
inflation (paragraph 1), and the source of this growth, the revolution in information technology 
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(paragraph 3). He elaborates in the fourth paragraph that an accumulation of innovations has 
resulted in “dramatic changes in the way goods and services are produced.” This is a quintessential 
explanation of the “new economy” of the late 1990s, where rapid innovations in information 
technology were resulting in dramatically higher growth rates and the replacement of manufacturing 
sector jobs with new, IT-focused service sector jobs.  
This speech also reveals a great deal about the context and key enabling and impeding forces of 
the new economy. In terms of context, Greenspan highlights this in the third paragraph: “…what is 
evidently the source of this spectacular performance—the revolution in information technology.” 
Again, his elaboration of the cumulative impact of innovations over the past 50 years in the fourth 
paragraph further reiterates the point that this “new economy” is only possible because of the rapid 
and cumulative changes that the IT revolution has brought about.  
In terms of enabling forces, Greenspan highlights a few, including technological advancements 
such as the linkage of computers into large-scale networks (paragraph 6), free global trade 
(paragraph 26), and a world-class educational system (paragraph 26). Impeding forces include 
financial imbalances and inflationary pressures (paragraphs 17–24), worker insecurities (paragraphs 
25 and 26), and protectionism (paragraph 26).  
Step 3: Connotation of tech companies/stocks 
Coding: Positive 
Explanation: Greenspan expounds an extremely positive view of technology and tech 
companies throughout this speech. As explained above, in this speech, Greenspan views 
information technology as the sole source of the spectacular performance of the U.S. economy. 
While he notes that some tech companies may not last due to tough competition and an unknown 
future, tech companies are seen as revolutionizing the nation’s production and distribution system 
(paragraph 4). Thus, all the benefits of the new economy, as explained above, are made possible by 
technology.   
Step 4: Tech company/stock narratives 
Coding: Technological Dominance 
Explanation: This narrative is evident throughout and the sole focus of this speech, as seen in 
the title, “The revolution in information technology.” In the fourth paragraph, Greenspan observes, 
“Those innovations, exemplified most recently by the multiplying uses of the Internet, have brought 
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on a flood of startup firms, many of which claim to offer the chance to revolutionize and dominate 
large shares of the nation’s production and distribution system (emphasis added).” In this speech, 
Greenspan also notes the high market valuations awarded to tech startups. 
The destinator or context for this dominance is the profound, “discontinuous” shift in the 
economy (paragraph 4). The accumulation of innovations over the past 50 years is also noted as a 
key reason such dominance is now possible.  
In terms of enabling and impeding forces, constant innovation (paragraph 4), technological 
synergies (paragraph 6), and high equity values or a low cost of capital (paragraph 14) are 
highlighted as key enablers, while intense competition (paragraph 11) and a lack of skills and 
education (paragraphs 25 and 26) are seen as impeding forces.  
Stage 4: Institutional analysis 
This fourth stage was conducted in a more open manner, as I examined the broader institutional 
features of each item. Below, I list some of the key questions posed by such an analysis. Such 
questions and their answers then led me to consider further questions. While this process remained 
open and flexible, the key concern remained understanding whether and how the boom narratives 
regarding tech companies and the new economy came to be a taken-for-granted assumption, or 
socially established facts, for investors during the late 1990s. 
What are some of the key assumptions? 
Several assumptions are made in this speech. One key assumption is that Greenspan sees the 
economy’s current condition, being its remarkable growth, as a culmination of over 50 years of 
innovation and that this pace of change will continue. He comments, “Indeed, many argue that the 
pace of innovation will continue to quicken in the next few years…(paragraph 15).” He elaborates 
that there is still the “largely untapped potential for e-commerce,” which will grow exponentially 
over the next few years. Such an assumption is so important because it suggests that, far from the 
boom being about to end, it is only just beginning.  
What is seen as self-evident, requiring little explanation? 
This speech is full of extremely confident, matter-of-fact language. Examples include (all 
emphases added), “…it has become increasingly clear that this business cycle differs in a very 
profound way from the many other cycles that have characterized post-World War II America 
(paragraph 1),” “And I see nothing to suggest that these opportunities will peter out any time soon 
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(paragraph 14),” and “…information technology has almost certainly pushed out the point at which 
scale diseconomies begin to take hold for some industries (paragraph 12).” 
As a result of such language, the narratives of a “New Economy” and “Technological 
Dominance” come across as heavily institutionalized in this speech.  
What benefits or consequences are mentioned? 
In this speech, the technological revolution is viewed as a huge boost for U.S. productivity 
(paragraph 2), employment (paragraph 21), living standards (paragraph 13), and business growth 
and efficiency (paragraphs 7, 8, and throughout). Protectionist measures are viewed as resulting in 
slower innovation and lower living standards (paragraph 26). 
What is it possible to speak of? Has this changed over time? 
In paragraph 12, Greenspan argues that IT has now “pushed out the point at which scale 
diseconomies begin to take hold for some industries.” Thus, IT enables larger, conglomerate-style 
corporations, even those that were inefficient in past times. This argument bodes well for 
organizations that plan to grow beyond what was once deemed reasonable or practicable. 
Also, this argument and Greenspan’s view that “blockbuster” strategic alliances are beneficial 
combine to offer a very powerful incentive for companies to grow and merge and for investors to 
support such behavior.  
What terms are re-used or re-circulated? 
Concepts such as the “new economy,” U.S. tech dominance, and unprecedented productivity 
growth were altogether absent from the first half of this pillar. In fact, quite the contrary, many 
speakers argued that U.S. companies were falling behind and struggling to compete in an 
increasingly globalized and deregulated world economy. However, in recent years, these terms are 
appearing rather commonly.  
What terms are repressed or abandoned? Any threats to mainstream discourse? 
While Greenspan does note that some see “outsized valuations” (paragraph 4) for tech 
companies and that many tech companies will not last in a constantly changing economy (paragraph 
11), he does not mention the possibility of a large-scale stock bubble or any systemic risk to the U.S. 
economy. In fact, in this speech, Greenspan views innovations in derivatives as a means of 
redistributing risk, and thus allow “more investment in real assets (paragraph 13).” 
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Such a failure to mention the possibility of a bubble is interesting, as just two months prior, in a 
January 13 speech, Greenspan acknowledged that the U.S. may just be experiencing “one of the 
many euphoric speculative bubbles that have dotted human history.” Thus, the omission of such a 
possibility in this speech is rather significant, and could be viewed as a sign that Greenspan no 
longer views a large-scale bubble as a real possibility. 
Who has access to this narrative? 
Alan Greenspan is the only voice in this speech. Altogether in this sample, Greenspan delivered 
37 of the 65 speeches, giving him enormous access to and power over the nation’s economic 
dialogue.  
Concluding comments 
As a result of the above analysis, a few conclusions were reached regarding the 
institutionalization, and failed deinstitutionalization, of boom narratives during the U.S. tech boom. 
First, this speech was part of a broader trend of speeches becoming increasingly positive and 
including more boom narratives in the late 1990s. The narratives of “New Economy” and 
“Technological Dominance” would both instill great confidence in investors, leading them to 
believe the boom would continue for the foreseeable future. As Chairman Greenspan delivered this 
speech at one of the premier universities in the U.S., this speech acquired immediate legitimacy. I 
made a note that my write-up must note the spread and repetition of boom narratives in this pillar, 
along with the important role that Greenspan played.  
Second, this speech made it increasingly clear that the theme of technology underwent a 
dramatic shift over time, for in the late 1980s and early 1990s technology was viewed in a mixed 
manner, as both a cause of and a solution to financial problems. Increasingly, however, a 
technological, structural shift in the U.S. economy is viewed as the driving force and context behind 
the dominance of U.S. tech companies and the new, service-based economy that is emerging. I 
noted that this transition should be explained in my thesis.  
Third, the use of matter-of-fact language was becoming increasingly common, especially by 
Greenspan, and especially in very positive discourse. I note that this language use should be 
explained in the thesis, and that “unequivocal language” would be an appropriate heading.  
Finally, Greenspan does acknowledge in this speech that, “in the view of some,” the valuations 
of tech startups may be “outsized (paragraph 4).” He also notes some very real impediments to 
continued growth, such as financial imbalances and the limited supply of skilled labor in the U.S. 
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workforce. However, these few comments are far outweighed by the overwhelmingly positive and 
optimistic discourse in the rest of the speech. In addition, an earlier speech by Greenspan did 
acknowledge that the U.S. could be in the midst of a large-scale, speculative bubble, and this speech 
did not. I note that the balance of negative to positive discourse needs to be further examined and 
explained, and that this speech should be highlighted as an instance where a Federal Reserve 
speaker failed to mention the possibility of a bubble, just a month before the market started to crash.  
 
